1 CGHC010245822016 2026:CGHC:30317 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 551 of 2016 1 - Smt. Chandrakala D/o Devnath, Aged About 52 Years R/o Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh 2 - Bharat Singh S/o Ravisingh Thakur, Aged About 30 Years R/o Chhepdaguda Para, Bhanpuri, Tahsil Bastar, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ... Petitioners versus 1 - Subhashnath (Died And Deleted Through Lrs) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 30-03-2026 1.1 - (A) Daleshwar S/o Late Subhasnath Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 1.2 - (B) Kamlesh S/o Late Subhasnath Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 1.3 - (C) Mitranath Thakur S/o Late Subhashnath Thakur Aged About 74 Years R/o 330, Bhaversingh Para, Gumda, Dantewada, District Dantewada, C.G. 2 - Smt. Champa W/o Indranath, Aged About 60 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 3 - Teksingh (Died And Deleted Through Lrs) As Per Honble Court Order VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.07.24 19:16:34 +0530 2 Dated 30-03-2026 3.1 - (A) Smt. Kalawati W/o Late Teksingh Aged About 55 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 3.2 - (B) Amar Singh S/o Late Teksingh Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 3.3 - (C) Alambar S/o Late Teksingh Aged About 36 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 3.4 - (D) Kailash S/o Late Teksingh Aged About 33 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 3.5 - (E) Sarita W/o Late Ranjeet Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 4 - Mahendra Singh Thakur S/o Ayodhyanath, Aged About 45 Years R/o Village Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 5 - Smt. Shakuntala (Died And Deleted Through Lrs) As Per Honble Court Order Dated 30-03-2026 5.1 - (A) Pramod Singh S/o Late Aasman Aged About 50 Years R/o Aamaguda, Jagdalpur, District Bastar, Chhattisgarh 6 - Fulsingh S/o Premshankar Thakur, Aged About 40 Years R/o Dongaghat, Asna, Tahsil Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 7 - Roopsingh S/o Suktu (Gelmani), Aged About 40 Years R/o Dantewada, District Dantewada Chhattisgarh, District : Dantewada, Chhattisgarh 8 - Neelawai Wd/o Late Munnaram, R/o Lohandiguda, Tahsil Lohandiguda, 3 District Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 9 - Kamlesh S/o Late Munnaram, R/o Lohandiguda, Tahsil Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 10 - Gajendra S/o Late Munnaram, R/o Lohandiguda, Tahsil Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 11 - Ku. Megha S/o Late Munnaram R/o Lohandiguda, Tahsil Lohandiguda, District Bastar Chhattisgarh , District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 12 - Smt. Paramjit Kaur, W/o. Onkar Singh, Aged About 35 Years R/o Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh 13 - Smt. Sanjeev Kapoor S/o Late Balram Kapoor, Aged About 40 Years R/o Jagdalpur, District Bastar Chhattisgarh, District : Bastar(Jagdalpur), Chhattisgarh ---Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Manish Nigam, Advocate For Respondent No. 1, 3 & 4 : Ms. Sweksha Sharma, Advocate For other Respondents : None Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board 16/07/2026 1. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners against the order dated 12.05.2016, passed by learned District Judge, Bastar, Place Jagdalpur, in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 22/2015, whereby the application filed by the petitioners under Section 151 of the CPC has been rejected 4 and consequently the application for passing of the final decree has also been dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that one Sheo Charan Lal has filed a civil suit bearing civil suit No. 6-A/1970 for partition, separate possession and mesne profits of the suit property shown in schedule-A to L annexed with the plaint. The suit of the plaintiff Sheo Charan Lal was decided on 05.03.1973 and a decree for partition was passed with respect to half share of the lands mentioned in schedule-E and K property and the remaining half share was given to the defendants No. 1 to 5. the defendants No. 1 to 5 were also ordered to take a sum of Rs. 5000/- to the plaintiff as his share of the value of the house and also ordered for partition of the said property according to their share given herein above and put them in possession of respective share. It was also directed in the decree that all the parties shall produce all the properties to be partitioned before the Commissioner and all documents relating thereto as are in their possession or power. The challenge to the judgment and decree dated 05.03.1973 in the FA No. 59/1973 has also been dismissed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur vide judgment dated 09.01.1979. In the meantime, various revenue proceedings were drawn by the respective parties and ultimately on 12.05.2015, the petitioners filed an application for preparing final decree in the civil suit No. 6-A/1970. In the application, they averred about death of various parties to the suit and shown their family tree about existing legal heirs of the parties to the suit. 5 3. The defendants raised objection by filing their reply and raising objection that he application has been filed after about 36 years of the preliminary decree and in between that period, the parties have mutually partitioned the property and get their names mutated in the revenue records and are in settled possession of their respective shares. The parties have never objected in share of each others and now after such a long time, the petitioners again re-agitating the issue of partition, which has already been concluded. It will reopen the entire case, which has already been settled. The petitioners are also bound by their conduct that they acted upon the mutual partition and now they cannot claimed for preparation of final decree pursuant to the preliminary decree dated 05.03.1973 and prayed for dismissal of the application. 