1 CGHC010028992022 2026:CGHC:30605-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 223 of 2022 1 - Rupesh Kamar S/o Sagan Kumar Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Madeli P.S. Magarlod, District Dhamtari (C.G.) 2 - Shravan Kamar S/o Ganesh Kamar Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Madeli P.S. Magarlod, District Dhamtari (C.G.) 3 - Dasari Bai W/o Rupsingh Kamar Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Madeli P.S. Magarlod, District Dhamtari (C.G.) ... Appellants versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Station House Officer, Police Station Magarlod, District Surguja (C.G.) --- Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Manoj Kumar Jaiswal, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy A.G. Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avi ndra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 20/07/2026 1. Though the matter was listed for consideration on I.A. No. 02/2026, which is the second application for suspension of sentence and grant VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.07.23 18:31:46 +0530 2 of bail, however, considering the fact that, appellants are in jail since 23.03.2020, with the consent of the parties the appeal is being finally heard. Accordingly, I.A. No. 02/2026 is disposed of. 2. The present appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 10.12.2021, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Camp Court, Kurud, District Dhamtari, in Sessions Case No. 35 of 2020, whereby the accused persons have been convicted under Sections 302, 34 of the IPC and sentenced them R.I. for life with fine of Rs. 2000/- (each of the accused), in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for six months (to each of the accused). 3. The case of the prosecution in brief is that, on 23.03.2020 at 10:05 a.m, on the intimation of Makhanlal Netam (PW-1), a merg intimation (exhibit P-1) was recorded by the police of police station Magarlod that at about 8:00 a.m. he was informed Shiv Kamar that the deceased Roopsingh Kamar is lying dead in his house, and when he visited his house along with Bhushanlal Nagarchi (PW-2), Kotwar of the village, he saw his dead body having black mark on his neck. Inquest (exhibit P-5) was prepared by the police in presence of the witnesses and then the dead body of the deceased was sent for its postmortem to Govt. Hospital, Magarlod, where Dr. P. Janbandhu (PW-6) conducted postmortem and gave his report (exhibit P-21). While conducting postmortem, the doctor found head bone fractured dislocation of first and second cervical vertebra, ligature mark 3 present on front of neck and has opined that the cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest, mode of death is asphyxia due to ante- mortem throttling and death appears to be homicidal in nature. Spot map (exhibit P-2) was prepare by the police and spot panchnama (exhibit P-6) and spot map (exhibit P-33) were prepared by the patwari. Statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of CRPC were recorded. The accused persons were taken into custody and their memorandum statements exhibit P-8 of Rupesh Kamar, exhibit P-9 of Shravan Kamar and exhibit P-10 of Dasri Bai have been recorded. Based on the memorandum statement of Rupesh Kamar, one iron wire 92 cm of length and 0.5 cm thick has been seized from him vide seizure memo (exhibit P-11). FIR (exhibit P-29) was registered for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. The seized iron wire was sent for its query report to the doctor, who gave his report (exhibit P-23) and opined that the injury found on the neck of the deceased would have been caused by the said iron wire. 4. After completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons for the offence under Sections 302, 34 of IPC before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kurud, District Dhamtari. The case was committed to the learned Sessions Court, Dhamtari, from where it has been transferred to the learned trial Court for its trial. 5. The learned Trial Court framed charges against the accused persons under Sections 302, 34 of the IPC. The accused persons denied the charge and claimed trial. In order to prove the charge against the 4 accused persons, the prosecution has examined as many as 12 witnesses. The statements of the accused persons under Section 313 of CRPC have also been recorded, in which they denied the circumstances that appears against them, pleaded innocence and have submitted that they have been falsely implicated in the offence. 6. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted and sentenced the accused persons under Sections 302, 34 of the IPC and sentenced them as mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment. Hence this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omissions and contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and their statements are inconsistent. There is no eyewitness to the incident and the circumstances are very weak and did not corroborate with each other. The chain of circumstance has also not been proved. The case of the prosecution is based on the memorandum statement of the accused persons, which is inadmissible piece of evidence. The motive to commit murder of the deceased has also not been proved by the prosecution. Only on suspicion, the appellants have been convicted on the ground that some previous dispute occurred between them, however, there is no evidence or previous quarrel or any report. The independent witnesses have also not supported the prosecution case and therefore, the evidence produced by the prosecution are not 5 sufficient to hold them guilty for the alleged offence. Therefore, the appellants are entitled for acquittal. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants and have submitted that there is sufficient evidence available in the case against the appellants that they committed the murder of the deceased Roopsingh Kamar. On the date of incident, they were with the deceased and there is sufficient evidence of their previous quarrel and the deceased after undergoing the jail sentence released from there about a year back. During his incarceration, the appellant No.1 and appellant No.3 (wife of the deceased) were residing together, which was the motive to commit the murder of the deceased. The appellants were residing in the house, where the dead body of the deceased was found in injured condition and his death was found to be homicidal. The appellants have not explained about the circumstance under which the deceased died and failed to discharge their burden. Therefore, there are sufficient and overwhelming evidence against the appellants and the complete chain of circumstances has been proved by the prosecution by leading cogent and clinching evidence. There is no merit in the appeal filed by the appellants and the same is liable to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. So far as the homicidal death of the deceased is concerned, the learned trial Court has relied upon the evidence of PW-6/Dr. P. 6 Janbandhu, who conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased. He stated in his evidence that on 23.03.2020, he conducted the postmortem of the dead body of the deceased and found his hyoid bone fractured, dislocation of cervical vertebra No. 1 and 2 and ligature mark present on the front of neck. He opined that the cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest, nature of death is asphyxia due to ante-mortem throttling and death appears to be homicidal in nature. He proved the postmortem (exhibit P-21) and short postmortem report (exhibit P-22). He also proved the query report (exhibit P-23) that the injuries found on the body of the deceased would have been caused by the said iron wire, which was sent for its examination. In cross-examination he admitted that, except this ligature mark on the neck of the deceased, there was no other external injuries found on the body of the deceased. Nothing substantial could be extracted from the evidence of the doctor to prove that the deceased has died not from the physical violence, but by otherwise. 11. PW-2/Bhushan Nagarchi, PW-4/Roshan Lal, PW-8/Shiv Kamar and PW-9/Rooplal are the witnesses to the inquest of the dead body of the deceased (exhibit P-5). They proved the inquest by stating that they saw the neck injury on the dead body of the deceased. From these evidences the learned trial Court has considered that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature has been proved by the prosecution by leading cogent evidence and the defence could not be able to rebut the said evidence. From the evidence available on record, we are also concur with the consideration of the learned trial 7 Court that the deceased died due to ante-mortem throttling and his death was homicidal in nature. 12. With respect to involvement of the appellants in the offence in question, we examined the evidence available on record. 13. PW-1/Makhanlal Netam, who lodged the merg intimation has stated in his evidence that on the date of incident, he was being informed by Shiv Kamar that the deceased Roopsingh Kamar has died and when he went to his house, he saw his dead body and found injury on his neck. On being suspension of murder, he lodged merg intimation to the police. The accused persons confessed their guilt that they committed the murder of the deceased by throttling through iron wire. He also stated that the deceased Roopsingh released from jail about a year back. At the time, when he was in jail, Dasri Bai and Rupesh were living together. Nothing substantial could be extracted from his cross-examination by the defence, though he admitted that the police personals have informed him that the appellants have committed the murder of the deceased. 14. PW-2/Bhushanlal Nagarchi, Kotwar of the village, has stated in his evidence that during the proclamation in the village when he had gone towards the house of the deceased, Shiv Kamar informed him about the incident. When he along with Sarpanch had gone there, they saw the dead body of the deceased and on suspicion they lodged report to the police. On being interrogation from the appellants, they confessed in his presence that, they committed murder of the deceased Roopsingh. Roopsingh was released from 8 jail 10-15 days before and all of them were residing together. Rupesh was residing with his sister-in-law Dasri Bai. In cross-examination he stated that, when he went on the spot and asked from Dasri Bai, she could not give any plausible explanation about his death. He denied the suggestion that, it is the police person, who gave the information that the appellants committed murder of the deceased. 15. PW-3/Santosh has stated in his evidence that, during interrogation the accused persons admitted that they have committed the murder of the deceased by strangulate him. They also disclosed that Rupesh was having illicit relation with Dasri Bai and therefore, they committed murder of Roopsingh. He proved the memorandum statements (exhibit P-8, P-9 and P-10) and seizure of iron wire (exhibit P-11). After declaring him hostile, when he was cross-examined by the prosecution, he admitted that the deceased Roopsingh had earlier assaulted Shravan Kamar, who is the brother of Dasri Bai for which he was sent to jail and Dasri Bai was thereafter residing with Rupesh as his wife. He further admitted that in the eve of the date of incident, the appellants consumed liquor together and prepared a plan to eliminate the deceased. He further admitted that after consuming liquor, they took iron wire near from the field and came back to the house, where the deceased was sleeping. He further admitted that the accused Rupesh sat on head side, Shravan Kamar sat on his chest and Dasri Bai holds his both legs and then Rupesh tied the iron wife until his death. Thereafter they concealed the iron wire, near the Dumarmali drain. In cross-examination though he admitted that, he sent the documents on the instance of the police at police station and 9 no seizure has been made from the accused persons, however, the presence of the accused persons together in the house could not be rebutted by the defence from his cross-examination. 16. PW-4/Roshanlal is also a person, who had gone to the house of the deceased and witnessed inquest (exhibit P-5). 17. PW-5/Dharamraj has stated in his evidence that, on being interrogation the memorandum statements of the accused persons (exhibit P-8, P-9 and P-10) were recorded and iron wire has been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-11). This witness has also declared hostile and when he was cross-examined by the prosecution, he admitted the signature over the documents of memorandum and seizure. He is the brother and brother-in-law of the accused persons. In cross-examination he resiled from his statement made before the police and shown ignorance from any seizure. 