1 / 11 CGHC010434352025 2026:CGHC:31802 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR S.A. No. 579 of 2025 Nirupa Bai @ Kanti, D/o Resham Singh, aged about 45 years, R/o Village Chinvaridand, Thana And Tahsil Manendragarh, Distt. Manendragarh- Chirmiri- Bharatpur, C.G. Through Power Of Attorney Holder Devendra Kumar Aged About 63 Years, S/o Shri Patpal , By Caste Gadriya, R/o Village Chinvaridand, Thana And Tahsil Manendragarh, Distt. Manendragarh- Chirmiri- Bharatpur, C.G. ...Appellant Versus 1. Indrajit Kaur, W/o Late Shri Narendrajit Saini, aged about 51 years, R/o Bus Stand, Ward No. 11, Manendragarh, Distt. M.C.B. C.G. 2. Simran Saini, D/o Late Narendrajit Saini, aged about 31 years, R/o Plot No. 36, Diamond Colony, Saraswati Nagar, Behind Hotel The Lalit, Jaipur Rajasthan 3. Siran Saini, D/o Late Shri Narendrajit Saini, aged about 11 years, Being Minor Through Natural Guardian Mother Indrajit Kaur, Aged About 51 Years, W/o Defendants Late Shri Narendrajit Saini, R/o Bus Stand, Ward No. 11, Manendragarh, Distt. M.C.B. C.G. 4. D.P. Singh, S/o Jeevan Singh, aged about 57 years, R/o Village Bajag, Distt. Dindori M.P. At Present R/o Village Mevra, Tahsil Katghora, Distt. Korba, C.G. 5. The State of Chhattisgarh Through Its Collector, Distt. M.C.B., C.G. 6. Rajendra Singh @ Ram Singh, S/o Chotelal, R/o Village Manendragarh, Distt. M.C.B., C.G. ...Respondents For Appellant : Shri Parag Kotecha, Advocate For Respondent No.6 : Shri Hemant Kumar Agrawal, Advocate. For Respondent/State : Shri Jaiprakash Tiwari, PL. 2 / 11 (Hon’ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput) Order on Board 24.07.2026 This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) has been filed by the appellant assailing legality, validity and correctness of the judgment and decree dated 12.08.2025 passed by Learned First District Judge, Manendragarh, District Korea (henceforth “First Appellate Court”) in Civil Appeal No. 6-A/2024. By the impugned judgment and decree the First Appeal filed by respondents No. 1 to 4/defendants was dismissed, and the judgment and decree dated 30.04.2024 passed by II Civil Judge Class-I, Manendragarh, District Korea (henceforth “trial Court”) in Civil Suit No. 1-A/2019 was affirmed. Appellant herein was never impleaded as party either before the trial Court or before the First Appellate Court. 2. An application (IA No. 02/2025) seeking permission to file the present appeal has been filed by the appellant, which is being decided by this Court. 3. Facts necessary for adjudication of the said application are briefly stated as under:- 3.1 Respondent No. 6 Rajendra Singh alias Ram Singh who happens to be the plaintiff had filed a Civil Suit before the trial Court initially arraying Narendrajeet Saini S/o Dharamjeet Saini, D.P. Singh and the Chhattisgarh Government as the defendants, for declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property comprising Khasra No. 177/2 and 178 area 0.049 and 0.162 hectare (total area 0.211 hectare) situate at village Chainpur, Tehsil Manendragarh, District Manednragarh-Chirmiri- Bharatpur, CG. 3.2 As per the pleadings, as at the relevant time the plaintiff namely Rajendra Singh alias Ram Singh was minor, the suit property was purchased in his name by his mother. The money for purchasing the land was arranged by the maternal grand parents of the plaintiff. During the pendency of the suit the original defendant Narendrajeet Saini passed away and his legal heirs namely Indrajeet Kaur, Simran Saini and Siran Saini were brought on record. It is stated that when the plaintiff was minor, the original defendant Narendrajeet Saini playing fraud with his illiterate father executed the sale deed in favour of original defendant No.2 namely D.P. Singh on 29.03.1990 without obtaining permission for doing that. It is stated that the plaintiff was not aware with respect to sale of the suit property. It is stated 3 / 11 that father of the plaintiff neither knew original defendant No.2 nor he ever saw him as he never resided at Manendragarh. It is further stated that as the father of the plaintiff had no right to execute the sale deed, it is void abinitio, and for that the original defendants No. 1 and 2 do not derive any right, title or interest over the suit property. It is pleaded that defendant No.2 never appeared in any Court nor is he the actual buyer and being that it was the benami transaction. 4. The defendants filed their written statement, issues were framed by the trial Court and eventually vide judgment and decree dated 30.04.2024 the suit was decreed. The relevant portion of the decree passed by the trial Court reads as under:- “It is order and decreed that - 1. That The suit of the Plaintiff against the defendants is accepted hereby 2. The Plaintiff is declared as owner of suit land khasra no. 177/2 and 178 area 0.211 hectare situated at Village Chainpur, Tahsil Manendragarh District M.C.B. 3. The Plaintiff is entitled for possession of khasra no. 177/2 and 178 area 0.211 hectare situated at Village Chainpur, Tahsil Manendragarh District M.C.B.. 4. Possession of khasra no. 177/2 and 178 area0.211 hectare situated at Village Chainpur, Tahsil Manendragarh District M.C.B. shall be given to the Plaintiff in due course of law. 5. Sale deed executed on 29/03/1990 is declared null and void ab initio hereby. 