Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
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CGHC010206992023
2026:CGHC:31304
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPC No. 3061 of 2023 1 - Ramkumar S/o. Jagdish, Aged About 53 Years R/o. Nawagaon Kala, Tehsil Thankhamariya, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - Khelawan S/o. Jagdish, Aged About 67 Years R/o. Village Surajpura, Tehsil Sahaspur Lohara, District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh. 2 - Khelan, S/o. Jagdish, Aged About 56 Years R/o. Nawagaon Kala, Tehsil Thankhamariya, District Bemetara Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Swekcha Sharma, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Prasoon Agrawal, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 1 & 2 : Mr. S. S. Barik, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Goutam Khetrapal, Advocate.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board 22/07/2026
1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:-
“10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to set aside the order dated 03.03.2023 passed in Revenue Revision Case No. R.N./23/R/A-6/35/2017 passed by the Board of Revenue, Bilaspur, Circuit Court Raipur, and RAGHVENDRA JAT Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT
2 upheld the order dated 15.12.2016 passed in Case No.66/A-6/2015-16 passed by the Commissioner, Division Durg. 10.2 Any other order/direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be issued, in the interest of justice.”
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No. 1 had preferred an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Saja, District Bemetara, under Section 44(1) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959, challenging the mutation entries recorded by the Tahsildar. It is submitted that the mutation entries were made on 01.06.2013, whereas the appeal was instituted only on 23.09.2015, which was admittedly beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Consequently, respondent No. 1 himself filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. Learned counsel submits that despite the pendency of the said application, the learned SDO (Revenue), without first adjudicating the application for condonation of delay, proceeded to decide the appeal on merits, which is contrary to the settled principles of law. It is further submitted that the learned SDO (Revenue) also failed to consider the fact that respondent No. 1 had already alienated his share in the property, a fact duly reflected in the order itself. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Commissioner, who, after considering the aforesaid legal infirmity,
3 rightly remanded the matter to the SDO (Revenue) with a direction to first decide the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties and, only upon condonation of delay, to proceed to decide the appeal on merits, if so required. It is contended that respondent No. 1 thereafter challenged the said remand order before the Board of Revenue, in which, without appreciating the aforesaid jurisdictional defect and without considering the reasoning assigned by the Commissioner, set aside the remand order merely on the ground that respondent No. 1 had not been afforded an adequate opportunity of hearing.
Learned counsel submits that the Board of Revenue completely overlooked the fundamental issue regarding maintainability of the appeal on account of limitation and, therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the mutation proceedings were concluded by the Tahsildar without affording any opportunity of hearing to respondents No. 1 and 2. It is contended that, in such circumstances, the learned SDO (Revenue) rightly entertained the appeal and passed the order on merits. It is further submitted that the Commissioner unnecessarily interfered with the well-reasoned
order of the SDO (Revenue), and, therefore, the Board of Revenue rightly exercised its revisional jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the Commissioner. It is thus prayed that the impugned
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order passed by the Board of Revenue calls for no interference by this Court. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 5. From the record, it is evident that the appeal preferred before the SDO (Revenue) was admittedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. It is also not in dispute that respondent No. 1 had filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. However, without first adjudicating the said application and recording any finding regarding the existence of sufficient cause for condoning the delay, the learned SDO (Revenue) proceeded to decide the appeal on merits. Such a course adopted by the SDO (Revenue) is clearly contrary to the settled legal position, as the issue of limitation goes to the very maintainability of the appeal and is required to be decided at the first instance. The Commissioner rightly noticed this legal infirmity and, therefore, remanded the matter to the SDO (Revenue) with a direction to first decide the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and only thereafter, in the event the delay is condoned, to adjudicate the appeal on merits. The order passed by the Commissioner was thus in consonance with the settled principles governing adjudication of appeals filed beyond limitation. However, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, the Board of Revenue failed to consider this fundamental aspect and instead entered into the merits of the controversy by observing
5 that respondent No. 1 had not been afforded an adequate opportunity of hearing. The Board of Revenue thus overlooked the jurisdictional issue relating to limitation, which ought to have been addressed before any adjudication on merits. 6. It is a well-settled principle of law that whenever an appeal is presented beyond the prescribed period of limitation, the appellate authority is required to first consider and decide the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. Only after recording a finding that sufficient cause exists for condoning the delay and allowing such application can the appellate authority assume jurisdiction to examine the matter on merits.
In the present case, since the appeal before the SDO (Revenue) was admittedly barred by limitation and respondent No. 1 himself had sought condonation of delay by filing an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the SDO (Revenue) committed a manifest illegality in deciding the appeal on merits without first adjudicating the question of limitation. The Commissioner, therefore, rightly set aside the said order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Board of Revenue, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, exceeded the scope of such jurisdiction by entering into the merits of the dispute instead of confining itself to examining the legality and correctness of the order passed by the Commissioner. The revisional jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is intended to correct jurisdictional errors and material
6 irregularities; it is not meant for undertaking a detailed adjudication of the merits of the dispute at that stage. Consequently, the order dated 03.03.2023 passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be sustained in law. The matter deserves to be remitted to the SDO (Revenue), Saja, District Bemetara, with a direction to first decide the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act after granting due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties. Only if the delay is condoned shall the SDO (Revenue) shall proceed to adjudicate the appeal on merits, while also considering the specific contention raised by the petitioner that respondent No. 1 had already alienated his share in the property. 7. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 03.03.2023 passed by the Board of Revenue is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Saja, District Bemetara, to proceed in terms of the directions contained in the order passed by the Commissioner dated 15.12.2016.
The SDO (Revenue) shall first decide the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act after affording due opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties and shall thereafter proceed further in accordance with law. 8. With this observation and direction, the writ petition is disposed of. Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat