JUDGMENT : Rajani Dubey, J. Since both these appeals arise out of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.2.2015 passed by learned 6 th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur in ST No.307/2013, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. By the impugned judgment, each of the appellants stands convicted & sentenced as under: Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 02. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 25.7.2013 at around 3 am dead body of a female was found on the railway track, Tekari by the police which was identified by PW-1 Lalram Janghel as the body of his daughter Nandani Verma. On his report, Dehati Merg Ex.P/1 was registered. PW-1 informed that the deceased was married to accused Gajendra Verma and they were residing in a rented house at Tekari colony. On 24.7.2013 Gajendra informed him about missing of the deceased, so he came by train to Mandar and here he came to know that dead body of a female is lying on the railway track, Tekari. On 15.10.2013 Sub Inspector of Police Station – Vidhan Sabha along with staff went to Mandar Tekari in connection with enquiry into Merg No.30/2013 and upon enquiry from a hooligan namely Shakil Ahmad, he informed that on 24.7.2013 accused Kamal @ Bittu Verma came on a black color Pleasure vehicle (a bike) near Entertainment Club and disclosed that he finished someone and while doing so, his right wrist was bitten and also showed the bite marks. Upon interrogation, accused Kamal @ Bittu confessed the crime and disclosed that out of greed for money he in association with Gajendra Verma, husband of the deceased Nandani Verma, committed her murder by strangulation and thereafter threw her dead body on the railway track. He also stated that for doing this, he obtained Rs.45,000/- from Gajendra Verma in three installments as also obtained the gold and silver ornaments worn by the deceased. Later, accused Gajendra Verma was also taken into custody and he too confessed his guilt in his memorandum. On being produced by accused Kamal @ Bittu Verma, the bills pertaining to sale of ornaments of the deceased to Ghasiram Jewellers, Mandar and Jagriti Jewellers, Dhaneli, were seized. Thereafter, the police also seized the bill books of these jewellers. Later, accused Gajendra Verma was also taken into custody and he too confessed his guilt in his memorandum. On being produced by accused Kamal @ Bittu Verma, the bills pertaining to sale of ornaments of the deceased to Ghasiram Jewellers, Mandar and Jagriti Jewellers, Dhaneli, were seized. Thereafter, the police also seized the bill books of these jewellers. After preparing inquest memo Ex.P/3, the dead body was sent for postmortem to Community Health Center, Dharsiva where PW-13 Dr. NK Lakda conducted postmortem on 25.7.2013 vide Ex.P/24 and opined that the cause of death is coma and hemorrhagic shock and asphyxia due to badly crushed and cutting of head from the body. In his opinion, prima facie the death appears to be accidental. After completing usual investigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons under Sections 302, 201, 34 of IPC followed by framing of charges accordingly by learned trial Court which were abjured by them and they prayed for trial. 03. In order to substantiate its case the prosecution examined 25 witnesses in all. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of CrPC wherein they denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false implication. However, no witness was examined by them in their defence. 04. After hearing counsel for the respective parties and appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused/appellants as mentioned in para 1 of this judgment. Hence these appeals. 05. Learned counsel for the appellant Gajendra Verma would submit that the impugned judgment is per se illegal and contrary to the material available on record. Learned trial Court without there being any legally admissible evidence held the nature of death of the deceased homicidal whereas the autopsy surgeon (PW-13) has opined in the postmortem report that it appears to be accidental and also stated so in his deposition. The entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence but the prosecution has failed to prove a complete chain of circumstances pointing towards the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. The entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence but the prosecution has failed to prove a complete chain of circumstances pointing towards the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. There is no evidence to prove that murder was committed at the house where the deceased and the appellant were residing, there is also no evidence to prove that the dead body was taken in a bag or through any other means and thrown on the railway track by the appellant. As regards memorandum of the appellant, it is also of no consequence because all the facts were already known to the police through memorandum of co-accused recorded earlier and further, the investigating officer admitted that nothing was recovered on the basis of memorandum of the appellant. He would submit that there is nothing on record to show that relations