Judgment : Rajani Dubey, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the appellants challenging the judgment and decree dated 01.01.2019 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Bhatapara, District Balodabazar–Bhatapara (C.G.) in Civil Suit No. 29-A/2011, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff/appellant was dismissed and the counter-claim preferred by the respondent No.1 was allowed. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred to as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court. 2. The pleadings made in the plaint by the plaintiff, are that the suit land situated at Mauja Dhurrabandha, P.H. No. 19, R.N.M., Tehsil Bhatapara, as described in Schedule ‘A’ appended to the plaint, bearing Khasra No. 11 and admeasuring 15.95 acres, was purchased by the plaintiff from defendant No. 1 on 21.03.1972 for a total consideration of Rs. 1,200/-. Upon receipt of the consideration amount, defendant No. 1 delivered possession of the suit land to the plaintiff and since then the plaintiff has been in continuous, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession thereof. It is further pleaded that due to unavoidable circumstances, the plaintiff could not get her name mutated in the revenue records, as a result of which the name of defendant No. 1 continued to be recorded as the owner, though the plaintiff remained in actual physical possession of the land. Subsequently, the plaintiff submitted an application before the Court of the Tehsildar, Bhatapara, seeking mutation of his name in the revenue records. In Revenue Case No. 10-A/6 of 2006–07, an attorney appeared on behalf of defendant No. 1 on 19.04.2006. The plaintiff alleges that without obtaining any decree declaring the earlier sale transaction to be illegal or non-binding, defendant No. 1, taking undue advantage of her name being recorded in the revenue records, executed a registered sale deed dated 13.10.2011 in favour of defendant No. 2 for a purported consideration of Rs. 19,43,000/-. The said sale deed, according to the plaintiff, is sham, collusive and without consideration, executed with the intention to harass the plaintiff and to defeat her lawful rights. It is further contended that the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since the date of purchase, i.e., 21.03.1972, and that defendant No. 1 had no authority to alienate the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2. Despite having knowledge of the plaintiff’s ownership and possession, defendant No. 2 allegedly purchased the suit land. It is further contended that the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit land since the date of purchase, i.e., 21.03.1972, and that defendant No. 1 had no authority to alienate the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2. Despite having knowledge of the plaintiff’s ownership and possession, defendant No. 2 allegedly purchased the suit land. The execution of the impugned sale deed has adversely affected the plaintiff’s title, giving rise to the present cause of action, which arose on 13.10.2011. On these grounds, the plaintiff has instituted the present suit seeking a declaration of title over the suit land, a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his peaceful possession and a further declaration that the sale deed dated 13.10.2011 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2 is illegal, void and not binding upon the plaintiff. 3. In turn, the defendant No.1 filed her written statement denying the facts and stating that the suit land is not owned or possessed by the plaintiff. The suit land was owned and possessed by Defendant No. 1 and she has sold the land to Defendant No. 2 and defendant No.2 is currently in physical possession of the suit land. Defendant No. 1 has not sold the suit land to the plaintiff, nor has Defendant No. 1 received any amount from the plaintiff. The sale deed dated 21-03-1972 does not bear the signature of Defendant No. 1. The defendant was a minor and the disputed land was registered in the name of Ramnani Bai, daugther of Kaushalya Bai. Defendant No. 1 remained in peaceful possession of the suit land until 2010-11. The plaintiff fraudulently obtained the execution of the sale deed dated 21-03-1972 through someone else. The defendant has not executed the sale deed. The plaintiff has not been in possession of the suit land and has sought relief for possession in the suit. Defendant No. 1 has become the owner of the suit land by virtue of adverse possession, having been in continuous possession of the suit land for over twelve years. If the plaintiff had any rights, they have been extinguished by adverse possession. The plaintiff has not affixed the appropriate court fees, and the plaint contains a non- joining of the parties. If the plaintiff had any rights, they have been extinguished by adverse possession. The plaintiff has not affixed the appropriate court fees, and the plaint contains a non- joining of the parties. In its counterclaim, Defendant No. 1 further denies the facts stated in the plaint and a request has been made to dismiss the plaintiff's suit and along with this, reiterating the