6. As per Section 31 of Specific Relief Act a copy of decree send towards the Registrar Manendragarh in whose office the instrument (Sale deed executed on 29/03/1990 between Chotelaal and D.P. Singh) has been so registered regarding to note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation. 7. Looking to the nature of the case, success and defeat of parties, the parties shall bear their own cost. 8. Counsel s fees as per Rule 179 and Rule 523-535 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Courts Rules and Orders or as certified and whichever is less. 9. On getting the advocate fee certified, whichever is less as per the list, will be payable as per rules.” 5. The suit was instituted on 18.09.2018. During the pendency of the suit, the suit property was purchased by the appellant herein on 27.08.2019 by a registered sale deed executed by defendant No. 2 D.P. Singh through his general power of attorney holder Anil Kumar. The trial Court passed the aforesaid decree on 30.04.2024, and by that time the appellant herein had not moved any application before the trial Court for arraying herself as one of the defendants to the suit. The said judgment and decree was put to challenge by respondents No. 1 to 4/ defendants. During the pendency of First Appeal it appears that an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC was filed by the appellant herein on 18.07.2025 for 4 / 11 impleading herself as one of the defendants as necessary party, which was dismissed by the District Judge on 31.07.2025. Ultimately the impugned judgment and decree came to be passed on 12.08.2025 by the First Appellate Court. 6. As the application of the appellant herein filed under order I Rule 10 CPC was rejected by the District Judge and she could not be arrayed as defendant in the First Appeal, she filed this appeal along with an application seeking permission to file the same. It is stated in the said application that the appellant is a necessary and proper party in the proceeding, however, learned District Judge has illegally rejected the said application and not permitted her to participate in the appellate proceedings. It is stated that the appellant was not aware of pendency of the civil proceedings and thus she could not file the said application earlier. It is stated that after rejection of the application by the District Judge final judgment and decree was passed, she has filed this appeal along with the said application (IA No.2/2025). It is pleaded that the suit property was purchased by the appellant by registered sale deed dated 27.08.2019 from respondent No. 4 herein. Thus the prayer has been made to allow the said application to permit the appellant to present this appeal. 7. Reply to the aforesaid application has been filed by plaintiff/respondent No.6 stating that the application filed by the appellant to present the second appeal is totally misconceived, devoid of merit and hit by the doctrine of lis pendens as provided under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. It is stated that the genuineness of the sale deed dated 29.03.1990 executed in favour of defendant D.P. Singh is highly doubtful. It is stated that defendant D.P. Singh throughout the proceedings remained ex parte and never appeared before any revenue or civil Court. It is stated that as the predecessor-in-title D.P. Singh had no valid title, appellant herein cannot acquire any better and independent title over the suit property separate from him. It is stated that the respondent No.6/plaintiff instituted the civil suit for title and possession on 18.09.2018 whereas the appellant is stated to have purchased the suit property on 27.08.2019. It is stated that since the said transaction took place during the pendency of the suit, the appellant is a transferee pendente lite and is bound by the judgment and decree passed against her predecessor-in-title namely D.P. Singh. It is stated that the original sale deed dated 29.03.1990 executed in favour of D.P. 5 / 11 Singh is highly doubtful as per paragraph No. 37 of the judgment passed by the trial Court. It is further stated that the appellant is not the bona fide purchaser of the suit property, and the application for impleadment was rightly rejected. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that being the bona fide purchaser of the suit property, right to challenge the impugned judgment and decree vests in the appellant, and thus her application for permission to file the present appeal deserves to be allowed. It is stated that even if the property was purchased by her during the pendency of the civil suit, she was a necessary party and her right, title and interest over the suit property is not put to jeopardy. In support of his submission, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of H. Anjanappa and others v. A. Prabhakar and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 183 as also the decision of this Court rendered in batch of Writ Petitions, WPC No. 1287 of 2015, being the lead one on 11.05.2026. 8. Per contra, Shri Hemant Agrawal learned counsel for respondent No. 6/plaintiff opposes the submission of Shri Kotecha. He however made the submission in the light of his reply to the application seeking permission to file the present appeal. It is submitted that as the appellant is not the bona fide purchaser, Learned trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court passed the judgment and decree in favour of plaintiff/respondent No.6. He submits that the suit property was purchased by the appellant during pendency of the suit therefore the principle of lis pendens provided under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would come into play. He submits that the appellant never made any effort to array herself as party before the trial Court and even in the First Appellate Court the application for that purpose was filed at the fag end. He submits that the first appellate Court while rejecting the application has observed that power of attorney holder of D.P. Singh himself appeared before the Court and stated that he does not know D.P. Singh and denied the execution of the sale deed dated 27.08.2019. He submits that lis has to come to an end somewhere. He submits that as the appellant is not the bona fide purchaser of the suit property, the application filed by her for permission to file the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. To support his contention, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the matter of Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and others reported in (2008) 7 SCC 144 6 / 11 and in the matter of Shingara Singh v. Daljit Singh and another rendered on 14.10.2024 in Civil Appeal No. 5919 of 2023. 9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record including the judgments and decree passed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court. 10. The main thrust of the argument of Shri Kotecha revolves around the fact that the appellant purchased the suit property on 27.08.2019 and thus she acquired the title of the suit property by virtue of sale deed and in order to prove the fact that the appellant is bona fide purchaser and could protect his title, an opportunity was to be given to her to assail the judgment and decree. He has attacked the order passed by the District Judge rejecting his application filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC impleading herself as appellant. 11. Learned counsel for respondent No.6/plaintiff makes the submission that the sale deed was executed during pendency of the civil suit and thus principles of lis pendens provided under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would come into play. He submits that as the appellant never made any effort to array herself as party before the trial Court and even in the First Appellate Court, the application for impleading herself as party was filed at the fag end and therefore the application was rightly rejected. For ready reference Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:- “52. Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.— During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or 7 / 11 discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.” 12. Perusal of the order passed by the District Judge rejecting the application filed under order I Rule 10 CPC would clearly speak that learned District Judge has considered the provision of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and observed that in case the judgment passed by the Civil Judge is affirmed the subsequent sale deed 27.08.2019 would be rendered as null and void automatically, and in case the judgment and decree of Civil Judge is set aside it would be considered valid. It is observed that right of the appellant herein cannot be adjudicated at this stage. It is further observed that power of attorney appeared before the Court and denied knowing D.P. Singh being executant of the sale deed but admitted his signature on the sale deed, and thus found that the appellant was not the necessary party. 