between the appellant and the deceased were strained and as such, there was no motive with the appellant to commit such a heinous offence. Moreover, identification of jewellery of the deceased is also doubtful in this case. The seizure witnesses have also not supported the prosecution case. So far as alleged extrajudicial confession of accused Kamal before PW-15 Shakil Ahmad is concerned, he was a stranger to accused Kamal and normally a person would not make confession to someone who is totally a stranger to him. Even otherwise, this witness has not supported the prosecution case at all and turned hostile. In a criminal case, the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. In view of the above, it is crystal clear that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and as such, he deserves to be acquitted of all the charges. 06. Learned counsel appearing for accused/appellant Kamal Kishore @ Bittu Verma would submit that the impugned judgment is contrary to law, facts and circumstances of the case. There is no legally admissible evidence to prove complicity of the appellant Kamal Kishore in the crime in question. The entire case is based on circumstantial evidence but the prosecution has failed to prove a complete chain of circumstantial evidence against the appellant and he is convicted merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises. There is no legally admissible evidence to prove complicity of the appellant Kamal Kishore in the crime in question. The entire case is based on circumstantial evidence but the prosecution has failed to prove a complete chain of circumstantial evidence against the appellant and he is convicted merely on the basis of conjectures and surmises. He submitted that the only incriminating circumstance heavily relied upon by learned trial Court is seizure of bills from this appellant vide Ex.P/21 of sale of Mangalsutra dated 28.7.2013, allegedly belonging to the deceased. As per seizure memo Ex.P/12, the Mangalsutra seized from PW-6 Rohit Verma, an employee of Ghasiram Bhagwati Charan Jewelers, was having five leafs. However, as per statement of father of deceased PW- 1 Lala Ram Janghel at paras 14 & 15 of his deposition and statement of PW-5 Hemlal Verma, Sarpanch who conducted the identification, at para 2 of deposition, the identified Mangalsutra was having four leafs. Even the Mangalsutra (Art.A-1) produced before the trial Court was having four leafs. Thus looking to nature and quality of evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is quite evident that it has failed to prove the charges leveled against the appellant beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt and being so, he is entitled for acquittal by extending him benefit of doubt. Reliance has been placed on the decisions in the matters of Ashish Jain Vs. Makrand Singh and others , (2019) 3 SCC 770 ; judgment dated 19 th April, 2022 of Hon’ble Supreme Court in CRA Nos.1476-1477 of 2018 in the case of Venkatesh @ Chandra Vs. State of Karnataka ; Chandrapal Vs. State of CG , (2023) 16 SCC 655; Pawan Kumar Chourasia Vs. State of Bihar , 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 197; judgment dated 17.8.2022 of this Court in CRA No.457/14 in Anant Dutta Vs. State of CG ; and the judgment dated 18.1.2024 passed by this Court in CRA No.354/16 in the case of Anil Soni Vs. State of CG. 07. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State opposing the contention of the appellants would submit that in view of oral and documentary evidence on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted and sentenced the appellants by the impugned judgment which needs no interference by this Court. Both the appeals are without any substance and hence liable to be dismissed. 08. Both the appeals are without any substance and hence liable to be dismissed. 08. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 09. It is clear from the record of learned trial Court that the appellants were charged under Sections 302/34 & 201/34 of IPC and after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, learned trial Court convicted and sentenced them under the aforesaid sections as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 10. The first question to be considered by this Court is whether death of Nandani Verm was homicidal or not? 11. PW-1 Lalaram Janghel lodged a Dehati Merg Intimation (Ex.P/1) about death of his daughter Nandani Verma. PW-17 Jainath Singh, Head Constable, recorded the Dehati Merg Intimation (Ex.P/1) and issued notice to the witnesses for conducting inquest vide Ex.P/2. PW- 22 Pulak Bhattacharya, Additional Tehsildar, prepared the inquest memo before witnesses vide Ex.P/3. As per panch witnesses, the dead body was sent for postmortem to Community Health Center, Dharsiva. PW-13 Dr. NK Lakda conducted postmortem on 25.7.2013 vide Ex.P/24 and found the following injuries/symptoms on the body: “1. Badly crushed body of a young lady found over PM table. 2. Head is separated from the body. 3. Head (skull bones are fractured and vault open. Brain material absent from vault. 4. Eyes closed and face diverted to one side. Mouth open. 5. Both clavicle bones and all ribs fractured. 6. Abdomen open and all intestines had come out of the abdominal cavity. 7. Both upper arm fractured. 8. Left leg below knee it is badly crushed, left foot absent. 9. Red saree, red petticoat and red blouse are found near body. Bangles in both wrists. 10. Rigor mortis could not be identified because of multiple fracture in both upper and lower extremities.” The autopsy surgeon opined that the cause of death is coma and hemorrhagic shock and asphyxia due to badly crushed and cutting of head from the body. In his opinion, prima facie the death appears to be accidental. Bangles in both wrists. 10. Rigor mortis could not be identified because of multiple fracture in both upper and lower extremities.” The autopsy surgeon opined that the cause of death is coma and hemorrhagic shock and asphyxia due to badly crushed and cutting of head from the body. In his opinion, prima facie the death appears to be accidental. However, in para 8 of his deposition the doctor replied to certain queries of the investigating officer as under: rgjhj dzekad&1 D;k e`frdk Vªsu esa dVus ls igys csgks'kh dh gkyr esa gks ldrh gS\\\\ mRrj& gkaA rgjhj dzekad&2 D;k e`frdk ds 'kjhj ds Hkhrjh Hkkx esa csgks'kh dh nokvksa ds va'k ik, x, Fks\\\\ mRrj& csgks'kh dh nokvksa ds va'k ughs ik, x, FksA rgjhj dzekad&3 D;k e`frdk ds 'kjhj ij ik;h x;h pksVsa vkRegR;k ;k csgks'kh dh gkyr esa iVjh ij j[kus ls esy [kkrs gSa\\\\ mRrj& e`frdk ds 'kjhj ij ikbZ xbZ pksVsa vkRegR;k ;k csgks'kh dh gkyr esa iVjh ij j[kus ls esy [kkrs gSa crk ikuk laHko ughsa gSA rgjhj dzekad&4 D;k e`frdk ds 'kjhj ij ikbZ xbZ pksVsa e`R;q ds iwoZ dh gS ;k e`R;q ds i'pkr dh gks ldrh gS\\\\ mRrj& e`frdk ds 'kjhj ij vkbZ pksVsa e`R;q ds iwoZ dh izrhr gks jgh FkhA rgjhj dzekad&5 D;k e`frdk dh e`R;q gR;kRed izd`fr dh Fkh\\\\ mRrj& gka] e`frdk dh e`R;q gR;kRed izd`fr dh gks ldrh gSA In cross-examination by the defence, when it was asked as to on what basis he has written in the query report Ex.P/25 that death of the deceased could be homicidal in nature, he answered as under: mRrj& iz'u ds mRrj esa crk;k gS blds laca/k esa eSaus mDr iz'u Dosjh esa iwNs tkus ij mRrj esa fy[kk gS ijarq Bhd gSA He admits in para 10 that there is no basis for mentioning the death of the deceased as homicidal in the postmortem report of Ex.P/24. Thus, from the statement of the doctor it is evident that he is not sure about the nature of death of the deceased whether it is homicidal or accidental. 12. Thus, from the statement of the doctor it is evident that he is not sure about the nature of death of the deceased whether it is homicidal or accidental. 12. A bare perusal of the statement of the autopsy surgeon makes it clear that in his postmortem report he first opined that the death looks like accidental in nature and when query was raised by the investigation officer whether it can be homicidal, then he answered that it is possibly homicidal and also admitted that in the postmortem report of Ex.P/24, there is no basis mentioned regarding death being homicidal in nature. 13. Now we proceed to consider the other circumstances appearing in the case to ascertain the nature of death of the deceased, and if it is found that the death was homicidal, then the next question to be considered is whether it is the accused/appellants who are author of this crime. 14. PW-1 Lalaram Janghel states that on 24.7.2013 at around 7.45 pm his son-in-law Gajendra Verma (husband of the deceased) telephonically informed him that Nandani has gone to market since 4 o’clock and not returned yet. Accused Gajendra Verma asked for the phone number of her female friend residing in Raipur but he told Gajendra that he does not have phone number of her female friend. At around 10.45 pm again Gajendra Verma informed him over telephone that Nandani Verma has not yet returned and asked them to come there. Thereafter, he along with his wife Smt. Mohan Kunwar Janghel went to Mandar by train at 1.30 am and reached Mandar at 5.30 am. There he made a call to Gajendra Verma and he came on motorcycle and they went with him to his house. In para 5 he states that when he asked Gajendra Verma about Nandani, he replied that she is still missing and thereafter, he along with Gajendrea Verma went to police station for lodging a missing report but there a constable informed them that dead body of a woman is lying on the railway track near Tekari railway gate. They went there and found that the dead body was of Nandani Verma, her head was crushed and there was no ornaments on her body. They went there and found that the dead body was of Nandani Verma, her head was crushed and there was no ornaments on her body. He states that when Gajendra Verma went to Police Station – Vidhan Sabha for getting his laptop seized by the police, he was arrested there on the charge of murder of Nandani Verma. At this stage, he was declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined where he admits that accused Gajendra Verma used to quarrel with the deceased over every trivial issue and also beat her. 15. In cross-examination by the defence, he admits that for the first time on 17.10.2013 he came to know through Navbharat newspaper about the manner in which the incident occurred and except this he has no knowledge about