facts mentioned in the reply, a counterclaim has been filed against the plaintiff and relief has been sought that the sale deed dated 21-03-72 has not been executed by defendant No. 01 and is not binding on her. The plaintiff has filed a reply to the counterclaim, denying all the facts of the counterclaim. Defendant No. 1 became aware of the sale deed dated 21-03-1972 on 19-04-2006. When the lawyer representing the counterclaimant appeared before the Tehsildar, Bhatapara. Defendant No. 1 has neither properly valued the counterclaim nor affixed the requisite court fee. Despite having knowledge of the sale deed since 19.04.2006, Defendant No. 1 failed to institute any proceedings within the prescribed limitation period seeking a declaration that the sale deed is illegal, null and void. Consequently, the counterclaim filed by Defendant No. 1 is barred by limitation and is liable to be dismissed. 4. In her written statement, defendant No. 02 denying the facts mentioned in the plaint stated that the suit land is the land owned and occupied by defendant No. 01 Ramnaini Bai, which is registered in the name of defendant No. 01 Ramnaini Bai in the revenue records B-One and Khasra Panchshala and defendant No. 01 Ramnaini Bai is actually and physically in possession of the suit land by carrying out agricultural work on it. The suit land has been sold to defendant No. 02 as per the registered sale deed dated 13-10-2011 and by executing the sale deed, defendant No. 01 Ramnaiti Bai has given actual and physical possession of the suit land to defendant No. 2 Chameli Bai on the date of execution of the registered sale deed dated 13-10-2011. Husband of Defendant No. 02- Johan Yadav has been cultivating the suit land five-six years prior to the registration date of the deed on 13-10-11 and even at present he is cultivating the crop. Defendant No. 02 has got a tube well dug in the suit land and he is in continuous possession of the suit land. Husband of Defendant No. 02- Johan Yadav has been cultivating the suit land five-six years prior to the registration date of the deed on 13-10-11 and even at present he is cultivating the crop. Defendant No. 02 has got a tube well dug in the suit land and he is in continuous possession of the suit land. The plaintiff has never had possession or possession of the suit land, rather defendant No. 02 was in possession of the suit land on the date of presentation of the suit. Defendant No. 02 has obtained possession of the suit land from defendant No. 01. Accordingly, it is prayed that the remaining averments made in the plaint be rejected and the suit filed by the plaintiff be dismissed. 5. The remaining defendant, namely Defendant No. 3, has chosen to remain ex parte in the present proceedings and no written statement has been filed on its behalf. 6. Learned trial Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties, framed issues; the parties led their evidence and thereafter, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff vide judgment dated 01.01.2019. Hence, this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Court below are perverse, contrary to law and unsustainable on facts as well as in law. The trial Court failed to appreciate that the sale deed dated 21.03.1972 was validly and legally executed. Merely because no steps for mutation were taken thereafter, no right, title, or interest could revert to the erstwhile owner. Once the first sale deed was executed, the original owner stood completely divested of all her rights, title and interest in the property and, therefore, had no authority to execute any subsequent sale deed or instrument in favour of any other person. The trial Court ought to have appreciated that, under the settled law, a presumption of title arises in favour of the plaintiff/appellant on the basis of a registered sale deed, and that registration operates as notice to the world in terms of Section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act (read with the Evidence Act). The findings to the contrary are erroneous and unsustainable. The burden to prove minority and the alleged illegal execution of the sale deed squarely lay upon the defendants. The findings to the contrary are erroneous and unsustainable. The burden to prove minority and the alleged illegal execution of the sale deed squarely lay upon the defendants. The Court below committed a grave error in wrongly shifting this burden upon the plaintiff/appellant and, on that basis, recorded findings against the plaintiff on the relevant issues. The trial Court has completely ignored vital legal and technical aspects relating to limitation, valuation of the suit, and the court fee payable thereon, and has decided the case in a prejudicial manner in favour of the defendants, without proper appreciation of law and evidence on record. The trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence brought on record by the parties in its proper perspective. Therefore, the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set aside. Reliance has been on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Prem Singh and others Vs. Birbal and others ; (2006) 5 SCC 353 , Hansa V. Gandhi Vs. Deep Shankar Roy and others ; (2013) 12 SCC 776 , Jamila Begum (dead) Through Legal Representatives Vs. Shami Mohd. (dead) Through Legal Representatives and another; (2019) 2 SCC 727 and Damodhar Narayan Sawale (dead) Through Legal Representatives Vs. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske and others 8. Learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned judgment and decree and submits that the learned trial Court minutely appreciated oral and documentary evidence and rightly dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff and decreed the counter- claim filed by defendant No.1. The impugned judgment is well merited and no interference is called for by this Court. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India Vs. Vasavi Co-op Housing Society Limited and others ; (2014) 2 SCC 269 , Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah (Dead) through Legal Representatives Vs. Muddasani Sarojana; (2016) 12 SCC 288 , Shanti Devi (Since Deceased) through Lrs. Goran…... Vs. Jagan Devi and others; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1961, Iqbal Ahmed (Dead) by Lrs. and Another Vs. Abdul Shukoor; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1787 & Vasantha (Dead) Through Legal Representative Vs. Rajalakshmi Alias Rajam (Dead) Through Legal Representatives; (2024) 5 SCC 282 , the decision of Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Sukhsen Vs. Kamataiya ; 2004 SCC OnLine MP 300 , on the decision of this Court in the matter of State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Abdul Shukoor; 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1787 & Vasantha (Dead) Through Legal Representative Vs. Rajalakshmi Alias Rajam (Dead) Through Legal Representatives; (2024) 5 SCC 282 , the decision of Hon’ble Madhya Pradesh in the matter of Sukhsen Vs. Kamataiya ; 2004 SCC OnLine MP 300 , on the decision of this Court in the matter of State of Chhattisgarh Vs. Chhattisgarh Board of Revenue and another ; (2018) 1 CGLJ 151 . 9. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues which are as under:- 10. As per plaintiff, he purchased schedule A property total Khasra No. 11 and total area of 15.95 acre from defendant No.1- Ramnaini Bai vide sale deed dated 21.03.1972 and since then the plaintiff was in possession but he due to his personal engagement, he could not mutate the purchased land in his name and name of defendant No. 1 was remained as land owner in revenue records and when he filed application for mutation on 19.04.2006, at that time defendant No.1 sold her land to defendant No.2 vide sale deed dated 13.10.2011. 11. As per defendant No.1, she never sold her land to plaintiff and plaintiff by playing fraud executed the sale deed dated 21.03.1972 in his favour. Till sale deed dated 13.10.2011 defendant No. 1 was remained in possession of disputed land and defendant No. 1 also filed counter-claim for declaring sale deed dated 21.03.1972 is not binding upon her. 12. Sub-registrar Kafeel Ahmed Khan (P.W.-1) filed register of registrar office and also filed original sale deed dated 21.03.1972 of Ramnaini Bai and Vidhi Narayan Shukla vide Ex.P/1. 13. Vidhi Narayan Shukla (P.W.-2) stated that he had produced the sale deed relating to the purchase of the land from Ramnani Bai, which was marked as Ex. P/2. He further stated that a certified copy of the deed dated 13.10.2011 was produced as Ex. P/3. He also deposed that certified true copies of the order sheet and the entire reply application in Revenue Case No. 103/06 for the year 2006-07, pending before the Tehsildar, Bhatapara, between Vidhnarain and Ramnani, were filed and the order sheet consisting of 17 pages was marked as Ex. P/4. He further stated that the certified copy of the application under Sections 109 and 110 of the Land Revenue Code was exhibited as Ex. P/4. He further stated that the certified copy of the application under Sections 109 and 110 of the Land Revenue Code was exhibited as Ex. P/5, the certified copy of the application filed by defendant Ramnani for stopping the transfer of the land was marked as Ex. P/6 and the reply to the said application by Ramnani Bai was marked as Ex. P/7. The witness further stated that the application submitted by him before the Tehsildar under Section 1 read with Rule 10 of the CrPC was exhibited as Ex. P/8 and the application filed by Ramnani Bai under Order VIII Rule 1A(3) of the CPC was marked as Ex. P/9. He also stated that the certified copy of his affidavit was exhibited as Ex. P/10, the affidavit of Ravindra Kumar Agarwal was marked as Ex. P/11 and the reply filed by him to the application of Ramnani Bai under Order VIII Rule 1A(3) of the CPC was exhibited as Ex. P/12. 15. It is evident from Ex. P/1 that the said document was executed on 21.03.1972. However, the plaintiff submitted an application for mutation before the Revenue Court only in the year 2006. Ex. P/4 is the order-sheet of the Revenue Court, which reflects proceedings from 06.02.2006 to 19.09.2011. 