ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The applicant has filed this Civil Revision under Section 392 of the CG Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (in short “the Act”) being aggrieved by the order dated 9.5.2024 passed by the Third Additional District Judge, Raipur (CG) in Civil MJC No.89/17. By the impugned order, the MJC was allowed on the ground that the Appeal Committee of the concerned Municipal Corporation has passed the order dated 11.4.2016 in favour of the present applicant without considering the delay in preferring the subject appeal. 2. The facts relevant for disposal of this Revision are as follows : it concerns a dispute regarding mutation of House No.14/281/1, situated at Indira Gandhi Ward, Naharpara, Raipur. The said property was registered in the Municipal Records in the name of Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava S/o Mathura Prasad Shrivastava. The respondent herein has filed an application for mutation of his name in the records, which was allowed in his favour. When the present applicant came to know about the same, she filed an appeal before the Municipal Corporation, Raipur under Section 403 of the Act while inter alia stating that in addition to respondent - Ramesh Chandra Shrivastava, late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava was survived by four daughters namely Smt. Vidya Devi Shrivastava, Smt. Asha Shrivastava, Smt. Sudha Shrivastava, Smt. Indira Shrivastava (present applicant) as well as two other sons namely Pramod Shrivastava and Vinod Shrivastava. It was also alleged that no ‘Will’ was executed by late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava, who died on 12.12.1993. However, Ramesh Chandra Shrivastava and Pramod Chandra Shrivastava allegedly prepared a forged partition deed and filed an application for mutation without the consent of the other co-parceners. Moreover, the applicant was not aware about the notice published on 10.6.2004 in Daily Newspaper ‘Jan Satta’. Subsequently, based on a concocted report, the name of Ramesh Chandra Shrivastava was recorded in respect of the house in dispute, under the assertion that the other house had been allotted to Pramod Shrivastava. This appeal was opposed by the respondent, who contended that the other co-parceners were not joined as parties and further that the appeal was barred by limitation. This appeal was opposed by the respondent, who contended that the other co-parceners were not joined as parties and further that the appeal was barred by limitation. By the order of the concerned Appeal Committee, the appeal was allowed vide order dated 11.4.2016; consequently it was directed that the name of respondent Ramesh Chandra Shrivastava be deleted from the Revenue Records of the Municipal Corporation and substituted with the names of the legal heirs of late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent filed a Review Petition before the Appeal Committee, however, the same was also rejected. Subsequently, a MJC was filed before the Third Additional District Judge, Raipur by Ramesh Chandra Shrivastava (respondent herein). The Court below has allowed the MJC vide the impugned order on the ground that the appeal filed before the Appellate Committee was barred by limitation and no application for condonation of delay showing sufficient cause had been filed. Ultimately, the Court held that the order dated 11.4.2016 passed by the Appeal Committee of the Municipal Corporation was not in accordance with law. Accordingly, the MJC was allowed leading to filing of this Revision. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that Section 403(5) of the Act provides that if an appeal is not preferred within the prescribed time i.e. 30 days from the date of knowledge, an application showing sufficient cause for delay and seeking condonation for the same is required to be filed. However, inadvertently, the same could not be filed. He further submits that as the matter pertains to family property, it ought to be decided on merits rather being dismissed on technical grounds. He submits that the Court below should have adopted a pragmatic approach and remitted the matter to the concerned Appeal Committee, thereby, affording the applicant an opportunity to file an appropriate application for condonation of delay showing sufficient cause for the delay. However, the Court below failed to do so and allowed the MJC solely on the ground of delay in filing the appeal before the Appeal Committee. In support of his submissions, learned counsel would place reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Kumarakurubaran Vs. However, the Court below failed to do so and allowed the MJC solely on the ground of delay in filing the appeal before the Appeal Committee. In support of his submissions, learned counsel would place reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of K. Kumarakurubaran Vs. P. Narayanan and others in Civil Appeal No.5622 of 2025 (arising from SLP(C) No.2549/2021) wherein it was held that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of knowledge rather than the prescribed date. He further placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shesh Nath Singh and another Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Limited and another , reported in (2021) 7 SCC 313 , wherein it was held that even in the absence of a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court may condone the delay provided that sufficient cause has been shown through the pleadings and records. He would also reliance on the judgment rendered in the matter of Palmview Investments Overseas Limited Vs. Ravi Arya and others reported in 2023 SCC Online Bombay 966, to submit that suits or other matters relating to public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on mere technicalities, but rather should be decided on their merits. In view of the above, learned counsel for the appellant prays to allow the revision. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submits that an appeal under Section 403 of the Act should be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order is communicated. In the present matter, the order was communicated on 6.2.2014; consequently, the appeal ought to have been filed within 30 days therefrom. However, the appeal was filed only on 9.10.2014, which is beyond the prescribed statutory period of limitation. He further submits that no application for condonation of delay has been filed and in absence of such application, the appeal could not be heard and decided. However, the Appeal Committee has committed an illegality by failing to consider this aspect and allowing the appeal while ignoring the delay in its filing. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on the judgment rendered in the matter of Nikhila Divyang Mehta and another Vs. However, the Appeal Committee has committed an illegality by failing to consider this aspect and allowing the appeal while ignoring the delay in its filing. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent places reliance on the judgment rendered in the matter of Nikhila Divyang Mehta and another Vs. Hitesh P. Sanghvi and others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 779, wherein it has been held that the prescribed period of limitation must be strictly considered and the Court is mandated to dismiss a suit if it is found to be barred by limitation. Furthermore, the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 15.6.2023 passed in WA No.245/2023 ( State of CG and others vs. Aghori Das and others ), dismissed a similar matter on the ground that it was barred by time. 5. I have heard submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record with utmost circumspection. 6. From a perusal of the record, it is evident that after the death of original householder namely Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava, one of his sons namely Ramesh Chandra Shrivastava (respondent herein), filed an application for mutation based on a purported partition deed. However, this deed does not bear the signatures of all the legal heirs of late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava. The present applicant and the other legal heirs of late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava were not impleaded as parties during the process of mutation; thus, the mutation order was obtained behind their back on the basis of a so-called partition deed. Subsequently, although a notice regarding mutation proceedings was published in the newspaper “Daily Jansatta” on 14.2.2014, the same did not come into the knowledge of the present applicant. Upon gaining knowledge of the matter, she bonafidely preferred an appeal before the Appeal Committee of the Municipal Corporation, contending that the appeal is within the period of limitation when computed from the date of knowledge. After considering this aspect, the Appeal Committee, by its order dated 11.4.2016, allowed the appeal and set-aside the mutation order passed in favour of the respondent and directed substitution of late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava with his legal heirs. However, as a formal application for condonation of delay showing sufficient cause was not filed, the Committee proceeded to pass the order on merits without addressing the limitation issue. 7. Section 403 of the Act reads as under : 403. However, as a formal application for condonation of delay showing sufficient cause was not filed, the Committee proceeded to pass the order on merits without addressing the limitation issue. 7. Section 403 of the Act reads as under : 403. Appeal against the order of the Commissioner and subordinate officers.- (1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed an officer subordinate to the Commissioner, under this Act or under any rule or byelaw made there under may appeal of the Commissioner within thirty days of the date on which the order is conveyed to him. (2) Any person aggrieved by:- (a) any notice or order issued or other action taken by the Commissioner under sections 174, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 237, 241, 243, 246, 247, 248, 249, 298A, 295, 296, 299, 301, 302, 310, 311, 312, 313,315, 322, 323, or 393 of this Act or any rule or bylaw made there under; (b) any order of the Commissioner regarding granting or refusing a licence or permission; or (c) any other order of the Commissioner that may be made appealable by byelaws under section 427, may appeal to the Corporation within 30 days from the date of such order. (3) Such appeal shall be heard and disposed of by a committee to be called the “Appeal Committee ”appointed by the Corporation. (4) The Appeal Committee shall consists of the Mayor and four elected Councillors elected by the Corporation in accordance with the system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable vote, in the meeting called under sub- section (1) of section 18. The Mayor shall be ex- officio Chairman of the Appeal Committee. (4-A) The term of Appeal Committee shall be coterminous with the term of the Corporation. (4-B) In the event of any vacancy occurring in the Appeal Committee it shall be reported to the authority prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 18 and the vacancy shall be filled in, in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4). (5) The Appeal Committee may for sufficient cause extend the period prescribed for appeal. (6) The Appeal Committee may remand any case for further enquiry or decision or may pass any other order as may be deemed just and proper; and no appeal or revision shall lie against this decision of the Committee. (5) The Appeal Committee may for sufficient cause extend the period prescribed for appeal. (6) The Appeal Committee may remand any case for further enquiry or decision or may pass any other order as may be deemed just and proper; and no appeal or revision shall lie against this decision of the Committee. (7) The Appeal Committee may review its own order: Provided that no order under sub-section (6) or (7) shall be passed to the prejudice of any person until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (8) The Appeal Committee may allow any Officer deputed by the Commissioner for the purpose to appear before it in any appeal and to watch, or re- present the interests of the Corporation. (9) The Corporation may frame byelaws for the conduct of business before the Appeal Committee. 8. A perusal of Section 403(5) of the Act reveals that the Appeal Committee is empowered to extend the limitation period for filing an appeal. In view of the above, it appears that the Committee may have considered the issue of limitation based on verbal submissions that were not formally recorded in the proceedings. 9. It is trite law that proceedings or suits cannot be defeated on the ground of mere technicalities, and substantial justice should be done. In the present matter, the dispute arose on account of the mutation of the name of only one son of late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava in the revenue records. Furthermore, the purported partition deed is defective as it excludes other coparceners and does not bear the signatures or names of all stakeholders. There is no letter of consent or other similar authorisation in favour of Ramesh Chandra Shrivastava (respondent). Consequently, by the impugned order, dismissal of the subject appeal by the Court below on the ground of limitation does not appear to be reasonable. 10.In Palmview Investments Overseas Limited (supra), the Bombay High Court has held the following in para 28 : 28. In United Bank of India case [United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660 ] the Supreme Court has held that letter of authority of an individual, who had signed the pleadings on behalf of the company can be cured by the company subsequently. In United Bank of India case [United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660 ] the Supreme Court has held that letter of authority of an individual, who had signed the pleadings on behalf of the company can be cured by the company subsequently. The court held that where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Though appellant is not a public corporation, a litigant's interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. The court also held that in the absence of a person expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual, the company can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. Paras 8, 9, 10, 11 and 13 of United Bank of India case [United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, (1996) 6 SCC 660 ] read as under: (SCC pp. 663-665, paras 8-13) 8. In this appeal, therefore, the only question which arises for consideration is whether the plaint was duly signed and verified by a competent person. 9. In cases like the present where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation, public interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. 10. There is sufficient power in the courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable. 10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by against a corporation the secretary or any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and dehors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement on its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer. 11. The courts below could have held that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi must have been empowered to sign the plaint on behalf of the appellant. In the alternative it would have been legitimate to hold that the manner in which the suit was conducted showed that the appellant Bank must have ratified the action of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi in signing the plaint. If, for any reason whatsoever, the courts below were still unable to come to this conclusion, then either of the appellate courts ought to have exercised their jurisdiction under Order 41 Rule 27(1)(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure and should have directed a proper power of attorney to be produced or they could have ordered Sh. L.K. Rohatgi or any other competent person to be examined as a witness in order to prove ratification or the authority of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi to sign the plaint. Such a power should be exercised by a court in order to ensure that injustice is not done by rejection of a genuine claim. 12. *** 13. The court had to be satisfied that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi could sign the plaint on behalf of the appellant. The suit had been filed in the name of the appellant Company; full amount of court fee had been paid by the appellant Bank; documentary as well as oral evidence had been led on behalf of the appellant and the trial of the suit before the Sub-Judge, Ambala, had continued for about two years. It is difficult, in these circumstances, even to presume that the suit had been filed and tried without the appellant having authorised the institution of the same. The only reasonable conclusion which we can come to is that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi must have been authorised to sign the plaint and, in any case, it must be held that the appellant had ratified the action of Sh. The only reasonable conclusion which we can come to is that Sh. L.K. Rohatgi must have been authorised to sign the plaint and, in any case, it must be held that the appellant had ratified the action of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi in signing the plaint and thereafter it continued with the suit. 11.Furthermore, the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court has considered the above aspect in the judgment rendered in the matter of Union of India and another Vs. Harendra Gawaria reported in 2022 SCC Online Raj 463 and held the following in para 12, 13 & 15 : 12. "To err is human, to forgive is divine", the mistake can be of two kinds. First kind of mistake would not be where nobody is affected by a mistake and the second mistake where a third party is affected by a mistake. The difference in two mistakes would be that whereas the rectification of the first mistake would cause no prejudice, rectification of the second would cause a prejudice. 13. This analogy has been taken for consideration by the Coordinate Bench of this Court while deciding D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1700/2017 on 01.11.2017 in the case of "Kavita Chaudhary Vs. Registrar (Examination), in which this Court has held that the human error can be rectified provided, no third parties' right is affected. It has also been held that a bona fide mistake which does not affect a third party right, should be allowed to be cured if the rectification of the said mistake would cause no prejudice to anyone. In the said judgment, this Court has placed reliance on the judgment "State of Rajasthan Vs. Datar Singh, in D.B.S.A.W. No. 875/2012 decided on 11.10.2017. 15. It is the settled position of law that whenever there is a conflict between the substantial justice and hyper- technicality then the substantial justice should be preferred to avoid the defeat for the ends of justice. If the hypertechnical stand of the petitioner is allowed to stand as it is then it would amount to failure of justice. 15. It is the settled position of law that whenever there is a conflict between the substantial justice and hyper- technicality then the substantial justice should be preferred to avoid the defeat for the ends of justice. If the hypertechnical stand of the petitioner is allowed to stand as it is then it would amount to failure of justice. The judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the present case.” 12.Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the dispute among the legal heirs of the original title holder i.e. Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava and in light of the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments, this Court deems it appropriate to remand the matter to the Appeal Committee of the concerned Municipal Corporation. The Committee shall decide the appeal filed under Section 403 of the Act, afresh, affording a proper opportunity of hearing to all the interested parties i.e. the legal heirs of late Kuldeep Narayan Shrivastava. Ordered accordingly. 13.Furthermore, the applicant is granted liberty to file an appropriate application with sufficient reasons seeking condonation of delay and extension of the limitation period. The applicant is also directed to implead all the legal heirs in the said application. Consequently, the Appeal Committee of the Municipal Corporation is directed to issue notice to all the parties to afford them an adequate opportunity of hearing and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 14.For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order as well as the order dated 11.4.2016 passed by the Appeal Committee of the Municipal Corporation, Raipur are hereby set-aside. 15.With the aforesaid observations/directions, the Revision is disposed of.