- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 12837 OF 2023 BETWEEN: T CHINNAGIRIYAPPA S/O THIMMAIAH AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS R/AT E-143, DID VILLAGE ROAD NELAGADARANAHALLI NAGASANDRA BENGALURU - 560 073 …PETITIONER (BY SRI. RAM SINGH K., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE OF KARNATAKA BY BYDARAHALLI POLICE STAITON BENGALURU - 560 091 REP BY SPP HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU - 560 001 2. SMT PUTTAMMA W/O LATE MARAPPA AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS R/AT SITE NO 38, 39 THIGALARAPALYA COLONYU THIGALARAPALYA BENGALURU - 560 058 …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT. DEEPTHI ALVA, HCGP FOR R1 SRI. SHAIKH SAOUD, ADVOCATE FOR R2) Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S. 482 OF CR.P.C. BY THE ADVOCATE FOR THE PETITIONER PRAYING THAT THIS HONOURABLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.NO.1225/2023 (CR.NO.725/2023) OF RESPONDENT NO.1 BYADARAHALLI POLICE STATION, BENGALURU REGISTERED FOR ALLEGED OFEFNCE P/U/S 504 AND 506 OF IPC, PENDING ON THE FILE OF II ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, BENGALURU. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER The petitioner is before the Court calling in question proceedings in Spl.C.No.1225/2023 registered for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ('Atrocities Act' for short) and Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. 2. Heard Sri. Ram Singh K., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Smt. Deepthi Alva, learned High Court - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri. Shaikh Saoud, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows: On an incident that takes place on 07.09.2023, a complaint comes to be registered by respondent No.2 - complainant, alleging hurling of abuses, which would become the ingredients of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act and Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC. This becomes a crime in Crime No.725/2023. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. Filing of the charge sheet has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition on the score that the aforementioned offences are not made out in the case at hand. This Court had granted an interim order of stay 3 years ago and the same is subsisting even today. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the a perusal at the allegations in the complaint would indicate that the petitioner has allegedly hurled abuses not in a public place or a place of public view, but where there - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 was nobody. He would submit that this could not have resulted in the charge sheet being filed by the police at all. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant would submit that the police have filed a charge sheet post investigation. Therefore, it is a matter of trial for the petitioner to come out clean. He would seek dismissal of the petition. 6. Learned HCGP would also toe the lines of the learned counsel appearing for the complainant seeking dismissal of the petition. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The incident that triggers registration of the crime happens on 07.09.2023. The next day, the complaint is registered. The complaint reads as follows: - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 "gÀªÀjUÉ ¢£ÁAPÀ: 08-09-2023 EAzÀ ¨ÁåqÀgÀºÀ½î ¥ÉƯÉÆÃ¸ï ¥ÀÄlÖªÀÄä ¯ÉÃmï oÁuÁ¢üPÁjAiÀĪÀjUÉ ªÀiÁgÀ¥Àà wUÀ¼ÀgÀ PÁ¯ÉÆä ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ. «µÀAiÀÄ: £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ºÀwÛgÀ §AzÀÄ ZÉ£ÀßVj JA§ ªÀåQÛ PÉÆ¯É ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁUÀÄ eÁw ¤AzÀ£É ªÀiÁrgÀĪÀ §UÉÎ ***** ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉà £ÀªÀÄä ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ºÀwÛgÀ §AzÀÄ ZÉ£ÀßVj JA§ ªÀåQÛ £ÀªÀÄä ºÀwÛgÀ §AzÀÄ CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¤A¢¹ eÁw ¤AzÀ£É ªÀiÁr ºÀ¯Éè ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä AiÀÄwß¹zÀ£ÀÄ. wUÀ¼ÀgÀ¥Á¼ÀåzÀ PÁ¯ÉÆäAiÀÄ®° ªÁ¸À«gÀĪÀ ¥ÀÄlÖªÀÄä ¯ÉÃmï ªÀiÁgÀ¥Àà ¸ÀªÀð £ÀA. 99 gÀ®° ¸ÉÊmï £ÀA. 38 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 39 ZÉ£ÀߥÀà£ÀªÀgÀ PÀÄlÄA§PÉÌ ¸ÉÃjzÀ ¸ÀévÀÄÛAiÀiÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. ¸ÀzÀj 38 ZÉ£ÀßUÀj ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ZÉAzÀæªÀÄä £ÀPÀ° zÁR¯É ¸ÀȶֹgÀÄvÁÛgÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀ 07-09-2023 ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 5.30 jAzÀ 6 