1 CGHC010397612025 2026:CGHC:31397-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2885 of 2025 1 - Lakeshwar Sahu S/o Shri Kamlesh Sahu Aged About 30 Years R/o Bana, P.S. Urla, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Dayashankar Banjare S/o Santosh Banjare Aged About 20 Years R/o Lodhipara, P.S. Pandari, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioners versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Devendra Nagar, District Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Soumya Rai, Deputy Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 23/07/2026 1. Heard Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State. VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.07.27 17:43:09 +0530 2 2. By way of the present petition filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the petitioners have called in question the legality and validity of FIR bearing Crime No. 41/2025 registered at Police Station Devendra Nagar, Raipur for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred as ‘COTPA Act, 2003’), the consequential charge- sheet (Challan No. 31/2025 for the offence under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003, the order dated 28.03.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur taking cognizance, and all consequential criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No. 13563 of 2025 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur. 3. The present petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer: “(1) That this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned FIR dated 09.02.2025, registered against petitioners bearing Crime No. 41 of 2025 (impugned FIR is part of impugned Final Report, bearing Challan No. 44 of 2025, certified copy filed as Annexure P/1), registered at Police Station Devendra Nagar, District Raipur, for the offences punishable under Sections 4A and 21(1) of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) Act, 2003. 3 (2) That this Hon'ble Court may further kindly be pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned Final Report, bearing Challan No. 44 of 2025 dated 19.03.2025 (Annexure P/1), filed against the petitioners, before Learned JMFC, Raipur, arising out of the impugned FIR No. 41/2025, for the offence punishable under Sections 4A and 21(1) of the Act, 2003. (3) That this Hon'ble Court may further kindly be pleased to quash and set-aside the impugned order dated 28.03.2025 vide which the Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, has taken cognizance of the offences punishable under Section 4A and 21(1) of the Act, 2003, against the petitioners, and also directed for the registration of case before Court. This Hon'ble Court may further kindly be pleased to quash/set aside the sequential proceedings (order sheets), passed in the Criminal Case No. 13563 of 2025. (4) This Hon'ble Court be further pleased to pass such other orders as it may deem fit under the facts and circumstances of the case, in favour of the petitioners against the respondent.” 4. The facts, in brief, are that on the basis of a secret information received by Police Station Devendra Nagar, Raipur, a raid was conducted on 09.02.2025 at the Watch Press Complex, Blinkit Dark Store, Devendra Nagar Raipur, Raipur, where certain hookah-related materials, including hookah pipes, papers and flavours, valued at ₹15,000/- and electronic devices like computer, laptop, etc. amounting to ₹1,50,000/- (total amounting to ₹1,65,000/-) were seized. At the relevant time, petitioner 4 No.1 was working as the Deputy Manager and petitioner No.2 as a Delivery Boy in the said establishment. On the allegation that the seized articles were being illegally stored and supplied, FIR bearing Crime No.41/2025 was registered against the petitioners on 09.02.2025 for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed charge-sheet (Challan No. 44/2025 for the offence under Section 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003), whereupon the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur, by order dated 28.03.2025, took cognizance of the aforesaid offences. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have preferred the present petition seeking quashment of the FIR, charge-sheet, the order taking cognizance and all consequential criminal proceedings. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are merely employees of Blinkit Company, petitioner No.1 being the Deputy Manager and petitioner No.2 being a Delivery Boy, and had no ownership, control or knowledge regarding the hookah-related articles seized from the dark store. It is contended that the seized articles were only stored in packed condition for logistics and delivery purposes and that the petitioners were neither operating nor running any hookah bar. He would submit that, although the charge sheet has been filed under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003, but the provisions of COTPA Act has been amended and Sections 4A and 21A has been inserted by the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of Advertising and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply and Distribution) (Chhattisgarh Amendment) Act, 2021, Act No. 1 of 2023 w.e.f. 10.02.2023 (hereinafter referred as ‘COTPA 5 Amendment Act, 2021’). Referring to Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021, learned counsel submits that the said provisions prohibit the opening or running of a hookah bar and do not criminalize the mere storage or delivery of hookah-related materials. It is further argued that even if the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation are accepted in their entirety, no offence under the aforesaid provisions is made out against the petitioners. It is, therefore, submitted that continuation of the criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law, warranting exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for quashing the impugned FIR, charge-sheet, order taking cognizance and all consequential proceedings. 6. Per contra, learned State counsel opposes the petition and submits that the FIR was registered on the basis of credible information regarding illegal storage and supply of hookah-related materials from the Blinkit dark store. It is contended that during the raid, hookah-related articles were seized from the premises where petitioner No.1 was working as the Deputy Manager and petitioner No.2 as the Delivery Boy, and since the petitioners failed to produce any valid documents authorizing the storage of such articles, a prima facie case for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003 (Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021) was found to be made out. It is further submitted that, after due investigation, charge-sheet has already been filed and the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class has taken cognizance of the offences. According to the learned State 6 counsel, the allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offences and the issues raised by the petitioners involve disputed questions of fact which are matters of trial. It is, therefore, submitted that no case is made out for exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 8. Considering the facts of the present case, the question arises here as to whether the allegations contained in the FIR and the material collected during investigation, even if accepted in their entirety, constitute the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003 (Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021). It is necessary here to take notice of relevant provisions of Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003 and Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021, which reads as under:- Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003 “4. Prohibition of smoking in a public place.– No person shall smoke in any public place: Provided that in a hotel having thirty rooms or a restaurant having seating capacity of thirty persons or more and in the airports, a separate provision for smoking area or space may be made. 7 21. Punishment for smoking in certain places.– (1) Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 4 shall be punishable with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees. Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021) 4A. Prohibition of hookah bar –Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no person shall, either on his own or on behalf of any other person, open or run any hookah bar or serve hookah to customers in any place including the eating house. Explanation.–The term “eating house” means any place where food or refreshment of any kind are provided for visitors, and sold for consumption. 21A. Punishment for running hookah bar.–– Whoever contravenes the provisions of section 4A shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years but which shall not be less that one year and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees but which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees. 9. The allegations against the petitioners are not in dispute. The prosecution case itself is that the petitioners were working as Deputy Manager and Delivery Boy, respectively, in the Blinkit dark store from where hookah-related articles were seized. There is no allegation in the FIR, seizure memo or charge-sheet that the petitioners had opened, established, managed or were running any hookah bar, or that the 8 premises in question was being used for serving hookah for consumption by customers. Rather, the allegations merely indicate that hookah-related materials were found stored in the dark store of Blinkit. 10. Section 4 of COTPA Act, 2003 and Section 4A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021 specifically prohibits any person from opening or running a hookah bar in any place including an eating house. Section 21(1) of COTPA Act, 2003 and Section 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021 merely prescribes the punishment for contravention of Section 4 of COTPA Act, 2003 and Section 4A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021 respectively. Thus, the essential ingredient of the offence is the opening or running of a hookah bar. Mere possession, storage or transportation of hookah-related accessories, in the absence of any allegation that the accused was operating or facilitating a hookah bar, does not satisfy the ingredients of the offence. The prosecution has not placed any material to show that hookah was being served or consumed at the premises or that the petitioners were operating any hookah bar. Consequently, even if the entire prosecution case is accepted as true, the ingredients of Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003 ( Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021) are conspicuously absent. 11. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, the Supreme Court held that inherent powers can be exercised where the allegations in the complaint or FIR, even if accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged. The said principle continues to govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., now Section 528 of the 9 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. In para 6 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “6. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal it is necessary to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code. The said section saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. There is no doubt that this inherent power cannot be exercised in regard to matters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code. In the present case the Magistrate before whom the police report has been filed under Section 173 of the Code has yet not applied his mind to the merits of the said report and it may be assumed in favour of the appellant that his request for the quashing of the proceedings is not at the present stage covered by any specific provision of the Code. It is well- established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, 10 we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the Court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the allegations in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the first information report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute offence alleged but there is either no legal 11 evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point (vide : In Re : Shripad G. Chandavarkar, Jagat Chandra Mozumdar V. Queen empress, Shanker singh (Dr) V. State of punjab, Nripendra Bhusan Ray V. Gobind bandhu Majumdar and Ramanathan Chettiyar v. K. Sivarama Subrahmanya Ayyar)” 12. The scope of interference by the High Court while exercising its inherent jurisdiction is no longer res integra. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, the Hon'ble Supreme Court illustratively held that criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed where the allegations made in the FIR, even if taken at their face value and accepted in their 12 entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or where the uncontroverted allegations and the material collected fail to disclose the commission of any offence. The present case squarely falls within the said categories. 13. In Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, the Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be permitted to be set into motion as a matter of course. Courts are duty-bound to ensure that the allegations disclose the commission of an offence before permitting criminal prosecution to continue. 14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Manoj Kumar Sharma and others v. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2016 (9) SCC 1, has held that-: “35. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code, a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein it was held as under: (SCC pp. 347-49, paras 29-30) 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be 13 available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far-reaching consequences inasmuch as it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/ complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such that would lead to the conclusion that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/ complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual 14 basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC: 30.1. Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2. Step two whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3. Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be 15 justifiably refuted by the prosecution/ complainant? 30.4. Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5. If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused." 15. Likewise, in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401, while cautioning that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court simultaneously reiterated that where the allegations in the FIR do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence, or where the essential ingredients of the alleged offence are absent, the High Court would be justified in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of the process of law. It has been held that :- "13. The power of quashing criminal proceedings has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and the court cannot be justified in 16 embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the FIR/complaint, unless the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. However, the Court, under its inherent powers, can neither intervene at an uncalled for stage nor can it "soft-pedal the course of justice" at a crucial stage of investigation/proceedings. The provisions of Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called as "CrPC") are a device to advance justice and not to frustrate it. The power of judicial review is discretionary, however, it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave errors and to ensure that stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. However, there are no limits of power of the Court, but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. (Vide State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.31 and Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. 32)” 16. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present case, this Court finds that the allegations in the FIR and the material collected during investigation merely disclose recovery of hookah-related articles from a Blinkit dark store where the petitioners were admittedly employees. There is no allegation or material suggesting that the 17 petitioners had opened or were running a hookah bar or that the premises was being used for serving hookah to customers. Therefore, the foundational ingredients required for attracting Sections 4 and 21(1) of COTPA Act, 2003 (Sections 4A and 21A of the COTPA Amendment Act, 2021) are wholly absent. Continuation of the criminal proceedings in such circumstances would amount to permitting prosecution despite the absence of the basic ingredients of the alleged offence, which would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. 17. Accordingly, the present petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The FIR bearing Crime No. 41/2025 registered at Police Station Devendra Nagar, Raipur, for the offences punishable under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003, the consequential charge-sheet (Challan No. 44/2025 for the offence under Sections 4 and 21(1) of the COTPA Act, 2003), the order dated 28.03.2025 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur taking cognizance thereof, and all consequential criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No. 13563 of 2025 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Raipur are hereby quashed. 18. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved