1 CGHC010234532026 2026:CGHC:31099-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 611 of 2026 1 - Amit Bose S/o S.K. Bose Aged About 52 Years Posted As Lab Assistant, Sickle Cell Institute, Chhattisgarh, Devendra Nagar Chowk, Railway Station Road, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - S. Abdul Samad S/o S.A. Wazid, Aged About 52 Years Posted As Lab Assistant, Sickle Cell Institute, Chhattisgarh, Devendra Nagar Chowk, Railway Station Road, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Appellants versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department, Mantralaya Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2 - Director, Directorate, Health And Family Welfare Department (Medical Education), Indrawati Bhawan, Nawa Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Director General, Sickle Cell Institute, Chhattisgarh, Devendra Nagar Chowk, Railway Station Road Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Joint Director (Administration), Sickle Cell Institute, Chhattisgarh, Devendra Nagar Chowk, Railway Station Road, Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Jitendra Pali, Advocate For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr. Praveen Das, Additional Advocate General For Respondents No.3 & 4 : Mr. Arjit Tiwari, Advocate ANURADHA TIWARI Digitally signed by ANURADHA TIWARI Date: 2026.07.23 10:12:34 +0530 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 22.07.2026 1. Heard Mr. Jitendra Pali, learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. Praveen Das, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondents No.1 & 2 and Mr. Arjit Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.3 & 4. 2. The present intra Court appeal has been filed against the order dated 07.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.3930/2022, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants/writ petitioners before the learned Single Judge has been disposed of. 3. The facts before the learned Single Judge were that the appellants/writ petitioners were appointed as Laboratory Assistants in the Sickle Cell Institute, Raipur, pursuant to the appointment order dated 08.10.2015. Subsequently, respondent No.3 issued a show-cause notice dated 01.06.2022 proposing initiation of departmental proceedings against the appellants/writ petitioners on the allegation that they had crossed the maximum prescribed age limit of 40 years on the date of their appointment. 4. Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid show-cause notice, the appellants/writ petitioners preferred WPS No.3930/2022 3 contending that they were entitled to age relaxation in terms of the conditions of the recruitment advertisement, as they had earlier served the same institution on contractual basis for a considerable period. It was further contended that the impugned show-cause notice was arbitrary and unsustainable in law and, therefore, deserved to be quashed. Upon hearing the parties, the learned Single Judge, vide order dated 07.05.2026, declined to interfere with the show-cause notice at the threshold and disposed of the writ petition by reserving liberty in favour of the appellants/writ petitioners to submit their reply to the show-cause notice along with all relevant documents within the stipulated time. The learned Single Judge further directed respondent No.3 to consider the reply and the documents objectively and pass a reasoned and speaking order within the time prescribed therein, while directing that the interim protection granted in favour of the appellants/writ petitioners would continue for the period specified in the said order. 5. Aggrieved by the order dated 07.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellants/writ petitioners have preferred the present writ appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants/writ petitioners submits that the learned Single Judge has committed a manifest error in declining to interfere with the impugned show-cause notice and relegating the appellants to submit their reply before the very 4 authority which had already formed a preconceived opinion against them. It is contended that the appellants were appointed as Laboratory Assistants after undergoing a regular recruitment process pursuant to a public advertisement, and their candidature was duly scrutinized and approved by the competent Selection Committee and the appointing authority. The appellants had disclosed their correct age and all relevant particulars at the time of recruitment and there was neither any concealment nor any misrepresentation on their part. Therefore, after permitting the appellants to serve for nearly seven years, initiation of departmental proceedings on the ground of age is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unsustainable in law. 7. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that the appellants were entitled to relaxation in the upper age limit in terms of the conditions contained in the advertisement as well as the Government circulars governing recruitment. It is contended that the appellants had rendered more than ten years of service on contractual basis under the same institution prior to their regular appointment and, therefore, were entitled to corresponding age relaxation. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Govind Maskhare v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others (Writ Appeal No.427 of 2016 decided on 15.11.2016), learned counsel submits that contractual employees are entitled to age relaxation equivalent to the period of contractual service rendered by them and such benefit cannot 5 be denied merely because they served under a different department. It is further submitted that the Director, Medical Education, by communication dated 11.01.2018, had also clarified that contractual employees were entitled to age relaxation up to the prescribed limit, and the appointments of the appellants were made on the basis of such interpretation. Having themselves interpreted the policy in favour of the appellants, the respondents are estopped from taking a contrary stand after several years. 8. Learned counsel also submits that the impugned show-cause notice is a mere formality, as even before its issuance an inquiry committee had been constituted, an inquiry had been conducted behind the back of the appellants, adverse findings had already been recorded and disciplinary action had been proposed. Thus, according to learned counsel, the authority had already prejudged the issue and directing the appellants to submit a reply before the same authority amounts to an empty and futile exercise. It is further submitted that the inquiry was conducted in complete violation of the principles of natural justice, inasmuch as no notice was issued to the appellants, no opportunity of hearing was afforded and the inquiry report was never supplied to them. 9. It is lastly submitted that the present case falls within the well- recognized exceptions where interference against a show-cause notice is warranted, as the proceedings have been initiated without jurisdiction, with a predetermined mind and in a manner which amounts to abuse of the process of law. Learned counsel 6 contends that the alleged lapse, if any, was entirely attributable to the respondent authorities who scrutinized the eligibility of the appellants, interpreted the applicable rules and issued the appointment orders. Consequently, the appellants cannot be made to suffer for any alleged error on the part of the department. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge be set aside, the writ appeal be allowed and the show-cause notice dated 01.06.2022 be quashed along with all consequential proceedings. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents No.3 and 4 opposes the appeal and supports the order passed by the learned Single Judge. It is submitted that the writ petition itself was directed only against a show-cause notice, which did not determine any right of the appellants nor visit them with any civil consequences. It is contended that despite the liberty granted by the learned Single Judge to submit a detailed reply along with all supporting documents before the competent authority, the appellants had admittedly not filed any reply to the show-cause notice during the pendency of the writ petition. It is further submitted that only subsequent to the disposal of the writ petition have the appellants chosen to submit their reply before the competent authority, which is presently under consideration. He further submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly declined to interfere at the stage of issuance of the show-cause notice and has adequately protected the interests of the appellants by 7 directing the competent authority to objectively consider the reply and the documents to be submitted by them and to pass a reasoned and speaking order. It is contended that no prejudice has been caused to the appellants by the impugned order and, therefore, no interference in the intra-court appellate jurisdiction is called for. 11. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State adopts the submissions advanced on behalf of respondents No.3 and 4 and submits that the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by this Court. It is, therefore, prayed that the writ appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 12. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and have carefully considered their rival submissions. We have also perused the records of the case, including the order dated 07.05.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No.3930/2022. 13. After appreciating the submissions of learned counsel for the parties therein as also the materials on record, the learned Single Judge has passed the impugned order in following terms:- “6) It appears that petitioners were appointed to the posts of Laboratory Assistant under respondent No. 3 vide order dated 8.10.2015 and after lapse of seven years, a show-cause notice has been issued against them wherein it 8 is alleged that they exceeded 40 years of age on the date of appointment. Whether petitioners are entitled for age relaxation or not is to be considered by the respondent No. 3 therefore, this petition at this juncture is being disposed reserving liberty in favor of petitioners to file reply to the show-cause notice dated 1.6.2022 and submit relevant documents within period of 30 days from today. It is expected that Director General, Sickle Cell Institute shall consider the reply and documents, if submitted by the petitioners in objective manner and take appropriate decision by way of a speaking order preferably within period of 90 days from today. 7) The interim order passed in favor of petitioners on 15.6.2022 shall operate for period of 90 days or till final decision is taken by the authority concerned. 8) With the aforesaid direction, this petition stands disposed. Mr. Shikhar Sharma and Mr. Arjit Tiwari, learned counsel for the respective parties are directed to communicate this order to Director General, Sickle Cell Institute.” 