2026:JHHC:9036-DB 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI I.A. No. 2461 of 2025 In / And L.P.A. No. 143 of 2025 -- 1.The Deputy Commissioner-cum-Liquidator, Daltonganj Central Co-operative Bank Limited, Daltonganj, PO & PS- Daltonganj, Dist.-Palamau 2. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Jharkhand, Office at Dhurwa, PO & PS-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi 3. District Co-operative Officer-cum-Managing Director, Daltonganj Central Co-operative Bank Limited, Daltonganj, PO & PS-Daltonganj, Dist.-Palamau .... Appellant(s) Versus 1. Kumar Somesh, aged about 36 years, son of Late Achyutanand Singh (original petitioner of main writ), Resident of Belwatika, PO & PS-Daltonganj, Dist.-Palamau 2. Mukta Singh, aged about 33 years, Daughter of Late Achyutanand Singh (original writ petitioner), wife of Chandan Singh, Resident of Boring Road, 54A, Anandpuri, Near Manorma Apartment, West Boring Road, Dist.-Patna 3. The State of Jharkhand .... Respondent(s) CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN -- For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Lakshmi Kant Choudhary, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, AC to Sr. SC-II -- 03/30.03.2026 1. I.A No.2461 of 2025 has been filed by the appellants seeking condonation of the delay of 292 days in filing the instant appeal. 2. This I.A states that the appellants were not aware of the fact that any order had been passed in W.P.(S) No.4248/2015 on 11.03.2024 by this Court, and the appellants were fully engaged in the Jharkhand Assembly Election up to 23rd November, 2024. It is further stated that the appellants received the intimation from the office of Mr. K.K. Singh, Advocate about filing of contempt petition against him by the respondents as early as on 25.11.2024 and immediately the appellants filed show cause in Contempt 2026:JHHC:9036-DB 2 Case no. 11445 of 2024 and then only they came to know about the order dated 11.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2015. 3. Thereafter, on 21.12.2024, the appellants asked their Advocate to provide a certified copy of the order dated 11.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2015. Further, after the order dated 11.03.2024 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2015, the appellants filed the instant L.P.A., but a delay of 292 days has occurred in filing it. 4. Therefore, it is pleaded that the appellants have a good case and a genuine reason: the Bank is in liquidation and unable to pay at present; after the liquidation process is over, the payment will be made to the respondents. It is further stated that the delay is not intentional but due to circumstances which were beyond the control of the appellants. For all these reasons, it was pleaded that the appellants were prevented by sufficient cause from filing the instant L.P.A. within the time prescribed by law. 5. Based upon such averments, which cannot even be believed or, in any event, only expose the casualness with which such matters are handled, and as such, the delay of 292 days cannot be condoned. 6. Even otherwise, no notice has been issued to the first and second respondents, who are the legal representatives of the original petitioner, namely, Achyutanand Singh, on whose petition, i.e., W.P.(S) No. 4248 of 2015, the impugned order dated 11.03.2024 was passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. The order directs the appellants to pay an amount of Rs. 1,71,696/- to the original petitioner and now his heirs. This 2026:JHHC:9036-DB 3 amount represents the service dues which the learned Single Judge found were illegally withheld from the original petitioner. 7. Mr Lakshmi Kant Choudhary, the learned counsel for the appellants, only submits that the liquidator has no funds to pay the above amount. Now, based upon such an argument, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order dated 11.03.2024. 8. We note that no argument was advanced before us about the learned Single Judge’s impugned order being illegal or otherwise vulnerable. Since the only argument on behalf of the appellant is that the appellant is not in a position to pay the amount of Rs. 1,71,696/-, now to the legal representatives of the original petitioner who unfortunately died during the pendency of the petition/appeal, we do not find any error in the order impugned. 9. In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the “better affidavit” sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8- 1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8- 1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months. 26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision 2026:JHHC:9036-DB 4 taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps. 27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.” 10. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause 2026:JHHC:9036-DB 5 assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case.” 11. Thus, the rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and the principles of equity. The length of delay is a relevant consideration for condonation of delay in filing appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing the appeal has occasioned due to own negligence and casual attitude of the party claiming condonation of delay, the same may not be condoned on the ground of doing substantial justice. 12. It is a trite law that a government department cannot claim a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone, including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being available and used. If it is found from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 2026:JHHC:9036-DB 6 13. Therefore, considering the circumstances referred to in the I.A. and the aforesaid decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we dismiss this I.A. without any costs. 14. As a consequence, the accompanying appeal will not survive, and it is disposed of. Pending interim applications, if any, stand disposed of. (M. S. Sonak, C.J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.) 30th March, 2026 Jk/Amit Uploaded on 07/04/2026