ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Anup Majumdar, Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Mr. C.J.K. Rao, Mr. Ishan Verma, Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey, Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, Mr. Pankaj Kamlesh holding brief of Mr. Akath Kumar Yadav, Mr. Ravish Verma as well as Ms. Monika Thakur, learned counsel for the respective petitioners. Also heard Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State as well as Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta and Ms. Mamta Gendle holding brief of Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, learned counsel appearing for the respective respondents. 2. Since a common question of law and facts arises for consideration in all these writ petitions, the same were clubbed together, heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order, so as to avoid repetition of facts and to ensure uniformity and consistency in adjudication. 3. For the sake of convenience and clarity, WPS No. 647 of 2021 has been treated as the lead case, and the facts, pleadings and reliefs stated therein are being referred to for the purpose of adjudication of all the connected matters, unless specifically stated otherwise. 4. The common grievance raised by the petitioners in the present batch of writ petitions is not confined to an individual or isolated service dispute, but stems from a systemic and unresolved uncertainty in the State’s executive approach towards determination of pensionary entitlement of employees whose service trajectory spans the pre- and post-New Pension Scheme period. The petitioners were initially engaged as Shikshakarmis prior to the introduction of the New Pension Scheme, their services were subsequently regularised and thereafter absorbed into the School Education Department, thereby giving rise to a complex service continuum which has not been adequately addressed through any uniform or authoritative policy decision of the State Government. 5. The petitioners contend that despite restoration of the Old Pension Scheme by the State Government through Gazette Notifications dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023, the foundational issue governing applicability of the pension regime remains unresolved, namely, the determination of the relevant “date of appointment” for pensionary purposes. In the absence of clarity as to whether such date is to be reckoned from the initial engagement, regularisation, confirmation or absorption, similarly situated employees are being subjected to unequal treatment, inconsistent administrative decisions and divergent interpretations across departments, thereby defeating the principles of uniformity, certainty and fairness in public service administration. 6. In the absence of clarity as to whether such date is to be reckoned from the initial engagement, regularisation, confirmation or absorption, similarly situated employees are being subjected to unequal treatment, inconsistent administrative decisions and divergent interpretations across departments, thereby defeating the principles of uniformity, certainty and fairness in public service administration. 6. The grievance of the petitioners is further aggravated by the fact that executive authorities have, at different points of time, adopted shifting and mutually inconsistent stands regarding pension applicability, resulting in the issuance of orders such as the impugned order dated 16.02.2021, without there being a settled policy framework or a definitive determination by the competent authority. This has left the petitioners in a state of perpetual uncertainty with respect to their pensionary rights, exposing them to arbitrary administrative outcomes and avoidable litigation. 7. In essence, the petitioners do not seek an immediate judicial determination of individual pension entitlement, but raise a collective grievance regarding the absence of a clear, reasoned and uniform executive decision governing employees similarly circumstanced as them. The grievance is therefore institutional rather than individual, and is directed towards securing policy clarity, decisional consistency and legal sustainability in the State’s approach to pension governance, so that any future adjudication rests upon a settled and authoritative administrative foundation. 8. Brief facts of the writ petitions are that the petitioners were initially appointed during the years 1998–1999 as Shikshakarmis under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shikshakarmi (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997. Their appointments were made through the prescribed process and against sanctioned posts under the Panchayat framework, and from the very inception, the petitioners continuously discharged teaching and allied educational responsibilities in government-run institutions. 9. Upon rendering long and uninterrupted service, the services of the petitioners were subsequently regularised strictly in accordance with the applicable statutory rules, Government resolutions, and executive instructions in force from time to time. Consequent upon such regularisation, the petitioners were absorbed into the School Education Department of the State Government, thereby bringing them within the fold of regular government service. 10. After absorption, the petitioners continued to serve in regular, pensionable establishments under the direct administrative, financial, and disciplinary control of the State Government, and their service conditions thereafter were governed by the relevant service rules applicable to government employees, including those relating to pay scales, service benefits, and retiral entitlements. 10. After absorption, the petitioners continued to serve in regular, pensionable establishments under the direct administrative, financial, and disciplinary control of the State Government, and their service conditions thereafter were governed by the relevant service rules applicable to government employees, including those relating to pay scales, service benefits, and retiral entitlements. Despite such absorption and continued service in pensionable posts, the period rendered by the petitioners as Shikshakarmis has not been accorded due recognition for the purposes of pensionary benefits. 11. The dispute giving rise to the present batch of writ petitions originates from an administrative order dated 16.02.2021, passed by the Under Secretary, School Education Department, whereby certain representations pertaining to pensionary status were rejected. The said order was stated to have been issued in purported compliance of earlier directions of this Court. The petitioners contend that the said order reflects the absence of a clear, uniform and settled executive position governing the applicability of the pension regime to employees whose service commenced prior to the introduction of the New Pension Scheme but whose regularisation and absorption occurred thereafter. 12. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the State Government issued Gazette Notifications dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023 reinstating the Old Pension Scheme and prescribing an option mechanism for employees governed by the New Pension Scheme. However, according to the petitioners, despite restoration of the Old Pension Scheme, the State has not clarified the determinative date of appointment for pensionary purposes, resulting in continued ambiguity as to whether the relevant date is the date of initial engagement, regularisation, confirmation or absorption. It is this continuing uncertainty and lack of a definitive policy determination that has necessitated the filing of the present batch of writ petitions. 13. Mr. Anup Majumdar, Mr. Mateen Siddiqui, Mr. C.J.K. Rao, Mr. Ishan Verma, Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey, Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, Mr. Pankaj Kamlesh holding brief of Mr. Akath Kumar Yadav, Mr. Ravish Verma as well as Ms. Monika Thakur, learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners, jointly submit that the petitioners were initially appointed during the years 1998–99 as Shikshakarmis under the Madhya Pradesh/Chhattisgarh Panchayat Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997, against sanctioned posts under different Janpad Panchayats and Local Bodies. It is submitted that the petitioners entered service through a process recognised under the prevailing statutory framework and continuously discharged their duties without break in service. 14. It is submitted that the petitioners entered service through a process recognised under the prevailing statutory framework and continuously discharged their duties without break in service. 14. The learned counsel further jointly submits as under:- A. Past Service Rendered Under the Government Is Pensionable Under the Rules of 1976 - It is submitted that the Rules of 1976 provide a comprehensive statutory framework governing pensionable service. Rule 12(2) clearly mandates that qualifying service shall commence from the date on which a Government servant takes charge of a post, whether appointed substantively, officiatingly, or in a temporary capacity. Further, Rule 13 stipulates that service shall qualify for pension if it is rendered under conditions regulated by the Government, paid by the Government, and not declared as non-pensionable. • The post of Shiksha Karmi was created by the School Education Department vide order dated 24.01.1998. Significantly, the said order does not disclose any independent approval of salary budget by the Finance Department. In the absence of a separate sanctioned budget, it can safely be presumed that the salary of Shiksha Karmis was paid out of the existing salary budget of lecturers, teachers, and assistant teachers, which forms part of the Consolidated Fund of the State under Article 266(1) of the Constitution. • Education being a State subject, the Schools were never transferred to local bodies, as is evident from departmental orders dated 1998, 2001, and 2003 (Annexures P/1–P/5). Admittedly, the petitioners were appointed as Shiksha Karmis, continued to discharge sovereign educational functions, and were paid salaries from the Consolidated Fund of the State. Consequently, their services cannot be treated as non-pensionable. • With effect from 01.04.2012, the petitioners were included under the New Pension Scheme (NPS) only prospectively, which itself is an acknowledgment that their posts were never declared non-pensionable. Further, administrative control of Teachers (L.B.) was brought under the State Government in 2012, and their service conditions were fully regulated by statutory rules framed by the Government. Therefore, the contention of the State that prior service is not pensionable is wholly misconceived. B. No Mandatory Requirement of Holding a Civil Post Prior to Absorption • It is submitted that Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules of 1976 fully govern the petitioners’ cases. There exists no provision of law mandating that an employee must hold a civil post prior to absorption for earlier service to count towards qualifying service. B. No Mandatory Requirement of Holding a Civil Post Prior to Absorption • It is submitted that Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules of 1976 fully govern the petitioners’ cases. There exists no provision of law mandating that an employee must hold a civil post prior to absorption for earlier service to count towards qualifying service. • Under Rule 4(1), the Rules of 1976 apply immediately upon transfer or absorption of the employee. The proviso to Rule 4(1) mandates that the employee may exercise a statutory option within three months regarding continuation of previous pension rules or governance under the Rules of 1976. Rule 4(3) further provides that where no such option is exercised, the Rules of 1976 shall automatically apply, and Rule 4(4) declares the option to be final. • In the present case, the petitioners, upon absorption, were governed by the Rules of 1976 and never opted for the New Contributory Pension Scheme. Moreover, by amendment dated 20.01.2023, Rule 4(ii) was substituted, making the Old Pension Scheme compulsorily applicable to employees appointed between 01.11.2004 and 31.03.2022 who opted for OPS. Thus, by operation of sub-rules (1), (2), (3), and (4) of Rule 4, the petitioners stand statutorily governed by the Rules of 1976. C. Executive Instructions Cannot Override Statutory Rules • The absorption order dated 30.06.2018 was purely an executive action under Article 166(1) of the Constitution. It did not prescribe any service rules nor could it regulate pensionary rights. Subsequently, the Chhattisgarh School Education Services (Educational and Administrative Cadre) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 2019 were promulgated on 05.03.2019, occupying the entire field relating to service conditions. • Once statutory rules were framed, the executive instructions dated 30.06.2018 ceased to operate. The said executive order does not, in any event, deal with determination of qualifying service for pension. Any clause in the absorption order denying benefit of prior service cannot survive in the face of Rule 4(1) of the Rules of 1976 and the statutory framework of the Rules of 2019. • Notably, Rule 4(d) of the Rules of 2019 treats Teachers (L.B.) appointed under the Rules of 2012 as part of the constituted service and expressly recognizes eight years of prior service (from 2012) as a condition for absorption. If that service counts for absorption, there is no rational or legal basis to exclude it from qualifying service for pension. • Notably, Rule 4(d) of the Rules of 2019 treats Teachers (L.B.) appointed under the Rules of 2012 as part of the constituted service and expressly recognizes eight years of prior service (from 2012) as a condition for absorption. If that service counts for absorption, there is no rational or legal basis to exclude it from qualifying service for pension. Such exclusion would amount to hostile discrimination against Teachers (L.B.). D. Issue of Past Service for Pension Is Still Open and Sub- Judice • In Ram Gopal Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh , though the High Court initially declined to count past service for promotion, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 6708/2023 set aside the judgment and directed reconsideration of whether services rendered under Zila Parishad prior to absorption should count towards promotion as well as retiral benefits. Thus, the issue remains open and is pending consideration in batch matters before this Court. E. Judicial Precedents Supporting Counting of Past Service for Pension • The Hon’ble Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Writ Appeal No. 3258 of 2024 (Nagar Palika Parishad v. Kundan Sarla) , has categorically held that the services rendered by employees under a local body prior to their absorption into government service are liable to be counted for grant of gratuity and pension. The Division Bench, while affirming the beneficial nature of pension rules, rejected the contention of the employer that pre-absorption service stood extinguished upon absorption and held that such an interpretation would defeat the object of pensionary legislation. • Further, the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 11734 of 2021 (Dinesh Kumar Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others), read with Writ Petition No. 8083 of 2019 (Pushpa Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others), wherein Teachers (L.B.) were granted the benefit of revised pay scale and pension by taking into consideration their service rendered prior to absorption in Government service. The Court held that once the employees were absorbed and governed by statutory rules applicable to Government servants, denial of past service would be arbitrary and discriminatory. The Court held that once the employees were absorbed and governed by statutory rules applicable to Government servants, denial of past service would be arbitrary and discriminatory. • The Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh High Court, in Ram Jatan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (W.P. No. 4919 of 2003) and connected matters, has further held that the period spent in service under Janpad Panchayat Schools is required to be counted towards qualifying service for pension after absorption in the Education Department. The said judgment consistently recognizes continuity of service for pensionary purposes notwithstanding the change in employer. • The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dr. Hira Lal v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal Nos. 1677–1678 of 2020, wherein it has been unequivocally held that the right to receive pension is a right to property protected under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. It was further held that pension cannot be curtailed, abridged, or taken away by executive instructions or administrative orders lacking statutory backing. Non-inclusion of qualifying service would amount to unconstitutional deprivation of property. • In Vijay Singh & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2013) 11 SCC 673 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the legal distinction between statutory rules and executive instructions, holding that executive instructions issued under Article 162 of the Constitution do not have the force of law and cannot amend, override, or supplant statutory service rules framed under Article 309. Any condition imposed by executive fiat in contravention of statutory pension rules is liable to be struck down. • Further, in Partha Das v. State of Tripura, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1844 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that executive instructions issued under Article 166(1) of the Constitution are merely policy decisions and do not have legislative or statutory sanctity. Such executive decisions cannot regulate or curtail vested service rights unless supported by statutory rules. • In A.B. Krishna & Others v. State of Karnataka & Others, (1998) 3 SCC 495 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that once the legislature or the rule-making authority frames statutory rules under Article 309, the executive power stands displaced by the “doctrine of occupied field”. The executive cannot issue directions inconsistent with statutory rules governing service conditions, including pension. The executive cannot issue directions inconsistent with statutory rules governing service conditions, including pension. • This Court, in Nirmal Gandra Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, decided on 08.02.2016 in WPS No. 4459 of 2014 , has similarly held that the petitioner was entitled to count his past service rendered in Special Area Development Authority (SADA) for the purpose of computing qualifying service for pension after absorption in Municipal Service, reaffirming continuity of service for pensionary benefits. • Further support is drawn from the judgment of the Hon’ble Himachal Pradesh High Court in J oga Singh & Others v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others , wherein it was held that the service rendered as Teacher under the Vidya Upasak Yojna between 2000 and 2007 shall be counted as qualifying service for pension under the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 after absorption. The said judgment attained finality as the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed SLP No. 183 of 2016 on 04.01.2016 and Review Petition (C) No. 274 of 2017 on 02.03.2017. • Lastly, Vinod Kanjibhai Bhagora v. State of Gujarat, (2024) 2 SCR 155, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that pension schemes constitute delegated beneficial legislation and must be interpreted liberally so as to advance the object of social security, provided such interpretation does not run contrary to express provisions of the Pension Rules. The Court further held that service rendered under another Government, if not expressly excluded, can be treated as qualifying service. 15. It is jointly submitted that the record of the present case itself demonstrates shifting and inconsistent administrative stands adopted by different authorities at different points of time, thereby subjecting similarly situated employees to unequal and arbitrary treatment. In absence of a clear executive determination on this foundational aspect, any adjudication on merits would necessarily require this Court to enter into policy-formulation rather than policy-review, which, according to the learned counsel, warrants remitting the matter back to the competent authority for a reasoned, categorical and uniform policy decision within a stipulated time frame. 16. In light of the statutory provisions, constitutional guarantees, authoritative judicial pronouncements, and the admitted factual position that the petitioners rendered continuous service under State control and were paid from the Consolidated Fund, denial of counting past service for pension is illegal, arbitrary, and unconstitutional. 16. In light of the statutory provisions, constitutional guarantees, authoritative judicial pronouncements, and the admitted factual position that the petitioners rendered continuous service under State control and were paid from the Consolidated Fund, denial of counting past service for pension is illegal, arbitrary, and unconstitutional. The petitioners are therefore entitled to have their entire service counted as qualifying service for pension under the Rules of 1976, with all consequential benefits. 17. On the other hand, Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for the State, vehemently opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel appearing for the respective petitioners and submits that it is not in dispute that the petitioners have neither challenged the absorption policy dated 30.06.2018 issued by the School Education Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Raipur, nor any circular issued by the State of Chhattisgarh, whether relating to reinstatement of pension vide notification dated 11.05.2022 or subsequent circulars dated 20.01.2023, whereby the option was given to remain in the New Pension Scheme (NPS) or opt for the Old Pension Scheme (OPS), and the corresponding amendments brought in the Pension Rules or Chhattisgarh General Provident Fund Rules. 18. It is submitted by Mr. Dadariya that the petitioner was appointed under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Shikshakarmi (Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997 (“Rules, 1997”) and is claiming benefits outside these rules. The service conditions as provided under the statutory rules are binding upon the petitioner; therefore, he cannot claim relief outside the service conditions governing the said statutory rules. Nowhere under the Rules, 1997, is it stipulated that the Pension Rules, 1976 will be applicable, for the simple reason that Shikshakarmis are not holders of a civil post. It is important to note that the State Government made a policy decision to absorb the services of Shikshakarmis working in the Panchayat/local body under the specific condition that they would be entitled to all benefits only from the date of absorption. All petitioners accepted these terms without protest or demur. Consequently, the conditions of absorption are binding upon the petitioners, and they cannot claim relief contrary to the conditions prescribed in the absorption policy dated 30.06.2018. 