4. The learned trial Court after hearing the parties, rejected the application filed by the petitioners holding that earlier an application for execution of decree was filed on 03.05.2013, in which an objection was raised that the application is barred by limitation as provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, from the report of patwari it reflected that the parties are settled in their possession after their mutual partition and some of the lands were sold by the respective land owners and purchasers are in their possession. The separate mutation has also been affected and there is no ground to initiate the proceedings. It has also been observed in its order by the learned trial Court that the application filed by the petitioners Smt. Chandrakala under Sections 109 and 110 of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 was dismissed, which was for execution of the 6 judgment and decree passed by learned District Judge. While considering the application, the learned trial Court also considered various revenue proceedings between the parties and has decided not to proceed further for final decree in suit and has rejected the application filed by the petitioners vide order dated 12.05.2016, which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that, the learned trial Court rejected the application filed by the petitioners for preparation of the final decree on the ground of delay that the application has been filed after about 36 years. He would further submit that there is no provision in the Limitation Act providing limitation for filing application for passing of the final decree. The parties to the suit can file an application for final decree at any time. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court has been affirmed in first appeal and it attained its finality. The decree of partition is preliminary in nature and the final decree ought to have been drawn as provided under Order 20 Rule 18 of the CPC. Until and unless the final decree is passed, the rights of the parties are not finally determined. The intermediate revenue proceedings cannot be considered to be sufficient partition of the suit property for the reason that the parties have initiated the revenue proceedings as per their whims, which cannot be said to be in the light of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. He would further submit that the parties have their right to defend in the proceeding of final decree, which will be considered by the learned trial Court, but the application filed by the petitioners cannot be out-rightly dismissed. 7 Therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court suffers from illegality and jurisdictional error and the same is liable to be set aside and the matter may be remitted back to the learned trial Court to initiate proceeding for final decree in the case. In support of his submission, he would rely the judgments of ‘Venu v. Ponnusamy Reddiar (Dead) through Legal Representatives and another’ 2018 (15) SCC 254, ‘Shub Karan Bubna @ Shub Karan Prasad Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna and others’ 2009 (9) SCC 689 and ‘Hashim Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad and others’ 2007 (2) SCC 355. 6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1, 3 and 4 opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that after passing of the judgment and decree dated 05.03.1973, the parties have mutually partitioned the suit property and settled their possession. Various revenue proceedings have been drawn for partition, mutation, etc. by the respective parties and the parties have acted upon their mutation partition. None of the parties including the petitioners have raised any objection in the same and now they again tried to unsettle the the mutual partition effected between the parties in the garb of final decree. She would further submit that the learned trial Court dismissed the application of the petitioners not only on the ground of limitation, but on the ground of earlier mutual partition, settled possession of the parties in the suit land, rejection of the application filed by the petitioners for execution of the decree and also considering the various revenue proceedings before the revenue 8 authorities and therefore, there is no need to further go for final decree as the judgment and decree dated 05.03.1973 has already been acted upon the parties by their mutual partition and settlement. By the efflux of time, some of the parties have also alienated some of the lands allotted to their shares, in which the respective purchasers are in possession. The effective implementation of the judgment and decree, which was for partition cannot be re-agitated and re-opened again in the application filed by the petitioners. The order passed by the learned trial Court is based on proper appreciation of the fact and the law applicable to it, which needs no interference and the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material annexed with the writ petition. 8. The undisputed facts of the present case reveal that the civil suit for partition was decreed on 05.03.1973 and a preliminary decree determining the shares of the parties was passed. The said decree attained finality after dismissal of the first appeal by the High Court on 09.01.1979. The controversy involved in the present petition is whether the application filed by the petitioners seeking preparation of the final decree could have been rejected at the threshold merely on the ground of delay and on the basis of subsequent revenue proceedings said to have been undertaken by the parties. 9. It is now well settled that a decree in a partition suit ordinarily consists of two stages. At the first stage, the Court determines the shares of the parties by passing a preliminary decree and at the 9 second stage, the actual division of the properties by metes and bounds is effected through the final decree. Until the final decree is drawn, the partition proceedings remain pending, and the rights declared under the preliminary decree are worked out in the final decree proceedings. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in ‘Hashim Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad’ (2007) 2 SCC 355, has held that where the Court refuses to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or exercises such jurisdiction on wholly irrelevant considerations, the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution can be invoked for correction of such jurisdictional error. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shub Karan Bubna @ Shub Karan Prasad Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna and others, (2009) 9 SCC 689, has held that a partition suit continues till a final decree is passed and there is no prescribed period of limitation for filing an application for preparation of the final decree. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the application for drawing up a final decree is merely a continuation of the original suit and not an independent proceeding. In para 18.3, it has been held that:- “18.3. As the declaration of rights or shares is only the first stage in a suit for partition, a preliminary decree does not have the effect of disposing of the suit. The suit continues to be pending until partition, that is, division by metes and bounds takes place by passing a final decree. An application requesting the court to 10 take necessary steps to draw up a final decree effecting a division in terms of the preliminary decree, is neither an application for execution (falling under Article 136 of the limitation Act) nor an application seeking a fresh relief (falling under Article 137 of the Limitation Act). It is only a reminder to the court to do its duty to appoint a Commissioner, get a report, and draw a final decree in the pending suit so that the suit is taken to its logical conclusion.” 12. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in ‘Venu v. Ponnusamy Reddiar (Dead) through LRs.’, (2018) 15 SCC 254, wherein it has been held that mere delay in seeking preparation of the final decree cannot be a ground to reject such application, as no limitation is prescribed for initiating final decree proceedings after passing of the preliminary decree. 13. The Trial Court, by the impugned order, rejected the application filed by the applicants under Section 151 of the CPC seeking a direction to the Collector to ascertain the legal representatives of all the deceased parties and submit a report for preparation of the final decree in terms of the preliminary decree dated 05.03.1973 passed in Civil Suit No. 6-A/1970, as affirmed by the High Court in First Appeal No. 59/1973 on 09.01.1979. While considering the application, the Trial Court examined the genealogy of the parties and recorded that almost all the original parties had died and were represented by their legal heirs. It further considered the subsequent proceedings initiated after the decree and found that, pursuant to the 11 civil court decree, Prem Shankar had filed proceedings under Section 178 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code before the Tahsildar on 21.03.1979 seeking partition of the agricultural lands, whereupon the Tahsildar, by order dated 18.06.1979, directed the Patwari to divide the lands into two equal shares in accordance with the decree, and after the Patwari submitted the partition report on 07.08.1979, appropriate orders were passed. The Trial Court also noticed that subsequent mutation proceedings under Section 110 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code were instituted by Devnath, Laxminath and Bharat for recording their names in the revenue records, and thereafter, in Revenue Case No. 9/A-6/1987-88, the Tahsildar, by order dated 29.01.1988, held that Ratni, widow of Prem Shankar, and his children Phoolsingh and Shakuntala alone were entitled to mutation, observing that Devnath and others had no right over the disputed land as the revenue records previously stood exclusively in the name of Prem Shankar. The Trial Court further referred to the proceedings initiated by Chandrakala before the Tahsildar in Revenue Case No. 92/A-6/2012-13 seeking implementation of the civil court decree, which culminated in the order dated 12.02.2015 rejecting the application on the grounds that the decree had already been acted upon, the lands had already been partitioned, mutated and partly alienated, a portion of the land had been acquired for the National Highway, the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to execute the civil court decree in the absence of appropriate orders from the civil court, and, in any event, execution of the decree had become barred by limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act. The Trial Court also considered the judgments relied upon by the applicants, 12 namely, ‘Sudarshan Panda v. Laxmidhar Panda’ (AIR 1983 Orissa 121), ‘Lakshmi v. Sanakappa Aiwa’ (1989) 2 KLT 264, ‘Syed Ikramuddin v. Syed Mohammed Ali’ AIR1986 AP 267, ‘Muthangi Ayyanna v. Muthangi Jaggarao’ AIR 1977 SC 292, ‘Murugan v. Chidambaram Pillai’ AIR 1991 MAD 307 and ‘Bashiruddin Khwaja Mohiuddin v. Binraj Murlidhar’ AIR 1987 Bom 235, but held that the principles laid down therein were distinguishable and inapplicable in the peculiar facts of the present case in view of the revenue proceedings already undertaken pursuant to the decree. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the Trial Court concluded that the decree had already been substantially implemented through the revenue authorities, that the subsequent revenue records had undergone several changes by partition, mutation, transfer and acquisition, and that no useful purpose would be served by directing the Collector to undertake a fresh enquiry regarding the legal representatives or to initiate fresh proceedings for preparation of a final decree. Consequently, holding that no case for exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC was made out, the Trial Court dismissed both the application under Section 151 CPC and the application seeking preparation of the final decree, and closed the proceedings. 14. The effect of the subsequent revenue proceedings, mutation entries, long-standing possession and alienations made by the parties are matters which are required to be considered during the final decree proceedings. Those circumstances cannot constitute a ground to reject the application for preparation of the final decree at the 13 threshold. These issues cannot be conclusively decided while considering the maintainability of the application itself. 15. Mutation entries in revenue records neither create nor extinguish title. Likewise, mutation proceedings by themselves cannot substitute a judicial partition by metes and bounds unless the Court records its satisfaction regarding a lawful and complete partition in accordance with law. Therefore, the learned trial Court committed jurisdictional error in dismissing the application itself instead of registering the final decree proceedings and deciding the rival claims after granting opportunity to all the concerned parties. 16. The learned Trial Court, in the considered opinion of this Court, travelled beyond the scope of consideration at the stage of entertaining an application for preparation of a final decree. The existence of subsequent revenue proceedings, mutation entries, family arrangements, or alienations could not constitute a valid ground for rejecting the application itself. Those are matters which ought to have been examined during the course of final decree proceedings while working out the preliminary decree. By declining to initiate the final decree proceedings altogether, the learned Trial Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, thereby warranting interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 17. Having considered the rival submissions and the material available on record, this Court finds that the preliminary decree determining the shares of the parties was passed on 05.03.1973 and attained finality after dismissal of the first appeal on 09.01.1979. It is also 14 borne out from the record that immediately thereafter, the parties themselves approached the revenue authorities and initiated proceedings under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code for giving effect to the decree. Pursuant thereto, partition proceedings were undertaken, mutation entries were effected, and the parties accepted and acted upon the revenue records. Over the course of nearly three and a half decades, the parties continued in separate and settled possession of their respective portions. During this long interregnum, some of the lands have also been alienated to third parties, while a portion has been acquired for the National Highway. These subsequent developments cannot be ignored while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. At this distant point of time, unsettling the possession of the parties or reopening the partition already acted upon by them would not only cause serious prejudice but would also adversely affect the rights that have accrued over the years, including those of subsequent transferees. 18. At the same time, this Court cannot lose sight of the settled principle that a partition suit does not attain complete finality until a final decree is drawn and there is no prescribed period of limitation for seeking preparation of a final decree. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was not justified in rejecting the application for preparation of the final decree altogether. The ends of justice would be adequately served by directing the learned Trial Court to proceed with the final decree proceedings; however, while doing so, it shall, as far as practicable, preserve the existing possession and the arrangement 15 already acted upon by the parties, and any departure therefrom shall be made only if it is found to be absolutely unavoidable for giving effect to the preliminary decree. The learned Trial Court shall take into consideration the partition proceedings undertaken before the revenue authorities, the mutation entries made pursuant thereto, the long-standing possession of the respective parties, and the alienations, if any, effected by them after such partition, and shall endeavour to prepare the final decree in a manner that gives effect to the preliminary decree without unsettling the existing arrangement or adversely affecting rights that have crystallized over the passage of time, except where such adjustment becomes absolutely necessary for giving effect to the preliminary decree in accordance with law. This course would harmonize the legal requirement of drawing up a final decree with the equitable consideration of preserving a state of affairs that has remained undisturbed for more than three decades. 19. The learned trial Court shall proceed with the final decree proceedings in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 20 Rule 18 read with Order 26 Rules 13 and 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While doing so, the learned trial Court shall afford adequate opportunity of hearing to all the parties including the legal representatives, as well as any person claiming through them, if necessary, in accordance with law. 20. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 12.05.2016 passed by the learned District Judge, Bastar at Jagdalpur in Miscellaneous Civil Case No.22/2015 16 is hereby set aside. The application filed by the petitioners seeking preparation of the final decree stands restored to its original file. The parties are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 11.08.2026. 21. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved