1 CGHC010317212022 2026:CGHC:31227 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6575 of 2022 Vishnu Singh S/o Gulab Singh Aged About 62 Years R/o Village Pasal, Tehsil Bhaiyathan, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner versus 1- State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Department Of Home Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhavan, Atal Nagar, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2-Director General Of Police State Chhattisgarh. 3- Inspector General Of Police Surguja Range, Chhattisgarh. 4- Superintendent Of Police Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner : Mr. Isan Saluja, Advocate, holding the brief of Mr. Narendra Mehar, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vinay Pandey, Deputy Advocate General Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 22/07/2026 1. The petitioner has filed the petition seeking the following relief:- “10.1. The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set aside order dated 02.05.2022 passed by the Director General Of Police, Chhattisgarh Annexure P/1. 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash/set aside the order dated 03.06.2020 passed by the Inspector General of Police, Chhattisgarh Annexure P/2. Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2 10.3 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in favor of the petitioner as per the facts & circumstance of the present case, in the interest of justice.” 2. Facts in brief are that the petitioner retired from the post of Sub- Inspector in the Police Department. Lastly, he was posted at Police Station Lakhanpur, District Surajpur. After attaining the age of superannuation, he retired from service. A criminal case for commission of offences under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC was registered against one Tuleshwar on 26.04.2018. At the relevant time, the petitioner was posted as Sub-Inspector. An FIR was lodged by Mahilal, father of the victim, alleging that his daughter had been kidnapped by the accused on 20.04.2018 at about 9:00 PM. On 12.05.2018, the accused was arrested. On 03.10.2018, a complaint was made against the petitioner before the Inspector General of Police to the effect that the accused and the victim wanted to marry each other, but the petitioner restrained them. An inquiry was conducted against the petitioner and statements of Jabar Say, Kanwal Singh, Tuleshwar and Inspector Ram Sakra were recorded. On 15.10.2018, the statement of the petitioner was recorded by the Additional Superintendent of Police, Surajpur. The petitioner denied the allegations regarding acceptance of a bribe of 25,000 and also denied the allegation that he had ₹ threatened the accused with implication in a false case. On 22.10.2018, an inquiry report was submitted before the Inspector General of Police, thereafter, the Inspector General of Police issued order to serve charge- sheet upon the petitioner and at the same time, departmental inquiry was contemplated against the petitioner and on 29.03.2019, an article of charge was served upon him. In the charge-sheet, allegations were made that the petitioner was grossly negligent in discharge of his 3 duties as he did not arrest the accused on 27.04.2018 and took steps for his arrest only after 15 days, i.e., on 12.05.2018. It was further alleged that the petitioner had accepted a bribe of 25,000 from the ₹ accused. The petitioner filed his reply to the article of charge and denied the allegations. In the departmental inquiry, the prosecution examined its witnesses and the petitioner along with his counsel cross- examined them. The Inquiry Officer, in his report, held the petitioner guilty of the second part of the charge, namely that he was grossly negligent in discharge of his duties as he did not arrest the accused on 27.04.2018 and took steps only after 15 days, on 12.05.2018. A second show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner by the Inspector General of Police, who, being the disciplinary authority, recorded disagreement with the findings of the Inquiry Officer regarding the first charge and found the second charge proved. The petitioner filed a reply to the show-cause notice and denied the allegations. 3. In this petition, the petitioner has challenged the punishment of reduction in pay equivalent to one increment, cumulatively for one year. The petitioner preferred an appeal, which was dismissed vide order dated 02.05.2022, against which, he has challenged both the orders by filing the present petition. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the findings against the petitioner are based on the contradictions and testimonies of interested witnesses. He would contend that the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority ought to have appreciated the evidence with greater care. He would further submit that during cross-examination, complainant Tuleshwar Singh admitted that at the time of recovery of the victim, he was not present. He further admitted that witnesses were scared on account of registration of F.I.R. The witness also admitted that he did not want any action 4 against the accused and that the complaint was lodged at the instance of the villagers. 5. He would further submit that the defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment as prosecution witnesses. He would argue that under Rule 15(2) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, for short, CCA Rules, 1966, whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, such divergent findings must be based upon sufficient and reliable evidence. The disciplinary authority failed to comply with Rule 15(2) of the Rules, 1966. He has placed reliance in the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Munshi Prasad And Ors vs State Of Bihar reported in (2002) 1 SCC 351, and Dudh Nath Pandey vs The State Of U.P , reported in (1981) 2 SCC 166. 6. On the other hand, Mr. Vinay Pandey, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State would oppose the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner and submit that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity during the departmental inquiry and there is no allegation of violation of principles of natural justice. He would also submit that that there was negligence on the part of the petitioner in discharge of his duties. The petitioner failed to arrest the accused involved in the kidnapping of a minor victim. Though the complaint was lodged on 26.04.2018, but no immediate steps were taken by the petitioner. As per statement of the witnesses, the accused was allowed to go scot-free. He would argue that the petitioner had accepted illegal gratification of ₹25,000 to avoid arrest of the accused. He would further argue that the disciplinary authority found the first part of the charge proved whereas the latter part was not found proved by the Inquiry Officer ,against the petitioner. The disciplinary authority vide order dated 17.03.2020, found the second part of the charge also proved. He would further argue that 5 the disciplinary authority considered the entire evidence and thereafter recorded its findings in accordance with law. 7. It has been argued that the disciplinary authority acted strictly in accordance with Rule 15(2) of the CCA Rules, 1966. The disciplinary authority imposed the penalty on 03.06.2020 and the said order has been affirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 02.05.2022. He argued that the findings arrived at in the departmental inquiry were based on the preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the