ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This civil revision has been preferred by the applicants being aggrieved by the order dated 20.01.2026 passed by the learned Fifteenth Additional Judge, Junior Division to the Court of First Civil Judge, Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 365A/2024, whereby the joint application filed by the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, ‘CPC’) has been rejected. 2. By way of this civil revision, the applicants have prayed for following relief:- “It is therefore prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be please to allow this revision application and may kindly allow application under O 23 R 3 CPC and further disposed off the civil suit as per compromise deed entered by the parties in the interest of justice.” 3. Brief facts of the case, in a nutshell are that the applicants/plaintiffs are real brothers. Their father, Late Shri Imam Bakhsh, was the recorded Bhumiswami and owner of agricultural lands bearing Khasra No. 41/2 admeasuring 0.3240 hectares, Khasra No. 41/3 admeasuring 0.6600 hectares and Khasra No. 42/3 admeasuring 1.0510 hectares, total three Khasras admeasuring 2.0350 hectares (approximately 5.02 acres), situated at Village Kathadih, P.H. No. 00083, R.N.M. Raipur-18 Kandul, Tehsil and District Raipur (C.G.), duly recorded in the revenue records in his name. The aforesaid agricultural land is the subject matter of dispute between the parties. It is contended that Late Shri Imam Bakhsh expired on 27.01.2024. The defendant No. 1, Smt. Kausar Bano, is the second wife of Late Shri Imam Bakhsh. After his demise, disputes arose between the applicants and defendant No. 1 with regard to declaration of title, partition, possession and permanent injunction over the suit property. Consequently, the applicants instituted a civil suit against defendant No. 1. Upon issuance of notice, defendant No. 1 appeared and filed her written statement before the learned trial Court. 4. During pendency of the suit, the matter was amicably settled between the applicants and defendant No. 1. Pursuant to the settlement, the parties jointly filed an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC before the learned trial Court. In support of the compromise, evidence of applicants No. 1 and 2 Nasir Bakhsh and Shahid Bakhsh as well as non-applicant No. 1 Smt. Kausar Bano was recorded, and the compromise deed was placed on record. Pursuant to the settlement, the parties jointly filed an application under Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC before the learned trial Court. In support of the compromise, evidence of applicants No. 1 and 2 Nasir Bakhsh and Shahid Bakhsh as well as non-applicant No. 1 Smt. Kausar Bano was recorded, and the compromise deed was placed on record. However, the learned trial Court, vide order dated 20.01.2026, rejected the said application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC on the ground of alleged non-joinder of parties and held that in absence of such parties, the compromise application could not be accepted. 5. Being aggrieved by the said order, the applicants have preferred the present civil revision. 6. Mr. Yogesh Pandey, learned counsel for the applicants submits that the impugned order dated 20.01.2026 is wholly illegal, erroneous and contrary to the settled principles of law governing compromise of suits and necessary parties in a partition matter. It is submitted that the suit instituted by the applicants was purely a suit for declaration, partition and possession of their lawful share in the joint family property. In a partition suit, only the co-sharers are necessary and proper parties, as the controversy relates to determination and separation of their respective shares in the joint property. Persons who are not co-owners or co-sharers have no independent right to insist upon being impleaded in such proceedings. 7. Mr. Pandey further submits that the learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate that a person holding merely an agreement to sell executed by a co-sharer does not acquire any right, title or interest in the immovable property. Such an agreement does not confer ownership nor does it create any charge upon the property. At best, it gives a right to seek specific performance against the executant of the agreement. Therefore, such a person cannot be said to be either a necessary or a proper party in a suit for partition. It is further contended that an agreement to sell does not convey ownership; it merely creates a contractual right enforceable in accordance with law. Unless and until a registered sale deed is executed, no legal interest in the property passes to the proposed purchaser. Moreover, in the case of joint property, a co-owner cannot convey a specific demarcated portion without prior partition. Unless and until a registered sale deed is executed, no legal interest in the property passes to the proposed purchaser. Moreover, in the case of joint property, a co-owner cannot convey a specific demarcated portion without prior partition. Hence, partition is required to be effected first, and thereafter, if permissible, the share falling to the vendor can be subjected to transfer. Consequently, any person claiming under an agreement to sell would, at best, be entitled to claim only the share that may ultimately fall to the vendor’s allotment in the partition. 8. It is further submitted by Mr. Pandey that Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 clearly stipulates that a contract for sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. Thus, the person in whose favour such agreement is executed has no present proprietary interest in the suit property. He further submits that under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, the plaintiff is dominus litis, meaning thereby that the plaintiff is the master of the suit. The plaintiff cannot be compelled to implead a party against his will unless such party is shown to be a necessary party for effective and complete adjudication of the controversy. The alleged agreement holders, claiming through defendant No. 1, are neither necessary nor proper parties in a suit for partition and possession, as the real dispute pertains only to separation of shares between co-owners. It is thus contended by Mr. Pandey that the learned Trial Court gravely erred in rejecting the application under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC on the ground of non- joinder of such third parties, who neither possess any legal interest in the property nor are required for effectual adjudication of the partition proceedings. The impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside. 9. In support of his contentions on the issue of compromise, learned counsel for the applicants placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (Dead) through LR. Sadhna Rai (Smt.) v. Rajinder Singh and others, (2006) 5 SCC 566 and Shub Karan Bubna alias Shub Karan Prasad Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna and others, (2009) 9 SCC 689 10. On the other hand, Mr. Sadhna Rai (Smt.) v. Rajinder Singh and others, (2006) 5 SCC 566 and Shub Karan Bubna alias Shub Karan Prasad Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna and others, (2009) 9 SCC 689 10. On the other hand, Mr. Hemant Gupta, learned counsel appearing for non-applicant No. 1, fairly submits that the dispute between the parties is essentially inter se between the co-sharers and the compromise arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 appears to have been entered into voluntarily and without coercion. He submits that if this Court is satisfied that the compromise is lawful and confined only to the rights and shares of the parties to the suit, the same may be considered in accordance with law. He further submits that though certain third parties are claiming rights on the basis of agreements to sell, such agreements, by themselves, do not create any present right, title or interest in the immovable property and any right flowing therefrom would be subject to the outcome of partition proceedings. He submits that recording of the compromise between the co-sharers would not, by itself, extinguish any independent remedy that may be available to such agreement holders in accordance with law. He, therefore, submits that if adequate clarification is made that the compromise decree shall bind only the parties to the suit and shall be subject to any lawful claim independently adjudicated in appropriate proceedings, the non-applicant No. 1 has no objection to the compromise being recorded. 11. Mr. Dilman Rati Minj, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the State/non-applicant No.2 submits that the State is only a formal party in the present proceedings and has no substantive interest in the private dispute relating to partition of the suit property. 12. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and perused the documents along with this civil revision as also the case laws relied upon by the respective parties. 13. From perusal of the impugned order dated 20.01.2026, it transpires that the suit pertains to agricultural land bearing Khasra Nos. 41/2 (area 0.3240 hectare), 41/3 (area 0.6600 hectare) and 42/3 (area 1.0510 hectare), total area 2.0350 hectares, situated at Village Kathadih, P.H. No. 00083, R.N.M. Raipur-18 Kandul, Tehsil and District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, in respect of which partition, separate possession and permanent injunction were sought. 41/2 (area 0.3240 hectare), 41/3 (area 0.6600 hectare) and 42/3 (area 1.0510 hectare), total area 2.0350 hectares, situated at Village Kathadih, P.H. No. 00083, R.N.M. Raipur-18 Kandul, Tehsil and District Raipur, Chhattisgarh, in respect of which partition, separate possession and permanent injunction were sought. It further transpires that during pendency of the suit, the parties claimed to have entered into a memorandum of mutual settlement, duly notarized, whereby out of the total land measuring 2.0350 hectares (219052 sq. ft.), 145000 sq. ft. was allotted to the plaintiffs and 74052 sq. ft. to defendant No.1, and a sketch map indicating their respective shares was appended thereto. On the strength of the said compromise, a prayer was made for declaring the parties as absolute owners of their respective portions in terms of the settlement. 14. However, the trial Court, upon examination of the pleadings, particularly paragraphs 18 and 19 of the plaint and written statement, noticed that there existed a prior agreement to sell in respect of the disputed property in favour of a third party, namely Shri C.K. Agarwal & Sons (HUF), allegedly executed through a power of attorney holder, and that a substantial earnest money of Rs.50,00,000/- had been received. In view of the said transaction and the involvement of third-party interests, the Court found that necessary parties were not before it and that the compromise was not shown to be lawful and in accordance with Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. Consequently, holding that the compromise could not be recorded in absence of necessary parties and in view of the subsisting agreement to sell, the learned trial Court rejected the application seeking disposal of the suit on the basis of compromise. 15. Order 23 deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits. Rule 3 relates to compromise of suits, relevant portion of which is extracted below: “3. 15. Order 23 deals with withdrawal and adjustment of suits. Rule 3 relates to compromise of suits, relevant portion of which is extracted below: “3. Compromise of suit .—Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:” 16. The said Rule consists of two parts. The first part provides that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the court shall order such agreement or compromise to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The second part provides that where a defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the court shall order such satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith. The Rule also makes it clear that the compromise or agreement may relate to issues or disputes which are not the subject-matter of the suit and that such compromise or agreement may be entered not only among the parties to the suit, but others also, but the decree to be passed shall be confined to the parties to the suit whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. We are not, however, concerned with this aspect of the Rule in this appeal. 17. What is the difference between the first part and the second part of Rule 3? The first part refers to situations where an agreement or compromise is entered into in writing and signed by the parties. The said agreement or compromise is placed before the court. 17. What is the difference between the first part and the second part of Rule 3? The first part refers to situations where an agreement or compromise is entered into in writing and signed by the parties. The said agreement or compromise is placed before the court. When the court is satisfied that the suit has been adjusted either wholly or in part by such agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties and that it is lawful, a decree follows in terms of what is agreed between the parties. The agreement/compromise spells out the agreed terms by which the claim is admitted or adjusted by mutual concessions or promises, so that the parties thereto can be held to their promise(s) in future and performance can be enforced by the execution of the decree to be passed in terms of it. 18. On the other hand, the second part refers to cases where the defendant has satisfied the plaintiff about the claim. This may be by satisfying the plaintiff that his claim cannot be or need not be met or performed. It can also be by discharging or performing the required obligation. Where the defendant so “satisfies” the plaintiff in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, nothing further remains to be done or enforced and there is no question of any “enforcement” or “execution” of the decree to be passed in terms of it. 19. In the matter of Pushpa Devi Bhaga t (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “23. We will first consider the meaning of the words “signed by parties”. Order 3 Rule 1 CPC provides that any appearance, application or act in or to any court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. The proviso thereto makes it clear that the court can, if it so desires, direct that such appearance shall be made by the party in person. The proviso thereto makes it clear that the court can, if it so desires, direct that such appearance shall be made by the party in person. Rule 4 provides that no pleader shall act for any person in any court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognised agent or by some other person duly authorised by or under a power of attorney to make such appointment. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 provides that every such appointment shall be filed in the court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1), be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in the court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. The question whether “signed by parties” would include signing by the pleader was considered by this Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India [ (1992) 1 SCC 31 ] with reference to Order 3 CPC: (SCC pp. 44 & 46-47, paras 30, 35 & 37-39) “30. There is no reason to assume that the legislature intended to curtail the implied authority of counsel, engaged in the thick of proceedings in court, to compromise or agree on matters relating to the parties, even if such matters exceed the subject-matter of the suit. The relationship of counsel and his party or the recognised agent and his principal is a matter of contract; and with the freedom of contract generally, the legislature does not interfere except when warranted by public policy, and the legislative intent is expressly made manifest. There is no such declaration of policy or indication of intent in the present case. The legislature has not evinced any intention to change the well- recognised and universally acclaimed common law tradition…. *** 35. So long as the system of judicial administration in India continues unaltered, and so long as Parliament has not evinced an intention to change its basic character, there is no reason to assume that Parliament has, though not expressly, but impliedly reduced counsel's role or capacity to represent his client as effectively as in the past. … *** 37. So long as the system of judicial administration in India continues unaltered, and so long as Parliament has not evinced an intention to change its basic character, there is no reason to assume that Parliament has, though not expressly, but impliedly reduced counsel's role or capacity to represent his client as effectively as in the past. … *** 37. We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent for counsel not to act on implied authority except when warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding immediate adjustment of suit by agreement or compromise and the signature of the party cannot be obtained without undue delay. In these days of easier and quicker communication, such contingency may seldom arise. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever doubted. … 38. Considering the traditionally recognised role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by their duly authorised agents. … 39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorised representative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorisation by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. … If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated.” (emphasis supplied) The above view was reiterated in Jineshwardas v. Jagrani [ (2003) 11 SCC 372 ] . … If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated.” (emphasis supplied) The above view was reiterated in Jineshwardas v. Jagrani [ (2003) 11 SCC 372 ] . Therefore, the words “by parties” refer not only to parties-in- person, but their attorney-holders or duly authorised pleaders. 24. Let us now turn to the requirement of “in writing” in Rule 3. In this case as noticed above, the respective statements of the plaintiffs' counsel and the defendants' counsel were recorded on oath by the trial court in regard to the terms of the compromise and those statements after being read over and accepted to be correct, were signed by the said counsel. If the terms of a compromise written on a paper in the form of an application or petition is considered as a compromise in writing, can it be said that the specific and categorical statements on oath recorded in writing by the court and duly read over and accepted to be correct by the person making the statement and signed by him, can be said to be not in writing? Obviously, no. We may also in this behalf refer to Section 3 of the Evidence Act which defines a “document” as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means intended to be used or which may be used for the purpose of recording the matter. The statements recorded by the court will, therefore, amount to a compromise in writing. 25. Consequently, the statements of the parties or their counsel, recorded by the court and duly signed by the persons making the statements, would be “statement in writing signed by the parties”. The court, however, has to satisfy itself that the terms of the compromise are lawful. In this case we find from the trial court records that the second defendant had executed a vakalatnama empowering her counsel Shri Dinesh Garg to act for her in respect of the suit and also to enter into any compromise. Hence there can be no doubt that Shri Dinesh Garg was authorised by the second defendant to enter into a compromise. Hence there can be no doubt that Shri Dinesh Garg was authorised by the second defendant to enter into a compromise. We also find that the counsel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants made solemn statements on oath before the trial court specifying the terms of compromise, which were duly recorded in writing and signed by them. The requirements of the first part of Rule 3 Order 23 are fully satisfied in this case.” 20. Further, in the matter of Shub Karan Bubna alias Shub Karan Prasad Bubna (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under :- “5. “Partition” is a redistribution or adjustment of pre-existing rights, among co-owners/coparceners, resulting in a division of lands or other properties jointly held by them into different lots or portions and delivery thereof to the respective allottees. The effect of such division is that the joint ownership is terminated and the respective shares vest in them in severalty. 6. A partition of a property can be only among those having a share or interest in it. A person who does not have a share in such property cannot obviously be a party to a partition. “Separation of share” is a species of “partition”. When all co-owners get separated, it is a partition. Separation of share(s) refers to a division where only one or only a few among several co-owners/coparceners get separated, and others continue to be joint or continue to hold the remaining property jointly without division by metes and bounds. For example, where four brothers owning a property divide it among themselves by metes and bounds, it is a partition. But if only one brother wants to get his share separated and other three brothers continue to remain joint, there is only a separation of the share of one brother. 7. In a suit for partition or separation of a share, the prayer is not only for declaration of the plaintiff's share in the suit properties, but also division of his share by metes and bounds. This involves three issues: (i) whether the person seeking division has a share or interest in the suit property/properties; (ii) whether he is entitled to the relief of division and separate possession; and (iii) how and in what manner, the property/properties should be divided by metes and bounds? This involves three issues: (i) whether the person seeking division has a share or interest in the suit property/properties; (ii) whether he is entitled to the relief of division and separate possession; and (iii) how and in what manner, the property/properties should be divided by metes and bounds? In a suit for partition or separation of a share, the court at the first stage decides whether the plaintiff has a share in the suit property and whether he is entitled to division and separate possession. The decision on these two issues is exercise of a judicial function and results in first stage decision termed as “decree” under Order 20 Rule 18(1) and termed as “preliminary decree” under Order 20 Rule 18(2) of the Code. The consequential division by metes and bounds, considered to be a ministerial or administrative act requiring the physical inspection, measurements, calculations and considering various permutations/combinations/ alternatives of division is referred to the Collector under Rule 18(1) and is the subject-matter of the final decree under Rule 18(2).” 