UÀAmÉAiÀÄ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è £À£Àß ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ ºÀwÛgÀ AiÀiÁgÀÄ E®èzÀ ¸ÀªÀÄAiÀÄzÀ°è ZÉ£ÀßVj §AzÀÄ ºÀ¯Éè ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä AiÀÄwß¹zÀ£ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ªÀqÀØgÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀiÁ¢UÀgÀÄ PÉƧÄâ CwAiÀiÁ¬ÄvÀÄ JAzÀÄ CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¤A¢¹zÀ£ÀÄ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÉÊmï ºÀwÛgÀ §AzÀÄ ¤£Àß ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ªÀÄPÀ̼À£ÀÄß PÉÆ¯É ªÀiÁr¸ÀÄvÉÃ£É JAzÀÄ fêÀ ¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQgÀÄvÁÛ£É. ¸ÀzÀj ¸ÀéwÛ£À ªÉÄÃ¯É ªÀiÁ£Àå £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è zÁªÉ £ÀA. M.J¸ï.£ÀA.512/2016 ZÉ£ÀßVj JA§ ªÀåQÛ £ÀªÀÄä ªÉÄÃ¯É ¥ÀæPÀgÀt ºÀÆrzÀÄÝ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è ¥ÀæPÀgÀt ªÀeÁªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ, ªÀiÁgÀ¥Àà ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀÄlÄA§zÀªÀgÀ ¥ÀgÀªÁV DzÉñÀ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ. ªÀiÁgÀ¥Àà ªÀÄvÀÄÛ PÀÄlÄA§ M.J¸À.zÁªÉ £ÀA.489/2006 ªÀiÁgÀ¥Àà ZÉ£ÀßVjAiÀÄ ªÉÄÃ¯É zÁªÉ ºÉÆÃrzÀÄÝ CzÀÄ PÀÆqÀ ªÀiÁgÀ¥Àà£ÀªÀgÀ PÀÄlÄA§zÀ ¥ÀgÀªÁV DzÉñÀ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ. £ÀAvÀgÀ ZÉ£ÀßVj Dgï.J.106/2015 ªÉÄîä£À« ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ ¥ÀæPÀgÀt ªÀeÁ DVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. £ÀAvÀgÀ Dgï.J.£ÀA.36/2017 gÀ°è ZÉ£ÀßVj ªÉÄîä£À« ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ ¥ÀæPÀgÀt ªÀeÁªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. zÁªÀ ¸ÀASÉå 212/2016, M.J¸À.£ÀA. 489/2006, Dgï.J.£ÀA.106/2015, Dgï.J.£ÀA.36/2017 J¯Áè ¥ÀæPÀgÀtUÀ¼ÀÄ £ÀªÀÄäAvÉ £ÁåAiÀiÁ®AiÀÄzÀ°è DzÉñÀªÁVgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. £ÁªÀÅ C¸ÀÄà±Àå eÁwAiÀiÁ ¨ÉÆë d£ÁAUÀPÉÌ ¸ÉÃjgÀÄvÉÛêÉ. GzÉÝñÀ¥ÀƪÀðPÀªÁV £ÀªÀÄä ªÉÄÃ¯É ¸ÀĪÀiÁIÄG 20 ªÀµÀðUÀ½AzÀ vÉÆAzÀgÉ PÉÆnÖgÀÄvÁÛ£É. £ÀªÀÄäzÀÄ eÁUÀ JAzÀÄ UÀ¯ÁmÉ ªÀiÁrgÀÄvÁÛ£É. zÀAiÀÄ ªÀiÁr £ÀªÉÄUÉ £ÁåAiÀÄ PÉÆr¸À¨ÉÃPÉAzÀÄ ¤ªÀÄä°è «£ÀAw¹PÉƼÀÄîvÉÛãÉ." The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet as obtaining in Column No.17 reads as follows: "17. PÉù£À ¸ÀAQë¥ÀÛ ¸ÁgÁA±À: - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 F zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥Àt ¥ÀnÖAiÀÄ PÁ®A £ÀA 14 gÀ°ègÀĪÀ ¸ÁQë-1gÀªÀgÀÄ ¥Àj²µÀÖ eÁwAiÀÄ ¨sÉÆë d£ÁAUÀPÉÌ ¸ÉÃjzÀÄÝ, PÁ®A £ÀA 12 gÀ°ègÀĪÀ DgÉÆævÀ£ÀÄ MPÀÌ°UÀ eÁwUÉ ¸ÉÃjgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ vÀºÀ²Ã¯ÁÝgÀgÀÄ ¨ÉAUÀ¼ÀÆgÀÄ GvÀÛgÀ «¨sÁUÀzÀªÀgÀÄ ¸À°è¹gÀĪÀ zÁR¯ÁwUÀ½AzÀ zÀÈqsÀ¥ÀnÖgÀÄvÀÛzÉ. ¢£ÁAPÀ:07/09/2023 gÀAzÀÄ ¸ÀAeÉ ¸ÀĪÀiÁgÀÄ 05-:30 UÀAmÉAiÀÄ°è ¨ÁåqÀgÀºÀ½î ¥Éưøï oÁuÉ ¸ÀgÀºÀzÀÄÝ, wUÀ¼ÀgÀ¥Á¼Àå ªÀÄÄRågÀ¸ÉÛAiÀÄ°ègÀĪÀ wUÀ¼ÀgÀ¥Á¼Àå PÁ¯ÉÆäAiÀÄ ¸ÀªÀgï¸ÀASÉå 99 gÀ°è£À ¤ªÉñÀ£À ¸ÀASÉå 38 ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 39 gÀ §½ ¸ÁQë-1 gÀªÀgÀÄ EzÁÝUÀ DgÉƦvÀ£ÀÄ KPÁKQ ¸ÀܼÀPÉÌ §AzÀÄ C°èzÀÝ ¸ÁQë-1 gÀªÀgÀ£ÀÄß L ªÀqÀتÀÄÄAqÉ, ªÀiÁ¢UÀªÀÄÄAqÉ, ¤£ÀUÉ JµÀÄÖ ºÉýzÀgÀÆ CxÀðªÁVªÀÅ¢®èªÀ, ¤£ÀßzÀÄ CwAiÀiÁ¬ÄvÀÄ F eÁUÀ £À£ÀßzÀÄ F eÁUÀzÀ §½ §AzÀgÉ ¤£ÀUÉ MAzÀÄ UÀw PÁt¸ÀÄvÉÛÃ£É JAzÀÄ CªÁZÀå ±À§ÝUÀ½AzÀ ¨ÉÊzÀÄ, CªÀªÀiÁ¤¹, eÁw¤AzÀ£É ªÀiÁr, ¥Áæt¨ÉzÀjPÉ ºÁQgÀĪÀÅzÀÄ FªÀgÉV£À vÀ¤SɬÄAzÀ ºÁUÀÆ ¸ÁPÁëöåzsÁgÀWÀ½AzÀ PÀAqÀÄ §A¢gÀÄvÀÛzÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ ªÉÄîÌAqÀ PÁAiÉÄÝ PÀ®AUÀ¼À£ÀéAiÀÄ DgÉÆævÀ£ÀÄ ²PÁëºÀðgÁVgÀÄvÁÛgÉAzÀÄ F zÉÆõÁgÉÆÃ¥ÀuÉ." (Emphasis added at each instance) If the complaint and the charge sheet are read in tandem, what would unmistakably emerge is that the offences under the Atrocities Act cannot be laid against the petitioner for the reason that the allegation itself is not that it has taken place in a public view or in a public place. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under Section 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act. They read as follows: “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— 3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (a) to (q) ……….. - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” Section 3(1)(r) of the Atrocities Act requires hurling of abuses with an intention to insult in a public place. Section 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act requires the hurling of abuses with an intention to insult in a place of public view. In the case at hand, the complaint itself narrates that the abuses were hurled in a place where no one was there. Therefore, though it is a public place, it was not in place of public view or in front of people, it was between the petitioner and the complainant. It would become apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of GUNJAN ALIAS GIRIJA KUMARI v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI)1, wherein while interpreting the ingredients of the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act, it is held as follows: "…. …. …. 