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2026 DAILYLAW 2918 (HP)

KULWANT SINGH v. STATE OF HP

CRMPM/2901/2025 · 2026-03-25

Virender Singh

body2026

Judgment text

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2026:HHC:8836 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. Cr.MP (M) No.   :  2901 of 2025 Reserved on     :     19.03.2026 Decided on       :     25.03.2026 Kulwant Singh …Applicant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh,  Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 For the applicant      :  Mr. Maan Singh, Advocate. For the respondent   : Mr. H.S. Rawat, Additional Advocate General,   with   Mr. Rohit   Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. Virender Singh, Judge Applicant­Kulwant Singh, has filed the present application, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha   Sanhita,   2023   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the 'BNSS'), with a prayer to release him on bail, during the pendency of the trial, arising out of FIR No.104 of 2020, dated 07.11.2020, registered under Sections 15 and 25 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:8836 (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the   ‘NDPS   Act’),   with  Police Station Banjar, District Kullu, H.P. 2. According the applicant, he is innocent and has falsely been implicated, in the present case. The  applicant has been arrested, in this case, on 26.03.2025 and from that date, he is behind the bars. 3. As per the applicant, main accused Kulvinder Singh has been released on bail. 4. It is the further case of the applicant, he has no concern   with   the   crime,   in   question   and   his   custodial interrogation is no longer required by the police. 5. The applicant has also tried his luck, by moving similar   application,   before   the   learned   Special   Judge, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P.  However, the said  application has been dismissed, vide order, dated 29.05.2025. 6. Apart   from   this,   Mr. Maan   Singh,   Advocate, appearing   for   the   applicant,   has   given   certain undertakings, on behalf of the applicant, for which, the applicant   is   ready   to   abide   by,   in   case,   ordered   to   be released, on bail, during the pendency of the trial. 3 2026:HHC:8836 7 On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the application. 8. When   put   to   notice,   the   police   has   filed the  status report, disclosing therein,  that on 07.11.2020, the I.O., along with other police officials, was on patrolling duty and was present at Chyunthapul. 8.1. At about 04.45, a.m., they noticed a car, being driven by its driver, coming from Banjar side. The said car, when reached near the place, where picketing had been done, driver of the said car, on seeing the police, became perplex and tried to flee away from the spot, after reversing the   car. In   that   process,   the   car   struck   against   the hillside. His activities raised suspicion in the mind of the I.O., and when the I.O., along with other police officials, reached near the Car, the driver and his companion, fled away. 8.2. The driver of the car was nabbed by the I.O, with the help of other police officials, however, the person, who was sitting in the front seat of the car, fled away from the spot. Registration of the said car was CH01AR­9249. Efforts to nab the person were made, but, he could not be 4 2026:HHC:8836 nabbed. No independent witness was present there, nor, any vehicle came there. 8.3. Thereafter, constable Vijay Kumar No. 372 and HHC Shyam Dass No.312, were associated as independent witnesses. Thereafter, the antecedents of the driver were inquired. He disclosed his name as Kulwinder Singh son of   Shri   Harmesh   Singh,   resident   of   Ahmadgarh,   Mandi Ludhiana (Punjab). Antecedents of the person, who had fled away from the spot, were also inquired from him. He disclosed his name as Kulwant Singh, resident of Ludhiana (applicant). 8.4. On   checking   the   car,   ten   sacks   containing poppy straw were found. On weighment, the total poppy straw (Afeemdoda) was found to be 90.529 kilograms. 9. Consequently, the said contraband was taken into possession and rukka was sent to the Police Station for registration of the FIR. Accused was arrested. 10. During investigation, accused Kulwinder Singh has disclosed that a sum of Rs.10,000/­ was to be paid to him by applicant Kulwant Singh to purchase poppy straw. Thereafter, they reached at Gushaini, where, one person 5 2026:HHC:8836 came and handed over the contraband to him, which was loaded   by   the   said   person,   as   well   as,   Kulwant   Singh. Kulwant Singh has disclosed the name of the said person as ‘Mama’. Thereafter, Kulwant Singh has disclosed his phone number as 62300­43135. The amount was also paid by Kulwant Singh to the said person. 11. Thereafter, the police had obtained the CDRs of mobile   phone   of   all   the   three   persons. Efforts   to   nab Kulwant   Singh   (applicant)   were   made,   but,   he   was   not found. The charge­sheet against accused Kulwinder Singh was submitted, in which, accused Kulwinder Singh was convicted. 12. Thereafter, proceedings under Section 82 Cr.PC were initiated and he was declared as Proclaimed Offender. However,   on   26.03.2025,   the   applicant   was   arrested. Thereafter,   he   was   produced   before   the   Court   and remanded to police custody. 13. Thereafter, charge­sheet against the applicant has been filed before the Court of learned Special Judge, Kullu. There are total 15 witnesses, out of which, two have 6 2026:HHC:8836 been examined and the case was listed on 26/27.02.2026, for evidence. 14. It has also been mentioned, in the status report that except the present case, no other case is found to have been registered against the applicant. 15. Learned counsel for the applicant has placed on record, copy of judgment dated 22.02.2021, passed by the Court of learned Special Judge­II, Kullu, by virtue of which the co­accused of the application namely Kulvinder singh has been convicted for allegedly possessing 500 grams of poppy straw, in the present case. 16. The applicant has been named, in the present case,   on   the   basis   of   the   alleged   disclosure   statement, made by the co­accused, in which, he has disclosed the name of the person, who had fled away from the spot, as Kulwant Singh (applicant).  The said statement was made by   accused   Kulvinder   Singh,   when,   he   was   in   police custody.  The custody and arrest are two different terms. 17. Hon’ble Apex Court in Vikram Singh and ors versus State of Punjab; AIR 2010 Supreme Court 1007 titled as   have distinguish between the word ‘arrest’ and 7 2026:HHC:8836 the word ‘custody’ as used in Section 27 of the Evidence Act.   Relevant   Paras­12   &   16   of   the   judgment,   are reproduced, as under:­ “12. Mr. Sharan has, however, referred us  to Section 46(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to   argue   that   till   the   appellants   had   been arrested   in   accordance   with   the   aforesaid provision they could not be said to be in police custody.   We   see   that   Section   46   deals   with 'Arrest how made'. We are of the opinion that word “arrest” used in Section 46 relates to a formal   arrest   whereas   Section   27   of   the Evidence Act talks about custody of a person accused of an offence. In the present case the appellants were undoubtedly put under formal, arrest on the 15th February 2005 whereas the recoveries had been made prior to that date but admittedly,   also,   they   were   in   police   custody and accused is an offence at the time of their apprehension   on   the   14th February   2005. Moreover,   in   the   light   of   the   judgment   in   the Constitution Bench and the observation that the words in Section 27 “accused of any offence” are   descriptive   of   a   person   making   the statement,   the   submission   that   this   Section would be operable only after formal arrest under Section 46(1) of the Code, cannot be accepted. This   argument   does   not   merit   any   further discussion. xxx xxx xxx 16. It is also significant that Jasvir Singh also disclosed that he had kept concealed the dead body in the fields of village Daulatpur and that it had been removed from Darshan Kaur's house in the Chevrolet car belonging to him and the three appellants had further revealed that the dead body had been disposed of in the fields of village   Daulatpur   and   the   dead   body   was recovered and taken into possession by Memo 8 2026:HHC:8836 Ex.PGGG signed by Manohar Lal as also Sub­ Inspector   Jeevan   Kumar. We   are   unable   to accept  Mr. Sharan's  bare submission that  the evidence   of   Manohar   Lal   and   Sub­Inspector Jeevan Kumar should not be believed as they were interested in the successful outcome of the prosecution,   as   no   other   material   adverse circumstance has been brought to our notice.” 18. Full   Bench   of   Hon’ble   Lahore   High   Court   in Hakam Khuda Yar  versus  Emperor; AIR 1940 Lahore 129, have also defined the word ‘custody’ and held that the police custody does not necessarily means custody after formal   arrest. Relevant   portion   of   the   judgment,   is reproduced, as under:­ “......... As   regards   the   first   point,   the   term "custody" is not defined either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Evidence Act. There is, of course, no doubt that an accused person will be in the "custody" of the police after his arrest; but   the   question   is   whether   he   can   be considered to be in "custody" at any time earlier, when he has not been formally arrested, but is merely detained by the police for the purpose of the investigation. Section 27 is anomalous in so far as it applies only to information leading to a discovery   when   received   from   an   accused person in the custody of the police, but not if he is   not   in   the   custody   of   the   police. If   the information  is   relevant  when   it   comes   from   a person in the custody of the police, there seems no good reason why it should not be so when it comes from an accused person, who is not in the custody of the police and therefore not under the influence of the police. The real intention of the Section   very   probably   is   to   make   information from   an   accused   person   which   leads   to 9 2026:HHC:8836 discovery relevant even when the person is in police custody. But the language of, the Section makes such information relevant only when it comes from an accused person in the custody of the police. The language used in the Section thus leads to the curious result probably never intended­­that when such information is given by an accused person, who is not in the "custody" of the police it will not be covered by the Section. However, apart from the above anomaly, the intention of the Section seems, I think, clear enough and that is to make information leading to a discovery relevant, even when it comes from an accused person who is in the custody of the police and thus   subject   to   police   influence. Ordinarily information   coming   from   an   accused   person, who is liable to be influenced by the police will be open to suspicion. But if the information leads to the discovery of a relevant fact, that discovery is considered to be a guarantee of the truth of the information as has been pointed out already and hence such information is made relevant by Section 27. Now there can be little doubt, that even   before   his   formal   arrest,   an   accused person, who is detained by the police owing to suspicion against him, is liable to be influenced by the   police. This  Court  has  therefore  put   a wide   interpretation   on   the   word   "custody"   as used in Section 27. In AIR 1933 Lah 609, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sir Shadi Lal and Coldstream J. that 'police custody'   does   not   necessarily   mean   custody after   formal   arrest   and   that   it   also   includes 'some form of police surveillance and restriction on the movements of the person concerned by the police. 19. In view of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in  Dipakbhai Jagdishchandra Patel v. State of 10 2026:HHC:8836 Gujarat,   (2019)   16   SCC   547,  the   statement   made   by co­accused during the investigation is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C.   and   cannot   be   used   as   a   piece   of   evidence. Relevant paragraph 44 of the judgment is reproduced as under: 44. Such   a   person,   viz.,   the   person   who   is named in the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eye of the law, can indeed be questioned, and the statement is taken by the police officer. A   confession   that   is   made   to   a   police   officer would be inadmissible, having regard to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, would   also   be   inadmissible. A   confession, unless   it   fulfils   the   test   laid   down   in   Pakala Narayana Swami [Pakala Narayana Swami v. King Emperor, 1939 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1938­ 39) 66 IA 66: AIR 1939 PC 47] and as accepted by this Court,may still be used as an admission under   Section   21   of   the   Evidence   Act. This, however, is subject to the bar of admissibility of a statement under Section 161 CrPC. Therefore, even if a statement contains an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, it would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 CrPC.” 20. Similar   view   has   again   been   taken   by   the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Tofan Singh versus State of Tamil Nadu’, (2021) 4 Supreme Court Cases 1. Relevant paragraph 158.1 of the judgment is reproduced as under: “158.1 That the officers who are invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are “police officers’ within the meaning of Section 25 11 2026:HHC:8836 of the Evidence Act, as a result of which any confessional statement made to them would be barred under the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and cannot be taken into account in order to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.” 21. So   far   as   the   relevancy   of   the   CDRs   of   the mobile phone of Kulvinder Singh and Kulwant Singh, are concerned, the relevancy of the same is to be considered during the trial. 22. Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in  State   by   (NCB) Bengaluru versus Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr., 2022 (2) SCALE 14, has held that evidentiary value of the CDRs is to be determined, during trial. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as under: “10. It has been held in clear terms in  Tofan Singh   Vs. State   of   Tamil   Nadu,  that   a confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act will remain inadmissible in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. In the teeth of the aforesaid decision, the arrests made by the petitioner­NCB, on the basis of the confession/voluntary   statements   of   the respondents or the co­accused under Section 67 of   the   NDPS   Act,   cannot   form   the   basis   for overturning the impugned orders releasing them on bail. The CDR details of some of the accused or the allegations of tampering of evidence on the part of one of the respondents is an aspect that will be examined at the stage of trial. For the aforesaid reason, this Court is not inclined 12 2026:HHC:8836 to interfere in the orders dated 16th September, 2019, 14th January, 2020, 16th January, 2020, 19th  December, 2019 and 20th  January, 2020 passed   in   SLP   (Crl.)   No@   Diary   No. 22702/2020,   SLP   (Crl.)   No.   1454/2021,   SLP (Crl.)   No.   1465/2021,   SLP   (Crl.)   No.   1773­ 74/2021   and   SLP   (Crl.)   No.   2080/2021 respectively. The   impugned   orders   are, accordingly,   upheld   and   the   Special   Leave Petitions   filed   by   the   petitioner­NCB   seeking cancellation   of   bail   granted   to   the   respective respondents, are dismissed as meritless.” (self emphasis supplied) 23. The   CDRs   can   only   provide   information   like Caller ID duration and Cell Tower Details, however, they do not capture the substance of the conversation itself. These are the call record details, which are the metadata (data about data) about the call and the same is totally different from   call   recording,   which   offers   direct   evidence   of   the communication,   including   specific   words   spoken   and context   of   the   conversation,   which   can   be   crucial,   for deciding the matter. 24. Although,   co­accused   Kulvinder   Singh,   has been convicted, by the learned trial Court, for the allegedly possessing   500   grams   of   poppy   straw,   however,   in   the considered opinion of this Court the applicant can also not be   prosecuted   for   the   offence,   involving   commercial 13 2026:HHC:8836 quantity of contraband. Even during the pendency of the trial against accused Kulvinder Singh, he was released on bail, as the same has been admitted in the status report. 25. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view that the bail application is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the applicant is ordered to be released on bail, during the pendency of the trial, arising out of  FIR No.104 of 2020, dated 07.11.2020, registered under  Sections 15  and 25  of the NDPS Act, with  Police Station Banjar, District Kullu, H.P., on his furnishing personal bond, in the sum of Rs.50,000/­, with one   surety,   in   the   like   amount,   to   the   satisfaction   of learned trial Court. 26. This order of release, however, shall be subject to the following conditions :­ “a)   Applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on   each   and   every   date   of   hearing   and   if prevented   by   any   reason   to   do   so,   seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; b) Applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence   nor   hamper   the   investigation   of   the case in   any   manner whatsoever; c)     Applicant shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any person acquainted with the 14 2026:HHC:8836 facts of   the case   so   as   to   dissuade them from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer; and d) Applicant shall not leave the territory of India without the prior permission of the Court.” 27. Any of the observations made herein above shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case as these observations are confined only to the disposal of the present bail application. 28. It is made clear that the respondent­State is at liberty to move an appropriate application, in case, any of the bail conditions is found to be violated by the applicant. 29. The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the   bail   order   to   the   Superintendent   of   Jail,   Sub   Jail, Hamirpur, through e­mail, with a direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the e­prison software. 30. In case, the applicant is not released within a period of seven days from the date of grant of bail, the Superintendent of Jail, Sub Jail, Hamirpur, is directed to inform this fact to the Secretary, DLSA, Hamirpur. The Superintendent   of   Jail,   Sub   Jail,   Hamirpur,  is   further directed that if the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, 15 2026:HHC:8836 as per the order passed by this Court, within a period of one month from today, then, the said fact be submitted to this Court. ( Virender Singh ) Judge March 25, 2026(ps) PRADEEP Digitally signed by PRADEEP Date: 2026.03.25 14:43:15 +0530