- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN WRIT PETITION NO. 17809 OF 2026 (SCST) BETWEEN: 1. SRI. UMESH S/O LATE SHIVANNA AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS R/O NARAYANAGATHAHALLI TADALUR POST, KASABA HOBLI ARASIKERE TALUK, HASSAN DISTRICT. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. KALEEMULLA SHARIFF, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER HASSAN DISTRICT, HASSAN. 2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER HASSAN SUB-DIVISION, HASSAN. 3. SRI. BORE GOWDA S/O SIDDE GOWDA R/O THIRUPATHIHALLI KASABA HOBLI, ARASIKERE TALUK. 4. M. SANTHOSHAGIRI S/O GIRIJAPATHI KASTURI RANGAPPANAHALLI Digitally signed by V MANJUSHA BAI Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 HIRIYURU TALUK CHITRADURGA DISTRICT. 5. NARAYANA S. CHAWLA S/O SRICHAND K. CHAWLA # 33/25, 1ST MAIN ROAD 1ST CROSS, SRIRAMPURAM BENGALURU. 6. S.B. HARISH S/O S.M. BALAKRISHNA #8, DIWAN MADHAVARAO ROAD BENGALURU. …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. ANITHA N., AGA FOR R1 & R2) THIS PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER NO.PTCL:15/2011-12, DATED 23-10-2018, PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, DISMISSING THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE-F, SO ALSO THE ORDER BEARING NO. LND/SC/ST/ASK 1/99-2000, DATED 30-06-2009 PASSED BY THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER AT ANNEXURE-E, BY ISSUING WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND ETC. THIS PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING/VIDEO CONFERENCING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 ORAL ORDER 1. The case of the petitioner is that, he belongs to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community and his grandfather was granted 3 acres 38 guntas of land in Sy.No.268 of Habbana Ghatta Village, Kasaba Hobli, Arasikere Taluk in the year 1965-66. His grandfather sold the land on 28.06.1967 in favour of respondent no.3. Thereafter, several sales have taken place. 2. The petitioner filed an application under the provisions of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (for short 'PTCL Act') on 05.04.1999. The same was dismissed by respondent no.2. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal before respondent no.1. He also dismissed the same by an order dated 23.10.2018. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition is filed on 11.06.2026. 3. The case of the petitioner is that, his grandfather was an illiterate person and that he had alienated the property granted in his favour within the non-alienation period and also without - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 obtaining the necessary permission of the State. He has challenged the same immediately after him coming to know about the same and respondent nos.1 and 2 have erroneously passed the impugned orders, which are liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, learned AGA appearing for respondent nos.1 and 2 submits that the petitioner has not produced the copy of the original grant. Even otherwise it is submitted that the claim of the petitioner is horribly time barred and it is prayed that the writ petition be dismissed. 5. The alienation was done way back on 28.06.1967 and it was challenged for the first time by filing an application on 05.04.1999. There is a delay of more than 32 years. Further, the impugned order of respondent no.1 is dated 23.10.2018 and the present writ petition is filed on 11.06.2026. The Hon'ble Apex Court in NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANOTHER reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232 in paragraph no.8 has held as under: "8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1-1-1939 to 31-12- 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent- Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly." 6. Thereafter, the State has introduced an amendment to Section 5 of the PTCL Act, which reads as under: "2. Amendment of section 5.- In the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (Karnataka Act No.2 of 1979), in section 5, in sub- section (1), after clause (b), the following clauses shall be inserted and shall always deemed to have been inserted, namely:- "(c) notwithstanding anything contained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section."" 7. This was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.100101/2024 in paragraph no.3, it has been held as under: - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 "3. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate, we decline indulgence in the matter for the following reasons: (a) The subject land does not answer the definition of ‘granted land’ in terms of Section 2(b) of the 1978 Act cannot be much disputed, inasmuch as the grant was not on account of social status of the grantee. The said grant was originally made in 1930 and later in 1958. The sale of this land happened vide registered Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972. The buyer, in turn, sold a part of the land to one Mr.Mahadevappa vide registered Sale Deed dated 16.04.1976. Admittedly, the resumption application filed earlier was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002 and appeal against the same also came to be turned down vide order 27.08.2004. Even prior to this, there were resumption orders that were set aside by a learned Single Judge in W.P. No.2608/2000 vide order dated 22.11.2000, remitting the matter back for fresh consideration. That is how the subsequent application came to be moved; that was rejected vide order dated 30.12.2002. Even appeal met the same fate vide order 23.12.2003. (b) When above was the state of things as per record, it is ununderstandable as to how persons claiming under the original grantee could move another application afresh on 27.08.2004. The Assistant - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 Commissioner could not have allowed the said application vide order dated 22.11.2004. It sounds strange that even the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the appeal against the same vide order dated 17.03.2011. The records reveal that the first alienation took place vide Sale Deed dated 05.12.1972 and the subject application for resumption was filed on 27.08.2004. In the meanwhile, the Re-grant of the land was obtained since it was a “hereditary land” falling within the precincts of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. Apparently, there is a time gap of about thirtytwo years spanning between alienation and the filing of resumption application. There is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the laches that militate on record and against justice. Thus, the case squarely fits into the Apex Court decision in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi vs State Of Karnataka reported in (2020) 14 SCC 232, that tardy and belated claims should not be favoured. This reasoning has animated the impugned judgment, rightly and therefore, the same cannot be faltered. (c) The vehement submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Act 30 of 2023 has amended the provisions of Section 5 of the 1978 Act by adding clauses (c) & (d) to sub-section (1) of the said Section and therefore, the concept of “limitation - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 and delay” has to remain miles away. These new clauses read as under: “(c) notwithstanding anything conained in any law, there shall be no limitation of time to invoke the provisions of this Act. (d) the provisions of clause (c) shall apply to all cases pending before all the competent authorities and all Courts of Law adjudicating the cases under this section.” It hardly needs to be stated that at no point of time, the 1978 Act prescribed any period of limitation for moving application for the resumption of granted land after it is alienated. (d) The Amendment Act that is made applicable with retrospective effect is only a duplication of the existing legal position. Such duplication happened even in English legislative history, hardly needs to be mentioned. The question of delay is a matter of limitation which this statute is silent about. Clauses (c) and (d), now introduced to Section 5(1) of the Act, do not bring any change in the statutory scheme. At the most, they are declaratory of what the statute has been all through, so far as the limitation period is concerned. Nobody disputes that there was no limitation period earlier and there is no limitation period now too. Laches, which would involve a host of factors, pertains to the Domain of Equity. - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 (e) Nekkanti supra does not speak of “limitation period” at all. What it discusses is, the long lapse of time between alienation of granted land and the filing of claim for its resumption. Observations occurring in para 8 of the decision lend support to this view: “8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa vs. Deputy Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs. State of Karnataka, 2006 (4) Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G. Maregouda vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, Chitradurga and Ors, 2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. …..” (Emphasis is ours) Apparently, the law declared by the Apex Court in the above case has not been altered by the subject amendment, even in the least. (f) It may be true, that the legislative debates might have taken place about the observations of the Apex Court in Nekkanti and other such cases while passing the Amendment Bill. That per se does not lend credence to the contention that the said amendment intends to invalidate the law declared by the highest court of the country which it did after considering all aspects of the matter including - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 the sense of equity & justice. If the Legislature intended to silence the voice of Nekkanti, it would have employed a different terminology. We repeat that, ordinarily, delay is decided by computing the period of limitation prescribed by law, whereas “laches” is decided keeping in view a host of factors. Cases are repleat in Law Reports relating to delay and laches in writ jurisdiction under Articles 12, 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. This is only to illustrate. (g) There is a marked difference between ‘delay & laches’ that operate in equity and ‘limitation & delay’ that obtain in law. The following observations of the Apex Court in Union of India Vs. N.Murugesan reported in (2022) 2 SCC 25 at para 20, 21 & 22 make out this point: "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create nonconsideration of condonation in certain circumstances.… The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches. 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.” (h) We are told at the Bar that the subject Amendment has been put in challenge in W.P. No.27496/2023 and that, matter is pending consideration. We make it clear that construction of a statute is one thing and its validity is another. We do not want to say even a word about the validity, that is being examined by the learned Single Judge before whom the matter is pending. We have only placed our interpretation on the amended provisions of the Act and nothing beyond. (i) Before parting with this case, we are constrained to observe that, legislative process is not simple and easy. It has to be undertaken with a lot of care, caution & expertise. Law speaks through language. If language is not properly employed what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, what needs to be done remains undone or misdone. A linguistic defect thus may defeat the intent of legislation. More is not necessary to specify." 8. Thus, the essence of the aforementioned judgments is that, if an application under the provisions of PTCL Act is not made within a reasonable time, the same is liable to be dismissed. - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 9. A reasonable time within which a person is required to file the necessary application before the Assistant Commissioner challenging the alienation of the granted land in favour of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as held by the Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi's case cited supra has to be considered to have been done with the noble object of preventing the misuse of the provisions of PTCL Act. 10. In the instant case, the alienation has taken place in the year 1967. No doubt, the same has happened within the non- alienation period. The State in its revenue records does not have a clause which mentions whether the property is a granted land or not. It is very difficult for a person scrutinizing the title deeds to find out the same. Many a times it is noticed even when a specific answer is sought from the revenue authorities whether the land is granted land or not, the endorsement issued by them are erroneous. Many a times when applied for the old RTCs, mutation extracts, to find out as to the existence of the grant or not and making an application to obtain a certified copy of the grant, the answer given by the - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 revenue authorities are that the old records are either mutilated or destroyed. For that reason, a person buying the property will not be able to check the title deeds beyond a particular period and he will have to believe the representations made by the vendor or the contents of the documents made available to him by the vendor. This anomaly to a great extent is covered by the concept of adverse possession, wherein it is 12 years in the case of a private individual and 30 years in case of a State. 11. Here is a situation where the grant is of the year 1965- 66. The sale in favour of respondent no.3 is of the year 1967. The sale in favour of respondent no.4 is of the year 1988 and the sale in favour of respondent no.5 is of the year 2001. 12. The petitioner claiming to be the legal heir of the original grantee for the first time challenged it in the year 1999 before respondent no.2, which is dismissed. Subsequently, he challenges the same before respondent no.1 which is dismissed in the year 2018. As late as 11.06.2026 the present writ petition is filed. - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 13. One has to take into account the effect it will have on the innocent bona fide purchasers for a valuable consideration like respondent no.5 in the instant case. He would have scrutinized the title deeds for the past 30 years, found it to be in accordance with law and would have purchased the property. The value of the land what it was in the year 1965 and what it is today would have increased by several hundred times. Respondent no.5 would be intending to develop the same or further alienate the property. At that juncture, even issuance of a notice by this Court would result in the petitioner negotiating for money. This would cause huge injustice to the purchasers. 14. The petitioner has failed to explain the inordinate delay in him filing the application before respondent no.2 in the year 1999. His grandfather has not challenged it. His parents have not challenged it. Further, there is no explanation for the inordinate delay in filing the instant writ petition also, questioning the order of respondent no.1 which was passed in the year 2018. Under the said circumstances, entertaining the writ petition as that of the petitioner would not serve the - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:29077 WP No. 17809 of 2026 objectives of the provisions of the PTCL Act, but would only result in injustice being caused to a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration. 15. As the inordinate delay as mentioned above has not been satisfactorily explained by the petitioner, the writ petition is hereby dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Sd/- (M.I.ARUN) JUDGE PGG List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5