petitioner has not challenged the impugned orders on any permissible ground and thus, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 9. In the present case, the petitioner filed a reply to the show-cause notice issued against the him and denied the allegations. A complaint was made against the petitioner by accused Tuleshwar alleging that the petitioner had taken 25,000 and allowed him to go free. It has further ₹ been alleged that the petitioner restrained him from marrying the victim and also seized his motorcycle. On such complaint being made, an internal inquiry was initiated by the Police Department and pursuant to the order passed by the Inspector General of Police, an inquiry was conducted by an Additional Superintendent of Police wherein statements were recorded. All relevant documents were supplied to the petitioner. The prosecution examined its witnesses and the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine them. 10. After conclusion of the preliminary inquiry, a departmental inquiry was initiated. In the departmental inquiry, an Inquiry Officer and a Presenting Officer were appointed. The petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. 11. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report before the disciplinary authority. In the report, one part of the allegations was found proved 6 whereas the other part was not found proved. The disciplinary authority considered the evidence, statements of witnesses and documents on record and thereafter recorded its findings that the second part of the charge was also proved. 12. The disciplinary authority issued a show-cause notice, which was duly replied to, and thereafter the penalty was imposed. The departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed. 13. In the entire writ petition, the petitioner has not assailed the competence of the disciplinary authority, therefore, it can safely be held that the penalty was inflicted by the competent authority. There is no allegation in the writ petition that the petitioner was not afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing or there was any violation of the principles of natural justice. There is also no allegation that the procedure contemplated under the Rule 14 of the CCA Rules, 1966 was not complied with. 14. The orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have been challenged only on the ground that there are contradictions and omissions in the statements of witnesses. The second ground raised by the petitioner is that the authorities failed to comply with Rule 15(2) of the Rules, 1966. 15. Rule 15(2) of the Rules, 1966 reads as under:- “15.The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the inquiring authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge, if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose.” 16. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision makes it clear that whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer on any article of charge, it is required to record reasons for such disagreement and thereafter record its own findings on such charge. 7 17. The disciplinary authority perused the evidence and recorded its disagreement with regard to the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. It also recorded its own findings on the basis of the evidence available on record. The authority provided opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by issuing a show-cause notice and thereafter imposed the punishment. Thus, it can safely be held that the disciplinary authority complied with Rule 15(2) of the Rules, 1966. 18. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Dudh Nath Pandey (supra). In the said matter, the validity and relevancy of defence witnesses in a criminal trial were considered. In a criminal trial, the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in a departmental inquiry, the guilt of a delinquent employee is required to be established on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. 19. The scope and power of judicial review of the Courts while dealing with the validity of the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was the subject matter of discussion before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. S.Vasanthi [(2014) 9 SCC 315], wherein it was reiterated that the High Court in the exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority as the same is not permissible under law. It shall be apt to reproduce paras 10 and 11 of the judgment which read thus:- "10.The scope and power of judicial review of the courts while dealing with the validity of quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is now well settled. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan v. J. Hussain (2013) 10 SCC 106, the law on this subject, is recapitulated in the following manner: (SCC pp.110-12, paras 7-10) "7. When the charge is proved, as happened in the instance case, it is the disciplinary authority with 8 whom lies the discretion to decide as to what kind of punishment is to be imposed. of course, this discretion has to be examined objectively keeping in mind the nature and gravity of charge. The Disciplinary Authority is to decide a particular penalty specified in the relevant Rules. Host of factors go into the decision making while exercising such a discretion which include, apart from the nature and gravity of misconduct, past conduct, nature of duties assigned to the delinquent, responsibility of duties assigned to the delinquent, previous penalty, if any, and the discipline required to be maintained in department or establishment where he works, as well as extenuating circumstances, if any exist…. 11. We are of the opinion that the High Court transgressed its limits of judicial review by itself assuming the role of sitting as departmental appellate authority, which is not permissible in law. The principles discussed above have been summed up and summarized as follows in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank . v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 ( SCC p.382, , para 19):- "19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry, the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent rt authority. 19.3 Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4 Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the 9 nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co- delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co- delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable." 20. From the above proposition of law, it is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial review cannot assume the role of sitting as a departmental appellate authority. The limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 21. In the present case, the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing. The disciplinary authority, on the basis of the legally admissible evidence and taking into consideration the evidence available on record, inflicted the penalty. Further, the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority have been affirmed by the appellate authority; thus, there are concurrent finding of fact, which cannot be disturbed while exercising powers under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. 10 22. Taking into consideration the above-discussed facts and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, no good ground is involved in the present case to interfere with the impugned orders, accordingly, the petition is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Rakesh Mohan Pandey JUDGE Nadim