ORDER : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The short question involved in this petition is: “Whether the District Election Officer-cum-Collector is empowered under Section 28A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short the “Act of 1951”) to impose minor penalty on the Polling Officer after declaration of result of the general election of Lok Sabha ? 2. The aforesaid question arises for consideration on the following factual backdrop: 2.1 The general election of Lok Sabha-2019 was declared on 10.03.2019 and mock poll was also conducted. On 21.04.2019, the petitioner herein was appointed as presiding officer of Booth Centre No.11, Limru, Korba and, on 23.042019, polling was done. Thereafter, the respondent No.03 i.e. Collector-cum-District Election Officer issued show cause notice dated 13.05.2019, (Annexure-P/03) to the petitioner calling explanation as to why action should not be taken against him for committing irregularities in the election proceedings, upon which, the petitioner filed reply dated 17.05.2019. 2.2 Thereafter, on 23.05.2019, results of the general election was declared and, ultimately, on 10.07.2019, impugned order (Annexure- P/01) was passed against the petitioner imposing penalty of stoppage of one increment with non-cumulative effect. Against which, this writ petition has been filed and the respondents have also filed their reply opposing the contention/averments made and relief sought in the writ petition. Meanwhile, on 30.06.2021, the petitioner retired from service upon attaining the age of superannuation. 3. Mr. Prateek Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though notice was issued to the petitioner on 13.05.2019, to which, he replied on 17.05.2019, but at that time the petitioner was “deemed to be on deputation” and same came to end after declaration of the result of the general election on 23.05.2019 and, as such, the District Election Officer-cum-Collector has no jurisdiction to imposed penalty upon the petitioner vide impugned order dated 10.07.2019. Thus, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the impugned order by submitting that there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 10.07.2019 and same has been passed strictly in accordance with law, as before passing the same a show cause notice dated 13.05.2019 was issued to the petitioner. Hence, the present writ petition deserved to be dismissed. 5. Hence, the present writ petition deserved to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and went through the record with utmost circumspection. 6. In order to consider the challenge made to the impugned order of penalty dated 10.07.2019, it would be necessary to notice Section 28A of the Act of 1951, which reads as under: “28A. Returning officer, presiding officer, etc., deemed to be on deputation to Election Commission.—The returning officer, assistant returning officer, presiding officer, polling officer and any other officer appointed under this Part, and any police officer designated for the time being by the State Government, for the conduct of any election shall be deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission for the period commencing on and from the date of the notification calling for such election and ending with the date of declaration of the results of such election and accordingly, such officers shall, during that period, be subject to the control, superintendence and discipline of the Election Commission.” 7. A careful perusal of Section 28A of the Act of 1951 would show that the returning officer, assistant returning officer, presiding officer, polling officer and any other officer appointed under Part-IV of the Act of 1951, for the conduct of any election shall be deemed to be on deputation to the Election Commission for the period commencing on and from the date of the notification calling for such election and ending with the date of declaration of the results of such election and accordingly, such officers shall, during that period, be subject to the control, superintendence and discipline of the Election Commission. 8. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote the term “Election Commission”, which has been defined under Section 2(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, which reads thus: “‘Election Commission’ means the Election Commission appointed by the President under Article 324;” 9. In the present case, it is not in dispute that for the purpose of general election of Lok Sabha-2019, the petitioner was appointed as polling officer/presiding officer on 21.04.2019 for Booth Centre No.11, Limru, Korba and the polling in the said election was held on 23.04.2019 and, ultimately, results of the election was declared on 23.05.2019. In the present case, it is not in dispute that for the purpose of general election of Lok Sabha-2019, the petitioner was appointed as polling officer/presiding officer on 21.04.2019 for Booth Centre No.11, Limru, Korba and the polling in the said election was held on 23.04.2019 and, ultimately, results of the election was declared on 23.05.2019. As such, according to Section 28A of the Act of 1951, before declaration of the result on 23.05.2019, the petitioner was under the control, superintendence and discipline of the Election Commission and all the authority and power to take any action was also vested upon the Election Commission. However, the issue involved in this case is no more res integra and stands conclusively decided by the Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Umesh Singh Yadav v. Collector/District Returning Officer, Balaghat and Others , 1992 MPLJ 173 in which the District Returning Officer exercising the power under Section 28-A of the Act of 1951 which is pari-materia provision to the provision contained in Rule 27-A of the Niyam, 1995 placed the petitioner therein on suspension, the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, on consideration has held that disciplinary power having been vested with the Election Commission during the election, the District Returning Officer was not competent to place the petitioner under suspension during election and held in para 6 as under: “6. ..On a plain reading of the above provisions, it is clear that the authority to take disciplinary action is vested only with Election Commission and during the period of election…” 10. The aforesaid decision has been followed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in S.K. Tripathi v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others , 2009 (3) MPHT 504 with approval holding as under: “9....What has been stated by the Division Bench is that the power vests in the Election Commission for taking action against the incumbents who are working during the election and deemed to be on duty with the Election Commission. That is the ratio of the said decision. I have said so because in paragraph 6 of the decision, the Division Bench has expressed the view that the power of superintendence, control and discipline is only conferred on the Election Commission in respect of various officers working during election. The term “only” is of immense significance.…” 11. That is the ratio of the said decision. I have said so because in paragraph 6 of the decision, the Division Bench has expressed the view that the power of superintendence, control and discipline is only conferred on the Election Commission in respect of various officers working during election. The term “only” is of immense significance.…” 11. In Steel Authority of India, Successor of Bokaro Steel Limited v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court at Bokaro Steel City, Dhanbad, and another , (1980) 3 SCC 734 , Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that if a particular officer has not been authorized under the approved Rules, then the charge-sheet served and Enquiry Committee constituted by such officer being unauthorized and order passed is invalid. 12. Applying the principles of law laid down in the above-stated judgments in light of Section 28A of the Act of 1951 to the facts of the case in hand, it is quite vivid that the order of punishment dated 10.07.2019, passed by the District Election Officer-cum-Collector, is without jurisdiction and authority of law, as under Section 28A of the Act of 1951 the Election Commission appointed by the President under Article 324 of the Constitution of India has been vested with all the authority and powers to take any action against the officers who are deemed to be on deputation during the entire election proceedings i.e. the period commencing on and from the date of the notification calling for such election and ending with the date of declaration of the results of such election. In the present case, the result of the general election of Lok Sabha-2019 was declared on 23.05.2019, whereas the impugned order of punishment has been passed on 10.07.2019 that too by the District Election Officer-cum- Collector after delectation of the result of the general election of Lok Sabha-2019 and not by the Election Commission, therefore, the same is without jurisdiction and without authority of law. Even otherwise, there is nothing available on record to demonstrate that the Election Commission has delegated its power to the District Election Officer-cum-Collector concerned, to take action against the petitioner herein. Accordingly, for the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order of punishment dated 10.07.2019 is liable to be and is hereby set aside. 13. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above by leaving the parties to bear their own costs.