CWP-19947 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT (123) M/S PUNJAB RICE LAND PRIVATE LTD. PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, ANR. CORAM: HON'BLE Present: KIRTI SINGH CRM-10466 annexed at Annexures P exceptions. Main Case (1) cast under dated 22.04.2026 (Annexure P Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar, in Reference No.05 of 2019, whereby the reference was answered in favour of respondent holding him entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service, full back wages and all consequential benefits. (2) 19947-2026 (O&M) -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH M/S PUNJAB RICE LAND PRIVATE LTD. Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Mr. Ravi Gakhar, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SINGH, J. (ORAL) 10466-2026 The application is allowed as prayed for and the documents annexed at Annexures P-11 to P-18 are taken on record subject to all just exceptions. Main Case The petitioner-Management, by way of the instant writ petition, cast under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, assails the Award dated 22.04.2026 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar, in Reference No.05 of 2019, whereby the reference was answered in favour of respondent holding him entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service, full back wages and all consequential benefits. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP-19947-2026 (O&M) Date of Decision: 06.07.2026 M/S PUNJAB RICE LAND PRIVATE LTD. ......Petitioner Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL, AMRITSAR AND .....Respondent MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH , Advocate for the petitioner. The application is allowed as prayed for and the documents 18 are taken on record subject to all just Management, by way of the instant writ petition, Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, assails the Award 1) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar, in Reference No.05 of 2019, whereby the reference was answered in favour of respondent No.2-workman, thereby holding him entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service, full back Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent 6 ......Petitioner AND .....Respondents The application is allowed as prayed for and the documents 18 are taken on record subject to all just Management, by way of the instant writ petition, Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, assails the Award 1) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Amritsar, in Reference No.05 of 2019, whereby the workman, thereby holding him entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service, full back Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent- SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19947 workman was initially engaged in the year 2012, admittedly left service on 30.04.2017, and after a break of approximately six months, joined afresh on 01.11.2017. It is urged that the dispute pertains only to this subsequent spell of employment, which came submits that the learned Tribunal, while returning a finding that the respondent Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, erroneously equated the calendar span between 01.11.2017 and 30.06.2018 with actual days worked. Reliance is placed on Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225; SCC 25; (2005) 8 SCC 750 (2006) 1 SCC 106 workman to prove completion of 240 days through cogent evidence. (3) perused the record. (4) the respondent corroborated by the wage credit for the entire period stage, a g Hon’ble S Banking Corporation v. Management of American Exp International Banking Corporation, (1985) 4 SCC 71 passing o 19947-2026 (O&M) -2- workman was initially engaged in the year 2012, admittedly left service on 30.04.2017, and after a break of approximately six months, joined afresh on 01.11.2017. It is urged that the dispute pertains only to this subsequent spell of employment, which came to an end on 30.06.2018. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal, while returning a finding that the respondent-workman had completed 240 days of continuous service under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, erroneously equated the calendar span between 01.11.2017 and 30.06.2018 with actual days worked. Reliance is placed on Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225; Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 Surenderanagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, (2005) 8 SCC 750 and R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, (2006) 1 SCC 106, to submit further that the initial burden lies upon the workman to prove completion of 240 days through cogent evidence. This Court has heard learned counsel for the p perused the record. Adverting to the facts of the present c the respondent-workman's evidence by way of affidavit (Ex.WW corroborated by the bank statement (Ex.W wage credit for the entire period precedi gainful reference can be made Supreme Court in Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Exp International Banking Corporation, (1985) 4 SCC 71 observations with regard to the i workman was initially engaged in the year 2012, admittedly left service on 30.04.2017, and after a break of approximately six months, joined afresh on 01.11.2017. It is urged that the dispute pertains only to this subsequent spell to an end on 30.06.2018. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal, while returning a finding that the workman had completed 240 days of continuous service under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, erroneously equated the calendar span between 01.11.2017 and 30.06.2018 with actual days worked. Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 Surenderanagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, and R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, that the initial burden lies upon the workman to prove completion of 240 days through cogent evidence. This Court has heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Adverting to the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that workman's evidence by way of affidavit (Ex.WW-1) was tatement (Ex.W-2), reflecting continuous monthly ing the alleged termination. At t e to the judgment passed by Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, (1985) 4 SCC 71, wherein wh interpretation of Section 25, it w workman was initially engaged in the year 2012, admittedly left service on 30.04.2017, and after a break of approximately six months, joined afresh on 01.11.2017. It is urged that the dispute pertains only to this subsequent spell to an end on 30.06.2018. Learned counsel submits that the learned Tribunal, while returning a finding that the workman had completed 240 days of continuous service under Section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, erroneously equated the calendar span between 01.11.2017 and 30.06.2018 with actual days worked. Mohan Lal v. Management of Bharat Electronics Range Forest Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 Surenderanagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, and R.M. Yellatti v. Assistant Executive Engineer, that the initial burden lies upon the and ase, it is not in dispute that 1) was 2), reflecting continuous monthly this the Workmen of American Express International ress hile was SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19947 held as un (5) abandonment since the year 2019, remained uncorroborated by way of any documentary evidence, including an attendance register, muster roll, leave record other document containing the respondent prima f 19947-2026 (O&M) -3- nder:- “xxxxx 5. Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act is plainly intended to give relief to retrenched workmen. The qualification for relief Under Section 25-F employed in an industry and has b less than one year under an employer. What is continuous service has been defined and explained in Disputes Act. In the present case, the is Section 25-B(2)(a)(ii) which to the extent that it concerns us, provides that a workman who is not in continuous service for a period of one year shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if the calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. The expression which we are required to construe is 'actually worked under the employer'. This expression, according to us, cannot mean those days only when me workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen, but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc. The learned counsel for the Management would urge that only those days which are mentioned in the Explanation to Section 25- purpose of calculating the number of days on which the workmen had actually worked though he had not so worked and no other days. We do not think that we are entitled to so constrain the construction of the expression 'actu employer'. The explanation is only clarificatory, as all explanations are, and cannot be used to limit the expanse of the main provision. If the expression 'actually worked under the employer' is capable of comprehending the days duri employment and was paid wages construe the expression-there is no reason why the expression should be limited by the explanation. To give it any other meaning then what we have done would bring the F very close to frustration. It is not necessary to give examples of how 25 F may be frustrated as they are too obvious to be stated. Moreover, the plea of incomplete service and voluntary abandonment since the year 2019, raised by the petitioner remained uncorroborated by way of any documentary evidence, including attendance register, muster roll, leave record document containing particulars of even a single date of absence the respondent-workman. In these circumstances, facie established that the prereq of the Industrial Disputes Act is plainly intended to give relief to retrenched workmen. The qualification for F. is that he should be a workman employed in an industry and has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. What is continuous service has been defined and explained in Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, the provision which is of reliance B(2)(a)(ii) which to the extent that it concerns us, provides that a workman who is not in continuous service for a period of one year shall be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. The expression which we are required to rked under the employer'. This expression, according to us, cannot mean those days only when me workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen, but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc. The learned counsel for the Management would urge that only those days which are mentioned in the -B(2) should be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of days on which the workmen had actually worked though he had not so worked and no other days. We do not think that we are entitled to so constrain the construction of the expression 'actually worked under the employer'. The explanation is only clarificatory, as all explanations are, and cannot be used to limit the expanse of the main provision. If the expression 'actually worked under the employer' is capable of comprehending the days during which the workman was in employment and was paid wages-and we see no impediment to so there is no reason why the expression should be limited by the explanation. To give it any other meaning then what we have done would bring the object of Section 25 very close to frustration. It is not necessary to give examples of how 25 F may be frustrated as they are too obvious to be stated. incomplete service and voluntary raised by the petitioner-management, remained uncorroborated by way of any documentary evidence, including attendance register, muster roll, leave record, wage register, or any particulars of even a single date of absence In these circumstances, since the workman h quisite of 240 days of service h of the Industrial Disputes Act is plainly intended to give relief to retrenched workmen. The qualification for . is that he should be a workman een in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. What is continuous service of the Industrial provision which is of reliance B(2)(a)(ii) which to the extent that it concerns us, provides that a workman who is not in continuous service for a period of one year shall be deemed to be in continuous service for workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. The expression which we are required to rked under the employer'. This expression, according to us, cannot mean those days only when me workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen, but must necessarily comprehend all those days during which he was in the employment had been paid wages either under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders etc. The learned counsel for the Management would urge that only those days which are mentioned in the ld be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of days on which the workmen had actually worked though he had not so worked and no other days. We do not think that we are entitled to so constrain the ally worked under the employer'. The explanation is only clarificatory, as all explanations are, and cannot be used to limit the expanse of the main provision. If the expression 'actually worked under the employer' is capable of ng which the workman was in and we see no impediment