the incident as to who killed her, how and where she was killed. He admits that he did not express suspicion over his son-in-law while informing the police about murder of his daughter. He identified the jewellery of his daughter Article A-1 and stated that the Mangalsutra of four leafs is of his daughter. He identified the jewellery in the TIP vide Ex.P/10 and admitted his signature thereon from A to A part. He admits the suggestion of the defence that he was shown 3-4 lockets which were slightly different from each other and therefore, he could identify the locket of his daughter. He admits that once his daughter had consumed phenyl but at the same time denies the suggestion that she consumed phenyl for committing suicide and states that this incident took place before her marriage. 16. PW-2 Smt. Maya Dubey, neighbour of the accused Gajendra Verma, states that Nandani and Gajendra Verma were living in the house well and there was some dispute between them occasionally that Nandani Verma is no more and she was cut by a train. The prosecution declared her hostile and cross-examined where she admits that on July 24, 2013, at around 1:00 PM, the accused Gajendra's friend came to his house and left on a scooty at around 2:30 PM. She states that she does not know whether on the same day, at around 3:00 PM, the accused Gajendra's friend returned with the scooty and was standing here. She admits that she didn't see Nandani Verma going out that day. She states that she does not know whether on the same day, at around 3:00 PM, the accused Gajendra's friend returned with the scooty and was standing here. She admits that she didn't see Nandani Verma going out that day. She admits that a few days later, on October 17, 2013, she came to know from newspapers and TV news that the accused Gajendra Verma and his friend had put Nandani's body in a bag and left it on the railway track to be run over. In para 10 she admits that friends and relatives of accused Gajendra Verma frequently visit his house and admits that she cannot identify the friend of Gajendra Verma who visited his house on 24 th July, 2013. 17. PW-8 Santoshi Bai, the landlady of the accused and the deceased, states that on the date of incident at around 12-12.30 pm she was sitting near the staircase of her house, at that time she saw that Kanwal Verma came there; she saw both the accused operating a laptop near Maya Dubey's bathroom. At that time, accused Gajendra Verma left to get biscuits for his child. Then Maya Dubey came to her and said she needed to use the bathroom, but someone was sitting there. She went to the bathroom and told accused Kanwal Verma that it's not right to sit near someone's bathroom. He got up and sat near the stairs. Accused Kanwal Verma told her that he is Gajendra Verma's friend and has come to see his salary increment on the laptop. After a while, accused Gajendra Verma returned, and both accused went to the room of Gajendra Verma. She states that the same day, at around 2:30 PM, accused Kanwal Verma left Gajendra Verma's house, taking his motorcycle. Thereafter she went to the shop to buy some things. When her children came back from school at around 4 PM, she returned home. She noticed Nandani's Pleasure scooty was missing. That evening she asked accused Gajendra Verma where Nandani was, and he said she had gone to the market. Around 7-7:30 PM, Gajendra Verma left his child with her (PW-8), saying he would go to check on Nandani. He returned shortly and said Nandani is missing. She noticed Nandani's Pleasure scooty was missing. That evening she asked accused Gajendra Verma where Nandani was, and he said she had gone to the market. Around 7-7:30 PM, Gajendra Verma left his child with her (PW-8), saying he would go to check on Nandani. He returned shortly and said Nandani is missing. In para 6 she states that next day at about 6 am mother and father of Nandani came to the house of Gajendra Verma and then he along with his father-in-law and a neighbour went to police station for lodging FIR. At about 9 am the police came to enquire about Gajendra Verma whether he resides on rent there, to which she confirmed it. The police informed that the wife of Gajendra Verma is cut by a train. The prosecution declared her hostile and cross-examined where she admits the suggestion that police searched the house of Gajendra Verma. In TV news she saw that Gajendra and one person strangulated the deceased to death and kept her dead body on the railway track. She admits that on 24.7.2013 accused Gajendra Verma was repeatedly making phone calls and seemed troubled. She volunteers that he was calling Nandani. She expressed ignorance about the fact whether in January, 2013 Nandani confined herself in a room and denies the suggestion that at the instance of Gajendra Verma, she went there to get the door opened. However, later on, after arrival of mother of Gajendra Verma, on being informed by her and tenant Maya Dubey she came to know that Nandani had bolted the door of her room and after arrival of parents of Nandani, she opened the door. 18. PW-25 Smt. Mohan Kunwar, mother of the deceased states that her son-in-law Gajendra called her husband at 9 p.m. and informed him that Nandani, who