Page No.# 1/7 GAHC020007352025 2026:GAU-NL:152 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : WP(C)/226/2025 MR. TAMA NGULLIE S/O MOTSOU, R/O PANGTI VILLAGE, WOKHA, NAGALAND, WORKING AS (UNDER SUSPENSION) IN THE GOVT. HIGHER SECONDARY SCHOOL, SUNGRO, WOKHA, NAGALAND VERSUS STATE OF NAGALAND AND 2 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND 2:THE COMMISSIONER AND SECRETARY DEPT. OF SCHOOL EDUCATION AND SCERT NAGALAND KOHIMA 3:THE PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR DIRECTORATE OF SCHOOL EDUCATION NAGALAND KOHIM Advocate for the Petitioner : W. MARHU, B. SOTO Advocate for the Respondent : INAHOLI, GOVT ADV NL, BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH O R D E R 24.03.2026 Heard Mr. B. Soto, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Ms. Inaholi, learned Government Advocate who appears on Page No.# 2/7 behalf of the State Respondents. 2. The Petitioner herein is aggrieved by the Order dated 07.02.2025 whereby the Petitioner was put under suspension by the Principal Director, Directorate of School Education, Nagaland. 3. The facts which led to the filing of the instant case is that the Petitioner was appointed as a Chowkidar on ad hoc basis in the Government Secondary School, Sungro, Wokha on 13.04.1992. The services of the Petitioner was regularized on 27.10.1992. On 04.02.2025, on the basis of a written complaint that the Petitioner have sexually assaulted the complainant’s daughter, an FIR was lodged and registered as Women P.S. Case. No. 001/2025 under Sections 64/65(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023 read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The Petitioner immediately was arrested on 05.02.2025. Pursuant thereto, on 07.02.2025 the Petitioner was put under suspension in terms with sub Rule 6(2) of the Nagaland Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1967. The Petitioner thereupon was released on bail vide an Order dated 21.05.2025. Thereafter, the Petitioner submitted an application to the Principal Director, Directorate of School Education on 02.06.2025 informing that the Petitioner has been released on bail and the Suspension Order so passed against him on 07.02.2025 be revoked. The case of the Petitioner herein is that pursuant thereto, neither the Memorandum of Charge was issued to the Petitioner nor the Suspension Order was revoked and it is under such circumstance the present writ petition has been filed. Page No.# 3/7 4. The materials on record show that this Court vide an Order dated 07.11.2025 issued notice. 5. The records reveal that on 23.03.2026 an Affidavit-in-Opposition was filed on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3. It is mentioned in the said Affidavit-in-Opposition that the suspension of the Petitioner have been continuously reviewed from time to time. In addition to that, it is also mentioned that on 10.03.2026 the Petitioner was served with the Memorandum of Charges in terms with Rule 9(2) of the Nagaland Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1967. 6. This Court now finds it relevant to take note of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhury vs. Union of India reported in (2015) 7 SCC 291 and observations of the Supreme Court at Paragraph Nos. 20, 21 and 22, which being relevant are reproduced herein under:- “20. It will be useful to recall that prior to 1973 an accused could be detained for continuous and consecutive periods of 15 days, albeit, after judicial scrutiny and supervision. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains a new proviso which has the effect of circumscribing the power of Magistrate to authorise detention of an accused person beyond a period of 90 days where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years, and beyond a period of 60 days where the investigation relates to any other offence. Drawing support from the observations contained of the Page No.# 4/7 Division Bench of Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar and more so of the Constitution Bench in Antulay, we are spurred to extrapolate the quintessence of the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC, 1973 to moderate suspension orders in cases of departmental/disciplinary enquiries also. It seems to us that if Parliament considered it necessary that a person be released from incarceration after the expiry of 90 days even though accused of commission of the most heinous crimes, a fortiori suspension should not be continued after the expiry of the similar period especially when a memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served on the suspended person. It is true that the proviso to Section 167(2) CrPC postulates personal freedom, but respect and preservation of human dignity as well as the right to a speedy trial should also be placed on the same pedestal. 21. We, therefore, direct that the currency of a suspension order should not extend beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer/employee; if the memorandum of charges/charge- sheet is served, a reasoned order must be passed for the extension of the suspension. As in the case in hand, the Government is free to transfer the person concerned to any department in any of its offices within or outside the State so as to sever any local or personal contact that he may have and which he may misuse for obstructing the investigation against him. The Government may also Page No.# 5/7 prohibit him from contacting any person, or handling records and documents till the stage of his having to prepare his defence. We think this will adequately safeguard the universally recognised principle of human dignity and the right to a speedy trial and shall also preserve the interest of the Government in the prosecution. We recognise that the previous Constitution Benches have been reluctant to quash proceedings on the grounds of delay, and to set time-limits to their duration. However, the imposition of a limit on the period of suspension has not been discussed in prior case law, and would not be contrary to the interests of justice. Furthermore, the direction of the Central Vigilance Commission that pending a criminal investigation, departmental proceedings are to be held in abeyance stands superseded in view of the stand adopted by us. 22. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the appellant has now been served with a charge-sheet, and, therefore, these directions may not be relevant to him any longer. However, if the appellant is so advised he may challenge his continued suspension in any manner known to law, and this action of the respondents will be subject to judicial review." 8. From a perusal of the above quoted judgment, it would be seen that the Supreme Court made it very clear that if within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of suspension the Memorandum of Charge/Chargesheet had not been served upon the delinquent employee, the continuation of the suspension would be in violation to Article 21 of the Constitution. It was also mentioned that in the circumstance Page No.# 6/7 Memorandum of Charge/Chargesheet had been submitted then there is a requirement of periodical review by a reasoned Order. 9. This Court also finds it relevant to observe that at paragraph No. 22 of the Judgment in Ajay Kumar Choudury (supra) the Supreme Court, observed that as in the case before the Supreme Court the Chargesheet was, in the meantime submitted, the observations made at paragraph No. 21 of the said judgment would not be applicable and the Petitioner therein would be at liberty to challenge the said Order of Suspension on any other grounds available or permissible. 10. This Court duly takes note that in the instant case the Memorandum of Charge had already been submitted to the Petitioner on 10.03.2026. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits that his client had received it only on 23.03.2026. 11. It is, therefore, the opinion of this Court that in view of the fact that the Petitioner has already been served with the Memorandum of Charge, the observations made by the Supreme Court at Paragraph No. 21 in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhury (supra) cannot be made applicable to the present case. 12. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands disposed of with the following observations and directions:- (i) The challenge to the impugned Suspension Order dated 07.02.2025 stands rejected on the ground that the Petitioner have now been served with the Memorandum of Page No.# 7/7 Charge in terms with Rule 9(2) of the Nagaland Services (Discipline & Appeals) Rules, 1967. (ii) This Court further directs the Respondent Authorities to carry out review of the Suspension Order as to whether the continuation of the Suspension Order in public interest is required every 3 (three) months, and if it is felt necessary, the same be extended by passing a reasoned Order. (iii) The Petitioner is, however, granted the liberty to approach this Court challenging the Suspension Order on the ground that the said continuation of Suspension Order is not in public interest. (iv) There shall be no order as to cost. JUDGE Comparing Assistant