1 CGHC010265392026 2026:CGHC:31797 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 5419 of 2026 Vimal Koshe S/o- Late Lallu- B, Aged About 43 Years R/o- Dongargarh, Ward No. 6, Krishna Nagar, Railway Colony, District- Rajnandgaon Chhattisgarh. Presently Posted As A Driver (Head Constable) At Kabirdham City Kotwali, District- Kabirdham Chhattisgarh Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Department Of Home Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Director General Of Police (D G P ), Police Head Quarters, Chhattisgarh, Sector 19, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District- Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Inspector General Of Police (I G), Rajnandgaon Range, District- Rajnandgaon, C G Kumhari, District- Durg Chhattisgarh 4 - Superintendent Of Police (S P) District- Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from the Case Information System) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. S.K. Singh Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Suyasdhar Badgaiya, GA (HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU) Order on Board 24/07/2026 1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition calling in question the legality and validity of the order dated 22.06.2026 passed by respondent RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.07.27 13:37:18 +0530 2 No.2 whereby the earlier order dated 15.09.2013, transferring the petitioner from the 18th Battalion, Chhattisgarh Armed Force, Manendragarh to District Rajnandgaon, has been recalled. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner, while serving in the Chhattisgarh Armed Force, was transferred to District Rajnandgaon by order dated 15.09.2013 after the competent authority considered his request in respect of the illness of his mother. It is contended that the said arrangement continued uninterruptedly for more than twelve years and, therefore, the respondents were not justified in recalling the same after such an inordinate lapse of time. Referring to Section 9 of the Chhattisgarh Special Armed Force Act, 1968 (for short, "the Act, 1968"), learned counsel submits that the statute itself contemplates transfer of personnel from the Armed Force to the District Executive Force and vice versa. It is, therefore, argued that the reason assigned in the impugned order, namely, that both establishments are governed by different recruitment rules and service conditions, is contrary to the statutory scheme. On these submissions, it is prayed that the impugned order deserves to be quashed. 3. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that although Section 9 of the Act, 1968 enables transfer between the Chhattisgarh Armed Force and the District Executive Force, such power can be exercised only by the State Government or an officer specifically authorized by it. Inviting attention to paragraph 8 of the return and Annexure R/2 dated 16.01.1989, it is submitted that no authorization has ever been issued by 3 the State Government empowering either the Director General of Police or the Inspector General of Police to order such transfer. It is further submitted that the order dated 15.09.2013 was issued on the petitioner's own request on humanitarian considerations owing to the illness of his mother and not in exercise of any statutory power under Section 9 of the Act, 1968. Therefore, by the impugned order the respondents have rightly canceled the earlier order. It is, thus, submitted that no interference is warranted in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions and perused the pleadings as well as the documents placed on record, particularly the provisions contained in Section 9 of the Act, 1968 and the Circular dated 16.01.1989 (Annexure R/2). 5. A plain reading of Section 9 of the Act, 1968 leaves no manner of doubt that transfer of a member of the Chhattisgarh Armed Force to the District Executive Force, and vice versa, can be effected only by the State Government or by an officer authorized by the State Government. The statute, therefore, makes the existence of a valid authorization a condition precedent for exercise of such power. 6. In the present case, the respondents have specifically pleaded in their return, duly supported by an affidavit, that no notification, order or authorization has ever been issued by the State Government empowering either the Director General of Police or the Inspector General of Police to exercise the power contemplated under Section 9 of the Act, 1968. 4 The said stand is fortified by Annexure R/2 dated 16.01.1989. Once such a specific plea was raised by the respondents, the burden shifted upon the petitioner to demonstrate the existence of any statutory authorization in favour of the Director General of Police. However, except placing reliance upon Section 9 of the Act, 1968, the petitioner has not been able to produce any notification, executive order or statutory instrument conferring such authority upon the Director General of Police. 7. A perusal of Annexure P/1 further reveals that the petitioner's transfer from the Chhattisgarh Armed Force to District Rajnandgaon was ordered by the Director General of Police on the petitioner's own request made on account of the illness of his mother. The humanitarian circumstances under which the order came to be issued are not in dispute. Nevertheless, compassion or administrative convenience cannot enlarge the statutory powers of an authority. The source of power must necessarily be traceable to the statute and not merely to equitable considerations. 8. Merely because the order dated 15.09.2013 remained operative for a considerable period would not, by itself, validate an administrative action which has not been shown to possess statutory sanction. Likewise, no legal or enforceable right can be founded upon an order whose issuance is not shown to be supported by the authority contemplated under the statute. 9. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the respondents found that the order dated 15.09.2013 had not been shown to have been issued by an authority competent under Section 9 of the Act, 1968, they cannot be 5 faulted for recalling the same by the impugned order dated 22.06.2026. The impugned order merely restores the position envisaged under the statutory framework. The reasons assigned therein neither suffer from arbitrariness nor disclose any perversity or legal infirmity warranting interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 10. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has failed to establish any statutory violation, arbitrariness, mala fides or jurisdictional infirmity in the impugned order dated 22.06.2026 so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (BIBHU DATTA GURU) JUDGE 𝓡𝓪𝓱𝓾𝓵