CWP No. 19792 of 2026 -1- IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH (117) CWP No. 19792 of 2026 Date of Decision: 06.07.2026 M/s Sifti Transport and Bus Service Regd., Amritsar ......Petitioner Versus The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab .....Respondents and others CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE KIRTI SINGH Present: Mr. Raj Kaushik, Advocate for the petitioner. **** KIRTI SINGH , J. (ORAL) 1. The present writ petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the order 08.9.2025 (Annexure P-1) passed by the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 15.12.2021 (Annexure P-2), has been dismissed. 2. The facts in brief are that respondent No. 2 invited applications for the grant of four stage carriage permits on the route Devigarh to Dera Beas. The petitioner being a consortium of seven individuals, jointly applied for one permit. The matter was heard on 15.12.2021 and the orders were reserved. On 05.5.2022, the petitioner allegedly came to know that its application had been rejected. Being aggrieved therefrom, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Punjab. However, vide the impugned order dated 08.09.2025, the appeal was GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.10 09:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 19792 of 2026 -2- dismissed as being barred by limitation. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order dated 08.09.2025 passed by the learned Tribunal concerned deserves to be set aside as the Tribunal has committed a patent error in dismissing the petitioner's appeal solely on the ground of limitation without appreciating the statutory provisions and the admitted factual position. It is submitted that after hearing the petitioner and others in the meeting held on 15.12.2021, respondent No. 2 reserved the matter for orders. However, no information with regard to the passing of any order by the authority concerned was received by the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner approached the office of the authority concerned on 05.5.2022 to ascertain the outcome of its application and, on coming to know that an order had already been passed, applied for a certified copy on the very same day i.e. 05.05.2022. The certified copy was admittedly supplied only on 31.03.2023 i.e. after an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 11 months, whereafter the appeal was filed within thirty days. It is further submitted that Rule 85 of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 specifically prescribes that limitation for filing an appeal is 30 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. Therefore, the delay of 11 months in supplying the copy of the order was entirely on the part of the office of respondent No. 2. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order dated 08.09.2025 be quashed and set aside. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have gone through the record with his able assistance. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment titled Shivamma (Dead) by LRs versus Karnataka Housing Board and others 2025 SCC Online 1969, while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, has held that a litigant seeking condonation of delay must establish GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.10 09:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 19792 of 2026 -3- sufficient cause and due diligence for the entire period of delay. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are as under: “72. As aptly noted in Hameed Joharan (supra), lapse of time is a specie for forfeiture of right, which is why where a litigant allows the limitation to expire for any right or remedy, due to its own volition, be it in the form of, inaction, lethargy, negligence or mistake, which could have been avoided, no indulgence should ordinarily be shown by the courts in entertaining or enforcing the assertion of such rights, de hors, the litigant otherwise demonstrating a cause for such delay, which may as well also fit within any of the parameters of the exceptions carved out within Section(s) 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act. x x x x x 78. The legislature in its wisdom, has in order to lay emphasis that rights of a party ought not to be defeated or relinquished by the expiry of limitation, conferred the discretion to courts to condone the same, subject to showing sufficient cause. 79. But to read this entitlement to file the appeal or application, on any day of the limitation, as instrument to construe the import of “within such period”, would run counter to the object of limitation, which is to enthuse a sense of responsibility and vigilance upon the litigants and avoid protraction of the lis. It would, in our opinion, invariably give the litigants, a ‘free-pass’ to resort to dilatory tactics for the substantial portion of the prescribed period of limitation, with little to no consequence. x x x x x 81. On the contrary, recognizing the flip side of the proposition that rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties into the exercise of discretion by the courts to admit any assertion of the same, after the prescribed period of limitation, provided there is no inaction or negligence, on the part of the litigant, rather than reading the same into “within such period” or “sufficient cause”, to our minds, appears to be the least disruptive interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that would balance the salutary object of any statute of limitation, in toto. It would not only ensure that not even an ounce of dilatory tactics by a litigant is allowed to pollute the streams of justice, but also curb the seriously falling standards of diligence that the litigants today have towards assertion of their rights or availment of remedies, and a growing tendency to leave things for the last moment, at the cost of prejudice to other litigants, and without any modicum of respect for the courts and judicial resources. At the same time, it will also allow courts to save those rights and permit their enforcement or adjudication, by a judicious exercise of their discretion in justified instances of delays, that are not a byproduct or result of the litigant’s own inaction or negligence. x x x x 139. However, while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and “sufficient cause” must be shown in GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.10 09:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 19792 of 2026 -4- substance, not in empty form. This ensures that the balance between justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants. 140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. x x x x 142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting. 143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this uniformity.” 6. A perusal of the record would show that the order dated 27.12.2021 was passed by respondent No. 2 on the basis of the proceedings of the meeting held on 15.12.2021. The order passed in the proceedings dated 15.12.2021 was challenged by the petitioner by filing an appeal before the statutory authority concerned, which was dismissed vide impugned order dated 08.9.2025. While dismissing the said appeal, the learned appellate authority observed that admittedly, the counsel for the petitioner was present in the meeting held on 15.12.2021 where the matter regarding the grant of stage carriage permits was discussed, whereafter the impugned order dated 27.12.2021 was passed. Therefore, the petitioner who had been duly represented during the said proceedings, was under a legal obligation to GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.10 09:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 19792 of 2026 -5- remain vigilant and ascertain the outcome of its application. It was further observed that no documentary evidence had been placed on record to establish that the petitioner took any steps to ascertain the status of its application or to obtain a copy of the impugned order between 15.12.2021 and 05.5.2022. The claim of the petitioner that an application for a certified copy of the order was filed on 05.5.2022, but the same was supplied to him on 31.3.2023, also remained unsubstantiated. Moreover, it could not be established that the petitioner had made any efforts in the interregnum to secure the copy of the order. It was thus concluded that mere assertions, unsupported by any supportive record, cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of such an inordinate delay. The petitioner was required to demonstrate that it had acted with due diligence in pursuing its application, and that the delay was attributable solely to the office of the Regional Transport Authority. Even otherwise, the petitioner had failed to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay. In the absence of such an application as well as any satisfactory explanation supported by cogent material, the learned Tribunal concerned had no occasion to examine whether sufficient cause had been made out for condoning the delay. 7. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Tribunal are based on a proper appreciation of the material on record and do not suffer from any patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error warranting interference under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 8. Consequently, finding no merit in the present writ petition, the same is hereby dismissed. GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.10 09:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh CWP No. 19792 of 2026 -6- 9. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (KIRTI SINGH) JUDGE July 06th, 2026 Gurpreet Singh Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No Whether reportable : Yes/No GURPREET SINGH 2026.07.10 09:56 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Chandigarh