1 CGHC010426392024 2026:CGHC:31800 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 8013 of 2024 Dashrath Lal Sonwani S/o Late Shri Shakha Ram Sonwani, Aged About 54 Years Occupation Service, Presently Posted And Working As Assistant Engineer, Rural Engineering Services, Pamgarh, District- Janjgir-Champa (C.G.) ... Petitioner versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through- Secretary, Department of Panchayat and Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Nawa Raipur Atal Nagar, District-Raipur (C.G.) 2 - Engineer In Chief, Rural Engineering Services, Vikas Bhawan Sector-19, Nawa Raipur, Atal Nagar, District-Raipur (C.G.) 3 - Executive Engineer, Res Division Sarguja, District-Sarguja (C.G.) ... Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. Sourabh Sahu, Advocate For State/Respondent : Mr. K.G. Yadav, Dy. GA (Hon’ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru) Order on Board 24/07/2026 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking quashment of the order dated 19.09.2016 whereby, after his reinstatement in service consequent upon acquittal in the criminal appeal, the respondents treated the period from 18.04.2016 to 19.09.2016 as "No Work No Pay" and held that the subsistence allowance already paid during the period of ASHUTOSH MISHRA Digitally signed by ASHUTOSH MISHRA Date: 2026.07.28 10:57:27 +0530 2 suspension was sufficient, thereby declining payment of full salary and allowances for the suspension period. The petitioner has also prayed for a direction to the respondents to decide his representation dated 18.10.2024. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though the petitioner was initially convicted by the trial Court and consequently removed from service on 18.04.2016, he was subsequently acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge by judgment dated 27.06.2016. Thereafter, he was reinstated in service by order dated 19.09.2016. It is argued that the acquittal was a honourable acquittal and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be deprived of the salary and allowances for the suspension period merely because he had remained under suspension. It is contended that the impugned order dated 19.09.2016 is arbitrary and deserves to be quashed. He would also submit that the petitioner preferred representation on 18.10.2024, which is still pending. 3. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that the petitioner was removed from service on account of his conviction by the competent Criminal Court and not pursuant to any departmental proceeding. After his acquittal, he was reinstated by order dated 19.09.2016, wherein the competent authority rightly directed that the relevant period would be governed by the principle of "No Work No Pay" and that the subsistence allowance already paid during the suspension period was sufficient. It is submitted that subsequent acquittal does not retrospectively wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction nor does it automatically entitle the petitioner to back wages. 3 Therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 5. The sole question that arises for consideration is whether the petitioner, who was removed from service on account of his conviction by the competent Criminal Court and was subsequently reinstated after acquittal in criminal appeal, is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period during which he remained out of service. 6. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was removed from service solely because of his conviction recorded by the competent Criminal Court and not on account of any departmental enquiry. The respondents merely acted upon a subsisting conviction. Consequently, during the relevant period, the respondents were legally disabled from obtaining any service from the petitioner. 7. This issue in hand is also well settled and no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) & Another, (1996) 11 SCC 603, in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Sections of Prevention of Corruption Act and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be 4 paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 8. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval. 9. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (AIR 1994 SC 552), the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or 5 otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …” 10. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim (2013) 11 SCC 67, the Supreme Court considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India (2005) 8 SCC 747, held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: - “11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.” 11. In the case in hand, the petitioner’s termination was not on account of disciplinary action, and the claim is not consequent upon exoneration in a departmental appeal. The petitioner was out of employment and was terminated during the period of conviction in a criminal case. Now he is claiming back-wages owing to his acquittal in the criminal appeal. 6 12. It is noteworthy to mention here that it was his own conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he may be entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of the proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. However, the question of back-wages would have arisen only if the respondents had taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the said action was found to be unsustainable in law, and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging his duties. The conduct of the petitioner becomes relevant for consideration of his entitlement to back-wages. In the present case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back-wages. 13. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by the competent criminal Court and not pursuant to any departmental proceedings. His subsequent acquittal does not automatically entitle him to back-wages. In Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that acquittal in a criminal case does not ipso facto confer a right to claim back-wages for the period during which the employee remained out of service on account of conviction. The principle laid down therein is that where the employer had acted on the basis of a subsisting conviction, the action cannot be termed illegal merely because the conviction was later set 7 aside. 14. This Court in Ram Prasad Nayak v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, WPS No.1473 of 2021, decided on 15.04.2025, after considering the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, categorically held that where an employee was removed from service on account of conviction in a criminal case and was subsequently acquitted would not be entitled to back wages, as the employer could not avail his services during the relevant period. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed. Subsequently, the said petitioner’s review petition was also dismissed by order dated 26.2.2026 passed in Review Petition No.191 of 2025. 15. For the aforesaid reasons and applying the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions and followed by this Court, the petitioner cannot claim full salary and allowances for the period during which he had admittedly not rendered any service merely because he was subsequently acquitted in appeal. 16. Accordingly, this Court finds no illegality, arbitrariness or infirmity in the impugned order dated 19.09.2016. The petitioner has failed to make out any ground warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. As an upshot, the writ petition, being devoid of merits, deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. SD/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) JUDGE ashu