1 CGHC010346132025 2026:CGHC:31395-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2539 of 2025 1 - Sarvagya Verma S/o Kriparam Verma, Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Mohra, Police Station Suhela, District Balodabazar Bhatapara (C.G.) ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station City Kotwali Balodabazar, District Balodabazar Bhatapara (C.G.) 2 - Xyz (Description Of The Prosecutrix/ Complainant Is In The Closed Envelop) ... Respondent(s) (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ramsajiwan, Advocate. For State/Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, Govt. Advocate. For Complainant/Respondent No. 2. : Mr. Rajesh Mishra, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 23/07/2026 1. Heard Mr. Ramsajiwan, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Jitendra Shrivastava, learned Govt. Advocate, for the State/Respondent No. 1, Mr. Rajesh Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the objector/Respondent No. 2. ALOK SHARMA Digitally signed by ALOK SHARMA Date: 2026.07.28 10:48:13 +0530 2 2. The petitioner has filed the present petition with the following prayer: "1. That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to allow the petition and kindly be pleased to quash the FIR/Crime No.469/2025 registered under Section 376 of Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station City Kotwali Balodabazar, District Balodabzar-Bhatapara (C.G.). 2. That, this Hon'ble Court further be pleased to quash the entire charge sheet in relating to Crime No.469/2025 under Section 376 of IPC and further be pleased to quash the cognizance order dated 29-05-2025 taken by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Balodabazar, District Balodabzar-Bhatapara (C.G.) in Criminal Case No.2522/2025. 3. That, this Hon'ble Court further be pleased to quash the impugned order dated 05-07- 2025 whereby the charged have been framed and also seeking quashment of plea of charges dated 05-07-2025 (Annexure P-1), passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.). 4. That, this Hon'ble Court further be pleased to quash the entire criminal proceeding relating to the S.T. No.72/2025 pending before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.). 5. That, any appropriate direction or order may also kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case." 3. The brief facts of the case are that the complainant alleged that she came into contact with the petitioner while both were working in the same establishment and, after the petitioner proposed marriage to her, she entered into a consensual relationship with him. It is the prosecution case that from 15.08.2023 to 27.01.2025, the petitioner repeatedly established physical 3 relations with the complainant at different places on the assurance that he would marry her, despite being aware that she was a divorcee. The complainant further alleged that the petitioner persuaded her to reject other marriage proposals by reiterating his promise to marry her, but when she asked him to solemnize the marriage after her family became ready, he refused to do so. It was also alleged that thereafter the petitioner and his relatives threatened and intimidated the complainant and warned her against initiating legal proceedings. On the basis of the said allegations, the impugned FIR was registered against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC, which, after investigation, resulted in the filing of the charge-sheet and framing of charge under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order taking cognizance and framing charge under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the material available on record. It is contended that the petitioner and the complainant were in a long-standing love relationship, and the physical relationship between them was consensual. The petitioner had no dishonest intention from the inception of the relationship and had, in fact, expressed his willingness to marry the complainant. It is submitted that the petitioner, along with his mother, had approached the complainant's family with a marriage proposal; however, the complainant's family declined to proceed with the marriage at that point of time due to financial constraints. Therefore, the subsequent failure of the marriage cannot be construed as a false promise so as to attract the offence under Section 376 IPC. 5. He further submitted that the petitioner has already been granted 4 regular bail by this Court vide order dated 30.06.2025 passed in MCRC No.4240/2025. It is also submitted that an earlier petition, being CRMP No.2284/2025, was withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh petition with proper pleadings and documents, pursuant to which the present petition has been filed. Accordingly, it is argued that continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and therefore, the impugned order taking cognizance and framing charge deserves to be quashed. 6. On the other hand, learned State counsel appearing for respondent No.1 opposes the petition and submits that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or perversity warranting interference by this Court. It is contended that the allegations made in the FIR, coupled with the material collected during investigation, including the statements of the complainant and other witnesses, prima facie disclose the commission of the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. It is further submitted that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is only required to ascertain whether there exists a prima facie case or a strong suspicion against the accused and is not expected to undertake a meticulous appreciation of the evidence or examine the defence of the accused. The plea of the petitioner that the relationship was consensual and that he was willing to marry the complainant involves disputed questions of fact, which can only be adjudicated during trial. Therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly framed the charge, and the present petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 opposes the petition and submits that the same is wholly misconceived and not maintainable. It is contended that after completion of investigation, the police filed the charge- sheet and the learned trial Court, upon considering the material available on 5 record, found sufficient grounds to frame charge against the petitioner. It is further submitted that the issues raised by the petitioner involve disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated in proceedings under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court and are required to be decided only after appreciation of evidence during trial. 8. It is further submitted that the petitioner, on the false assurance of marriage, induced the complainant into a physical relationship and continued to establish physical relations with her over a considerable period by repeatedly promising to marry her. The petitioner also persuaded the complainant to reject other marriage proposals and ultimately refused to marry her. It is further alleged that thereafter the petitioner and his relatives threatened the complainant with dire consequences, including circulation of her private photographs and videos, if she initiated legal proceedings. In these circumstances, it is submitted that the material collected during investigation prima facie discloses the commission of the alleged offence and the learned trial Court has rightly framed the charge. Accordingly, the present petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents appended with this petition. 10. The prosecution case, as emerging from the FIR and the charge-sheet, is that the petitioner and the complainant became acquainted while working together at Sky Automobile, Balodabazar. The complainant alleges that after the petitioner proposed marriage, she accepted the proposal and both entered into a relationship. It is further alleged that physical relations were established for the first time on 15.08.2023 and thereafter continued for a considerable period. The material on record also reveals that when the 6 petitioner's proposal was placed before the complainant's family, they expressed their inability to solemnize the marriage immediately due to financial constraints and requested that the marriage be deferred by about one year. According to the prosecution itself, the petitioner agreed to the request and allegedly stated that he would marry only the complainant. The dispute arose only subsequently when the petitioner declined to marry the complainant. 11. Significantly, the charge-sheet further records the statement of the petitioner that at the time of the relationship the complainant had represented herself to be unmarried and that he came to know about her being a divorcee only at a later stage, whereafter he declined to marry her. Whether such explanation is ultimately acceptable or not is a matter of evidence; however, the same assumes relevance for examining whether there was a dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner from the very inception. The prosecution material, even if accepted at its face value, does not prima facie indicate that the promise of marriage was false at the inception or that it was made only to obtain the complainant's consent for establishing physical relations. Rather, the material indicates that the parties were in a consensual relationship for a substantial period and the marriage could not ultimately materialize due to subsequent developments. 12. In the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 16 and 18 of its judgment that:- “16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of 7 fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati *⁸* this Court observed : (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. ... There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. * * * 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, <u>unless the court is 8 assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her. 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2019) 9 SCC 608, Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2019) 18 SCC 191, Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 181, and Mandar Deepak Pawar v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2110, has consistently held that a breach of a promise to marry would not by itself constitute the offence of rape unless it is shown that the promise was false from the very inception and was made with no intention of being fulfilled. A consensual relationship between two adults, which later culminates in refusal to marry, would not attract the provisions of Section 376 IPC in the absence of such material. 14. In the present case, this Court finds that the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation do not satisfy the essential ingredients necessary to constitute the offence under Section 376 IPC. The relationship between the parties admittedly continued for a considerable period, and the prosecution material itself reflects circumstances indicating that the issue regarding marriage arose subsequently. There is no prima facie material to infer that the petitioner had 9 induced the complainant into a physical relationship by making a false promise of marriage which he never intended to fulfil from the very beginning. Consequently, allowing the prosecution to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 15. Accordingly, the present petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The FIR bearing Crime No.469/2025 registered at Police Station City Kotwali, Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.) for the offence under Section 376 IPC, the charge-sheet filed pursuant thereto, the cognizance order dated 29.05.2025, the order dated 05.07.2025 framing charge under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC in Sessions Trial No.72/2025, pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (F.T.C), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.), and all consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Alok