1 CGHC010316962024 2026:CGHC:30587-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 2580 of 2024 Kishore Singh Sidar S/o Mr. Samundram Sidar Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Baroda, P.S. Sakti, District Sakti, Chhattisgarh. ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Ministry Of Home, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, Naya Raipur, District Raipur 2 - The Station House Officer Police Station Mangchuwa, District Balod, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Xxxxx (Prosecutrix) Nil ... Respondent(s) (cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Raza Ali, Advocate For State For Respondent No. 3 : : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate Mr. Vivek Mishra, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 20 .07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Raza Ali, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. S. Baghel, Govt. Advocate for the Respondent/ State and Mr. Vivek Mishra, learned counsel for the Respondent No. 3. SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.07.27 12:05:14 +0530 2 2. This petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (in short B.N.S.S.) has been preferred by the petitioner with the following prayer:- “It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of BNSS and in exercise thereof admit the petition, call for the records and after hearing the parties in the matter, quashing entire charge sheet including the FIR No.15/2024 filed before the JMFC, Dondilohara Dist. Balod, under Section 366, 376, 506 & 376(2) (n) of IPC and in consequences quash the order of taking cognizance and entire criminal case (i.e. Criminal case no. 1058/2024 between State Vs. Kishore Singh Sidar) being abuse of process of court and abuse of process of law and also in violation of petitioner's fundamental rights and in peculiar factual matrix of case and in interest of justice.” 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner seeks quashing of the FIR, charge-sheet and consequential criminal proceedings arising out of Crime No. 15/2024 registered for the offence under Section 376 IPC, contending that the relationship between the petitioner and the prosecutrix was consensual and developed during their training as Revenue Inspectors in 2019–2020, culminating in an engagement on 23.04.2023 with the consent of both families. It is submitted that the marriage was fixed for 19.05.2024 and the petitioner, along with his family and wedding procession, reached the venue with the intention of solemnizing the marriage. However, due to a dispute regarding the playing of traditional tribal musical instruments during the marriage ceremony and the refusal of the priest (Purohit) to proceed, the marriage could not be performed. The petitioner contends that there was never any false promise of marriage, as evident from the engagement, wedding preparations, invitation cards, 3 exchange of ornaments, and his presence at the marriage venue, and that the subsequent complaint lodged by the prosecutrix nearly one month later has been falsely given with mala fide intention. It is therefore argued that, even if the allegations are accepted in their entirety, no offence of rape on the false promise of marriage is made out. 4. He further submits that the FIR, charge-sheet and the consequential criminal proceedings are nothing but an abuse of the process of law, as even if the entire prosecution case is accepted at its face value, no offence under Section 376 IPC is made out. It is contended that the prosecutrix was a major, the relationship between the parties was consensual, and the promise of marriage was genuine, as evidenced by the engagement ceremony, fixation of the marriage date, exchange of gifts and ornaments, and the petitioner's arrival at the marriage venue with the wedding procession. The marriage could not be solemnized solely due to unforeseen circumstances arising during the ceremony and not because of any dishonest intention on the part of the petitioner. It is further submitted that there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, the allegations are actuated by mala fide intention, and the investigating agency failed to follow the settled legal principles governing such cases and therefore, the present CrMP may be allowed. 5. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 submits that the prosecutrix has voluntarily filed her reply before this Court stating that she does not wish to prosecute the criminal case any further and has no objection if the present petition is allowed and the FIR, charge-sheet and all consequential criminal proceedings arising out of Crime No. 15/2024 are quashed. 4 6. Learned counsel for the State, in turn, submits that the State has no objection in case if the matter is disposed of by quashing further criminal proceeding pending before the learned trial Court as prosecutrix has no objection and she does not wish to prosecute the criminal case further. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the petition. 8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that the petitioner and respondent No. 3 were major, were known to each other since their training as Revenue Inspectors during the year 2019–2020, and were in a consensual relationship. It is also borne out from the record that their engagement was solemnized on 23.04.2023 with the consent of both families, the marriage was fixed for 19.05.2024, and the petitioner, along with his family members and marriage procession, had reached the venue for solemnization of the marriage. The marriage, however, could not be performed owing to a dispute which arose during the marriage ceremony. Prima facie, these facts indicate that the promise to marry was not false from its inception and that the relationship between the parties was consensual. Moreover, respondent No. 3 has filed her reply before this Court categorically stating that she does not wish to prosecute the criminal case any further and has no objection if the FIR and the consequential criminal proceedings are quashed, and that such decision has been taken voluntarily without any pressure or coercion. 9. In the case of Prithivirajan v. State (represented by the Inspector of Police and another), reported in (2025) SCC Online SC 696, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered that :- 5 “7. The instant case is one of consensual relationship between the appellant and prosecutrix. Even otherwise, it does not appear from the record that the initial promise to marry allegedly made by the appellant was false to begin with. Perusal of FIR itself suggests that the alleged promise to marry could not be fulfilled by the appellant due to intervening circumstances. Consequently, the relationship ended because of which the present FIR came to be registered. Under these circumstances, letting the appellant face trial would be nothing short of an abuse of the process of the Court. This cannot be permitted.” 10. In the case of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered that :- 14.In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In *Anurag Soni v. State of Chhattisgarh^7, this Court held: (SCC para 12) “12. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 IPC and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 IPC.” 6 Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana (Deepak Gulati): (SCC p. 682, para 21) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused;” 15. In Yedla Srinivasa Rao v. State of A.P.^9 the accused forcibly established sexual relations with the complainant. When she asked the accused why he had spoiled her life, he promised to marry her. On this premise, the accused repeatedly had sexual intercourse with the complainant. When the complainant became pregnant, the accused refused to marry her. When the matter was brought to the panchayat, the accused admitted to having had sexual intercourse with the complainant but subsequently absconded. Given this factual background, the Court observed: (SCC pp. 620-21, para 10) “10. It appears that the intention of the accused as per the testimony of PW 1 was, right from the beginning, not honest and he kept on promising that he will marry her, till she became pregnant. This kind of consent obtained by the accused cannot be said to be any consent because she was under a misconception of fact that the accused intends to marry her, therefore, she had submitted to sexual intercourse with him. This fact is also admitted by the accused that he had committed sexual intercourse which is apparent from the testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and before the panchayat of elders of the village. It is more than clear that the accused made a false promise that he would marry her. Therefore, the intention of the accused right from the beginning was not bona fide and the poor girl submitted to the lust of the accused, completely being misled by the accused who held out the promise for marriage. This kind of consent taken by the accused with clear intention not to 7 fulfil the promise and persuading the girl to believe that he is going to marry her and obtained her consent for the sexual intercourse under total misconception, cannot be treated to be a consent.” 16.* Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati1 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 682-84, paras 21 & 24) “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. 24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the 1 Deepak Gulati V. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 8 initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, *unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her*.” (emphasis supplied) 17.In Uday v. State of Karnataka2 the complainant was a college- going student when the accused promised to marry her. In the complainant’s statement, she admitted that she was aware that there would be significant opposition from both the complainant’s and accused’s families to the proposed marriage. She engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused but nonetheless kept the relationship secret from her family. The Court observed that in these circumstances the accused’s promise to marry the complainant was not of immediate relevance to the complainant’s decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, which was motivated by other factors: (SCC p. 58, para 25) “25. There is yet another difficulty which faces the prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Secondly, it must 2 (2003) 4 SCC 46 9 be proved that the person who obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception. We have serious doubts that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. There was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix had consented to having sexual intercourse with him only as a consequence of her belief, based on his promise, that they will get married in due course. There is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the contrary, the circumstances of the case tend to support the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the result of their deep love for each other. It is not disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often, and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him liberties which, if at all, are permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 o’clock in the night. It usually happens in such cases, when two young persons are madly in love, that they promise to each other several times that come what may, they will get married.” (emphasis supplied) 18.* To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to Section 10 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.” 11. In the case of Deepak Gulati Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 675, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that :- “21.Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives. 11 22. In Deelip Singh it has been observed as under: (SCC p. 99, para 19) "19. The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are from the point of view of the victim. The second part of Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the point of view of the accused. It envisages that the accused too has knowledge or has reason to believe that the consent was given by the victim in consequence of fear of injury or misconception of fact. Thus, the second part lays emphasis on the knowledge or reasonable belief of the person who obtains the tainted consent. The requirements of both the parts should be cumulatively satisfied. In other words, the court has to see whether the person giving the consent had given it under fear of injury or misconception of fact and the court should also be satisfied that the person doing the act i.e. the alleged offender, is conscious of the fact or should have reason to think that but for the fear or misconception, the consent would not have been given. This is the scheme of Section 90 which is couched in negative terminology." 23. This Court, while deciding Pradeep Kumar, placed reliance upon the judgment of the Madras High Court in N. Jaladu, In re^6, wherein it has been observed: (Pradeep Kumar case, SCC pp. 418-19, para 11) "11. '26. ... "... We are of opinion that the expression 'under a misconception of fact' is broad enough to include all cases where the consent is obtained by misrepresentation; the misrepresentation should be regarded as leading to a misconception of the facts with reference to which the consent is given. In Section 3 of the Evidence Act Illustration (d) [states] that a person has a certain intention is treated as a fact. So, here the fact about which the second and third prosecution witnesses were made to entertain a misconception was 12 the fact that the second accused intended to get the girl married. ... 'thus ... if the consent of the person from whose possession the girl is taken is obtained by fraud, the taking is deemed to be against the will of such a person'. ... Although in cases of contracts a consent obtained by coercion or fraud is only voidable by the party affected by it, the effect of Section 90 IPC is that such consent cannot, under the criminal law, be availed of to justify what would otherwise be an offence." (N. Jaladu, In re case, ILR pp. 456-57)' (Deelip Singh case, SCC pp. 101-02, para 26)" 24.Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” 12. From perusal of the FIR lodged by the victim annexed at Page No. 26 of the petition and her written complaint at Page No. 31, it is the case of the victim herself that at the time of marriage ceremony, some dispute arose between the parties with respect to playing band. It is necessary here to take notice of the relevant part of the report made by the victim which reads as under :- 13 “bl izdkj nksuksa ifjokj ds }kjk esjs vkSj xxxx dk fookg frfFk 17-05-24 ls 19-05-24 rd r; fd;k x;k FkkA fnukad 19-05-2024 dks xxxx dh ckjkr yxHkx 100 yksx djhcu 6&7 cts xzke igqpkA jkf= esa vk’khokZn Hkkst Vhdkou dk dk;Zdze py jgk FkkA jkf= djhcu 1&2 cts ds e/; yxu Hkkaoj jLe dk dk;Zdze eaMi ds ckgj gksuk Fkk ogh Ckktk ctkus ds laca/k esa nksuks i{k esa okn&fookn gksus ls xxxx }kjk fookg dk;Zdze iw.kZ gksus ds igys gh vius ifjokj ,oa ckjkfr;ks ds lkFk eaMi NksMdj pys x;sA mDr d`R; ls eSa dkQh fopfyr rFkk ijs’kku gks xbZ FkhA fQj eSa fnukad 21-05-2024 dks xxxx ls eqykdkr ,oa ckrphr djus mlds fuokl LFkku xzke cksjnk lDrh xbZ FkhA ckrphr djus dh iz;kl dh ij ckrphr ugh gks ik;kA” 13. Similarly is the statement of the victim under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. and it is also the statement of her mother, brother, sister in law and other persons who were present in marriage ceremony of the victim as well as the petitioner. The settlement of marriage between the parties, the marriage procession and the marriage functions are not disputed by the victim and it is her case also that some dispute arose at the time of marriage ceremony regarding playing band and then the quarrel took place between the parties. It is not a case where the marriage with the victim but he proceeded up to marriage functions with the victim. In the present petition, a marriage card was also annexed by the petitioner which is at Page No. 66 and the photographs of the marriage functions have also been annexed at Annexure- P/3 annexed at Page No. 160 on words including the marriage cards. When the notices were issued to the Respondent No. 2/ victim, she filed her affidavit that she does not want to pursue her complaint further and due to dispute arose between the parties, she felt deeply insulted and embarrassed and therefore, she lodged the FIR against the petitioner. 14. From the peculiar facts of the present case as well as the low laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, it is not a case where the petitioner was not intended to marry with the victim or have not 14 fulfilled his promise even if it is accepted that he made physical relation with the victim on the pretext of marriage, however, the fact clearly demonstrates that the petitioner proceeded for marriage and it is only when some dispute arose at the time of marriage ceremony with respect to playing band, the marriage ceremony could not be completed. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the admitted factual position emerging from the record, the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2 expressing her unwillingness to pursue the matter further, and the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions, this Court is of the considered opinion that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Accordingly, this Court deems it a fit case for exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. 16. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The charge-sheet including the FIR No. 15/2024 filed before the JMFC, Dondilohara, Dist- Balod, under Section 366, 376, 506 and 376 (2)(n) of IPC and the entire Criminal Case (i.e. Criminal Case No. 1058/2024) and all further proceedings arising therefrom, are hereby quashed. 17. The petition stands allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Sagrika