19. It is contended by Mr. Dadariya that a perusal of the relevant provisions clarifies that the petitioners became eligible for absorption only after completing a minimum of 8 years of service. Consequently, the conditions of absorption are binding upon the petitioners, and they cannot claim relief contrary to the conditions prescribed in the absorption policy dated 30.06.2018. 19. It is contended by Mr. Dadariya that a perusal of the relevant provisions clarifies that the petitioners became eligible for absorption only after completing a minimum of 8 years of service. The petitioners accepted these conditions and only thereafter became employees of the School Education Department. They are entitled to service benefits only from the date of absorption and not prior. Petitioners, being beneficiaries, cannot resile from the acceptance made pursuant to the State Government’s policy, as doing so would lead to far-reaching complications. Regarding the relief sought for strict adherence to service conditions under the Rules, 1997, it is submitted that the petitioners have not identified any specific clause which has been violated in their case. The allegations made are vague, and, on the contrary, all provisions of law under the Rules, 1997 are being followed with respect to the service conditions of the present petitioners. 20. Mr. Dadariya submits that as regards the relief seeking the cessation of the applicability of the New Pension Scheme, 2004 (NPS) and restoration of the pension scheme as it existed prior, it is submitted that such relief cannot be granted in light of subsequent developments. The State of Chhattisgarh, vide notification dated 11.05.2022, reinstated the Old Pension Scheme (OPS) with effect from 01.11.2004, along with amendments to the Pension Rules. Petitioners appointed in 1998 as Shikshakarmis and absorbed in 2018 were granted the option to continue with NPS or opt for OPS. It is submitted that Shikshakarmis were merged into the School Education Department pursuant to the absorption policy dated 30.06.2018. All benefits for the LB teacher cadre were counted from 01.07.2018, and no arrears prior to this date are payable. This principle is reinforced by the decision in W.A. No. 215/2017 (Harnarayan Yadav v. Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission & Another), decided on 07.01.2019, which held that Shikshakarmis are not holders of a civil post and their past services cannot be counted for teaching experience or pension purposes. 21. Mr. Dadariya urged that the petitioners, without protest, accepted the absorption policy dated 30.06.2018 and were absorbed with effect from 01.07.2018. Subsequently, the Rules of 2019 came into force, which govern the service conditions of the petitioners, and these Rules have not been challenged. 21. Mr. Dadariya urged that the petitioners, without protest, accepted the absorption policy dated 30.06.2018 and were absorbed with effect from 01.07.2018. Subsequently, the Rules of 2019 came into force, which govern the service conditions of the petitioners, and these Rules have not been challenged. Prior to absorption, the petitioners did not hold civil posts under the State Government; hence, they were not entitled to benefits under the Civil Services Pension Rules, 1976. The Old Pension Scheme benefits can only be availed subject to the terms of absorption, including depositing government contributions from their NPS accounts as per Rule 2(1)(b) of the Pension Rules, 1976, inserted via notification dated 20.01.2023. Petitioners cannot claim benefits under both NPS and OPS. Counting of service for pension purposes starts only from the date of absorption, when Shikshakarmis are recognized as holding a civil post, and not before. 22. It is, therefore, respectfully submitted by Mr. Dadariya that until the petitioners are borne on a civil post under the State Government, Pension Rules, 1976 have no application. Consequently, past services rendered as Shikshakarmi cannot be counted for pension benefits under these Rules. The prayers for counting past service are not permissible under either the Pension Rules, 1976 or the Rules, 2019, and thus are liable to be dismissed. 23. Mr. Raj Kumar Gupta and Ms. Mamta Gendle holding brief of Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, representing the respective respondents, adopted in toto the submissions advanced by Mr. Anand Dadariya, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State. They submitted that the policy framework governing absorption, reckoning of service and entitlement to pensionary benefits has been correctly interpreted and implemented by the respondent authorities. They further submitted that the petitioners were duly informed of the terms and conditions of their absorption into the School Education Department, including the stipulation that their qualifying service for all service and pensionary benefits would be reckoned only with effect from 01.07.2018. Having accepted absorption with full knowledge of such conditions, the petitioners cannot now be permitted to approbate and reprobate by challenging the very policy under which they have derived substantial benefits. 24. It is contended that the role of the respondent authorities was confined to implementing the policy decision of the State Government, and no illegality or arbitrariness can be attributed to the respondents in strictly adhering to the terms of the policy. 24. It is contended that the role of the respondent authorities was confined to implementing the policy decision of the State Government, and no illegality or arbitrariness can be attributed to the respondents in strictly adhering to the terms of the policy. Learned counsel emphasized that the policy neither violates any statutory provision nor offends constitutional principles, and therefore, no interference by this Court is warranted. In conclusion, they submitted that the writ petitions are misconceived, devoid of merit, and seek reliefs which are contrary to the settled policy and governing service rules. It is prayed that all the writ petitions be dismissed. 25. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have carefully perused the pleadings, documents, and material available on record in all the connected writ petitions. 26. Having bestowed thoughtful consideration upon the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and upon a careful examination of the pleadings and record, this Court is of the view that the controversy raised in the present batch of writ petitions primarily emanates from the absence of a clear, final and uniform policy determination by the respondent-State on the determinative date of appointment for the purpose of pensionary entitlement in cases such as that of the petitioners. The petitioners represent a class of employees whose service journey commenced prior to the introduction of the New Pension Scheme and thereafter passed through stages of regularisation and absorption, thereby creating a hybrid service structure which has not been conclusively addressed under the existing executive framework. 27. It is well settled by a catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that matters relating to formulation of policy, particularly in the realm of service conditions, pension, cut-off dates and recognition of past service, fall squarely within the domain of the executive. Courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution do not sit as policy-makers but undertake judicial review only after a policy has been framed and crystallised. 28. In BALCO Employees’ Union v. Union of India and others , (2002) 2 SCC 333 , the Supreme Court has categorically held that courts cannot interfere with policy decisions merely because another view may appear more equitable or desirable, unless such policy is shown to be arbitrary, irrational or violative of constitutional provisions, by observing as follows :- “87. ……………… "232. ……………… "232. While protecting the rights of the people from being violated in any manner utmost care has to be taken that the court does not transgress its jurisdiction. There is, in our constitutional framework a fairly clear demarcation of powers. The court has come down heavily whenever the executive has sought to impinge upon the court's jurisdiction. 233. At the same time, in exercise of its enormous power the court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The courts cannot run the Government nor can the administration indulge in abuse or non-use of power and get away with it. The essence of judicial review is a constitutional fundamental. The role of the higher judiciary under the Constitution casts on it a great obligation as the sentinel to defend the values of the Constitution and the rights of Indians. The courts must, therefore, act within their judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest. It is precisely for this reason that it has been consistently held by this Court that in matters of policy the court will not interfere. When there is a valid law requiring the Government to act in a particular manner the court ought not to, without striking down the law, give any direction which is not in accordance with law. In other words, the court itself is not above the law. 234. In respect of public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the courts should not become an approval authority. Normally such decisions are taken by the Government after due care and consideration. In a democracy welfare of the people at large, and not merely of a small section of the society, has to be the concern of a responsible Government. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. If a considered policy decision has been taken, which is not in conflict with any law or is not mala fide, it will not be in public interest to require the court to go into and investigate those areas which are the function of the executive. For any project which is approved after due deliberation the court should refrain from being asked to review the decision just because a petitioner in filing a PIL alleges that such a decision should not have been taken because an opposite view against the undertaking of the project, which view may have been considered by the Government, is possible. When two or more options or views are possible and after considering them the Government takes a policy decision it is then not the function of the court to go into the matter afresh and, in a way, sit in appeal over such a policy decision.” 29. Similarly, in Census Commissioner and others v. R. Krishnamurthy , (2015) 2 SCC 796 , the Supreme Court reiterated that Courts are not equipped to adjudicate upon the merits of policy choices and that judicial review is confined to examining the legality and constitutionality of a decision, and not its wisdom. In the absence of a definitive policy decision on the core question involved herein, any attempt by this Court to adjudicate the issue on merits would result in judicial overreach into executive territory and held as follows :- “28. ………….. “229. It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy-making process and the courts are ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so undertaken. The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is violated and people’s fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution.” 30. So far as pensionary matters are concerned, it is beyond cavil that pension is not a bounty but a deferred portion of compensation for past service, as held in D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India , (1983) 1 SCC 305 . So far as pensionary matters are concerned, it is beyond cavil that pension is not a bounty but a deferred portion of compensation for past service, as held in D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India , (1983) 1 SCC 305 . At the same time, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the State is entitled to frame pension schemes, prescribe eligibility criteria and fix cut-off dates, provided such classification is founded on an intelligible differentia and bears a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 31. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and others v. N. Subbarayudu and others , (2008) 14 SCC 702 , it was specifically observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that fixing of a cut-off date is within the policy domain of the State and Courts cannot lightly interfere with such determination unless it is manifestly arbitrary or discriminatory by observing as follows :- “5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. (See State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005) 6 SCC 754 ).” 32. Further, the Supreme Court has further clarified in Union of India v. P.N. Menon and others , (1994) 4 SCC 68 , that financial implications and administrative feasibility are legitimate considerations for the State while framing pension policies, and that equality does not mandate extension of benefits to all merely on the ground of perceived hardship. Therefore, while recognition of past service for pensionary purposes may be a desirable policy choice, whether such past service is to be wholly counted, partially recognised, or excluded altogether is a matter to be assessed by the policy-maker after due consideration of financial, administrative and structural implications. 33. Therefore, while recognition of past service for pensionary purposes may be a desirable policy choice, whether such past service is to be wholly counted, partially recognised, or excluded altogether is a matter to be assessed by the policy-maker after due consideration of financial, administrative and structural implications. 33. Applying the aforesaid settled principles to the facts of the present batch of writ petitions, this Court finds that the controversy does not arise from a mere dispute regarding calculation of individual pensionary benefits, but emanates from a structural ambiguity in the State’s executive framework governing employees whose service trajectory commenced prior to the introduction of the New Pension Scheme and thereafter passed through stages of regularisation and absorption into regular government service. The petitioners constitute a distinct class whose engagement as Shikshakarmis dates back to the years 1998–1999, followed by long, uninterrupted service under State control, regularisation in terms of prevailing statutory norms, and eventual absorption into the School Education Department under the policy dated 30.06.2018. 34. In the present batch of writ petitions, this Court notes that the respondent-State has, as a matter of conscious policy choice, restored the Old Pension Scheme by issuing Gazette Notifications dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023. However, a careful and purposive reading of the aforesaid Notifications reveals that they do not decisively resolve the core and determinative issue arising in the present matters, namely, the exact date which ought to be reckoned as the date of appointment for the purpose of pensionary entitlement. 35. The Notifications are conspicuously silent on the treatment of services rendered by the petitioners prior to their regularisation or absorption into regular cadres. They neither expressly recognise such past service nor categorically exclude it, thereby leaving the matter open to divergent interpretations at the departmental level. This normative silence has resulted in a lack of uniformity, administrative uncertainty, and the spawning of avoidable litigation, compelling similarly situated employees to repeatedly approach the courts for redress. 36. The restoration of the Old Pension Scheme by the State Government through Gazette Notifications dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023 undoubtedly represents a conscious policy shift. This normative silence has resulted in a lack of uniformity, administrative uncertainty, and the spawning of avoidable litigation, compelling similarly situated employees to repeatedly approach the courts for redress. 36. The restoration of the Old Pension Scheme by the State Government through Gazette Notifications dated 11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023 undoubtedly represents a conscious policy shift. However, a careful reading of the said Notifications reveals that while the contributory nature of the New Pension Scheme has been rolled back for a defined category of employees, the crucial determinative question as to what constitutes the “date of appointment” for pensionary purposes has been left unanswered, particularly in cases such as the present, where employees entered service prior to 01.11.2004, but were regularised and absorbed at a later stage. The Notifications do not expressly clarify whether pension eligibility is to be reckoned from the date of initial engagement, date of regularisation, date of confirmation, or date of absorption into the regular cadre. 37. This statutory and executive silence assumes greater significance in the context of the admitted factual position that the petitioners rendered continuous service as Shikshakarmis against sanctioned posts, discharged sovereign educational functions in government schools, were paid out of public funds, and thereafter continued in pensionable establishments under the direct administrative, disciplinary, and financial control of the State Government. Despite this continuity of service, different executive authorities have adopted varying and inconsistent approaches in determining pension eligibility, culminating in the issuance of the impugned order dated 16.02.2021, which itself reflects an absence of a settled policy position. 38. The pleadings and submissions placed on record further demonstrate that similarly situated employees have been treated dissimilarly depending on departmental interpretation, resulting in avoidable litigation and erosion of uniformity in service administration. The petitioners, therefore, rightly characterise their grievance as institutional rather than individual, seeking not an immediate adjudication on the quantum or grant of pension, but a clear, reasoned and uniform executive determination which would govern all employees placed in an identical service continuum. 39. This Court is mindful of the consistent position of law that policy formulation, particularly in service matters relating to pension, cut- off dates, and recognition of past service, lies primarily within the domain of the executive. Judicial review at the stage of policy vacuum or ambiguity must be exercised with circumspection, lest the Court transgress into the realm of policy-making. This Court is mindful of the consistent position of law that policy formulation, particularly in service matters relating to pension, cut- off dates, and recognition of past service, lies primarily within the domain of the executive. Judicial review at the stage of policy vacuum or ambiguity must be exercised with circumspection, lest the Court transgress into the realm of policy-making. As noticed earlier, the Supreme Court in BALCO Employees’ Union (supra) and Census Commissioner (supra) has repeatedly cautioned against courts assuming the role of policy architects in the absence of manifest arbitrariness or constitutional infirmity. 40. In the present cases, this Court finds that the issue has not yet crystallised into a challenge against a definitive policy decision of the State. On the contrary, what emerges is an absence of a conscious, categorical and final executive determination on the core issue of reckonable service for pension in respect of employees like the petitioners. In such circumstances, any attempt by this Court to conclusively determine whether the service rendered prior to absorption must or must not be counted for pension would amount to pre-empting executive discretion and venturing into policy formulation. 41. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that pension is a welfare measure and a form of deferred compensation, and the long years of service rendered by the petitioners prior to absorption cannot be brushed aside as irrelevant. The fact that several petitioners would otherwise be required to complete ten years of service from 01.07.2018, thereby becoming eligible for pension only after 01.07.2028, despite having already rendered more than a decade of service under State control, raises issues of fairness, proportionality and administrative reasonableness, which are matters requiring due consideration at the policy level. 42. In the considered view of this Court, the ends of justice would be best served not by issuing a mandamus either granting or denying pensionary benefits, but by requiring the respondent-State to undertake a comprehensive and reasoned reconsideration of the determinative date of appointment for pensionary purposes in respect of employees whose service commenced as Shikshakarmis and later culminated in absorption into regular government service. Such reconsideration must necessarily take into account the continuity of service, nature of duties performed, source of salary, administrative control, and the constitutional mandate of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 43. Such reconsideration must necessarily take into account the continuity of service, nature of duties performed, source of salary, administrative control, and the constitutional mandate of equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 43. It is, therefore, clarified in unequivocal terms that this Court does not strike down or modify the existing policy, nor does it direct extension of any specific pensionary benefit. The formulation or amendment of policy remains within the exclusive prerogative of the State Government. However, any policy decision so taken must be clear, unambiguous, uniformly applicable and constitutionally compliant, so as to obviate further litigation and ensure predictability in service administration. 44. The State Government is accordingly expected to take a conscious, reasoned and categorical decision on the issue, including the question as to whether and to what extent the service rendered by the petitioners as Shikshakarmis prior to absorption in the School Education Department merits consideration for pensionary purposes, including the requirement of completion of ten years of qualifying service from 01.07.2018. 45. Needless to observe that any such decision shall be informed by relevant considerations, shall eschew arbitrariness, and shall conform to the constitutional guarantees of fairness, non-discrimination, and proportionality. It shall remain open to the petitioners to avail appropriate legal remedies in accordance with law, should the policy decision so taken give rise to any cause for grievance. 46. With the aforesaid observations/directions, all the writ petitions (WPS/647/2021, WPS/12523/2025, WPS/8201/2024, WPS/8130/2024, WPS/4111/2021, WPS/5143/2023, WPS/2812/2023, WPS/1814/2021, WPS/2206/2021, WPS/2255/2021, WPS/2476/2021, WPS/2557/2021, WPS/3137/2021, WPS/3831/2021, WPS/3835/2021, WPS/3850/2021, WPS/2930/2021, WPS/4141/2021, WPS/4980/2021, WPS/2367/2021, WPS/5983/2021, WPS/6659/2021, WPS/416/2022 and WPS/1739/2022) are disposed of . There shall be no order as to costs.