ORDER : 1. Petitioner has filed this petition seeking following reliefs:- “10.1. That, Hon’ble Court may issue an appropriate writ or direction to quash the impugned termination order dated 30/10/2014 (Annexure P/4) passed by Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Dhamdha, District Durg (CG). 10.2. That, Hon’ble Court may direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner and grant her all consequential benefits. 10.3. The Hon’ble Court may grant any other relief as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the nature and circumstances of the present case in the interest of justice” 2. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that petitioner was appointed as Shiksha Karmi Grade-III vide order dated 27.6.2007. Petitioner was regularized in service on 03.10.2011. However, service of petitioner was terminated vide order dated 30.10.2014 on the ground that documents/certificates submitted by him were found to be forged upon verification. He submits that the impugned order has been passed without conducting any enquiry or affording opportunity of hearing to petitioner, hence, termination of petitioner is bad in law. He submits that writ petitions filed by other terminated employees challenging their termination order were allowed, they have been reinstated in service and therefore, petitioner is also entitled to the same benefits. 3. Per contra, learned State Counsel would submit that petitioner was appointed on the basis of documents/ certificates produced by her. However, upon verification, it was found that appointment was secured by the petitioner on the basis of forged documents/certificates, therefore, after providing opportunity of hearing, she was terminated from service. He submits that if an appointment is found to be based on forgery, the authority has right to recall such appointment and hence, the impugned order does not call for any interference. He further submits that termination order was passed in the year 2014 and writ petition is admittedly filed in the year 2026, after an unexplained inordinate delay of about 12 years. Approaching the Court at such a belated stage is clearly impermissible and such a petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available in record of writ petition. 5. From the pleadings of writ petition it is appearing that petitioner was terminated from service way back on 30.10.2014. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available in record of writ petition. 5. From the pleadings of writ petition it is appearing that petitioner was terminated from service way back on 30.10.2014. Present writ petition has been filed on 10.2.2026 i.e. after more than 11 years, to set aside termination order of petitioner. Perusal of Para-3 of writ petition, which relates to ‘delay in filing of writ petition’, would show that no explanation has been offered for not approaching the Court for a period of 11 years, but for mentioning that petitioner has been terminated without inquiry. 6. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that against an impugned order, if a person wishes to approach the Court invoking writ jurisdiction, he should approach the Court within a reasonable period. The reasonable period cannot be stretch to the extent of more than a decade. 7. In the case of Bhoop Singh v. Union of India , (1992) 3 SCC 136 it was held as under:- "7. It is expected of a Government servant who has a legitimate claim to approach the Court for the relief he seeks within a reasonable period, assuming no fixed period of limitation applies. This is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set-up after it has been functioning on a certain basis for years. During the interregnum those who have been working gain more experience and acquire rights which cannot be defeated casually by lateral entry of a person at a higher point without the benefit of actual experience during the period of his absence when he chose to remain silent for years before making the claim. Apart from the consequential benefits of reinstatement without actually working, the impact on the administrative set-up and on other employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless the delay is satisfactorily explained and is not attributable to the claimant. This is a material fact to be given due weight while considering the argument of discrimination for deciding whether the petitioner is in the same class as those who challenged their dismissal several years earlier and were consequently granted the relief of reinstatement.” 8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that belief. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed." 8. In case of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corpn. and another v. Jabar Singh and others , (2007) 2 SCC 112 it was observed as under:- "43. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches." 9. Further, in the case of New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others , AIR 2007 SC 1365 , Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterating the principles relating to interference in cases where petitioner approached the Court with unexplained delay, held as under: "16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction.” 10. In case of Union of India v. N. Murugesan , (2022) 2 SCC 25 , Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering delay, laches and acquiescence, has observed thus:- “20. …..One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches…..” “….The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.” 22…….Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.” 11. Recently, in the matter of Bichitrananda Behera Vs. State of Orissa and others , 2023 Live Law (SC) 883, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering that original application filed on 2.4.2005 challenging resolution dated 7.1.1993 of the Managing Committee constituted on 28.12.1992; respondent No.5 had not moved before any forum for 12 years, be it Court of law or tribunal or an authority, assailing his claim qua the solitary post of PET in the school in question, has observed taking note of decision in cases of Union of India v. Tarmsem Singh , (2008) 8 SCC 648; Chairman, State of Bank of India vs. M.J. James , (2022) 2 SCC 301 , that respondent No.5 should have been non-suited on the ground of delay and laches. 12. 12. Thus, gist of the above decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, as culled out in above decisions, is that delay and laches in espousing a cause, can come in the way of a litigant who is not vigilant, even if he has a good case on merits and the Courts should be reluctant in entertaining stale claims of persons, who without any reasonable explanation approach the Court with an inordinate and gross delay. The Courts in their discretionary power do not ordinarily assist the indolent or lethargic persons who sleepover their rights. If a litigant fails to satisfy the Court on the inordinate delay in approaching the Court, the Court will be well justified in rejecting the claim on delay and laches. 13. From the facts of present case, as discussed above, it is clear that termination order was passed on 30.10.2014. Petitioner did not challenge this order of termination till the year 2026 i.e. for a period of more than 11 years. He woke up in the year 2025 only after finding that some other persons who were also terminated from service got the relief. Period of 11 years is a very long time for any person to seek relief of whatsoever nature be it. There has to be some reasonable and plausible grounds, pleaded and explained to condone such an inordinate delay to entertain a writ petition. There is no averment explaining the delay but for merits of his case. Merely because some other similarly terminated employees, who had approached the Court, got the relief and have been reinstated in service, petitioner cannot be permitted to challenge termination of his service after a period of almost 12 years, without any cogent explanation for such an inordinate delay, as held in Bhoop Singh’s case (supra). 14. Considering the facts of present case in light of above authoritative decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the opinion of this Court, this petition is liable to be and is hereby dismissed on account of delay and laches. 15. Certified copy as per rules.