16. Ex. D/1 to Ex. D/2 are revenue records wherein the disputed land is recorded in the name of defendant No.1, namely Ramnaini Bai. 17. The plaintiff has categorically admitted that after execution of the sale deed dated 21.03.1972, no application for mutation was ever filed by him. 18. Smt. Chameli (D.W.-2) and her husband Johan Yadu (D.W.-4) have deposed that they had taken the agricultural land on js?k (lease) from Ramnaini Bai and have been cultivating the same. 19. Smt. Chameli (D.W.-2) has further stated that a borewell was installed on the suit land by them and the bill dated 15.11.2011 pertaining thereto has been produced vide Ex. D/14. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the counter-claim filed by the defendant is barred by limitation. However, a perusal of the written statement filed by the defendant/respondent clearly demonstrates that the counter-claim was preferred only after the plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration. D/14. 20. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the counter-claim filed by the defendant is barred by limitation. However, a perusal of the written statement filed by the defendant/respondent clearly demonstrates that the counter-claim was preferred only after the plaintiff instituted the suit for declaration. It is further evident from the record that when the plaintiff filed an application for mutation before the Revenue Court, the defendant raised objections thereto and consistently asserted that she had never executed any sale deed in favour of the plaintiff on 21.03.1972. Upon acquiring knowledge of the suit filed by the plaintiff on 09.03.2010, the defendant promptly filed the counter-claim. In these circumstances, the counter-claim cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Consequently, the objection raised by the plaintiff with regard to limitation of the counter-claim is devoid of merit and is liable to be rejected. 21. In the case of Union of India (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 15 to 19, has held as under:- “15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. 16. The High Court, we notice, has taken the view that once the evidence is let in by both the parties, the question of burden of proof pales into insignificance and the evidence let in by both the parties is required to be appreciated by the court in order to record its findings in respect of each of the issues that may ultimately determine the fate of the suit. The High Court has also proceeded on the basis that initial burden would always be upon the plaintiff to establish its case but if the evidence let in by the defendants in support of their case probabilises the case set up by the plaintiff, such evidence cannot be ignored and kept out of consideration. 17. At the outset, let us examine the legal position with regard to whom the burden of proof lies in a suit for declaration of title and possession. This Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira [ AIR 1959 SC 31 ] observed that: (AIR p. 37, para 20) "20…. 17. At the outset, let us examine the legal position with regard to whom the burden of proof lies in a suit for declaration of title and possession. This Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira [ AIR 1959 SC 31 ] observed that: (AIR p. 37, para 20) "20…. in a suit [for declaration] if the plaintiffs are to succeed they must do so on the strength of their own title." 18. In Nagar Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh [(1995) 3 SCC 426] this Court held as under (SCC p.427c) "The onus to prove title to the property in question was on the plaintiff-respondent……..In a suit for ejectment based on title it was incumbent on the part of the court of appeal first to record a finding on the claim of title to the suit land made on behalf of the plaintiff The court is bound to enquire or investigate that question first before going a into any other question that may arise in a suit." 19. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up b by the defendants is found against (sic them), in the absence of establishment of the plaintiff's own title, the plaintiff must be non-suited.” 22. In the matter of Sukhsen and another (supra), the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held as under:- “From the perusal of the document it is apperent that this document did not contain the details of the land, sold by the document, nor it was read over to the executants, who were illiterate, before the execution. In these circumstances, on the basis of the document Ex D-1, it cannot be said that the document was proved in accordance with law and defendant got right and title over the land in dispute. When the land was purchased in the year 1954 then why the purchaser has not got their name mutated in the revenue records? There is no explanation in this regard. When the land was purchased in the year 1954 then why the purchaser has not got their name mutated in the revenue records? There is no explanation in this regard. The Khasra entry of year 1976-77 is on record as Ex P-1 which also shows that the land remained in the name of plaintff. Bhoo Adhikar Pustika also shows the Bhoomiswamis are the plaintiffs. All the aforesaid circumstances create a serious doubt in respect of the document Ex D-1. This Court in Jay Narayan Durga Prasad (supra) consider-ing scope of Sec.90 of the Evidence Act held:- 5". True, Section 90 of the Evidence Act raises a presumption in respect of documents which are 30 years' old, about their execution and signatures and every other part of such documents, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, if the documents are produced before the Court from a proper custody. But it is trite that the question as to whether the presumption under Section 90 arises or not, in the circumstances of the case, must be decided on the evidence adduced. The parties are, therefore, left with the option of leading such evidence as they like for the proof or disproof of the presumption. (see Mohammad Hussain and others v. Gopibai and others [1975 J.L.J. Note 38]. Besides, the presumption is permissive; a party leading evidence to prove a document, cannot rely on such presumption. (See Shriram v. Sabir Hussain [ 1983 M.P.W.N. 43 ]. As the plaintiff himself has led evidence to prove the document and signatures on it of document No. 1 and his father, he cannot be heard to say that as the document is 30 years old and there is presumption about its execution and signatures and every other part thereof, the defendants cannot be allowed to lead evidence in rebuttal." Sec.90 of the Act provides a presumption in respect of a document which is 30 years old and is produced from proper custody, then the Court may presume that the signatures and every other part of the document which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is in that person's handwriting and it was duly attested and contested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. This is a presumption for a document which is more than 30 years old and comes from proper custody. This is a presumption for a document which is more than 30 years old and comes from proper custody. Though in this case a document has been prodúced by the defendants and appears to be 30 years old but in this case when defendants themselves have produced the evidence in respect of execution and attestation of the document then there is no question for raising any presumption under Sec.90 of the Evidence Act. In Lakhi Baruah (supra) the Apex Court held:- “15.Section 90 of the Evidence Act is founded on necessity and convenience because it is extremely difficult and sometimes not possible to lead evidence to prove handwriting, signature or execution of old documents after lapse of thirty years. In order to obviate such difficulties such difficulties or improbabilities to prove execution of an old document section 90 has been incorporated in the Evidence Act, which does not away with the strict rule of proof of private documents. Presumption of genuieness may be raised if the documents in question are produced from proper custody. It is however, the discretion of the Court to accept the presumption flowing from Section 90. There is, however, no manner of Court that judicial discretion under Section 90 should not be exercised arbitrarily and not being informed by reasons." The Apex Court held that it is not mandatory to raise a presumption under Sec.90 of the evidence Act merely on the ground that the document is more than 30 years old. It is within the discretion of the Court to accept the presumption in the case. In the aforesaid circumstances if the appellate lower Court after appreciating the evidence found that the document Ex D-1 is not proved and does not convey any title in favour of the defendants then there is no infirmity or perversity in the judgment. Apart from this the defendants who were claiming in possession of the land since last more than 30 years, unable to produce any revenue record showing their possession over the land Taking cumulative effect of all the aforesaid, the Appellate court has rightly found that the document is not proved and the defendants are not in possession of the land. On the contrary the evidence of plaintiff showing their possession has been relied upon by the Appellate Court is based on sound reasoning. I do not find any merit in this appeal warranting interference.” 23. On the contrary the evidence of plaintiff showing their possession has been relied upon by the Appellate Court is based on sound reasoning. I do not find any merit in this appeal warranting interference.” 23. In Resham Lal @ Badri Prasad and another v. Gosai Ram and others , reported in 2007 SCC OnLine Chh 50 , this Court has held in para 9 as follows:- “9. A plain reading of Article 65 of the Limitation Act goes to show that a suit for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein based on title has to be instituted within 12 years from the date on which the possession of the defendants becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. In the present case, on 19.1.1967 Sonsai had transferred a valla title to the appellants/plaintiffs through a sale deed Ex. P-3. However, possession of the suit land was never delivered to the plaintiffs and Sonsai and thereafter his legal representatives continued to be in uninterrupted possession for over 12 years, which was also recorded in the revenue records. It is thus not a case where possession of Sonsai and thereafter his legal representatives was permissive in nature so as to come to the aid of the plaintiffs on the reasoning that possession howsoever long being permissive can never become adverse to the owner. Since in this case Sonsai retained possession of the suit land on the date of execution of the sale deed i.e. 19.1.1967, his possession was adverse to the vendee Le. the appellants/plaintiffs. The fact that possession of Sonsai and after his death, possession of his legal representatives i.e. the respondents/defendants was continuously recorded in revenue records till 1994 also strengthens the inference that possession of Sonsai and after his death possession of his legal representatives over the suit land was adverse to the vendee i.e. the appellants/plaintiffs. It is also to be remembered that this is not a case where Sonsai or his legal representatives were trespassers over the suit land. Ownership of the Sonsai over the suit land prior to 19,1.1967 is admitted. It is also to be remembered that this is not a case where Sonsai or his legal representatives were trespassers over the suit land. Ownership of the Sonsai over the suit land prior to 19,1.1967 is admitted. Since the appellants/plaintiffs remained inactive for a period of over 18 years and instituted the suit only in the year 1995, the respondents/defendants denied the sale by Sonsai in favour of the appellants/plaintiffs and resisted the suit on the ground that Sonsai had never parted with possession of the suit land and after his death they continued in possession thereof. In such a situation, the question of plea of adverse possession being taken by the respondents/defendants would not arise and in the facts and circumstances of this case, for the purpose of computing the period of limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, it would only required to be seen when did the possession of Sonsai and thereafter the respondents/defendants became adverse to the appellants/ plaintiffs. Therefore, the absence of plea or adverse possession by the defendants, in such a situation, would not come to the aid of the appellants/plaintiffs whose right to the suit land was extinguished under Article 27 of the Limitation Act due to their complete inaction for a period of 12 years from 19.1.1967.” 24. In the case of Eureka Builders and others Vs. Gulabchand, S/o Veljee Dand since deceased by Legal Representatives and Others reported in (2018) 8 SCC 67 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paras 55, 56, 57 and 59 as under:- “55. The reason was that in order to keep such new rights intact and enforceable, the original holders (three PATIL.) were under a legal obligation to have filed a suit for claiming a declaration and possession of the suit land and this ought to have been done by them within 12 years from the date of re-grant i.e. 1973. 56. They, however, failed to do so within 12 years and when they actually tried to exercise their rights by filing the suit in 2004 (after 31 years from 1973), by then it was too late to exercise such rights in law. By that time, their rights in the suit land stood extinguished. 57. Section 27 of the Limitation Act deals with extinguishment of right to property. By that time, their rights in the suit land stood extinguished. 57. Section 27 of the Limitation Act deals with extinguishment of right to property. It says that at the determination of the period prescribed in the Act for any person to institute a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished. Articles 64 and 65 of the Schedule provide 12 years' period for filing a suit to claim possession of any immovable property. The period of 12 years prescribed in these two articles is required to be counted d from "the date of dispossession" (Article 64) and "when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff (Article 65). 59. In view of these reasons, we are of the considered view that neither the original holders (three PATIL) and nor the appellants could take any benefit of the orders of re-grant dated 31-3-1973 and 1-4-1973 made by the State so as to divest the legal representatives of Shah Veljee Kanjee (plaintiffs) from their rights, title and interest in the suit land which they had legally acquired through court auction and direct purchase in 1942/1943.” 25. In the case of Vasantha (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paras 50, 51 and 54, has held as under:- “50. This position has been followed by this Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (two-Judge Bench), elaborated the position of a suit filed without the consequential relief. It was observed: (SCC p. 173. paras 55-58) "55. The section provides that courts have discretion as to declaration of status or right, however, it carves out an exception that a court shall not make any such declaration of status or right where the complainant, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so. 56. In Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi [ (1973) 2 SCC 60 ] this Court had categorically held that the suit seeking for declaration of title of ownership but where possession is not sought, is hit by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and, thus, not maintainable. In Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra [ 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129 ] this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession of property and had filed a suit seeking declaration of title of ownership. In Vinay Krishna v. Keshav Chandra [ 1993 Supp (3) SCC 129 ] this Court dealt with a similar issue where the plaintiff was not in exclusive possession of property and had filed a suit seeking declaration of title of ownership. Similar view has been reiterated observing that the suit was not maintainable, if barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. (See also Gian Kaur v. Raghubir Singh [ (2011) 4 SCC 567 ].) 