HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 3RD DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU WRIT PETITION NO. 17031 OF 2024 (GM-CPC) BETWEEN: SRI. D. M. RAVIKUMAR S/O MUNIVEEREGOWDA, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, R/O NO.10, 11TH CROSS ROAD, GAJANANA NAGAR, SUNKADAKATTE, VISHWANEEDAM POST, BANGALORE - 560 091. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. GURUDATH V R, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. SPOORTHY HEGDE N., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. SMT. SUNITHA D/O LATE K KRISHNOJI RAO, AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS, R/O NO.19, 5TH CROSS ROAD, AZAD NAGAR, BANGALORE - 560 018. 2. SRI. K LOKESH S/O KRISHNAPPA, MAJOR, 3. SMT. GEETHA D/O KRISHNAPPA, MAJOR, BOTH RESPONDENT NO.2 & 3 AT NO. 134, SUNKADAKATTE, VISHWANEEDAM POST, BENGALURU 091. 4. SMT. G S RATHNAMMA R Digitally signed by SUMATHY KANNAN Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNTAKA HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 2 FATHER NAME NOT KNOWN, MAJOR, 5. SRI. K RAMESH FATHER NAME NOT KNOWN, MAJOR, 6. SRI. H N CHANDRU FATHER NAME NOT KNOWN, MAJOR, 7. SMT. VIJAYA RAMESH FATHER NAME NOT KNOWN, MAJOR, 8. SMT. DIVYA FATHER NAME NOT KNOWN, MAJOR, 9. SMT. RATHNAMMA W/O RAMACHANDRAPPA MAJOR, 10. SMT. K SANGEETHA FATHER NAME NOT KNOWN, MAJOR, 11. SRI. HARINATHA FATHER NAME NOT KNOWN, MAJOR, RESPONDENT NO.4 TO 11 ARE R/O SRIGANDHAKAVAL VILLAGE, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. VINAY KUMAR G S, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. KUMBAR VASANT FAKEERAPPA., ADVOCATE FOR R1; VIDE ORDER DATED 15.01.2025, NOTICE TO R2 TO R11 ARE DISPENSED WITH) HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 3 THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO QUASH THE ORDERS DATED 20-11-2019 ON IA NO.26 AND 10- 01-2024 ON IA NO.35 AT ANNEXURE-H AND L RESPECTIVELY PASSED BY THE LEARNED XIV ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE IN O.S.NO.7635/2016 BY DECLARING THE SAME IS ILLEGAL, BESIDES ERRONEOUS AND ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU ORAL ORDER 1. The challenge in the present petition by the petitioner/applicant is against an order dated 10.01.2024, passed in O.S.No.7635/2016, by the XIV Addl. City and Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, on an application in I.A.No.35 of 2023 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’), filed under Order I, Rule 10(2) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’). 2. The learned counsel for the applicant/petitioner submits that he had previously filed an application in I.A.No.26 of 2019. That the said application was dismissed HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 4 by the learned Trial Court, in view of the fact that the petitioner/applicant had not produced any documents in support of his contention. Subsequently, the petitioner/ applicant filed another application, being I.A.No.35 of 2023. In this application, the documents were attached. However, the learned Trial Court has dismissed the application, principally stating that it is the second application and it is barred by the principles of res- judicata. The learned counsel for the petitioner/ applicant submits that neither in I.A.No.26 nor in IA No.35, were the facts and the contentions raised by the petitioner/applicant examined by the learned Trial Court. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, on the other hand, submits that the Impugned Order has been passed in accordance with law. He submits that it is not disputed that if the same applicant files two applications, the second application would be barred by the principles of res-judicata. Secondly, he contends that the suit property belongs to the respondent/plaintiff HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 5 granted to him through his father in the year 1974, but the petitioner/applicant and other defendants have illegally taken possession of the suit property. He submits that the petitioner/applicant is not a necessary party and thus the application was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court. 4. The brief relevant facts of the case are that a suit was filed by the respondent No.1/plaintiff, seeking a declaration of ownership in respect of a property admeasuring 0.11 guntas in Survey No.1/16, situated at Srigandhadakaval Village, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk [hereinafter referred to as the ‘schedule property’] on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 09.05.1977. The prayers in the plaint also included prayers for recovery, handing over possession and an injunction against the defendants. The details of the schedule property, as set out in the plaint, are extracted below: “SCHEDULE PROPERTY 1. All the piece and parcel of the property bearing No.1/16, measuring 0.11 guntas situated at Srigandhadakaval Village, HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 6 Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk and bounded on: East by : Kamakshipalya Chikkanarasimhaiah’s land West by : Aralepet Channamma’s land North by : Vaddarakatte South by : Mayamma’s land 2. All the piece and parcel of the property bearing No.85/12, measuring 0.11 guntas situated at Srigandhadakaval Village, Yeshwanthapura Hobli, Bengaluru North Taluk and bounded on: East by : Chikkanarasimhaiah’s land West by : Byrappa’s land North by : Government Oni, South by : Mayamma’s land.” 5. It is not disputed that initially the petitioner/applicant filed an application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC (I.A.No.26 of 2019) seeking to implead himself as a party to the suit. This application was rejected by the learned Trial Court, primarily, by its order dated 20.11.2019 in view of the fact that the said application was bereft of any details. It was held by the learned Trial Court that the application did not contain even a single document and appeared on the face of it to be ‘bald and vague’. The learned Trial Court further held that the petitioner/ applicant had failed to establish his contentions. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 7 6. Subsequently, the petitioner/applicant filed a second application, being I.A.No.35 of 2023 on 08.11.2023. In the affidavit annexed to the application, it was stated that the petitioner/applicant is the owner and in possession of portions of the suit schedule Item No.1 property, by virtue of two registered gift deeds. The application also sets out the title chain as to how the petitioner/applicant obtained the title of the property. In addition, the petitioner/ applicant produced documents 1 to 11 seeking to evidence the title. 7. To this application, objections were filed by the respondent/plaintiff, denying all the averments. The respondent/plaintiff further denied the ownership of the petitioner/applicant and also stated in his objections that the petitioner/applicant does not belong to the family and he does not have any rights in the suit schedule property whatsoever. 8. The learned Trial Court, however, after examining the I.A.No.35 held that the material on record shows that HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 8 the same application was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 20.11.2019 with costs. It was held that since such dismissal was not challenged by the applicant, despite which another application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC was filed, the subsequent application cannot be entertained. It was further held that the learned Trial Court had already passed a speaking order on 20.11.2019 holding that the proposed defendant/petitioner is not entitled to the relief claimed. Thus, the application came to be dismissed. 9. An examination of the order dated 20.11.2019 shows that the learned Trial Court did not examine the application at all. It was held by the learned Trial Court that the applicant has not provided any details whatsoever and the application is vague and that the applicant has not disclosed his identity either with the property or the parties and only stated that he is interested with the property. Thus, the only ground for dismissal of I.A.No.26 of 2019 was the fact that there were averments or HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 9 contentions or no documents made with respect to the application so filed. The relevant extract of the Impugned Order dated 20.11.2019 passed in I.A.No.26 of 2019 is set out below: “8. On perusal of contents of the application it is quite clear the applicant has not disclosed the name of his mother-in-law who has stated to be construct house about 30 years back and khata stands in her name so also he has not mentioned name of his wife and brother-in-law also. According to him his mother-in-law had executed G.P.A. in favour of his wife and brother-in-law. Even he has not produced single piece of document to support his contentions made in the application. The application apparently face on record appears to be bald, vague without support of necessary documents. A person claiming to be necessary and proper party for adjudication of the case on hand as to establish how he is related to the property, subject matter of this suit and his relationship with the parties to the suit, applicant has not disclosed his identity either with property or with parties, some bald allegation that he is interested in the subject matter itself is not sufficient to come to the conclusion that he is necessary and proper party for effective adjudication of the case on hand. The applicant has miserably failed to establish his contention. Further on perusal of the averments of the pleadings of respective parties nowhere reference of pleadings of respective parties nowhere reference of proposed applicant is available. Such being the contention of the applicant without his presence that the parties to the case cannot be adjudicated effectively and conclusively does not holds good. He has miserably failed to prove this point. Accordingly, I answered point No.1 in the negative. 9. Point No.2: For the various reasons discussed in Point No.1 and findings given by me on it, I proceed to pass the following: HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 10 ORDER I.A. No.26 under Order I Rule 10(2) r/w. Section 151 of C.P.C. filed by the applicant / 3rd party is hereby dismissed on cost of Rs.1000/-.” [Emphasis Supplied] 10. I.A.No.35, however, is a separate and distinct application, also filed under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of CPC albeit by the same applicant. It sets out details including the title chain of the schedule property reflecting acquisition of the property and has 11 documents annexed along with it, which include registered gift deeds based on which the applicant gets title to the suit property. 11. Order I Rule 10 of CPC empowers the Court to allow addition, substitution or deletion of a party to a suit at any stage of the proceedings in the following terms: “10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.— (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. (2) Court may strike out or add parties.— The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 11 without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” [Emphasis Supplied] 11.1 A plain reading of the above provision shows that sub-rule (2) of Order 1 Rule 10 confers a wide discretionary power on the Court to strike out or implead parties at any stage of the proceedings, either on its own motion or upon an application made by any party. The provision empowers the Court to delete the name of a party on such terms as it considers just, and to add any person whose presence is necessary to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 11.2 It is a settled position of law that while examining an application under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC, the Court is not required to examine the merits of the case and only to HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 12 examine as to whether the applicants are ‘necessary’ or a ‘proper’ parties to the case. 12. The question as to whether a party is a ‘necessary’ or ‘proper’ party is no longer res-integra. The Supreme Court in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. Mumbai International1, while explaining this provision has held as follows: “15.A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance. 16.The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the following observations of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Sumtibai v.Paras Finance Co.[(2007) 10 SCC 82] to contend that a person need not have any subsisting right or interest in the suit property for being impleaded as a defendant, and that even a person who is likely to acquire an interest therein in future, in appropriate cases, is 1 (2010) 7 SCC 417 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 13 entitled to be impleaded as a party: (SCC pp. 85 & 87, paras 9 & 14) “9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal [(2005) 6 SCC 733]. He has submitted that in this case it has been held that in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of property a stranger or a third party to the contract cannot be added as defendant in the suit. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the aforesaid decision can only be understood to mean that a third party cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance if he has no semblance of title in the property in dispute. Obviously, a busybody or interloper with no semblance of title cannot be impleaded in such a suit. That would unnecessarily protract or obstruct the proceedings in the suit. However, the aforesaid decision will have no application where a third party shows some semblance of title or interest in the property in dispute. *** 14. It cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that whenever a suit for specific performance is filed by A against B, a third party C can never be impleaded in that suit if he can show a fair semblance of title or interest, he can certainly file an application for impleadment.” [Emphasis Supplied] 12.1. A similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in J.N. Real Estate vs. Shailendra Pradhan and Others2 case relying on the Mumbai International case wherein it was held as follows: “22. This Court in Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1015 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 14 Ltd., (2010) 7 SCC 417, explained the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) of the CPC. In the unique facts which existed therein, there was a likelihood that the appellant would secure a right/interest in the suit property if the suit for specific performance instituted by the respondent against the Airport Authority of India was dismissed. It was held, that in such a factual circumstance and such being the right asserted by the appellant, it cannot be made a party to the suit for specific performance. While holding so, it was observed that although the general rule is that the plaintiff, being dominus litis, may choose the persons against whom he wishes to litigate and seek relief, yet this rule of impleadment would be subject to the provisions of Order I Rule 10(2) wherein courts are vested with the discretion to strike out or add parties to a suit depending on whether their impleadment is deemed necessary or proper. It was held that, even in suits for specific performance, a court may, at any stage of the proceedings, implead a person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 23. In Mumbai International Airport (supra), this Court explained the import of the expressions “necessary party” and “proper party” as thus: “14. The said provision makes it clear that a court may, at any stage of the proceedings (including suits for specific performance), either upon or even without any application, and on such terms as may appear to it to be just, direct that any of the following persons may be added as a party : (a) any person who ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, but not added; or (b) any person whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle the questions involved in the suit. In short, the court is given the discretion to add as a party, any person who is found to be a necessary party or proper party. 15. A “necessary party” is a person who ought to have been joined as a party and in whose absence no effective decree could be passed at all by the court. If a “necessary party” is not impleaded, the suit itself is liable to be dismissed. A “proper party” is a party who, though not a necessary party, is a person HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 15 whose presence would enable the court to completely, effectively and adequately adjudicate upon all matters in dispute in the suit, though he need not be a person in favour of or against whom the decree is to be made. If a person is not found to be a proper or necessary party, the court has no jurisdiction to implead him, against the wishes of the plaintiff. The fact that a person is likely to secure a right/interest in a suit property, after the suit is decided against the plaintiff, will not make such person a necessary party or a proper party to the suit for specific performance.” (Emphasis supplied) 24. It is limpid in the aforesaid observation that if a party is found to either a necessary or proper party, the court would have the jurisdiction to implead him, even against the wishes of the plaintiff concerned. In Mumbai International Airport (supra) another pertinent question that arose was whether there existed any conflict between the three-judge bench decision of this Court in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 and the decision of a two-judge bench in Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. Regd. Partnership Firm Beawer (Raj.), (2007) 10 SCC 82. 25. In Kasturi (supra), the respondent nos. 1 and 4 to 11 respectively therein, based their claim to be added as party defendants on an independent title and possession of the contracted property. In such a backdrop, while rejecting the applications for impleadment, this Court had expounded the scope of Order I Rule 10(2) CPC and laid down certain tests for determining whether a person is a ‘necessary party’ for the purpose of impleadment in a suit for specific performance as follows: (i) First, that a bare reading of Order I Rule 10(2) clearly indicates that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale or an agreement to sell, are the parties to the contract or, if they are dead, their legal representatives, as also persons who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. A subsequent purchaser would be a necessary party since his rights would be affected irrespective of whether he had purchased the HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 16 contracted property, with or without notice of the contract. However, it was clarified that a person whose claim is adverse to the claim of a vendor, is not a ‘necessary party’. Therefore, two tests were laid down by this Court, which must be satisfied for determining the question as to who is a necessary party — (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party. The relevant observations read as under: “7. In our view, a bare reading of this provision, namely, second part of Order 1 Rule 10 sub- rule (2) CPC would clearly show that the necessary parties in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale are the parties to the contract or if they are dead, their legal representatives as also a person who had purchased the contracted property from the vendor. In equity as well as in law, the contract constitutes rights and also regulates the liabilities of the parties. A purchaser is a necessary party as he would be affected if he had purchased with or without notice of the contract, but a person who claims adversely to the claim of a vendor is, however, not a necessary party. From the above, it is now clear that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question who is a necessary party. Tests are — (1) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be passed in the absence of such party.” (Emphasis supplied) (ii) Secondly, as regards the meaning of “proper party”, it was observed that in case of a suit for specific performance, the guiding principle for deciding who is a proper party is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. Such a question has to be decided while keeping in mind the scope of the suit for specific performance. If the HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 17 addition of that party enlarges the scope of such suit so as to convert it into a suit for title, then the presence of such a party cannot be said to be necessary for the effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit. The relevant observations read as under: “11. As noted herein earlier, two tests are required to be satisfied to determine the question who is a necessary party, let us now consider who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale. For deciding the question who is a proper party in a suit for specific performance the guiding principle is that the presence of such a party is necessary to adjudicate the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. Thus, the question is to be decided keeping in mind the scope of the suit. The question that is to be decided in a suit for specific performance of the contract for sale is to the enforceability of the contract entered into between the parties to the contract. If the person seeking addition is added in such a suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance would be enlarged and it would be practically converted into a suit for title. Therefore, for effective adjudication of the controversies involved in the suit, presence of such parties cannot be said to be necessary at all. Lord Chancellor Cottenham in Tasker v. Small [(1834) 40 ER 848 : 3 My & Cr 63] made the following observations: (ER pp. 850-51) ‘It is not disputed that, generally, to a bill for a specific performance of a contract of sale, the parties to the contract only are the proper parties; and, when the ground of the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity in suits of that kind is considered, it could not properly be otherwise. The Court assumes jurisdiction in such cases, because a court of law, giving damages only for the non-performance of the contract, in many cases does not afford an adequate remedy. But, in equity, as well as at law, the contract constitutes the right, and regulates the liabilities of the parties; and the object of both proceedings is to place the party complaining as HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 18 nearly as possible in the same situation as the defendant had agreed that he should be placed in. It is obvious that persons, strangers to the contract, and, therefore, neither entitled to the right, nor subject to the liabilities which arise out of it, are as much strangers to a proceeding to enforce the execution of it as they are to a proceeding to recover damages for the breach of it.’ ---xxx--- 13. From the aforesaid discussion, it is pellucid that necessary parties are those persons in whose absence no decree can be passed by the court or that there must be a right to some relief against some party in respect of the controversy involved in the proceedings and proper parties are those whose presence before the court would be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit although no relief in the suit was claimed against such person.” ---xxx--- 15. […] In the case of Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha [(1996) 10 SCC 53] this Court had taken the same view which is being taken by us in this judgment as discussed above. This Court in that decision clearly held that to decide the right, title and interest in the suit property of the stranger to the contract is beyond the scope of the suit for specific performance of the contract and the same cannot be turned into a regular title suit. Therefore, in our view, a third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character. […]” (Emphasis supplied) (iii) Thirdly, an intervenor seeking to be impleaded must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell. It was held that a person is considered to be legally interested in the answers to the controversy, only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that would legally affect him. The relevant observations read as under: ---xxx--- HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 19 “17. […] Apart from that, the intervener must be directly and legally interested in the answers to the controversies involved in the suit for specific performance of the contract for sale. In Amon v. Raphael Tuck and Sons Ltd. [[1956] 1 All ER 273: [1956] 1 Q.B. 357: [1956] 2 WLR 372] it has been held that a person is legally interested in the answers to the controversies only if he can satisfy the court that it may lead to a result that will affect him legally.” [Emphasis Supplied] 13. As discussed above, it has been contended by the respondent/plaintiff that the second application, I.A.No.35 of 2023 would be barred by the principles akin to res judicata. Section 11 of the CPC, which provides for res-judicata, sets out that the Court would not try a suit or issue, in which the matter directly or substantially in an issue has already been decided. This provision sets out that where a matter directly and substantially an issue in an earlier suit between the same parties (or their predecessor/successor) cannot be subsequently raised in the same suit once it has been heard and finally decided by a Court. The provision also contains several explanations. Section 11 of the CPC is reproduced below: “11. Res judicata.—No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 20 has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I.—The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to a suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court Explanation III.—The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. Explanation IV.—Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation V.—Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused. Explanation VI.—Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. Explanation VII.—The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 21 Explanation VIII. —An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.” [Emphasis Supplied] ss 14. The Supreme Court has in Sulthan Said Ibrahim v Prakasan & Ors.3 held that the principles of res judicata would apply not only to different proceedings but also to different stages in the same proceedings as well. The relevant extract is set out below: “53. The High Court, in its impugned order, held the application of the appellant under Order I Rule 10 to be barred by res judicata and thus not maintainable on that ground. We find no infirmity in the said observation mad by the High Court. This Court in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar reported in (2005) 1 SCC 787 observed that the principles of res judicata apply not only to two different proceedings but also to different stages of the same proceeding as well. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow: “18. It is now well settled that principles of res judicata apply in different stages of the same proceedings. (See Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi [AIR 1960 SC 941 : (1960) 3 SCR 590] and Prahlad Singh v. Col. Sukhdev Singh [(1987) 1 SCC 727].) 19. In Y.B. Patil [(1976) 4 SCC 66] it was held : (SCC p. 68, para 4) “4. ... It is well settled that principles of res judicata can be invoked not only in separate subsequent proceedings, they also get 3 2025 SCC OnLine 1218 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 22 attracted in subsequent stage of the same proceedings. Once an order made in the course of a proceeding becomes final, it would be binding at the subsequent stage of that proceeding.” xxx xxx xxx 21. Yet again in Hope Plantations Ltd. [(1999) 5 SCC 590] this Court laid down the law in the following terms : (SCC p. 604, para 17) “17. ... One important consideration of public policy is that the decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be final, unless they are modified or reversed by appellate authorities; and the other principle is that no one should be made to face the same kind of litigation twice over, because such a process would be contrary to considerations of fair play and justice.” [Emphasis Supplied] 14.1 However, it was further clarified in the Sulthan Said Ibrahim case that the only manner that it can be applicable in the same proceedings is when the issue had attained finality. The relevant extract is set out below: “54. Thus, as the dictum of the law as extracted aforesaid indicates, the only manner in which a decision arrived at by a court of competent jurisdiction can be interfered with is by modification or reversal by the appellate authorities. In the present case, the order for impleadment of the appellant as a legal heir was made by the Trial Court after due inquiry under Order XXII, as also observed by the Trial Court in its order rejecting the application under Order I Rule 10. Evidently, neither any objection was raised by the appellant before the Trial Court nor any revision was preferred subsequently against the said order. Thus, it HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 23 could be said that the issue as regards the impleadment of the appellant as a legal heir of the original defendant had attained finality between the parties and thus the subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 seeking to get his name deleted from the array of parties could be said to be barred by res judicata. Undoubtedly, the expression “at any stage of the proceedings” used in Order I Rule 10 allows the court to exercise its power at any stage, however the same cannot be construed to mean that the defendant can keep reagitating the same objection at different stages of the same proceeding, when the issue has been determined conclusively at a previous