13. Dealing with the case involving an identical issue, the Supreme Court in the matter of H. Anjanappa and others (supra) has observed that though not brought on record under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, the lis pendens transferee is entitled to seek leave to appeal against the final decree passed against the transferor. However, whether to grant such leave or not is within the discretion of the court and such discretion should be exercised judiciously in the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant portion thereof reads as under:- “58. From a conspectus of all the aforesaid judgments, touching upon the present aspect, broadly, the following would emerge: i. First, for the purpose of impleading a transferee pendente lite, the facts and circumstances should be gone into and basing on the necessary facts, the Court can permit such a party to come on record, either under Order I Rule 10 CPC or under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, as a general principle; ii. Secondly, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on record as a matter of right; iii. Thirdly, there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party; 8 / 11 iv. Fourthly, the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would depend upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the material available on record; v. Fifthly, where a transferee pendente lite does not ask for leave to come on record, that would obviously be at his peril, and the suit may be improperly conducted by the plaintiff on record; vi. Sixthly, merely because such transferee pendente lite does not come on record, the concept of him (transferee pendente lite) not being bound by the judgment does not arise and consequently he would be bound by the result of the litigation, though he remains unrepresented; vii. Seventhly, the sale transaction pendente lite is hit by the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act; and, viii. Eighthly, a transferee pendente lite, being an assignee of interest in the property, as envisaged under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC, can seek leave of the Court to come record on his own or at the instance of either party to the suit.” 14. Thus perusal of the aforesaid decision would indicate that the Courts have ample power to allow the lis pendens transferee to come on record, with the leave of the Court. 15. Perusal of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court Judge would indicate that 08 issues were framed. Issue No. 1 is in respect of ownership of the suit property, issue No. 2 is with respect to illegal possession of the suit property and issue No. 4 was with respect to declaring the sale deed dated 27.08.2019 as void abinito. While deciding issue No. 4 learned trial Court has considered the plaintiff’s averment that at the time of execution of sale deed 29.03.1990 he was minor and thus the sale deed is void. Fraudulent execution of the sale deed in the name of the non existing buyer was also considered. Learned trial Court also discussed whether the plaintiff’s father has right to alienate the suit property of the minor. Quoting provision of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and the evidence on record decided learned trial Court the issue in favour of the plaintiff. Learned trial Court has also observed that respondent No.4/defendant D.P. Singh remained ex parte in the initial stage of the suit and he never appeared before the Court nor in the revenue case. Learned trial Court has also observed that respondent No.4/defendant has not produced any document regarding identity of defendant No.2 and 9 / 11 ultimately in paragraph No. 38 of the judgment it has been held that the suit land belongs to minor and without permission of the Court it was sold and identity of the power of attorney was never revealed in the case. Sale deed so executed was thus held to be the part of fraudulent transaction. This finding of fact has eventually been affirmed by the First Appellate Court. 16. Now this Court has to consider whether despite suit property being purchased by the appellant herein during the pendency of the suit she should be allowed to file appeal and can be held as necessary party in the proceeding. In the case of Usha Sinha (supra) has observed that the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to the alienation of the suit property during the pendency of the suit irrespective of the fact that purchaser/alienees had no notice of the pending proceeding. Relevant portion thereof reads as under:- “18. It is thus settled law that a purchaser of suit property during the pendency of litigation has no right to resist or obstruct execution of decree passed by a competent Court. The doctrine of 'lis pendens' prohibits a party from dealing with the property which is the subject matter of suit. 