1 CGHC010053262025 2026:CGHC:31935-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 314 of 2025 1 - Sohan Nath Yogi S/o Motinath Yogi Aged About 24 Years R/o Gram Sonpur, P.S. And District Kawardha Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Khamtarai, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant : Shri N.Naha Roy, Advocate. For State : Shri Shalin Singh Baghel, Govt. Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Ramesh Sinha, CJ Hon’ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J Judgment on Board 27.07.2026 Per, Ramesh Sinha, CJ. 1 Though notice was duly served upon PW-2, father of victim, on 12.05.2025, but since no one appears on behalf of victim to raise objection on the application filed by the appellant seeking suspension of sentence and grant of bail and also considering the fact that appellant is languishing in jail since 19.05.2021, with the consent of the parties, the matter is heard finally. 2 The present appeal has been filed by the appellant against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated INDRAJEET SAHU Digitally signed by INDRAJEET SAHU Date: 2026.07.28 17:17:32 +0530 2 09.08.2024 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, FTSC (Prevention of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012) (in short, The POCSO Act), Raipur, in Special (POCSO) Case No.118/2021 whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under : Conviction Sentence 363 IPC RI for 07 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for one month. 366 IPC RI for 7 years and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for one month. 376(3) IPC and 4(2) of POCSO Act RI for 20 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for four months. 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act RI for 20 years and fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional RI for four months. 3 Brief facts of the case are that, on 06.05.2021 a missing report was lodged by the father of victim that her minor daughter is missing since 03.05.2021 and her whereabouts could not be traced out. Based on written complaint, FIR Ex.P/7 was registered by the police against unknown person for the offence under Section 363 IPC and started investigation. During the course of investigation, on 18.05.2021 the victim was recovered from the possession of appellant and recovery Panchnama Ex.P/1 was prepared in presence of witnesses. The victim was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Raipur where she was medically examined by Dr. Sonam Deshmukh, PW-4, who gave her report Ex.P/16. While medically examining the victim, the doctor has not noticed any external injuries on her body, however her hymen was found old ruptured and healed. The doctor opined that no definite opinion can be given about recent sexual intercourse and 3 opinion depends upon chemical analysis of slides. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to police for chemical examination. She also referred for X-ray for age determination. Spot map Ex.P/2 was prepared by the police and P/8 by the Patwari. The underwear of the victim was seized vide Ex.P/5. With respect to date of birth of victim, the police seized school register vide seizure memo Ex.P/14 and after retaining its attested true copy Ex.P/15-C, the original was returned back. According to school register, the date of birth of victim was 25.11.2006. The appellant was arrested on 18.05.2021 and he too was sent for his medical examination to District Hospital, Raipur, where he was examined by Dr. Ravindra Chandrakar, PW-6, who gave his report Ex.P/18-A and found him capable to perform sexual intercourse. The underwear of victim and her vaginal slides and the underwear of appellant were sent for its chemical examination to State FSL Raipur from where report Ex.P/32 was received according to which semen and sperms were found present on the sent articles. 4 The statement of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and statement of victim under Section 164 CrPC have been recorded and after conclusion of usual investigation charge sheet was filed against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363,366,376,376(2)(n) and 376 (3) IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act. 5 The trial court framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363,366,376(3),376(2)(n) IPC and Sections 4(2) and 5(l)/6 of POCSO Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 4 6 In order to establish the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 8 witnesses. Statement under Section 313 CrPC of the appellant have also been recorded in which he denied the circumstances appears against him, pleaded innocence and have submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the offence. 7 After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in opening para of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 8 Learned counsel for respective appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the prosecution witnesses which cannot be made basis to convict him in the offence in question. The entire conduct of victim is suspicious throughout the proceeding. There is no cogent and admissible evidence with respect to age of victim that she was minor and less than 18 years of age on the date of incident. School record has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance with law. In her medical examination, no injuries have been found on the body and there is no sign of any protest. The victim was major girl having love affair with the appellant. She eloped with him on her own will and engaged in making consensual physical relation with him. She resided with appellant in his house without raising any objection or making complaint to anyone. Thus, in absence of any cogent and clinching evidence against the appellant, he cannot be convicted for the alleged offences. The ingredients required for conviction under the offence of kidnapping and 5 rape are missing. Therefore, the appeal may be allowed and the appellant be acquittal from all the charges. 9 On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by the counsel for appellant and would submit that prosecution has proved its case beyond doubt. But for minor omission or contradiction, there are sufficient and overwhelming evidence against the appellant to convict him in the offence in question. The victim was minor on the date of incident which is proved from her school record. Once it has been considered that victim was minor, there is no question of her consent or elopement with the appellant on her own will. The statement of appellant that victim eloped with him but due to her minority she was unable to give her consent, itself is sufficient to prove the offence of kidnapping and rape. Even if no injuries were found on her body and her hymen was found old ruptured and healed, but that itself does not dilute the prosecution case as sperms and semen were found on the vaginal slide of victim which strengthens the case of prosecution that appellant committed sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, the judgment of conviction and sentence is absolutely justified and not required to be interfered with. 10 We have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the records of the trial court. 