18. PW-7/Kishan is the son of the deceased. He stated in his evidence that the accused Rupesh is his uncle, Shravan is his maternal uncle and Dasri Bai is his mother. He did not know the reason of death of his father. This witness has also declared hostile and when he cross- examined by the prosecution, he admitted that at the time when his father had gone to jail, his uncle released from jail and started residing with them. After some days, his father too has been released from jail. At the time of the incident, he had gone to his maternal grandmother’s house at Darripara. From the evidence of this witness, it transpires that there exists previous dispute between Roopsingh 10 and Rupesh and the appellant No.1 was residing with the appellant Dasri Bai, when his father (deceased) had gone to jail. 19. PW-8/Shiv Kamar has stated in his evidence that, a day before the date of incident, he had gone to Singhpur and when he came back from there, he found Dasri Bai crying. When he asked about her crying, she informed that Roopsingh has died and then he saw the dead body of Roopsingh in the house. Thereafter, he proceeded for lodging of the report to the police. This witness has also declared hostile and then cross-examined by the prosecution, in which he stated that at the time of incident, Dasri Bai was crying in her house and when he had gone there, he saw the dead body and injury on his neck and when he asked about the incident, Dasri Bai did not disclose anything and then they informed the police. On being interrogation by the police, she disclosed that she along with Rupesh and Shravan committed his murder and Rupesh and Shravan fled away. He also admitted that on being search, Rupesh and Shravan were found in the village and they too have admitted that they committed the murder of the deceased. In cross-examination he admitted that, when he came back from village Singhpur, the police has already taken the accused persons with them and he came to know about the incident from other persons. From his cross- examination despite the shaky cross-examination, the presence of the appellant Dasri Bai in the house could not be rebutted by the defence. 11 20. PW-10/Doman Tarak, PW-11/Subhashlal, PW-12/Nageshwar Sahu are the procedural witness, who assisted in the investigation of the offence and they proved the investigation, which they conducted. 21. From the evidence of these witnesses, the prosecution is able to prove that on the date of incident, the accused persons were present in the house, where the dead body of the deceased was found in injured condition and his death was homicidal. The accused persons consumed liquor together and thereafter committed murder of the deceased by throttling with the help of an iron wire. There was the motive to commit murder that earlier when the deceased had gone to jail, the appellant No.1 developed illicit relation with the appellant No.3, who is the wife of the deceased and when the deceased released from jail, he objected. The appellant No.2 Shravan is the brother of the appellant No.3 and he also participated in commission of the murder to the appellants No.1 and 3. The dead body of the deceased was found inside the house, where they were residing and there is no explanation from them, under what circumstance, the deceased died due to homicidal death. 22. In the case of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2023) 16 SCC 575, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 34 to 40 has held as under: “34. Section 106 of the Evidence Act, states as under: “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is 12 upon him. Illustration (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, the burden of proving that intention is upon him. (b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without a ticket, The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. 35. Section 106 of the Evidence Act referred to above provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word “especially” means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. The ordinary rule that applies to the criminal trials that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the rule of facts embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, “especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience. 36. In Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer reported in AIR 1956 SC 404, this Court 13 while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: “11. … The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention & the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p. 49 (B).” 37. The aforesaid decision of Shambhu Nath (supra) has been referred to and relied upon in Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar reported in (2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein this Court observed as under: “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable 14 inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” (Emphasis supplied) 38. In Tulshiram Sahadu Suryawanshi and Another v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2012) 10 SCC 373, this Court observed as under: “23. It is settled law that presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of 15 proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilised. We make it clear that this section is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, failed to offer any explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference. It is useful to quote the following observation in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar [(2000) 8 SCC 382 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1516]: (SCC p. 393, para 38) “38. Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional 16 cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer [AIR 1956 SC 404 : 1956 Cri LJ 794] the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: (AIR p. 406, para 11) ‘9. This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word “especially” stresses that. It means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within his knowledge.’”” (Emphasis supplied) 39. In Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681, this Court was considering a similar case of homicidal death in the confines of the house. The following observations are considered relevant in the facts of the present case: “14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such 17 circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1944 AC 315 : (1944) 2 All ER 13 (HL)] — quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh [(2003) 11 SCC 271 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 135].) The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: 18 “(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.” 