ORDER : 1. The four petitioners herein have called in question the legality, validity and correctness of the order passed by the Appellate Authority i.e. Inspector General of Police, Bastar Range, Lalbagh, Jagdalpur dated 1.3.2018 (Annexure-P/2) by which their Appeal against the order of Disciplinary Authority i.e. Superintendent of Police dated 4.6.2016 dismissing them from service has been upheld. 2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop. 3. At the relevant point of time i.e. 27.12.2014 petitioner Nos.1 to 3 were holding the post of Constable whereas petitioner No.4 was holding the post of Assistant Constable and they were deputed in security duty at the residence of former MLA namely, Manturam Pawar at Pakhanjur. During their duty hours, the Naxalites entered the residence of the said MLA and at gun point, looted the guns and ammunition kept in the guard room. After the incident, a preliminary enquiry was conducted and the following charges were levelled against the petitioners:- ‘ Charge No.1 – on 5.1.2015, while being posted at Naxal affected area, gross negligence and unsatisfactory conduct was shown by not following the Security Rules/Instructions and due to cowardly action, the issued guns and ammunition were looted by the unknown Naxalites. Charge No.2 .- Violation of Clause (v) of para No.487 of the Police Regulations. Charge No.3 .- Violation of Clause (2) and (4) of para No.-64 of the Police Regulations which stipulates the general service conditions of the Police service.’ 4. The Enquiry Officer after a detailed enquiry and after recording statements of witnesses recorded a finding that Charge Nos.1 and 3 are found proved whereas charge No.2 was not found proved. Thereafter a show cause notice dated 24.11.2015 was issued to the petitioners by the Disciplinary Authority asking them to file response to the enquiry report. Ultimately, by order dated 4.6.2016 the Disciplinary Authority held that the conduct of the petitioners in not following the security protocol proved the charges and accordingly, services of the petitioners were terminated. The Disciplinary Authority also ordered for recovery of pecuniary loss from the respective petitioners, which led to filing of an Appeal before the Appellate Authority and the said Authority vide order dated 1.3.2018 dismissed the appeal, which gave rise to filing of the present writ petition. 5. The Disciplinary Authority also ordered for recovery of pecuniary loss from the respective petitioners, which led to filing of an Appeal before the Appellate Authority and the said Authority vide order dated 1.3.2018 dismissed the appeal, which gave rise to filing of the present writ petition. 5. At the outset, Shri Otwani, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners would submit that the petitioners are not claiming back wages. Shri Otwani would next make twofold submissions; firstly, Rule 18 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short ‘the Rules, 1966’) would apply, as the same is applicable to the Police Constables by virtue of Regulation 213 of the CG Police Regulations, which has not been followed and common proceeding was conducted by virtue of Rule 18 of the Rules, 1966 without leave of the competent authority and thus, it is liable to be quashed in the light of decision rendered by this Court in the matter of Ghasiram Kosariya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others , (2011) 2 CGLJ 147 and secondly, Presenting Officer was not appointed and, therefore, the enquiry conducted against the petitioners is impermissible and liable to be set aside. 6. On the other hand, learned State Counsel would submit that the four petitioners have consented for holding common departmental enquiry and, therefore, at this stage, they cannot raise any contention that there is violation of the Rules, 1966. He would further submit that even if the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed, liberty may be reserved in favour of the respondents to initiate fresh enquiry in accordance with the Rules, 1966. 7. On rejoinder, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would submit that in the light of decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of G. Vallikumari Vs. Andhra Education Society and Others , (2010) 2 SCC 497 which is followed by this Court in the matter of Ghasiram Kosariya (Supra), back wages may not be granted but looking to the fact that 10 years have elapsed, it may not be proper at this stage to remand the matter for de novo enquiry. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 9. In the case at hand, at the relevant point of time, the four petitioners were working as Constables and Assistant Constable respectively. Their services are governed by the CG Police Regulations. However, by virtue of Regulation 213 of the Police Regulations, the Rules of 1966 are also applicable to the State Police Service, and as such, the Rules of 1966 would be applicable. It would be profitable to reproduce Rule 18 of the Rules, 1966:- ‘ 18 . Common proceedings : ( 1 ) Where two or more Government servants are concerned in any case, the Governor or any other authority competent to impose the penalty of dismissal from service on all such Government servants may make an order directing that disciplinary action against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding: Provided that the powers conferred on the Governor under this rule shall in case of Judicial Officers, be exercised by the Chief Justice. Proviso added vide GAD Notification No.C - 6-3-98-3-I, dated 20-5-1998, published in MP Gazette dated 21-5-1998 at page 486. Note - If the authorities competent to impose the penalty of dismissal on such Government servants are different, an order for taking disciplinary action in a common proceeding may be made by the highest of such authorities with the consent of the others. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of Rule 12, any such order shall specify : (i) the authority which may function as the disciplinary authority for the purpose of such common proceeding; (ii) the penalties specified in Rule 10 which such disciplinary authority shall be competent to impose; (iii) whether the procedure laid down in Rule 14 and Rule 15 or Rule 16 shall be followed in the proceeding.” 10. The consequence of Rule 18 in common proceeding has been considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the matter of Mahesh Kumar Shrikishan Tiwari Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others , 1985 MPLJ 516 wherein it has been held that where there is no order of the competent authority for holding common proceeding against the delinquent officials, the entire proceeding is vitiated being without jurisdiction irrespective of the question of proof of prejudice which must be implied. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others , 1985 MPLJ 516 wherein it has been held that where there is no order of the competent authority for holding common proceeding against the delinquent officials, the entire proceeding is vitiated being without jurisdiction irrespective of the question of proof of prejudice which must be implied. Similar proposition has been laid down in the matter of Navin Kumar Shankarlal Vyas Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others , 1989 MPLJ 514 . Following the aforesaid decisions of the MP High Court, this Court in the matter of Ghasiram Kosariya (Supra) has held in para-17 as under:- “ 17 . From the aforesaid decision on the applicability and requirement of Rule 18 of the Rules of 1966, which are applicable in the present case also, it is too well settled that in the absence of there being proper order as contemplated under Rule 18 of the Rules of 1966, the entire enquiry is vitiated and consequently the order of punishment is also rendered null and void.” 11. As such, Rule 18 is mandatory and unless proper order is obtained from the competent authority under Rule 18, common disciplinary proceeding initiated against the petitioners and subsequent order of punishment are rendered null and void. 12. Moreover, it is well settled proposition that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment on the ground that the enquiry was not properly conducted, the Court cannot reinstate the employee. It must remit the case concerned to the disciplinary authority for it to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated, and conclude the same. (See: State of UP & Others Vs. Rajit Singh , (2022) 15 SCC 254 ) 13. However, in the instant case, charge sheet was issued to the petitioners on 11.2.2015 and more than 10 years have elapsed. 14. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of G. Vallikumari (Supra) has held in paras-20, 21 & 22 thus:- “ 20 . Rajit Singh , (2022) 15 SCC 254 ) 13. However, in the instant case, charge sheet was issued to the petitioners on 11.2.2015 and more than 10 years have elapsed. 14. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of G. Vallikumari (Supra) has held in paras-20, 21 & 22 thus:- “ 20 . A careful reading of the Tribunal's order shows that though it did not find any procedural infirmity in the inquiry against the appellant, the order passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee was nullified only on the ground of violation of Section 8(2) of the Act read with Rule 120(2) of the Rules inasmuch as permission of the Director was not obtained before removing the appellant from service. The High Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and indirectly restored the order passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee because it was of the view that Section 8(2) is not applicable to the minority institutions. Neither the Tribunal nor the Division Bench of the High Court dealt with and decided the appellant's challenge to the findings recorded by the inquiry officer and her plea that the extreme penalty of removal from service imposed on her was not justified because she was not found guilty of any serious misconduct. 21 . Since the order of punishment passed by the Chairman of the Managing Committee is vitiated due to violation of the statutory rules and the principles of natural justice, we may have remitted the matter to the Tribunal with a direction to consider whether or not the penalty of removal from service imposed upon the appellant was disproportionate to the misconduct found against her or the action taken by the management was wholly arbitrary or unjust but keeping in view the fact that the appellant was removed from service more than 13 years ago, we do not consider it proper to adopt that course. 22 . In Supdt (Tech.I) Central Excise v. Pratap Rai, 1978 (3) SCC 113 , this Court held that if an order passed by the disciplinary authority is annulled on a technical ground, the concerned authority is free to pass fresh order but, at the same time, the Court declined to give such liberty to the administration on the ground that a period of 15 years had elapsed since the framing of charge.” 15. The aforesaid proposition has been followed by this Court in the matter of Ghasiram Kosariya (Supra). 16. Since in the instant case, enquiry was initiated on 11.2.2015, the appeal also remained pending and about 11 years have elapsed from the date of initiation of the enquiry, following the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of G. Vallikumari (Supra) and this Court in the matter of Ghasiram Kosariya (Supra) and considering the fact that the petitioners are not claiming back wages except other benefits, in the interest of justice, this Court is of the opinion that the matter must be finally set at rest without any further enquiry. Accordingly, it is directed that the petitioners be reinstated in service and all other benefits except back wages be also granted to them. 17. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above.