5.1 Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act read as under, 1 2026 SCC OnLine SC 834 - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 “3. Punishments for offences atrocities.— 3(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,— (a) to (q) ……….. (r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view; (s) abuses any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view;” 5.1.1 The offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the SC/ST Act can be said to have been committed when a person not belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe intentionally insults or intimidates with an intent to humiliate a person belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is made out when any member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name in any place within public view. 5.2 The ingredients of the offences are that there has to be an intentional insult or intimidation which has to be with an intent to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that such member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe is abused by caste name by a person who does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The common essential for constituting the offence under both the Sections is that the insult or intimidation under sub-clause (r) or hurling of abuses under sub-clause (s) have taken place “in any place within public view”. 5.3 All the appellants are framed for the offence under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC. Section 506, IPC is about punishment for the offence of criminal intimidation whereas the offence of criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503, IPC. It says that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, and when the same is done with an intent to cause alarm to that - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 person, commits criminal intimidation. Section 34, IPC speaks about the acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. 5.4 Before examining the sustainability of the charge framed and the charge-sheet for its details and contents in respect of the aforesaid offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, it would be useful to survey few decisions of this Court which have explained the scope and purport of the phrase “in any place within public view” pinpointing that the said requirement is indispensable to be fulfilled in order that the offence under the SC/ST Act is constituted. 5.5 In Swaran Singh v. State through Standing Counsel7, the place where the informant was insulted by the appellant by calling him ‘chamar’ was one where he had been standing near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises of his employer. This Court held that such place was “a place within public view”. The argument that the alleged act was not committed in a public place and hence did not come within the purview of the offence under the SC/ST Act was negatived by explaining a fine distinction between the expression ‘in any place within public view’ as used in the provision and the expression ‘public place’. 5.5.1 It was stated that the expression ‘a place within public view’ could not be confused with the expression ‘public place’. It was highlighted that a place can be a private place yet can be within public view, “….It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view….” (Para 28) 5.6 Swaran Singh (supra) came to be relied on by this Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand8 in respect of the concept of ‘place within public view’ as an ingredient of the offence. The very observations in Swaran Singh (supra) were reiterated in paragraph 14 in Hitesh Verma (supra) when the Court noticed the allegations in the FIR about abusing the informant. It was stated in the FIR that the incident of abuse happened within the four walls of the building of the informant, and it was not the case of the informant that any member of the public was present at the time of the incident in the house. The Court, therefore, ruled that the basic requirement that the abusive words were uttered in ‘a place within public view’ was not made out. It was further noticed that witnesses whose names were appended to the chargesheet were not the persons present within the four walls of the building. 