JUDGMENT : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. CRA No.1765/2019 :- This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.11.2019 passed in Special Criminal Case No. 282/2017 by the Special Judge (Atrocities), Raipur (C.G.), whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:— Conviction Sentence U/s. 354 of Indian Penal Code (for short, ‘IPC’) Rigorous Imprisonment for four years and fine of Rs.1,000/- in default of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months Under Section 323 of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.1,000/- in default of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months Under Section 506 Part II of IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.1,000/- in default of fine amount to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for three months 2. ACQA No.10/2020:- This acquittal appeal preferred by the victim arises out of the same judgment dated 14.11.2019 passed by the Special Judge (Atrocities), District Raipur (C.G.), in Special Criminal Case No. 282/2017, whereby the learned trial Court acquitted respondent No. 2/accused of the charges under Section 376(D) of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short, “the Act, 1989”). 3.Since both the appeals arise out of the same judgment and are based on the same set of facts and evidence, they are being decided by this common judgment. 4.Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 13.06.2017, at about 5:00 PM, prosecutrix, a resident of Village Achholi, Police Station Urla, District Raipur, belonging to a Scheduled Caste, went near Sheetla Talab to answer the call of nature. It is alleged that at that time accused- Maheshwar Nishad @ Natwar reached there, caught hold of her, assaulted her, used criminal force upon her and committed sexual intercourse with her against her will. It is further alleged that accused threatened to kill her and caused injuries to her. After the incident, prosecutrix was taken home by her relatives and was later taken to the hospital, where her report was recorded. On the basis of the report of the prosecutrix, FIR (Ex.P-25) was registered against the accused- Maheshwar Nishad. 5.During the course of investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-5. After the incident, prosecutrix was taken home by her relatives and was later taken to the hospital, where her report was recorded. On the basis of the report of the prosecutrix, FIR (Ex.P-25) was registered against the accused- Maheshwar Nishad. 5.During the course of investigation, spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-5. After obtaining the consent of the prosecutrix and her parents, she was sent for medical examination, where PW-8 Dr. Snehlata Singh examined her and found no external injuries on her body; however, the prosecutrix complained of pain in her chest and head. PW-17 Dr. P. Chauhan also examined the prosecutrix on 22.07.2017 and found no injuries on her private parts. She did not give any definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse and gave MLC reports vide Exs.P-18 and P-26 respectively. Accused- Maheshwar Nishad was taken into custody vide Ex.P-30 and was sent for medical examination, where PW-7 Dr. P.K. Gupta examined him and opined that accused was capable of performing sexual intercourse and gave MLC report vide Ex.P-16. Vide Ex.P-3, clothes of the prosecutrix were seized. Vide Ex.P-6, caste certificate of the prosecutrix was seized. Vide Ex.P-19, underwear of accused- Maheshwar Nishad was seized. Seized articles were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination and as per the FSL report (Ex.P-33), no seminal stains or human spermatozoa were found on the articles marked ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’, and the seminal stains found on articles ‘D’ and ‘E’ were insufficient for scientific examination. Statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. were also recorded. 6.After due investigation, accused- Maheshwar Nishad was charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional Criminal Court and the case was committed to the trial Court for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence by stating that he has not committed the aforesaid offences. 7.In order to bring home the offences, prosecution has examined as many as 19 witnesses and brought on record 33 documents vide Ex.P/01 to P/33. However, in his defence, accused has examined none and not exhibited any document. 7.In order to bring home the offences, prosecution has examined as many as 19 witnesses and brought on record 33 documents vide Ex.P/01 to P/33. However, in his defence, accused has examined none and not exhibited any document. 8.The trial Court, after hearing learned counsel for the parties and appreciating the evidence on record, by the impugned judgment, acquitted the accused- Maheshwar Nishad of the charges under Section 376(D) of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989, but convicted and sentenced the accused- Maheshwar Nishad for the offences mentioned in paragraph 1 of this judgment. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the present separate appeals have been filed by the accused- Maheshwar Nishad and the prosecutrix respectively. 9.Learned counsel for the accused- Maheshwar Nishad supports the impugned judgment insofar as it relates to the acquittal of the accused of the charges under Section 376(D) of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989 and submits that the evidence on record does not establish any injury on the person of the prosecutrix, nor is there reliable evidence to prove that the accused extended any criminal threat to her. On these grounds, it is contended that the conviction and sentence of accused under Sections 354, 323 and 506 Part II of the IPC are also unsustainable and that the accused deserves to be acquitted of the said offences as well. In the alternative, learned counsel for the accused submits that if this Court comes to the conclusion that the accused is guilty of the aforesaid offences, then, considering the fact that the accused has no criminal antecedents, he has been facing the lis since 2017 and has already remained in custody for a period of about 855 days, it is prayed that the sentence awarded to the accused be reduced and he be sentenced to the period already undergone by him. 10. Learned counsel for the prosecutrix submits that the learned trial Court has committed an error in acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 376(D) of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989. She further submits that the testimony of the prosecutrix is natural, consistent and trustworthy, and that her sole evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. She further submits that absence of injuries or lack of medical or forensic corroboration does not discredit her testimony. She further submits that the testimony of the prosecutrix is natural, consistent and trustworthy, and that her sole evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction. She further submits that absence of injuries or lack of medical or forensic corroboration does not discredit her testimony. She also submits the accused was aware of the caste of the prosecutrix and, therefore, the provisions of the SC/ST Act are clearly attracted. On these grounds, it was prayed that the acquittal of the accused be set aside and he be convicted and sentenced in accordance with law. 11. Learned counsel for the State also supports the contention made by learned counsel for the prosecutrix. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Constable Surendra Singh and another v. State of Uttarakhand , (2025) 5 SCC 433 , whereby in Para-11 & 12, it has been held that the High Court should interfere in the order of acquittal, if the same suffers from perversity and is based on misreading of material evidence etc. and observed as under: “ 11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and others v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) 6 (2024) 8 SCC 149 “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ ” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748], this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows :(SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court vide its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka , (2024) 3 SCC 544 has held in para 36 as under:- "42. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:- (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive-- inclusive of all evidence, oral and documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re- appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court. 15. 15. Thus, in light of the above-quoted guidelines, we have to examine whether the findings recorded by the learned trial Court suffers from patent perversity or the same is based on misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record and whether two reasonable views are possible or only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 16. Case of the prosecution is primarily based on the testimony of PW-1 prosecutrix. In her statement before the Court, PW-1 prosecutrix stated that on the date of the incident, i.e., 13.06.2017, she had gone to Sheetla Talab to answer the call of nature. According to her, the accused- Maheshwar Nishad, along with the juvenile, came there and asked her to indulge in wrongful acts. When she refused, the accused pressed her mouth, removed her salwar, and committed rape upon her. She further stated that the accused assaulted her on her chest, threatened to kill her by lifting a stone, and thereafter beat her with hands and legs, as a result of which, she became unconscious. She also stated that later her brother and aunt took her home, and she remained unconscious for two days, after which, she was taken to Mekahara Hospital, where her report was recorded. However, on the contrary, in her cross-examination, prosecutrix admitted that on the date of the incident itself she had gone to the police station along with her brother and other relatives, and that in her report she had mentioned only molestation and assault, making no reference to the alleged rape committed by the accused. She further admitted that after the incident, she had walked back home and had spoken to her family members. She also admitted that she had sufficient opportunity to narrate the incident to the police and to her family members. These admissions materially affect the credibility of her version regarding gang rape. 17. PW-2, Narendra Gayakwad, father of the prosecutrix, stated that he was not at home at the time of the incident and returned around 8:30 PM. He further stated that his children informed him that the prosecutrix had been assaulted. He also stated that the prosecutrix later told him that the accused and another boy had raped her. 17. PW-2, Narendra Gayakwad, father of the prosecutrix, stated that he was not at home at the time of the incident and returned around 8:30 PM. He further stated that his children informed him that the prosecutrix had been assaulted. He also stated that the prosecutrix later told him that the accused and another boy had raped her. In cross-examination, he admitted that in his police statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. (Ex.D-1) he had only mentioned the molestation and had not stated anything about rape. He further admitted that the prosecutrix had not informed him about the alleged rape at the relevant time. Thus, his evidence materially weakens the credibility of the allegation of rape. 18. PW-3 Harish Gayakwad, brother of the prosecutrix, stated that his younger brother, Dharmendra, informed him that the prosecutrix was lying near the pond. He stated that he, along with Kumari Jangde, aunt of the prosecutrix, went to the spot and brought the prosecutrix home. According to him, the prosecutrix was semi-conscious. He stated that the prosecutrix told him that the accused had assaulted her and threatened her. In cross-examination, he admitted that after coming home, the prosecutrix was able to speak properly and that she went to the police station on the same day and narrated the incident to the police. He further admitted that initially the prosecutrix did not tell him anything about rape. He also admitted that at the police station, the prosecutrix only mentioned the molestation and assault committed by the accused. Thus, his evidence does not provide independent support for the allegation of rape and materially affects the credibility of that part of the prosecutrix’s version. 19. PW-4 Kumari Jangde, aunt of the prosecutrix, stated that she was informed that the prosecutrix was lying near the pond. She went to the spot and brought her home. She stated that initially the prosecutrix complained of assault and chest pain, and later told her about the alleged rape. In cross- examination, she admitted that after coming home, the prosecutrix was able to talk properly and was not completely unconscious. She further admitted that while lodging the report at the police station, the prosecutrix was in good condition and was narrating the incident to the police herself. In cross- examination, she admitted that after coming home, the prosecutrix was able to talk properly and was not completely unconscious. She further admitted that while lodging the report at the police station, the prosecutrix was in good condition and was narrating the incident to the police herself. Thus, her evidence does not provide independent corroboration of the allegation of rape, and it indicates that the prosecutrix was conscious and able to communicate with her family and the police at the relevant time, which affects the credibility of her version regarding the sexual assault. Likewise, PW-5 Dharmendra Gayakwad, a child witness, also admitted that the prosecutrix had only told him about assault and molestation. His testimony does not support the allegation of rape. 20. PW-8 Dr. Snehlata Singh, examined the prosecutrix on 14.06.2017 and found no external injuries on her body. She stated that the prosecutrix complained of pain in the chest and head and referred her for further examination. The absence of injuries is a relevant circumstance, particularly when the allegation is of a violent gang rape accompanied by assault. Further, PW-17, Dr. P. Chauhan, examined the prosecutrix on 22.07.2017 and found no injuries on the private parts. The hymen was observed to be old, healed, and torn. She opined that no definite conclusion regarding recent sexual intercourse could be given. She also admitted in cross-examination that in cases of forcible intercourse, injuries are generally expected on the private parts. Thus, the medical evidence does not corroborate the prosecutrix’s allegation of gang rape and materially affects the credibility of that part of her testimony. 21. Besides above, the Forensic Science Laboratory Report (Ex.P-33) did not detect semen or spermatozoa on the vaginal slides or on the clothes seized from the prosecutrix. This scientific evidence does not support the allegation of rape. Moreover, spot maps prepared by the Investigating Officer and the Patwari (Exs.P-4 & P-12), and the evidence of prosecution witnesses themselves, clearly establish that the alleged place of occurrence is Sheetla Talab, which is a public nistari pond. The evidence further shows that near the pond there is a Sheetla Temple, an electricity sub-station and a ferro alloy factory where workers remain present. Prosecution witnesses themselves admitted that people frequently visit the pond and the temple and that employees remain present in the factory and the sub-station. The evidence further shows that near the pond there is a Sheetla Temple, an electricity sub-station and a ferro alloy factory where workers remain present. Prosecution witnesses themselves admitted that people frequently visit the pond and the temple and that employees remain present in the factory and the sub-station. The incident is alleged to have occurred at about 5:00 PM in the month of June, when there is sufficient daylight. In such circumstances, the allegation that the accused and the juvenile committed gang rape by removing the clothes of the prosecutrix at such a public place does not appear probable. 22. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence, it is clear that the allegation of rape was not disclosed at the earliest opportunity, as the prosecutrix (PW-1) herself admitted that on the day of the incident she went to the police station with her relatives and reported only molestation and assault, making no mention of rape. Her father (PW-2), brother (PW- 3), and aunt (PW-4) corroborated that she initially complained of assault and pain and was able to communicate properly. Medical evidence (PW-8 and PW-17) shows no injuries on her private parts and no definite opinion regarding recent sexual intercourse could be given. Forensic evidence (Ex.P- 33) detected no semen or spermatozoa on her body or clothes. The incident occurred around 5:00 PM at a public pond near a temple, electricity sub-station, and factory where people were present, making the alleged gang rape improbable. In view of the delay in disclosure, lack of corroboration, negative medical and forensic evidence, and the public location of the incident, the Trial Court has carefully analyzed these aspects and given cogent reasons for discarding the allegation of rape. Thus, the learned trial Court rightly acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 376(D) of IPC. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Another , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 has held vide paras 34 & 38 as under:- “34. Thus, the learned trial Court rightly acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 376(D) of IPC. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and Another , 2023 SCC OnLine SC 603 has held vide paras 34 & 38 as under:- “34. Insofar and inasmuch as interference in cases involving the SC/ST Act is concerned, we may only point out that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ramawatar v. State of M.P.22, has held that the mere fact that the offence is covered under a "special statute" would not inhibit this Court or the High Court from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 of the Code, in the terms below: (SCC pp. 641-42, paras 16-17) "16. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The SC/ST Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the SC/ST Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin-fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste-based atrocities. 17. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the SC/ST Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a "special statute" would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrPC." (emphasis supplied) 38.The Court would also note that even if the allegations are taken to be true on their face value, it is not discernible that any offence can be said to have been made out under the SC/ST Act against the appellant. The complaint and FIR are frivolous, vexatious and oppressive.” 24. Also, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Keshaw Mahto @ Keshaw Kumar Mahto vs. State of Bihar & Anr. Passed in SLP (CRL.) No. 12144 of 2025 has held vide para 18 as under:- “18. In the case at hand, we find that there is nothing on record to indicate that the alleged acts of the appellant were motivated for the reason that the complainant is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. Neither the FIR nor the chargesheet contains any whisper of an allegation of insult or intimidation by the appellant herein, let alone one made with the intention to humiliate the complainant.” 25. So far as the charge under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is concerned, the evidence on record does not show that the offence was committed on the ground that the prosecutrix belonged to a Scheduled Caste. There is no allegation of caste-based abuse or motive. Mere proof that the prosecutrix belongs to a Scheduled Caste and that the accused had knowledge of her caste is not sufficient to attract the said provision. Thus, the trial Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has rightly acquitted the accused of the aforesaidsaid charges. The view taken by the trial Court is a reasonable and possible conclusion and does not warrant interference in an appeal against acquittal. 26. Thus, the trial Court, after proper appreciation of the evidence on record, has rightly acquitted the accused of the aforesaidsaid charges. The view taken by the trial Court is a reasonable and possible conclusion and does not warrant interference in an appeal against acquittal. 26. Regarding the conviction of the accused- Maheshwar Nishad @ Natwar under Sections 354, 323, and 506 Part-II of the IPC, the evidence clearly establishes that he assaulted the prosecutrix, used criminal force with intent to outrage her modesty, and threatened her to life. The prosecutrix (PW-1) deposed that the accused assaulted her on the chest, caught hold of her, and lifted a stone to threaten her. This account is corroborated by the statements of her father (PW-2), brother (PW-3), and aunt (PW-4), who confirmed that she was brought home in a semi-conscious condition and complained of pain. Medical evidence further supports this fact: PW-8, Dr. Snehlata Singh, and PW-17, Dr. P. Chouhan, noted chest and head pain, while PW-19, Dr. Manoj Poptani, confirmed a small pleural collection in the left lung membrane of the prosecutrix, consistent with her account. Although the allegation of rape was not proved, but the portions of her testimony regarding assault, outrage of modesty, and threats are credible and corroborated. Therefore, the learned trial Court, after evaluating the entire evidence on record, rightly convicted the accused under Sections 354, 323, and 506 Part-II of the IPC. 27. As regards the sentence, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, and further taking into account that the accused- Maheshwar Nishad @ Natwar, has undergone 855 days of imprisonment and has been facing the lis since June 2017, i.e., for more than eight years, and that he has no criminal antecedents, this Court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met if, while upholding the conviction of the accused under Sections 354, 323, and 506 Part-II of IPC, the jail sentence awarded to him is reduced to the period already undergone. However, the fine amount along with the default stipulations, as imposed by the trial Court, shall remain intact. 28. Consequently, CRA No. 1765 of 2019 filed by the accused- Maheshwar Nishad @ Natwar is partly allowed. However, the fine amount along with the default stipulations, as imposed by the trial Court, shall remain intact. 28. Consequently, CRA No. 1765 of 2019 filed by the accused- Maheshwar Nishad @ Natwar is partly allowed. While upholding the conviction of the accused under Sections 354, 323, and 506 Part-II of IPC, the sentence imposed thereunder by the trial Court is hereby modified, and he is sentenced to the period already undergone by him, whereas ACQA No. 10/2020 filed by the victim/prosecutrix against the acquittal of the accused of the charge under Sections 376(D) and 3(2)(v) of the Act, 1989, being without any substance, is hereby dismissed. 29. The appellant is reported to be on bail. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C., the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the Cr.P.C. of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the trial Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 30. Registry is directed to transmit the lower Court record along with a copy of this judgment to the concerned trial Court forthwith for information and necessary compliance.