to so there is no reason why the expression should be limited by the explanation. To give it any other meaning Section 25- very close to frustration. It is not necessary to give examples of how 25 F may be frustrated as they are too obvious to be stated. incomplete service and voluntary management, remained uncorroborated by way of any documentary evidence, including , or any particulars of even a single date of absence of had had SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19947 been m was no to interfere with the Tribunal's finding that the workman 240 days of service observed that the employer was no evidence to prove that notice/charge sheet had been issued to the respondent alleged absence favour of the respondent (6) and full back wages is concerned, it is well settled, as held in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 75 Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC 324, that reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule in cases of wrongful termination, gainful employment of the illegal termination pleaded nor led any evidence that the respondent employed elsewhere during the period of his circumstances, this Court finds no infirmity in the direction for payment of full back wages. (7) of the view that the findings recorded by the learned Industrial Tribunal, have not been proved 19947-2026 (O&M) -4- met, the onus was on the petitioner ot satisfactorily discharged. Acco to interfere with the Tribunal's finding that the workman 240 days of service for the purpose of observed that the employer-employee relation was no evidence to prove that notice/charge sheet had been issued to the respondent-workman or that due inquiry had been held with regard to his alleged absence. It was thus that the relief of reinstatement was granted in favour of the respondent-workman. In so far as the grant of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages is concerned, it is well settled, as held in Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 75 Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC , that reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule in cases of wrongful termination, gainful employment of the workman seeking back wages illegal termination. In the present case, the petitioner pleaded nor led any evidence that the respondent employed elsewhere during the period of his rcumstances, this Court finds no infirmity in the direction for payment of full back wages. In conspectus of the position sketched out above, this Court is of the view that the findings recorded by the learned Industrial Tribunal, have not been proved to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record petitioner to prove otherwise, which burd ordingly, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the Tribunal's finding that the workman had completed for the purpose of Section 25B. Further it was employee relation stood established and there was no evidence to prove that notice/charge sheet had been issued to the or that due inquiry had been held with regard to his . It was thus that the relief of reinstatement was granted in In so far as the grant of reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages is concerned, it is well settled, as held in M/s. Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1979 SC 75, and reiterated in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC , that reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule in cases of wrongful termination, in the absence of proof of seeking back wages for the period of e present case, the petitioner-management neither pleaded nor led any evidence that the respondent-workman was gainfully employed elsewhere during the period of his alleged absence. In these rcumstances, this Court finds no infirmity in the direction for payment In conspectus of the position sketched out above, this Court is of the view that the findings recorded by the learned Industrial Tribunal, to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record den this Court finds no reason completed Further it was stood established and there was no evidence to prove that notice/charge sheet had been issued to the or that due inquiry had been held with regard to his . It was thus that the relief of reinstatement was granted in In so far as the grant of reinstatement with continuity of service M/s. Hindustan Tin Works (P) Ltd. v. The Employees of M/s. Hindustan eepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, (2013) 10 SCC , that reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the in the absence of proof of for the period of anagement neither workman was gainfully . In these rcumstances, this Court finds no infirmity in the direction for payment In conspectus of the position sketched out above, this Court is of the view that the findings recorded by the learned Industrial Tribunal, to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record. SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP-19947 This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India does not sit as an appellate Court to re factual findings in the absence of any manifest illegality petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice or patent illegality, warranting any interference by this Court. (8) same is hereby dismissed. (9) of. July 06, 202 SwarnjitS 19947-2026 (O&M) -5- his Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India does not sit as an appellate Court to re factual findings in the absence of any manifest illegality petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice or patent illegality, warranting any interference by this Court. In view of the above, I find no merit in the writ petition and th same is hereby dismissed. Civil miscellaneous application pending, if any, is also disposed , 2026 Whether speaking/reasoned Whether reportable his Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India does not sit as an appellate Court to re-appreciate factual findings in the absence of any manifest illegality or perversity. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice or patent illegality, warranting any In view of the above, I find no merit in the writ petition and th iscellaneous application pending, if any, is also disposed (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE : Yes/No : Yes/No his Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the appreciate or perversity. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, violation of principles of natural justice or patent illegality, warranting any In view of the above, I find no merit in the writ petition and the iscellaneous application pending, if any, is also disposed SWARNJIT SINGH 2026.07.13 17:12 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document