5.7 In a more recent decision in Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy9, this Court considered its own decisions in Swaran Singh (supra) as well as Hitesh Verma (supra), and elucidated an ironed-out proposition of law as under, “It could thus be seen that, to be a place ‘within public view’, the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view.” (Para 11) 5.7.1 The Court observed that even by taking the allegations in the FIR at their face value, what - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 was alleged was that when the complainant was in the office, the accused came there, made inquiries from the complainant and upon not being satisfied, started abusing the complainant in the name of his caste and insulted him. Thereafter, three colleagues of the complainant came later to pacify the accused and took him away. The Court thus noticed that the incident had taken place within the four corners of the chambers of the complainant, which was not “a place within public view”. 5.8 A decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sri Rithesh Pais v. State of Karnataka, by Puttur Town P.S.10 may also be noticed to be relevant, in which the offence was held to be not made out as the chargesheet material showed that the hurling of the abuses had happened in the basement and within the walls of the basement, holding that the basement of the building was not “a place within public view”. 5.9 A conclusive statement of law that emanates from the ratio of the decisions of this Court discussed above is that in order to make out the offence under Section 3(1)(r) and/or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, the occurrence of the incident and the act and conduct of hurling of caste- based abuses must take place at “a place within public view”. It must be a place within the public gaze. Even happens to be a private place, then in such eventuality a public-eye must have an access to be able to notice what happens there or what is taking place that will only make the “place within public view”. 6. Having appreciated the aspect that the requirement that the occurrence of the incident of insult or abuse, towards the member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe has to be in “a place within public view”, making the same a necessary condition for constituting the offence under the SC/ST Act, the facts in the present case may be attentively noticed. 6.1 In the FIR, while referring to the incident of abuse, on 28.01.2021, the statements were made - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 by respondent No. 2-complainant that the appellants were in the habit of harassing and hurling caste-based slurs at him for over a year and that they used to do it when some other persons or friends come to meet him, by using the abusive words from their balcony or at the ground floor of the house. 6.2 These allegations about the alleged continuous conduct did not speak of any specific instance or happening on a particular day and they are too irrelevant to contribute to make out an offence under Section 3(1)(r) or Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. It was next stated that because of such behaviour of the appellants, respondent No. 1- complainant had to send his son in a separate house. Such general accusations lead nowhere when it comes to allegation about the commission of offence. 6.3 As per the averments in the FIR, on the relevant date that is on 28.01.2021, the altercation occurred at the time when the appellants were trying to break open the house of respondent No. 2- complainant. According to respondent No. 2- complainant, appellant No. 1 hurled casteist slur in an abusive way to insult him and his wife. All the appellants-accused, it was further alleged, intimidated respondent No. 2-complainant and also threatened to implicate him in molestation charge. 6.4 It was noticeable that in the complaint/FIR, nowhere it was stated that the said incident wherein appellant No. 1 and other appellants are stated to have abused and threatened respondent No. 1-complainant, took place where there was a public gaze. The necessary ingredient of occurrence of the incident “in a place within public view” was conspicuously absent. 