21. From perusal of the entire record, it is evident that the suit in question is one for declaration of title, partition, separate possession and permanent injunction instituted between close family members, namely the widow and two sons of Late Imam Bakhsh. The dispute essentially pertains to determination and separation of their respective shares in the suit property inherited after the demise of Late Imam Bakhsh. During pendency of the suit, the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 admittedly entered into an amicable settlement and executed a compromise deed dated 12.12.2025, wherein specific portions of land were mutually allotted to them. The said compromise deed was reduced into writing, signed by the parties, and placed on record. The learned trial Court, in order to satisfy itself about the voluntariness and genuineness of the compromise, recorded the statements of the respective parties. The deposition sheets as well as the compromise deed demonstrate that the parties categorically affirmed the settlement and prayed for disposal of the suit in terms thereof by invoking the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. However, the learned trial Court rejected the application primarily on the ground that an agreement to sell had earlier been executed through a general power of attorney holder of Late Imam Bakhsh in favour of a third party and that a substantial amount had allegedly been received under the said agreement. However, the learned trial Court rejected the application primarily on the ground that an agreement to sell had earlier been executed through a general power of attorney holder of Late Imam Bakhsh in favour of a third party and that a substantial amount had allegedly been received under the said agreement. On that basis, the trial Court concluded that the compromise between the present parties could not be accepted. 22. In the considered opinion of this Court, such reasoning is legally unsustainable. It is necessary to emphasise that the present suit is essentially a partition suit between co-sharers. 23. In the present case, the compromise has been entered into exclusively between the co-sharers, the widow and sons of Late Imam Bakhsh, who alone constitute the necessary parties in a suit for declaration and partition of their shares. The alleged agreement to sell executed in favour of a third party does not, by itself, create any present right, title or interest in the immovable property. Such agreement may, at best, confer a contractual right to seek specific performance in appropriate proceedings. The validity, enforceability or effect of such agreement is not the subject-matter of adjudication in the present suit, nor is it being decided by recording the compromise. 24. Importantly, recording of the compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC will bind only the parties to the suit. It will not extinguish or adjudicate upon any independent legal remedy that may be available to the alleged agreement holder under the relevant law. Therefore, the apprehension that the rights of such third party would be prejudiced is misplaced. The compromise merely regulates and separates the respective shares of the co-sharers and does not determine the enforceability of any prior agreement to sell. 25. It is trite that in matters of partition amongst family members, if the parties to the lis voluntarily settle the dispute and reduce the terms into writing, the Court should ordinarily lean in favour of giving effect to such settlement, unless the compromise is unlawful or vitiated by fraud, coercion or misrepresentation. In the present case, the trial Court itself recorded evidence of the parties and found no infirmity in the genuineness of the compromise. The sole ground for rejection was the existence of an agreement to sell in favour of a third party, which, for the reasons stated above, cannot constitute a legal impediment to recording the compromise. In the present case, the trial Court itself recorded evidence of the parties and found no infirmity in the genuineness of the compromise. The sole ground for rejection was the existence of an agreement to sell in favour of a third party, which, for the reasons stated above, cannot constitute a legal impediment to recording the compromise. 26. Accordingly, in light of the settled principles of law and the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered view that the learned trial Court committed an error of law in rejecting the application filed under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. 27. With the aforesaid observations, the impugned order dated 20.01.2026 is set aside. The learned trial Court is directed to reconsider and pass an appropriate judgment and decree in terms of the compromise deed dated 12.12.2025 under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, after ensuring that the decree expressly confines its operation to the parties to the suit and does not prejudice any independent remedy available to third parties in accordance with law. 28. Resultantly, instant civil revision stands allowed . There shall be no order as to costs.