Deepak Kumar Badholiya S/o Late Srinivas Badholiya v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary Housing And Environment Department
2026-02-18
Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Rajani Dubey
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner is seeking recalling of the order dated 23.01.2026 passed in WPC No. 2554/2024. 2. The main crux of Writ Petition (C) No. 2554/2024 was that Respondent No. 3 Ajit Pujari and Respondent No. 4 Lalita Bhagat exercised and adjudicated the powers of Rent Controller without holding a lawful appointment order as mandatorily required under Section 7 of the Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. The impugned ex-parte eviction order dated 22.06.2022 was passed by Ajit Pujari and the application for setting aside the ex-parte order was rejected by Deputy Collector Lalita Bhagat vide order dated 13.10.2023, both of which were unsuccessfully challenged before the Chhattisgarh Rent Tribunal, Raipur, by order dated 08.05.2024. Thereafter, by order dated 23.01.2026 passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 2554/2024, this Hon’ble Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of alleged concealment of the appointment order dated 05.06.2024 issued under Section 7 of the Act. However, in paragraph 18 of the said order, this Hon’ble Court held that the Collector, Bilaspur, by a work-distribution order dated 09.12.2021, had validly assigned the charge of Rent Controlling Authority to a Deputy Collector, thereby rejecting the petitioner’s objection regarding lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner submits that if such work-distribution order was sufficient, there was no necessity for issuance of a statutory appointment order dated 05.06.2024 after nearly seven years of the earlier notification dated 27.09.2018, which clearly demonstrates that appointment under Section 7 is mandatory and cannot be substituted by a mere work-distribution order, especially in view of earlier Division Bench judgments of this Hon’ble Court quashing similar orders for want of prior notification. 3. Following prayers have been made in the present MCC application:- “1) That, this Hon'ble Court Pleased to Allow the Instant Recalling Petition and Pleased to Recall the Order Dated 23.01.2026 Passed in Writ Petition(C) No.2554/2024 wherein Fraud Being Committed with the Court of Law in not Disclosing the Fact Regarding Issuance of the Appointment Order on 05.06.2024 in Favor of Deputy Collector Shiv Kumar Kanwar which amply Shows that Appointment of Rent Controller is Aptly Required & Collector Bilaspur is not Competent to Issue Work Distribution Order/Roster. 2) That this Hon'ble Court may Graciously be pleased to Impose Heavy Cost upon the Respondent State Authorities in View of the Dicta Passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in 'SCIMED OVERSEAS INC.
2) That this Hon'ble Court may Graciously be pleased to Impose Heavy Cost upon the Respondent State Authorities in View of the Dicta Passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in 'SCIMED OVERSEAS INC. versus BOC INDIA LIMITED AND ORS. (2016) 3 SCC 70 . 3) Any other relief, viz Restoration of possession in case which this Hon'ble Court may deem dispossession, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and Proper for the Just Adjudication of the case and protecting Constitutional Rights Petitioners.” 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this Hon’ble Court has inherent power to recall its own judgment where the order has been obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, suppression of material facts, inherent lack of jurisdiction, or mistake of the Court causing prejudice, as authoritatively laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Budhia Swain & Ors. v. Gopinath Deb & Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 396 , Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., A.V. Papayya Sastry & Ors. v. Government of A.P. & Ors. (2007) 4 SCC 221 , and A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., AIR 1988 SC 1531 . It is contended that fraud vitiates every solemn act and that a judgment obtained by playing fraud on the Court is a nullity and non est in the eyes of law and can be questioned at any stage, even in collateral proceedings. The counsel further submits that the impugned judgment suffers from patent jurisdictional error and was procured by deliberate concealment and dishonest subterfuge on the part of the erring respondent, which misled the Court and resulted in recording findings contrary to settled law. Such an anomaly stands embossed on the judicial record, and in exercise of inherent powers and powers under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, this Hon’ble Court is fully competent to recall the judgment in order to uphold the majesty of justice and prevent abuse of the process of law. 5. Learned State counsel, per contra, opposes the prayer for recall and submits that the present application is wholly misconceived, not maintainable in law, and is nothing but a disguised attempt to seek review of a reasoned and final judgment of this Hon’ble Court. 6. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 3 to 5, while adopting the submissions advanced by learned State counsel, opposes the present MCC. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent Nos. 3 to 5, while adopting the submissions advanced by learned State counsel, opposes the present MCC. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. A perusal of the record reveals that the appointment order dated 05.06.2024, on which heavy reliance is now placed, had admittedly been issued much prior to the final hearing of WPS No. 2554/2024. The writ petition was heard at length, judgment was reserved on 12.11.2025 and thereafter pronounced on 23.01.2026. At no stage during the course of hearing did the petitioner produce the said appointment order or contend that any material fact had been suppressed by the respondents. Even during the interregnum between reserving of judgment and its pronouncement, no application was filed bringing any alleged concealment to the notice of this Court. 9. It is thus evident that the petitioner was fully aware of the appointment order dated 05.06.2024, yet consciously chose not to press the same at the time of arguments. The ground now sought to be raised is clearly an afterthought and appears to be an attempt to reopen the matter under the guise of recall. 10. From a further perusal of the grounds urged in the present MCC, it is apparent that the petitioner, in substance, seeks review of the findings recorded in the judgment dated 23.01.2026. It is well settled that recall jurisdiction is distinct from, and much narrower than, review jurisdiction. Recall is maintainable only where the order has been obtained by practicing fraud upon the Court, where there is a patent lack of jurisdiction, or where the order has been passed without affording opportunity of hearing. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Asit Kumar Kar v. State of West Bengal , (2009) 2 SCC 703 , has explained the distinction between recall and review and has held that recall is permissible where an order is passed without giving an opportunity of hearing or due to a procedural defect, and that it is different from review on merits. 12. Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh , (2004) 1 SCC 328 , it has been held that recall of an order is permissible in cases of procedural irregularity; however, a court cannot rehear the matter on merits under the guise of recall. 13.
12. Similarly, in State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh , (2004) 1 SCC 328 , it has been held that recall of an order is permissible in cases of procedural irregularity; however, a court cannot rehear the matter on merits under the guise of recall. 13. The reliance placed by the petitioner on A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. , (2007) 4 SCC 221 , is misconceived. In the said case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where a judgment had been obtained by deliberate fraud upon the Court by suppression of vital and material documents going to the root of the matter. The facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable, as no such fraud or deception has been demonstrated. 14. In the case of Budhia Swain v. Gopinath Deb, (1999) 4 SCC 396 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "6. What is a power to recall? Inherent power to recall its own order vesting in tribunals or courts was noticed in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. ( (1996) 5 SCC 550 ] Vide para 23. this Court has held that the courts have inherent power to recall and set aside an order (i) obtained by fraud practised upon the court. (ii) when the court is misled by a party, or (iii) when the court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party.” 15. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S, Nayak (1988) 2 SCC 602 , this Court has noticed motions to set aside judgments being permitted where (i) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all and was shown as served or in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had died and the estate was not represented, (ii) a judgment was obtained by fraud, (iii) a party has had no notice and a decree was made against him and such party approaches the court for setting aside the decision ex debito justitiae on proof of the fact that there was no service. 16.