6.5 Not only that it was not stated that it was “a place within public view” or that the outsiders or the members of the family were present at the time, the details mentioned in the FIR clearly indicated that the place of occurrence of the incident was - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 inside the residential house. Referring to the facts stated and the contents of FIR in this regard, firstly the FIR is silent about the place of occurrence of the alleged incident. Secondly, point No. 5(b) in the FIR mentioned the place of occurrence at the address stated as “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, New Delhi”, which was admittedly a residential home. Similarly was recorded the address of respondent No. 2-complainant in point No. 6(e) in the FIR to reinforce that it was the place of residential house where the occurrence took place. Thirdly, in the charge-sheet filed before the court, the very residential address “7/38, Ramesh Nagar, Kirti Nagar, Delhi” was mentioned to suggest the place of occurrence. 6.6 Respondent No. 2-complainant named two witnesses, one Love Manchanda and another named Chandra Prakash. Not only that both were the friends of respondent No. 2-complainant, from their statements, nothing could be elicited to show that they witnessed the incident. Love Manchanda stated that “on 28.12.2020, Bhim Sain (complainant) asked me to accompany him to his house where he wanted to take a picture of the locked lock of his house”. In his statement, Chandra Prakash stated that “he went to the house at Ramesh Nagar with the complainant Bhim Sain and when he wanted to open the lock of his house, the accused interjected”. 6.7 All material facts go to suggest that the alleged incident took place in a private place and within four walls of the house of respondent No. 2- complainant and the appellants, who all are family members. While the allegation in the FIR was, as stated, that respondent No. 2-complainant had been suffering similar kind of incidents since long and for last one year, it was not stated anything specific in respect of those earlier incidents with regard to the incident for which the complaint was filed, it was not indicated that any independent member of public was present to witness the occurrence. Once that is so, to suggest that the house place was not exposed to public eye or public gaze, a residential house in no way becomes “a place within public view”. - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 7. For any criminal proceedings to initiate, the starting point is filing of a complaint and registration of FIR. The complaint/FIR provides the first account of the happening of events and incidents alleged as commission of offence. A reaction and revelation at the first blush is always natural and therefore becomes creditworthy. The contents of the complaint giving the initial and primary description could be treated as more reliable, for, at the subsequent stage, there would be a scope and room for improvisation. 8. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal11, this Court laid down the acid test that if the contents of the FIR, taken at their face value, do not make out any case against the accused, such an FIR registered with ulterior motive deserves to be quashed. In Hitesh Verma (supra), in addition to the ingredient of “a place within public view”, the details in the FIR or the charge-sheet failed to disclose the precise contents of abusive language employed by the applicant to attract the offence under the SC/ST Act. In other words, when the essentials to constitute the offence did not come out from and were not satisfied in the contents of the FIR, the offence was held to have not been made out, rendering the FIR liable to be quashed. 8.1 In Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh12, this Court noted that the defect in the FIR was in the nature of non-mentioning of the name of material witness PW-1 which was treated as a basic defect in the hypothesis portrayed by the prosecution. The Court, in that context, observed, “although we accept that the FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of the crime, but absence of certain essential facts which are conspicuously missing in the present FIR, point towards suspicion that the crime itself may have been staged”. 8.2 Also in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of Uttar Pradesh13, this Court found absence of requisite ingredients of the offence under the SC/ST Act holding that the offence was not committed at “a place within public view”. It was observed that - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 even though the appellant in that case might have abused the complainant, but such abuse by itself and without anything more does not warrant subjecting the appellant to face a trial, particularly in view of the clear absence of the ingredients necessary to constitute the offence. 9. Thus, it is trite principle that the FIR becomes liable in law to be quashed when it, in its bare reading, does not disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the offence alleged therein. The basic constituents of the offence alleged in the FIR must stem and stand disclosed from the contents of the FIR. In order that the FIR alleging any action is sustainable in law to be a good and acceptable document to proceed criminally against any accused named therein or any person to be made accused on its basis, it must manifest and reveal basic ingredient of the offence(s) alleged therein. For an offence to be made out under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, as is the question in the instant case, the requirement that the occurrence has to be “in a place within public view” is not satisfied, is missing and absent. 9.1 It could be said that the occurrence of the incident to become an offence under the SC/ST Act must have happened “in a place within public view”, is in a way, a principal requirement amongst the other ingredients. The other aspects namely “intentional insult or intimidation” and “an intent to humiliate”, gathers a kind of intensity when the insult, intimidation, humiliation or abusive utterances, as the case may be, takes place in “a place within public view”, in the presence of members of the public. The requirement that the place must be one “within public view” can be said to be substantiating the other elements of the offence under the SC/ST Act. It is therefore a sine qua non for making out the offence under the SC/ST Act. 10. This leaves the Court to the charge framed under Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC against all the appellants. As noted hereinabove, the offence of criminal intimidation as - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 defined under Section 503, IPC and made punishable under Section 506, IPC requires that whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property and when such threat is with the intent to cause alarm to that person, commits criminal intimidation. The “intent to cause alarm” is an pivotal aspect and consideration to judge whether the offence of criminal intimidation is made out or not. 10.1 In the present case, even after closely reading the averments in the complaint, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that the appellants-accused exerted threat with an intent to cause “alarm” to respondent No. 2-complainant. The submission could be countenanced that the element of “alarm” to the complainant was “absent”. Even otherwise, the offence under Section 506, IPC was alleged against the appellants to conjunct the same with the offence alleged under the SC/ST Act which are not made out. 10.2 As far as the charge under Section 34, IPC is concerned, nothing is suggested either from the facts or attendant circumstances that the appellants-accused had any common intention to do a criminal act and that they acted in furtherance of such common intention. In that view, it would be an abuse of the process of law and would amount to harassment to the appellants to subject them to the criminal proceedings in relation to Section 506 read with Section 34, IPC." (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court in GUNJAN supra considers the entire spectrum of law and holds that the offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Atrocities Act cannot be made out when the alleged hurling of abuses has not taken place in a - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:35117 CRL.P No. 12837 of 2023 public place or place of public view. In that light, the ingredients of the offences are not found in the case at hand. 9. In GUNJAN supra, the appellant was also charged with the offence under Section 506 of the IPC. The Apex Court holds that Section 506 was included in conjunction with the offences under the Atrocities Act and therefore, the offence under Section 506 is not made out. In that light, the offences under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC would tumble down qua the petitioner. Therefore, permitting further proceedings against this petitioner would become an abuse of the process of the law and result in miscarriage of justice. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: ORDER (i) The petition is allowed. (ii) Proceedings in Spl.C.No.1225/2023 pending before the II Additional District Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru, stands quashed qua the petitioner. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE SJK/ List No.: 2 Sl No.: 27