stage. Allowing the same would run contrary to the considerations of fair play and justice and would amount to keeping the parties in a state of limbo as regards the adjudication of the disputes.” [Emphasis Supplied] 15. The Supreme Court in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya4, has while dealing with such an issue of an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC seeking impleadment of legal representatives in view of the fact that an earlier application under Order 22 Rule 4 of CPC was filed, held that the earlier application would not operate as res- judicata as dismissal is purely on the maintainability with the adjudication on the merits of the case. The relevant 4 (2017) 9 SCC 700 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 24 extract of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai case is set out below: “9. Merely because the earlier application filed by the appellant under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was dismissed on 9-9-2009 as not maintainable, it will not prohibit the plaintiff from filing another application, which is maintainable in law. There was no adjudication of the application to bring legal representatives on record on merits by virtue of the order dated 9-9-2009. On the other hand, the earlier application filed under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code was dismissed by the trial court as not maintainable, inasmuch as Defendant 7 had died prior to the filing of the suit and that Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code comes into the picture only when a party dies during the pendency of the suit. The only course open to the appellant in law was to file an application for impleadment to bring on record the legal representatives of deceased Defendant 7 under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code. Hence, the order passed by the trial court on the application filed under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code, dated 9-9- 2009, will not act as res judicata.” [Emphasis Supplied] 16. Thus a defence of re-judicata would only come into play during proceedings, where a Court competent to try a suit or an issue which has been heard and finally decided by the Court on the merits. This has not been undertaken by the learned Trial Court in this case as can be seen from the discussion below. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 25 17. The record reflects that the petitioner/applicant claims to own a part of the suit schedule Item No.1 property and by virtue of transfers inter-se family members of the respondent/plaintiff. The claim for ownership of the petitioner/applicant is based on a registered gift deed(s). The petitioner/applicant also contends that since he is in possession of the suit schedule property, he is a necessary party. The learned Trial Court has however not undertaken any examination in this behalf as is clear from the Impugned Order and has proceeded to dismiss the application holding that the issue has already been adjudicated upon by the learned Trial Court on 20.11.2019. The relevant extract of the Impugned Order in this behalf is below: “07. The material placed on record clearly discloses that the very same applicant-D.M.Ravikumar has filed I.A.No.26 before this Court seeking permission to come on record as additional defendant. The previous application of very same applicant was resisted by the plaintiff. After hearing the both parties, on 20.11.2019, this Court has passed an order on 1.A.No.26 filed by the very same applicant and rejected it. This Court while rejecting the previous application, has held that the applicant has failed to establish his contention and he has not produced necessary documents as to establish how he is related to property, subject-matter of the suit and his relationship HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 26 with the parties to the suit. That order was passed in the year 2019. Above order passed by this court has not been challenged by the applicant before the Appellate Court. Thereafter, on 08.11.2023, the applicant again-filed subsequent application under Order 1 Rule 10(2) r/w Section 151 of CPC before this Court. 08. It is significant to note that the order passed on previous application filed by the applicant, has not been challenged from 2019 till 2023. This Court has already passed a speaking order that proposed defendant is not entitled to the relief claimed in the application and same is remained unchallenged. The applicant again took out an identical and similar application under Order 1 Rule 40 CPC. When application with similar request was earlier rejected, subsequent application cannot be entertained. Therefore, the applicant is not entitled to the relief claimed in the: application on hand. Hence, Point No.1 is answered in the negative and in view of the same, I proceed to pass the following: ORDER Successive application i.e., I.A.No.35, filed by the applicant – D.M. Ravikumar under Order 1, Rule 10(2) of CPC is hereby rejected.” [Emphasis Supplied] 18. However, and given the fact that there was no adjudication by the learned Trial Court in I.A.No.26 of 2019, on 20.11.2019, and the Impugned Order has set out that a speaking order has been passed and thus a similar application cannot be entertained, the finding of the learned Trial Court citing ’res judicata’ in respect of the second application, cannot be sustained. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:33202 WP No. 17031 of 2024 27 19. In these circumstances, the Impugned Order is set aside. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 20. The learned Trial Court shall examine the application, IA No.35 of 2023, afresh, after hearing the parties. 21. It is clarified that this order is being passed without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties qua the merits of the issue, which will be decided by the learned Trial Court in accordance with the law. 22. All pending applications stand closed. Sd/- (TARA VITASTA GANJU) JUDGE JJ/KS List No.:1 Sl No.: 10