16. In our opinion a tribunal or a court may recall an order earlier made by it if (i) the proceedings culminating into an order suffer from the inherent lack of jurisdiction and such lack of jurisdiction is patent, (ii) there exists fraud or collusion in obtaining the judgment, (iii) there has been a mistake of the court prejudicing a party, or (iv) a judgment was rendered in ignorance of the fact that a necessary party had not been served at all or had died and the estate was not represented. 17. The power to recall a judgment will not be exercised when the ground for reopening the proceedings or vacating the judgment was available to be pleaded in the original action but was not done or where a proper remedy in some other proceeding such as by way of appeal or revision was available but was not availed. The right to seek vacation of a judgment may be lost by waiver, estoppel or acquiescence." 18. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Prakash Agarwal v. Gopi Krishan , (2013) 11 SCC 296 further clarifies the law on the use of the power under Section 151 of the CPC by the Court and holds as follows: "13. Section 151 CPC is not a substantive provision that confers the right to get any relief of any kind. It is a mere procedural provision provision which enables a party to have the proceedings of a pending suit conducted in a manner that is consistent with justice and equity. The court can do justice between the parties before it. Similarly, inherent powers cannot be used to re-open settled matters. The inherent powers of the Court must, to that extent, be regarded as abrogated by the legislature. A provision barring the exercise of inherent power need not be express, it may even be implied. Inherent power cannot be used to restrain the execution of a decree at the instance of one who was not a party to suit. Such power is absolutely essential for securing the ends of justice, and to overcome the failure of justice. The Court under Section 151 CPC may adopt any procedure to do justice, unless the same is expressly prohibited.
Such power is absolutely essential for securing the ends of justice, and to overcome the failure of justice. The Court under Section 151 CPC may adopt any procedure to do justice, unless the same is expressly prohibited. XXX 19.In view of the above, the law on this issue stands crystallised to the effect that the inherent powers enshrined under Section 151 CPC can be exercised only where no remedy has been provided for in any other provision of CPC. In the event that a party has obtained a decree or order by playing a fraud upon the court, or where an order has been passed by a mistake of the court, the court may be justified in rectifying such mistake, either by recalling the said order, or by passing any other appropriate order. However, inherent powers cannot be used in conflict of any other existing provision, or in case a remedy has been provided for by any other provision of CPC. Moreover, in the event that a fraud has been played upon a party, the same may not be a case where inherent powers can be exercised." 19. Recently, in the case of My Palace Mutually Aided Coop. Society v. B. Mahesh , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1063 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "27. In exercising powers under Section 151 of the CPC, it cannot be said that the civil courts can exercise substantive jurisdiction to unsettle already decided issues. A Court having jurisdiction over the relevant subject matter has the power to decide and may come either to a right or a wrong conclusion. Even if a wrong conclusion is arrived at or an incorrect decree is passed by the jurisdictional court, the same is binding on the parties until it is set aside by an appellate court or through other remedies provided in law. 28. Section 151 of the CPC can only be applicable if there is no alternate remedy available in accordance with the existing provisions of law. Such inherent power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under the Code. Section 151 cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing fresh suits, appeals, revisions, or reviews. A party cannot find solace in Section 151 to allege and rectify historic wrongs and bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC." 20.
Such inherent power cannot override statutory prohibitions or create remedies which are not contemplated under the Code. Section 151 cannot be invoked as an alternative to filing fresh suits, appeals, revisions, or reviews. A party cannot find solace in Section 151 to allege and rectify historic wrongs and bypass procedural safeguards inbuilt in the CPC." 20. The allegations of fraud levelled by the petitioner are bald and unsupported by any cogent material to show that the respondents deliberately misled this Court. Mere non-acceptance of the petitioner’s interpretation of Section 7 of the Act cannot be equated with fraud. The judgment dated 23.01.2026 was passed after hearing learned counsel for the parties and upon due consideration of the pleadings and documents on record. None of the contingencies warranting recall are made out. 21. It also emerges from the record that the petitioner had ample opportunity to raise all permissible grounds at the time of hearing of the writ petition. Having failed to do so, he cannot now be permitted to reopen the concluded adjudication by filing the present MCC styled as a recall petition. The application, in essence, seeks reconsideration of findings on merits, which is impermissible in exercise of recall jurisdiction. 22. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that no case for recall of the order dated 23.01.2026 is made out. The MCC, being devoid of merit, is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 23. No order as to cost(s).