11 The first and foremost question would be the age of the victim as to whether she was minor on the date of incident or not? 12 The prosecution has mainly relied upon document Ex.P/15-C which is the attested true copy of school register and sought to be proved by PW-3 who is the Assistant Grade-III in the school. PW-3 has stated in 6 her evidence that police has seized the school register with respect to date of birth the victim. After retaining its attested true copy Ex.P/15-C, the police has returned back the original register. As per school register, the date of birth of victim is 25.11.2006. The victim was admitted in the school in Class-VI. In cross examination, she admits that there is no endorsement in the school register as to who made entry in the school register and in which year. She further admits that there is no mention about the basis on which the date of birth of victim is recorded in the school register. There is no document with respect to birth certificate of victim annexed in the school register. She further admits that record of school register of victim is not of Class-I, but of Class-VIth. From the evidence of this witnesses, it does not reflect that she was the author of school register and further on what basis the date of birth of victim was recorded. Further, the school register is not of her initial schooling, but it is of Class VIth and there is no document with respect to transfer certificate or any other document based on which the date of birth of victim was recorded in the school register of Class- VIth. 13 In the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011 (2) SCC 385, which is in respect of admissibility of school records of a person, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the headmaster would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary 7 value to prove the age of the victim in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 14 In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under: "40.Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit1, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal2, where this Court observed as follows:- 8 "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 15 In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub- 9 section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hypertechnical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 10 16 Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 11 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference." 17 Reverting to the facts of present case, the victim PW-1 have stated her date of birth as 25.11.2006 and at the time of incident she was about 14 years of age. In cross examination, she shown her ignorance about her date of birth certificate and stated that she has not seen her birth certificate. Her elder brother is 23 years of age and her another brother is 18 years and she is third child of her parents. 18 PW-2, the father of victim, have stated that he could not remember date of birth of victim. 19 From the evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to age of victim, it could not be established that she was minor on the date of incident. When the victim has stated that she has not seen her birth certificate and her father also states that he could not remember date of birth of victim, further the entries made in the school register has not been proved by its author and there is no other oral evidence to prove her date of birth, it cannot be said that there are cogent evidence produced by the prosecution with respect to age of victim, yet the trial 12 has held her minor based on school records which has not been proved by the prosecution in accordance with law. Thus, this court is of the opinion that prosecution could not establish that victim was minor on the date of incident. 20 So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape is concerned, we again examine the evidence of victim PW-1. 21 The victim has stated in her evidence that she knew the appellant since she was studying in Class-VIIth. The appellant was residing in a rented house situated near burial place. He gave his mobile number to her and she used to talk him through mobile phone. He used to take her inside the burial place and at that time he was intoxicated. He informed her that he is addicted of Ganja, adhesive Solution and intoxicated tablets and he made forcible physical relation with her. He took her with him towards Sonpur-Kawardha and kept her in a field in the night. In late night he took her to his house and in the next morning his mother saw her and inquired about her. He kept her in his house for about 15 days and regularly made physical relation with her. After about 15 days, her parents came there in her search and recovered her. In cross examination, she contradict her 164 CrPC statement that while she was going to school, the appellant tried to outrage her modesty and appellant gave his mobile number to her. In paragraph 21 of her cross examination she admits that the appellant has not allured her to go with him. She further admits that appellant did nothing wrong with her. When she was confronted by the court as to whey she made statement against the appellant about kidnapping and rape, she 13 answered that under fear of police she made earlier statement against the appellant. She further disclosed that in the last year when she was in Durg, the police threatened her to give statement as per their own wish. In cross examination she conclusively stated that under the fear of police and threaten given by them, she made statement against the appellant, by which her evidence has become shaky. She denied the allegation against the appellant that he kept her and committed forcible sexual intercourse with her. 22 When the evidence of victim itself is shaky and she did not remain firm in allegation levelled against the appellant and made statement that appellant has neither kidnapped nor committed any wrong with her, her evidence cannot be believed for maintaining conviction of the appellant for the alleged offences of kidnapping or rape. 23 PW-2, the father of victim is the witness of her missing report only and later he too was declared hostile. 24 The other evidence produced by the prosecution are procedural witnesses i.e. doctor and police officers who conducted the investigation. From the evidence of victim as well as her father, there does not appear to be any cogent and clinching evidence against the appellant for his conviction for the alleged offences. Even no external injuries were found on the body of victim regarding protest or any struggle while kidnapping or committing sexual intercourse with her. 25 In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: - “9. It must however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between “taking” and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard 14 ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstances can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of Section 361 of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our opinion, if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfilment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to “taking”.” 26 Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Tilku @ Tilak Singh Vs. State of Uttarakhand has also relied upon the aforesaid judgment of S. Varadarajan (Supra) in its judgment dated 06.02.2025 passed in Criminal Appeal No.183 of 2014. 27 Since the prosecution has failed to establish that victim was minor on the date of incident, the victim herself admitted that the appellant has not kidnapped and did nothing wrong with her and that the evidence of victim as well as her father are not found sufficient to convict the appellant for the alleged offence, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. 28 The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim 15 must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges levelled against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 29 As a fallout of aforesaid consideration, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is hereby set aside. The appellant is acquitted from all the charges. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 19.05.2021. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 30 Keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of B.N.S.S. 2023, the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one reliable surety in the like amount before the court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 31 The trial court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial court concerned for compliance and necessary action. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice inder