57. In view of the above, the law becomes crystal clear that it is not permissible to claim the relief of declaration without seeking consequential relief. 58. In the instant case, the suit for declaration of title of ownership had been filed, though Respondent 1-plaintiff was admittedly not in possession of the suit property. Thus, the suit was barred by the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and, therefore, ought to have been dismissed solely on this ground. The High Court though framed a substantial question on this point but for unknown reasons did not consider it proper to decide the same." 51. In Venkataraja v. Vidyane Doureradjaperumal [ (2014) 14 SCC 502 ] (two-Judge Bench), the purpose behind Section 34 was elucidated by this Court. It was observed that the purpose behind the inclusion of the proviso is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It was further expounded that a mere declaratory decree remains non-executable in most cases. This Court noted that the suit was never amended, even at a later stage to seek the consequential relief and therefore, it was held to be not maintainable. This position of law has been reiterated recently in Akkamma v. Vemavathi [ (2021) 18 SCC 371 ] (two-Judge Bench). 54. Adverting to the facts of the present case, on a perusal of the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiff was aware that the appellant herein was in possession of the suit property and therefore it was incumbent upon him to seek the relief which follows. The plaintiff himself has stated that Defendant 1 was in possession of the subject property and had sought to transfer possession of the same to Defendant 2, thereby establishing that he himself was not in possession of the subject property. We are not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent on this issue. The plaintiff himself has stated that Defendant 1 was in possession of the subject property and had sought to transfer possession of the same to Defendant 2, thereby establishing that he himself was not in possession of the subject property. We are not inclined to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent on this issue. We note that after the death of the life estate holder in 2004, there was no attempt made by the original plaintiff to amend the plaint to seek the relief of recovery of possession. It is settled law that amendment of a plaint can be made at any stage of a suit [(Harcharan v. State of Haryana, (1982) 3 SCC 408 (two judges Bench)], even at the second appellate stage [Rajendra Prasad v. Koyastha Pathshala, 1981 Supp SCC 56 (1) (two- Judge Bench)]” 26. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the plaintiff himself admitted that the suit property was never mutated in his name. He also failed to adduce any cogent evidence to establish his possession over the suit property during the period from 1972 to 2011. On the contrary, defendant No. 1 produced documentary evidence from Ex.D/1 to Ex.D/10 and examined as many as six witnesses, which conclusively establishes her continuous possession over the suit property. It is further apparent from the relief clause of the plaint that the plaintiff sought only a declaration of title and did not claim any consequential relief for recovery of possession, which is fatal to the case of the plaintiff. 27. The learned trial Court has meticulously appreciated both oral and documentary evidence available on record and has rightly recorded a finding that the plaintiff failed to prove either his title or possession over the suit property. Conversely, defendant No. 1 successfully proved her title as well as possession over the suit property. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any illegality, perversity, or infirmity warranting interference by this Court. Accordingly, the dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff and the decree of the counter-claim preferred by defendant No. 1 are fully justified. 28. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed . Accordingly, the dismissal of the suit filed by the plaintiff and the decree of the counter-claim preferred by defendant No. 1 are fully justified. 28. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds no merit in the present appeal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed . The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court are hereby affirmed.