had gone to the market at 4 p.m., did not return yet. She had taken Rs.5,000 with her to buy a saree and for the beauty parlor. At 11 p.m., Gajendra called again and informed that Nandani still had not returned and asked them to come to his house. The accused and her daughter lived in a village near Mandhar Station. Then they took the 2 a.m. train to Mandhar and reached Mandhar in the morning. At Mandhar Station, they met accused Gajendra; he appeared nervous. He then took them to his house. The accused and her daughter lived in a village near Mandhar Station. Then they took the 2 a.m. train to Mandhar and reached Mandhar in the morning. At Mandhar Station, they met accused Gajendra; he appeared nervous. He then took them to his house. After that, he went with her husband to the police station. She states that she does not know as to how Nandani died. She told the police that the accused Gajendra had been beating and harassing her daughter for the past year. The prosecution declared her hostile and cross-examined where she denied the suggestion that she told the police in her statement that the accused Gajendra and his friend killed Nandani and threw her body on the railway tracks. She denied her police statement Ex. P-39. However, she admits the suggestion of the defence that Nandani was short-tempered. 19. The prosecution alleged that necklace/mangalsutra of the deceased was soled by accused/appellant Kamal Kishore. PW-4 states that in Village-Dhanesli there is a jewellery shop in the name of Jagriti Jewellers. He states that Jyoti Verma came to his shop, her husband was standing outside, she sold old silver ornament and bought a locket. He states that the police seized a gold ear ring 2.40 mg, one pair of silver anklet 109.5 mg and bill book No.936 as per seizure memo Ex.P/6 and the police after weighment of the seized anklet and ear ring in his shop, prepared weighment panchanama Ex.P/7. He admits his signature from A to A part on these documents. He identified accused Kamal Verma as husband of Jyoti Verma and states that when Jyoti Verma came to his shop, it is accused Kamal Verma who was standing outside. He admits the suggestion of the defence that in the bill book, after the name of Jyoti Verma, the name of her husband or father is not mentioned. He also admits that though in the weighment panchanama Ex.P/7 he has mentioned about gold ear ring but in Article A there is no mention of ear ring. He then volunteers that the value of old gold and silver was deducted from the price of the new items while calculating the total cost. He also admits that estimate is written in Article A. 20. He then volunteers that the value of old gold and silver was deducted from the price of the new items while calculating the total cost. He also admits that estimate is written in Article A. 20. PW-10 Jyoti Verma, wife of accused Kamal Verma, states that her husband did not go anywhere, he was at Dhaneli; neither he gave anything to her nor to the police and that the police did not record her statement about the incident. She was declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined where she denied all the suggestions of the prosecution. However, she admits that Article A is of Jagriti Jewelers which bears her name and Article A-4 is receipt of Ghasiram Bhagwati Charan Jewelers which bears her name. She then volunteers that though her name is there, but neither she sold nor did she buy anything. She admits that in Article A and Article A-4 there is mention of selling of old gold and silver. 21. PW-11 Pawan Verma and PW-14 Bhagwat Prasad Sahu, witnesses to the memorandum of accused and seizure, admit their signature on the memorandum statements of Ex.P/19 and P/20 and seizure Ex.P/21 but deny the contents thereof and any seizure from the accused persons. They stated that all the jewelleries were kept in the police station. They were declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined where they denied all the suggestions of the prosecution. However, they admit the suggestion of the defence that the police obtained their signature on all the documents in the police station itself when they went there in connection with their land related matter. 22. The police prepared panchanama Ex.P/18 where Shakil Ahmad states that on 24.7.2013 Kamal Verma disclosed to him that he has finished someone. However, PW-15 Shakil Ahmad states that he does not recognize the accused persons, the police came to his house at night and took him to police station where they obtained his signature on certain papers and released him. He admits his signature on panchanama Ex.P/18 from C to C part. He was declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined where he denies to have given statement of Ex.P/28 to the police. In cross-examination he admits that the police obtained his signature on blank papers forcibly. 23. He admits his signature on panchanama Ex.P/18 from C to C part. He was declared hostile by the prosecution and cross-examined where he denies to have given statement of Ex.P/28 to the police. In cross-examination he admits that the police obtained his signature on blank papers forcibly. 23. The police recorded memorandum of accused Kamal Verma (Ex.P/19) in which he disclosed that lksus pkanh dks fcdzh fd;s tsojkr ,oa 'ko ys tkus esa mi;ksx fd;k [kkyh cSx dks /kusyh ukyk ,oa ?kklhjke TosylZ eka+j o tkx`fr TosylZ /kusyh ls pyks pydj cjken djk nsrk gwaA Memorandum of accused Gajendra Verma was recorded as per Ex.P/20 in which he disclosed that … dey ds ?kj tkrs le; /kusyh ukyk esa cSx dks Qsaddj dey dks mlds ?kj /kusyh NksM+dj eSa vius ?kj okil vk x;kA dey dks uanuh ds igus tsojkrksa dks ,oa dey dks fn;s x;s uxnh dqy jde 45 gtkj :i;k rFkk /kusyh ukyk esa Qsads cSx dks pyks pydj cjken djk nsrk gwaA eSus iwoZ es vius c;ku es uanuh dks 5000 : nsdj cktkj tkus dh ckr dgh Fkh tks >wBh gSA As per these memorandum statements, two receipts were seized by the police vide Ex.P/21 which bear the name of Jyoti Verma/Kamal Verma. As per seizure memo Ex.P/12 the police seized 1) lksus dk eaxylw= dh ikap iRrh otuh yxHkx 5-060 xzke dherh 11]600 : ,oa 2) ,d lksuk [kjhnh fcy cqd dza 121 ftles 18001 ls 18400 rd vafdr g S ,d ist es 4 fcy okyh ftlds fcy ua- 18303 es iqjkuk lksuk 5- 060 g dher 11600 ) T;kfr oekZ@dey oekZ fnukad 28@7@2013 ys[k gSA dh dkcZu izfr jksfgr dqekj oekZ ds is'k djus ij otg lcqr es tIr dj dCtk iqfyl fy;k x;kA 24. PW-6 Rohit Verma states that his jewelery shop in the name of Ghasiram Bhagwati Charan Jewelers is situated at Azad Chowk, Village-Mandar. The police seized one locket Article A-1 and bill book Article A-2. The police prepared weighment panchanama Ex.P/13. He states that Article A-4 is the receipt of Ghasiram Bhagwati Charan Jewelers. In cross-examination he admits that Article A-4 does not bear signature of any seller. He also states that there is no mention of property in Article A-4 and volunteers that old gold is written there. He states that in the receipt of Article A-4, Jyoti Verma/Kamal Verma is written. In cross-examination he admits that Article A-4 does not bear signature of any seller. He also states that there is no mention of property in Article A-4 and volunteers that old gold is written there. He states that in the receipt of Article A-4, Jyoti Verma/Kamal Verma is written. He admits in para 6 that whosoever comes to his shop for selling old property, his ID proof is obtained. He volunteers that since Jyoti Verma was known to them, her ID proof was not taken. 25. As per the prosecution, Mangalsutra of the deceased was seized from the jewellers which was sold by Jyoti Verma, wife of accused Kamal Kishore, but as per identification memo Ex.P/10, PW-1 Lalaram Janghel, father of the deceased, identified the gold locket with leafs as his daughter’s locket. However, as per seizure memo Ex.P/12 gold Mangalsutra of five leafs was seized whereas PW-1 father of the deceased states that the Mangalsutra worn by his daughter was of four leafs and on that basis he identified her Mangalsutra. 26. Close scrutiny of the evidence makes it clear that the prosecution only proved the fact that on the date of incident accused Kamal Verma visited the house of the accused Gajendra Verma and the deceased and some jewellery was recovered on the basis of memorandum of the accused Kamal Verma. 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Venkatesh @ Chandra (supra) in paras 18 & 19 of its judgment held as under: 18. Before we consider the merits of the matter, some of the features of the present case which we have found to be quite disturbing must be noted and deliberated upon. The Trial Court in paragraphs 27 to 30 of its judgment extracted voluntary statements of the appellants. First and foremost, going by the parameters of Section 27 of the Evidence Act only so much of information which relates distinctly to the facts thereby discovered can be stated to have been proved. The extent and ambit of said provision as well as applicability thereof were considered by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kotayya and Ors. v. King-Emperor, AIR (34) 1947 PC 67 as under: "10. Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. v. King-Emperor, AIR (34) 1947 PC 67 as under: "10. Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has argued that in such a case the "fact discovered" is the physical object produced, and that any information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon this view information given by a person that the body produced is the one used by him in the commission of a murder. or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. But if all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their Lordships think that the proviso to s. 26, added by s. 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships view it is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate-distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that "I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house" does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added "with which I stabbed A" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant," (Emphasis added) As was observed by the Privy Council the words "with which I stabbed A" were inadmissible since they did not relate to the discovery of knife in the house of the informant. Applying this logic, only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of certain facts alone could be marked in evidence and not the entirely of the statement. Applying this logic, only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of certain facts alone could be marked in evidence and not the entirely of the statement. Coming to the instant case and going by the principle and the illustration highlighted by the Privy Council, out of the statement of accused No.1, only the following portion except the words printed in "italics" would be admissible and can be marked in evidence: ".....If I am taken there, I will show the spot where we committed murder, and we will show the place where we have thrown the knife and the rod. And we will show the shop in which we sold the jewelleries." The expression "where we committed murder" must not come on record. Similarly, all the earlier facts narrated in the statement about past history which are in the nature of self-implication, would be inadmissible as amounting to a confession made to a Police Officer. All the statements namely, Exhs. P-21 to P-24 must be read accordingly. 19. We must observe that we have repeatedly found a tendency on part of the Prosecuting Agency in getting the entire statement recorded rather than only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of facts. In the process, a confession of an accused which is otherwise hit by the principles of Evidence Act finds its place on record. Such kind of statements may have a direct tendency to influence and prejudice the mind of the Court. This practice must immediately be stopped. In the present case, the Trial Court not only extracted the entire statements but also relied upon them.” 28. This Court in the matter of Anant Dutta (supra) observed in paras 20 to 25 of its judgment as under: “20. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: - “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge. —When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 21. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 22. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer , AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: - “11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).” Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 23. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under:- “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 24. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 24. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 , while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 25. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 778 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.” 29. In the present case, as observed above, based on the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt whether death of the deceased was accidental, suicidal or homicidal. Except memorandum of the accused/appellants, no clinching or legally admissible evidence is there on record to prove their complicity in the crime in question. In this case, the recovery of jewellery and its identification are also doubtful. The prosecution also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the said jewelry belong to the deceased and also that wife of the accused Kamal Verma sold the said jewellery. It is also clear from record that no article was seized pursuant to memorandum of accused Gajendra. PW-16 GS Singh, IO, admits that as per memorandum Ex.P/20 of accused Gajendra, no article was seized. 30. It is also clear from record that no article was seized pursuant to memorandum of accused Gajendra. PW-16 GS Singh, IO, admits that as per memorandum Ex.P/20 of accused Gajendra, no article was seized. 30. As regards the extrajudicial confession said to have been made by accused Kamal Kishore Verma before PW-15 Shakil Ahmad, this witness did not support the prosecution case at all and was declared hostile and cross-examined where he denied all the suggestions of the prosecution. He even denied to have given statement of Ex.P/28 to the police where he allegedly stated that accused Kamal Verma confessed before him that he has killed someone and showed to him bite marks on his wrist. He only admits his signature on the panchanama of Ex.P/18. In cross-examination by defence, he admits that his signature was obtained on blank papers by the police forcibly. Furthermore, the said panchanama is shown to have been prepared in presence of two witnesses namely PW-11 Pawan Verma and PW-14 Bhagwat Prasad. However, both these witnesses turned hostile and did not support the prosecution case at all. They stated that the police obtained their signature on the police statement where all the documents were already prepared and they were not aware of its contents. Even otherwise, as per Evidence Act, the said document of Ex.P/18 bears no evidentiary value and the same cannot be used against the accused/appellants. 31. This Court in the matter of Anil Soni (supra) while dealing with evidentiary value of extrajudicial confession, observed in para 14 of the judgment as under: “14. In Sahadevan (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court further considered the earlier decisions including Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 259 and pertinently laid down the principle in paragraphs 15.1, 15.8 and 16 as under :- “15.1. In Balwinder Singh (supra) this Court stated the principle that: (SCC p. 265, para 10) “10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance.” 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance.” 15.8. Extra-judicial confession must be established to be true and made voluntarily and in a fit state of mind. The words of the witnesses must be clear, unambigous and should clearly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of conviction, if it passes the test of credibility. The extra-judicial confession should inspire confidence and the court should find out whether there are other cogent circumstances on record to support it. (Ref. Sk. Yusuf v. State of W.B., (2011) 11 SCC 754 and Pancho v. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC 165 .) The principles 16. Upon a proper analysis of the above referred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These percepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra- judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused : (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.” 32. Keeping in view the above-referred judgments, if the facts and evidence of this case are looked into, it is crystal clear that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Even the nature of death of the deceased is not proved in this case with certainty. The entire prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, but the chain of circumstances is neither complete nor consistent and does not unerringly point towards the guilt of the appellants. Even the nature of death of the deceased is not proved in this case with certainty. The entire prosecution case rests on circumstantial evidence, but the chain of circumstances is neither complete nor consistent and does not unerringly point towards the guilt of the appellants. There is no legally admissible evidence to establish that the deceased was murdered at her matrimonial home or that her body was transported and placed on the railway track by the appellants. The alleged extra-judicial confession of appellant Kamal Kishore @ Bittu Verma before PW-15 Shakil Ahmad is wholly unreliable. The said witness did not support the prosecution case, denied having made any such statement, and alleged that his signatures were obtained on blank papers by the police. The panch witnesses to the said document also turned hostile. In view of settled principles of law, such an uncorroborated, disputed and doubtful extra- judicial confession cannot be relied upon to sustain a conviction. This apart, the witnesses to the memorandum and seizure (PWs-11 & 14) have not at all supported the prosecution case. No incriminating article was recovered pursuant to the memorandum of appellant Gajendra Verma, which is also admitted by the Investigating Officer himself. Therefore, his memorandum does not advance the prosecution case in any manner. 33. The alleged recovery and identification of jewellery is also fraught with serious discrepancies. The description of the Mangalsutra seized (five leafs) does not tally with the description given by the father of the deceased (four leafs). The seizure witnesses turned hostile, the jewellers’ records are doubtful, and the wife of appellant Kamal Kishore denied any sale of the jewellery. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the recovered jewellery belonged to the deceased or that it was sold at the instance of the appellants. Mere presence of appellant Kamal Kishore at the house of appellant Gajendra Verma on the date of incident, without any further incriminating circumstance, does not establish complicity in the alleged crime. Suspicion, howsoever grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution has also failed to establish motive with sufficient clarity. Though allegations of marital discord were made, they are general in nature and not supported by cogent and trustworthy evidence sufficient to connect the appellants with the alleged offence. 34. On the basis of aforesaid discussions, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The prosecution has also failed to establish motive with sufficient clarity. Though allegations of marital discord were made, they are general in nature and not supported by cogent and trustworthy evidence sufficient to connect the appellants with the alleged offence. 34. On the basis of aforesaid discussions, both the appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges under Sections 302/34 & 201/34 of IPC. The accused/appellants are reported to be on bail, therefore, keeping in view the provisions of Section 481 of BNSS, 2023 each of them is directed to furnish a personal bond for a sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months alongwith an undertaking that in the event of filing of special leave petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellants on receipt of notice thereon shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The record of the trial Court along with copy of this judgment be sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and necessary action. A copy of this judgment be also forwarded to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and necessary action.