14. A plain reading of the impugned order would reveal that the learned Single Judge has not adjudicated upon the merits of the controversy relating to the entitlement of the appellants to age relaxation. Rather, noticing that the challenge before the Court was only to a show-cause notice proposing initiation of departmental proceedings, the learned Single Judge consciously 9 refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits and relegated the appellants to avail the statutory opportunity of submitting their reply along with all relevant documents before the competent authority. Simultaneously, the learned Single Judge protected the interests of the appellants by directing the competent authority to objectively consider their reply and pass a reasoned and speaking order within a stipulated period while continuing the interim protection till such decision. Thus, the order impugned is essentially procedural in nature and cannot be said to have caused any prejudice to the appellants warranting interference in appeal. 15. At this stage, it is apposite to note that on a pointed query being put by this Court to the learned counsel for the appellants as to whether the appellants had filed any reply to the show-cause notice during the pendency of the writ petition, learned counsel fairly submitted that no such reply had been filed before the learned Single Judge and that only subsequent to the disposal of the writ petition, the appellants have submitted their reply before the competent authority. 16. Significantly, despite such submission being made across the Bar, there is not even a whisper in the memorandum of the present writ appeal that the appellants have subsequently availed the liberty granted by the learned Single Judge and have filed their reply to the show-cause notice. The appeal proceeds as though 10 the appellants continue to be aggrieved by the mere issuance of the show-cause notice, without disclosing the subsequent developments which admittedly have taken place pursuant to the liberty granted by the learned Single Judge. Such omission assumes significance, particularly when the very grievance of the appellants before the learned Single Judge was that they ought to be permitted to place their case before the authority. 17. It is well settled that ordinarily a writ petition challenging a mere show-cause notice is not maintainable unless the notice is shown to have been issued by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction or is ex facie without authority of law. The object of issuance of a show-cause notice is to afford an opportunity to the noticee to place his defence before any adverse decision is taken. Interference by the writ Court at such a nascent stage is an exception rather than the rule. In the present case, the learned Single Judge adopted a balanced approach by preserving the right of the appellants to raise all factual and legal pleas before the competent authority instead of foreclosing the departmental proceedings at the threshold. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the said approach. 18. The principal contention of the appellants that they are entitled to age relaxation by virtue of the recruitment advertisement, the Government circulars and the decision of the Division Bench in Govind Maskhare (supra) involves questions which necessarily 11 require examination by the competent authority in the first instance in the light of the applicable recruitment rules, departmental circulars and the factual matrix of each appellant. Likewise, the plea that the departmental authorities had already interpreted the relevant circulars in favour of the appellants, that the appointments were made after due scrutiny by the Selection Committee and that the proceedings suffer from violation of the principles of natural justice are all issues which can very well be urged before the competent authority while responding to the show-cause notice. The learned Single Judge has neither rejected nor concluded these issues but has expressly left them open for consideration by the competent authority through a reasoned order. 19. Once the appellants themselves have admittedly availed the liberty granted by the learned Single Judge by submitting their reply to the show-cause notice, the very foundation of the challenge laid in the present appeal stands substantially diluted. Having accepted the benefit flowing from the impugned order by submitting their reply before the competent authority, the appellants cannot simultaneously contend that the order itself deserves to be set aside. Moreover, since the competent authority is yet to take a final decision after considering the reply submitted by the appellants, any observation made by this Court on the merits of the rival contentions would not only be premature but may also prejudice either side in the pending proceedings. 12 20. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has exercised his discretion judiciously and in accordance with settled principles governing judicial review against show-cause notices. The impugned order strikes an equitable balance by safeguarding the rights of the appellants while simultaneously permitting the statutory authority to discharge its functions in accordance with law. We do not find any jurisdictional error, perversity or manifest illegality in the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge so as to warrant interference in this intra-Court appeal. 21. Consequently, the present writ appeal, being devoid of merit, deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. It is, however, made clear that the competent authority shall consider the reply already submitted by the appellants, if not already decided, strictly in accordance with law and on its own merits, uninfluenced by any observations made either in the order passed by the learned Single Judge or in the present judgment. 22. There shall be no order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Anu