Order : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. The petitioner herein, who stood retired from service as Executive Engineer in the Water Resources Department of the State of Chhattisgarh, seeks to challenge legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order dated 24-9-2018 (Annexure P-1) by which the State Government has appointed Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer under Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 for conducting departmental enquiry against him after his retirement. 2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop: - 3. The petitioner attained the age of superannuation and he retired as Executive Engineer on 31-3-2007 vide Annexure P-3. The State Government after leave from the competent authority under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 (for short, ‘the Pension Rules’) instituted departmental enquiry against the petitioner by issuing charge-sheet to him and two other employees namely, Mr. Mukesh Santoshi & Mr. P.K. Patel, on 31-8- 2007, however, charges against Mr. Mukesh Santoshi & Mr. P.K. Patel were dropped by order dated 22-5-2008. In response to the charge-sheet, the petitioner submitted detailed reply on 3-3-2009 vide Annexure P-5 stating that the works were executed in accordance with the PWD Manual, without any financial irregularity or misappropriation of public funds and after receipt of reply, no further departmental proceeding was taken up from 2009 to 2018 and till the impugned order was issued, whereby Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed under Rule 14 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, which is sought to be challenged by the petitioner on the ground that there is inordinate delay in conducting departmental enquiry and after the departmental proceeding was instituted on 31-8-2007, the order appointing Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer was issued on 24- 9-2018 i.e. with a delay of 11 years and meanwhile, 10% of the total pension amount has also been deducted from the petitioner by order dated 16-1-2017 (Annexure P-2), which is in violation of the Rules and therefore the order impugned be quashed. 4. 4. Return has been filed on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh/respondents No.1 to 4 stating inter alia that departmental enquiry has been conducted in accordance with the Pension Rules and the petitioner has been charge-sheeted, however, in the meanwhile, departmental proceeding could not proceed, however, by the impugned order dated 24-9-2018, Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer have been appointed and thereafter the matter could not proceed further. 5. Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, would submit that charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner with the leave of the competent authority only on 31-8- 2007 and thereafter, the impugned order dated 24-9-2018 was communicated, as such, only in order to harass the petitioner, such an order has been passed which is patently illegal and a detailed reply to the charge-sheet has been submitted by the petitioner appropriately and competently on 3-3-2009 denying all the allegations and that is the reason why the Department could not proceed further against the petitioner, as such, on account of inordinate delay, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner be quashed. He would also submit that contrary to the third proviso (b) to Rule 9(4) of the Pension Rules, though the departmental proceedings have not been completed within two years from the date of institution, the entire amount of pension is not being paid to the petitioner, as 10% of the total pension amount is being deducted, which is unsustainable and bad in law. 6. Mr. Vivek Mishra, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State of Chhattisgarh/respondents No.1 to 4, would support the impugned order and oppose the writ petition and submit that after due consideration, considering the reply, Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer have been appointed which is in accordance with law, as such, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also gone through the material available on record with utmost circumspection. 8. The petitioner stood retired on attaining the age of superannuation from the post of Executive Engineer on 31-3-2007 and after a period of one and half year, he was subjected to departmental proceeding with the permission of the competent authority under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the Pension Rules, however, charges against Mr. Mukesh Santoshi & Mr. 8. The petitioner stood retired on attaining the age of superannuation from the post of Executive Engineer on 31-3-2007 and after a period of one and half year, he was subjected to departmental proceeding with the permission of the competent authority under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the Pension Rules, however, charges against Mr. Mukesh Santoshi & Mr. P.K. Patel have been dropped and they have already been exonerated from the charges. The charge against the petitioner is financial irregularities relating to the period 2002-2004, which he replied on 3-3-2009, thereafter, till the impugned order dated 24-9- 2018 was passed, no action was taken by the State Government for last 11 years i.e. from 31-8-2007 to 24-9-2018 which is almost more than 11 years and in the return filed by the State, the State is conspicuously silent with regard to the delay / inaction on its part for a period of 11 years in appointing Enquiry Officer & Presenting Officer to proceed further with the departmental proceeding and the delay on the part of the State Government is writ large on the face of it. 9. In this regard, decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154 may be noticed herein profitably in which their Lordships have held that the delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings, and observed as under: - “19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations. 10.The principle of law laid down in N. Radhakishan’s case (supra) has been followed with approval in the matter of P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board (2005) 6 SCC 636 and it has been observed as under: - “11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” 11. Further, the principle of law laid down in P.V. Mahadevan (supra) was recently followed in the matter of Amresh Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others 2025 SCC OnLine SC 693 by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and it has been held as under: - “18. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of this court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh 1990 Supp SCC 738 , wherein the court noted that there was no reason to interfere with the quashing as the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after 12 years of delay. A reference should also be made to the decision of this Court in P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board where it has been reiterated that continuing the departmental proceedings after an undue delay would be unjust, causing unnecessary mental distress and damaging the reputation of the employee for the mistakes committed by the department in initiating disciplinary proceedings.” 12.Coming to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in N. Radhakishan’s case (supra) followed in P.V. Mahadevan (supra) and further followed in Amresh Shrivastava (supra), it is quite vivid that delay from 31-8-2007 to 24-9-2018 when the impugned order came to be passed, is totally unexplained on the part of the State and there is no allegation that the petitioner has in any way attempted to delay the departmental proceeding, rather it is the State Government which has appointed neither Enquiry Officer nor Presenting Officer and thus, the departmental enquiry has not commenced except institution of proceeding. It is also apparent that departmental proceeding against the petitioner is delayed which reflects from non-appointment of Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer for a long time and thus, delay of 11 years has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. It is also apparent that departmental proceeding against the petitioner is delayed which reflects from non-appointment of Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer for a long time and thus, delay of 11 years has caused serious prejudice to the petitioner. There is no material at all to demonstrate that the petitioner is responsible for delay of 11 years in appointing Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer. Thus, the principles of law laid down in N. Radhakishan’s case (supra) followed in P.V. Mahadevan (supra) and further followed in Amresh Shrivastava (supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case warranting striking down of the impugned order by which Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed. 13.Prejudice to the petitioner is also writ large on the ground that in spite of the fact that there is a provision in the rule in shape of third proviso clause (b) to sub-rule (4) of Rule 9 of the Pension Rules that if the departmental proceedings are not completed within a period of two years from the date of institution, the entire amount of pension so withheld shall stand restored on the expiration of the aforesaid period of two years, the said provision/benefit has not been extended to the petitioner and he is being paid pension after deducting 10%. As such, I am of the considered opinion that it is a fit case where this Court must step in exercise of power and jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and quash the order Annexure P-1. Accordingly, the order dated 24-9-2018 (Annexure P-1) passed by the State Government including departmental proceeding instituted against the petitioner are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to extend the benefits to the petitioner which are withheld on account of pendency of the departmental enquiry against him. 14.The writ petition stands allowed to the extent sketched herein-above with no order as to cost(s).