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. xxx xxx xxx 22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes place in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation 19 how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. …” (Emphasis supplied) 40. The question of burden of proof, where some facts are within the personal knowledge of the accused, was examined by this Court in the case of State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Others reported in (2000) 8 SCC 382. In this case, the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused, and took him away at about 2:30 in the night. The next day in the morning, his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial court convicted the accused under Section 364, read with Section 34 of the IPC, and sentenced them to ten years rigorous imprisonment. The accused preferred an appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for the charge of murder. The accused had not given any explanation as to what happened to the deceased after he was abducted by them. The Sessions Judge, after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence, had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons, and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital, and concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court took note of the 20 provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, and laid down the following principles in paras 31 to 34 of the report: “31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore- narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the 21 court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the Court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the Court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody.” (Emphasis supplied) ”. 23. Furthermore, it is well settled that merely because a witness has been declared hostile, his entire testimony does not stand effaced from consideration. In K.P. Tamilmaran v. The State by Deputy Superintendent of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 493, the Supreme Court has reiterated this settled principle in paragraph 36, which reads as under:- 22 “36. It is though trite and much overstated but the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, is not applicable to our criminal justice system. It is for the Court to distinguish the wheat from the chaff while dealing with the depositions of a hostile witness. Courts can rely upon that part of the deposition of a hostile witness which is corroborated by other evidence on record. This Court in Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 4 SCC 327 discussed the worth of the evidence of a hostile witness in the following words: "36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as washed off the records, it remains admissible in trial and there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the accused upon such testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence…" If part of the evidence of a hostile witness corroborates with other reliable evidence, then that part of the evidence is admissible. Once a prosecution witness has been declared hostile and then cross-examined by the prosecution, then it is for the Court to evaluate the veracity of the testimony. There can be several reasons for a witness to turn hostile and the court must also look into these factors while evaluating the evidence given by a hostile witness. It is an uncomfortable reality in our criminal Courts for a prosecution witness to turn hostile. But then the 23 purpose of a Trial Court is to go to the truth of the matter. Whatever evidence is there before the Court must be examined, tested, corroborated (whenever necessary), before a verdict can be finally given.” 24. In view of the judgment of K.P. Tamilmaran (supra), when we examined the evidence of the witnesses, we found that, though the witnesses, PW-3/Santosh, PW-5/Dharamraj, PW-7/Kishan, PW-8, Shiv Kamar and PW-9, Rooplal, we found that on the date of incident, the appellants consumed liquor together and prepared a plan to commit the murder of the deceased, taken the iron wire, and has committed his murder. Presence of Dasri Bai was also found proved from the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses on the very next morning of the incident, who was crying in her house. It also comes that all the accused persons were residing in the same house for which there is no explanation from the accused persons. 25. From the evidence, it has been proved that the appellants were there with the deceased on the date of incident, but in the next morning the dead body of the deceased was found in his house and appellants No. 1 and 2 have absconded and appellant No.3 was found crying in the house. They were having motive to commit murder of the deceased. All these goes to show and established that the appellants are guilty for the commission of the murder of the deceased. From the evidence of the witnesses as well as medical evidence, the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the appellants that they committed the murder of the deceased by throttling of his neck, which leads to his homicidal death. Therefore, we do not find any 24 reason to differ with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court and hereby uphold the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial Court against the appellants. 26. The appeal filed by the appellants is devoid of merits, liable to be and is hereby dismissed. The appellants shall undergo the entire sentence awarded by the learned trial Court. 27. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellants are undergoing their jail sentence to serve the same on the appellants informing them that they are at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 28. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved