(2026: JHHC: 8882-DB) 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Civil Review No. 90 of 2024 1. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, having its registered office at 17, Jamshedji Tata Road, P.O. Church Gate, P.S. Marine lines, Mumbai-400020 through its Chief Regional Manager Mr. Shubhabrata Khan, having his office at Maru Tower (5th Floor), Kanke Road, P.O. Kanke, P.S. Gonda, District Ranchi 2. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, having its Ranchi Retail Regional Office at 5th Floor, Maru Tower, Kanke Road, P.O. & P.S. Kanke, District Ranchi-834008 through its Chief Regional Manager 3. V.K. Sinha, son of not known to the petitioner, Senior Regional Manager, now Mr. Shubhabrata Khan, having his office at Maru Tower (5th Floor), Kanke Road, P.O. Kanke, P.S-Gonda, District Ranchi …. …. Petitioner Versus Ranjeet Kumar Singh, son of Sri Jitendra Kumar Singh, resident of Village Madwaniya, P.O. Madwaniya, P.S. Nagar Untari, District Garhwa .... …. Opp. Party --------- CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN --------- For the Applicants: Mr. Rahul Lamba, Advocate Mr. Anish Kamal, Advocate Ms Kanu Priya, Advocates --------- Order No. 04/Dated: 30.03.2026 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This petition seeks a review of the Coordinate Bench’s order dated 06th May, 2024 dismissing the CMP No. 289 of 2019 and denying the restoration of Letters Patent Appeal No. 455 of 2012. 3. Mr. Rahul Lamba, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that there was delay of only five months in applying for restoration. This delay was explained in I.A. No. 1256 of 2024. The reason set out in this I.A. is that the original Advocate had expired and therefore, there was marginal delay in filing the review petition. He (2026: JHHC: 8882-DB) 2 pointed out that almost 45 days had elapsed in issuing the certified copy of the order dated 6th May, 2024. 4. The record shows that the Letters Patent Appeal No. 455 of 2012 was filed against the learned Single Judge’s order dated 20th March 2012, permitting the original petitioner, i.e. the respondent in the LPA, to remove the deficiencies in the application seeking allotment of retail outlet dealership within a specific period. Though the LPA was filed on 31.10.2012, it was not pursued with the diligence expected of a party like HPCL. 5. The office notes show that this LPA was dismissed for default on 29.10.2018. The restoration application was filed only on 24th April 2019, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, but, more significantly, it contained several defects. 6. The office notes show that on 22nd January 2024, i.e., about 5 years after the filing of the restoration application, the defects were not cleared by HPCL. Still, by order dated 31st January 2024, a week’s time was granted to clear the defects. Despite this, the record shows that the defects were not cleared. 7. Considering the above circumstances, the Coordinate Bench felt that the HPCL had pursued this matter very casually and without displaying any diligence whatsoever. The contention about the conducting lawyer having passed away in the meantime has also been considered. 8. The Coordinate Bench observed that this was a matter of 2012. By keeping the LPA pending for more than 12 years, the rights of the original petitioner were sought to be frustrated. The Coordinate (2026: JHHC: 8882-DB) 3 Bench has also commented that such a tactic is adopted by casual litigants only to deny the parties the fruits of their litigation. 9. Therefore, the assertion that the reason outlined in the application for condonation was not considered at all is incorrect. The same has indeed been considered. Since the Coordinate Bench held the view that the HPCL treated this matter with the utmost casualness and lack of diligence, upon reviewing the records, we do not believe there is a case for us to exercise our review jurisdiction to overturn that view. 10. The consideration of delay cannot be limited to a narrow or isolated time frame but must necessarily take into account the entire sequence of events and the party’s overall conduct. Hence, the approach of the Coordinate Bench in considering the overall conduct of the present applicant, therefore, cannot be faulted. 11. In this context, reliance can be placed upon a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. vs Karnataka Housing Board and Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969. The Hon’ble Court has categorically, in paragraphs 37 to 39, while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, held that the expression “within such period” occurring in the context of limitation cannot be construed in a fragmented manner, but must be understood as encompassing both the prescribed period of limitation as well as the period of delay thereafter, and that the provision must be interpreted holistically by giving meaningful effect to all its components. 12. The Coordinate Bench has reviewed the reasons presented, including the conduct of the review petitioner, the undue advantage (2026: JHHC: 8882-DB) 4 gained by the review petitioner through delaying the matter and keeping it pending for several years, and the deprivation of the original petitioner’s benefits from the litigation, along with other relevant factors, before issuing the order for which review is now sought. There is no flaw in the order or in the approach taken. 13. In any case, given the limited scope of the review jurisdiction, we are convinced that there are no grounds to review the order of the Coordinate Bench. 14. The review petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.) March 30, 2026 N.A.F.R. Ranjeet/Cp.2 Uploaded on