'Lis pendens' itself is treated as constructive notice to a purchaser that he is bound by a decree to be entered in the pending suit. Rule 102, therefore, clarifies that there should not be resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. It declares that if the resistance is caused or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, he cannot seek benefit of Rule 98 or 100 of Order XXI. 23. So far as the present case is concerned, the facts are no more in dispute. As already noted earlier, Title Suit No. 140 of 1999 was instituted by the respondent-plaintiff on April 10, 1999. Thus, the litigation was pending in respect of the property and the matter was sub-judice. The appellant thereafter purchased the property from original defendant Nos. 4 and 5 by a registered sale deed on February 15, 2000 i.e. during the pendency of the suit. It is also not in dispute that ex- parte decree came to be passed against the defendants on May 24, 2001. In the situation, in our considered opinion, the doctrine of lis pendens would apply to the transaction in question, and the High Court was wholly right in holding that the case was covered by Rule 102 of Order XXI of the Code. The appellant could not seek protection of pendency of suit instituted by her. The Executing Court was not justified in granting stay of execution 10 / 11 proceedings. The High Court was, hence, right in setting aside the order of the Executing Court.” 17. Further in the case of Sanjay Verma vs Manik Roy And Ors reported in (2006) 13 SCC 608 it has been held by the Supreme Court as under:- “12 The principles specified in Section 52 of the T.P. Act are in accordance with equity, good conscience or justice because they rest upon an equitable and just foundation that it will be impossible to bring an action or suit to a successful termination if alienations are permitted to prevail. A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. The principle of lis pendens embodied in Section 52 of the T.P. Act being a principle of public policy, no question of good faith or bona fide arises. The principle underlying Section 52 is that a litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. The mere pendency of a suit does not prevent one of the parties from dealing with the property constituting the subject matter of the suit. The Section only postulates a condition that the alienation will in no manner affect the rights of the other party under any decree which may be passed in the suit unless the property was alienated with the permission of the Court.” 18. Perusal of the sale deed itself is part of the record executed in favour of the appellant by the power of attorney would indicate that if on account of any error the suit land or a part thereof gets out of the ownership or possession of the buyer, the seller would be responsible to make up the loss which the buyer shall be entitled to get from his movable and immovable property. Sale deed also shows the suit land to be free from all encumbrances. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant brought on record to persuade this Court that she is the bona fide purchaser and has her right, title and interest to challenge the judgment and decree, but this Court is not persuaded with the same. As held by the Supreme Court in H. Anjanappa and others (supra) that a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to come on record as a matter of right; there is no absolute rule that such a transferee pendente lite, with the leave of the Court should, in all cases, be allowed to come on record as a party; that the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite would depend upon the nature of the suit and appreciation of the material available on record. However, whether to grant such leave or not is within the discretion of the court and such discretion should be exercised judiciously 11 / 11 in the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case in hand the litigation is pending since 18.09.2018 but till that time despite the purchase of the suit property the appellant has not filed any application for impleadment in the suit before passing of the judgment and decree by the trial Court. Such application was filed at the fag end of the first appeal. Learned trial Court found the execution of initial sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 fraudulently and also doubted existence of identity of defendant No. 2. Admittedly, the plaintiff was minor at the time of initial execution of the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 by father and it does not appear that any permission was taken from the Competent Court before the sale deed was executed. While deciding the application under Order I Rule 10 CPC learned First Appellate Court has also observed that the appellant is neither necessary nor proper party. Recital of the sale deed also indicates that if any loss is caused, the appellant is entitled for reimbursement of the same. Thus in the opinion of this Court the lis has to come to an end somewhere and therefore in the light of the aforesaid decisions of the supreme Court and the observations made above, this Court is of the opinion that the application cannot be allowed. It is thus dismissed. 20. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost. Sd/- (Sachin Singh Rajput) Judge Jyotishi AVANISH JYOTISHI Digitally signed by AVANISH JYOTISHI Date: 2026.07.27 17:34:50 +0530