Order : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The present First Appeal is filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 15.01.2020 passed by the learned 6 th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.), in Civil Suit No. 164-A/2016, titled Swadhin Nag Chaudhary v. Ajay Francis, whereby the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff has been dismissed. 2. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, as pleaded by the appellant in the appeal, are that the appellant herein instituted a civil suit for specific performance of contract against the respondent, seeking enforcement of an agreement to sell in respect of immovable property. The learned Trial Court, however, dismissed the said suit primarily on the ground that the agreement to sell, marked as Ex.P/10, was not duly stamped in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act and, therefore, was held to be inadmissible in evidence. On this basis, the learned Trial Court concluded that the appellant was not entitled to a decree for specific performance. The appellant/plaintiff had filed the suit praying for a decree of specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 26.11.2013 executed by the respondent/defendant in respect of land bearing Khasra No. 1275/7, P.H.N. No. 22, admeasuring 0.04 acres, and Sheet No. 18/12, Plot No. 67, admeasuring 1782 sq. ft., situated at Torwa, Tahsil and District Bilaspur (C.G.). It was specifically pleaded that, in pursuance of the said transaction, the appellant had earlier paid a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- vide cheque No. 013672 dated 10.04.2012 and a further sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- vide cheque No. 013674 dated 10.05.2012. It was also averred that an earlier agreement dated 11.04.2012 had been executed between the parties for sale of the same suit property. It was further pleaded that the appellant/plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and was awaiting the respondent/defendant to obtain the necessary permission from the competent revenue authorities for execution of the sale deed. It was further stated that, after execution of the agreement dated 11.04.2012, the respondent, in breach of the said agreement, entered into another agreement with one Smt. Mausmi Vishwas for sale of the very same property. It was further stated that, after execution of the agreement dated 11.04.2012, the respondent, in breach of the said agreement, entered into another agreement with one Smt. Mausmi Vishwas for sale of the very same property. Upon coming to know about the subsequent agreement, the appellant caused publication of a public notice in a local newspaper, as a result of which the agreement entered into by the respondent with Smt. Mausmi Vishwas stood cancelled. It was further averred that, at the request and assurance of the respondent, the appellant did not initiate any legal proceedings for specific performance of the agreement dated 11.04.2012. Instead, the parties executed a fresh agreement to sell dated 26.11.2013, and the appellant again paid a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- to the respondent vide cheque No. 42009773. The agreement dated 26.11.2013 specifically recorded that possession of the suit property had been handed over to the appellant by the respondent. As per Clause 4 of the agreement dated 26.11.2013 (Ex.P/10), the respondent/defendant was obliged to obtain the requisite permission from the Collector, Bilaspur, and, upon grant of such permission, to intimate the appellant so that the balance sale consideration could be paid and a registered sale deed could be executed in favour of the appellant. According to the averments made in the plaint, the respondent/defendant deliberately and mala fide described the diverted suit property as agricultural land and failed to properly pursue the application for permission before the District Collector, Bilaspur. As a consequence, the application for permission was dismissed vide order dated 23.03.2015. The appellant came to know about the said dismissal only when he personally visited the revenue Court, and thus the cause of action arose on or after 23.03.2015, as until then the respondent was under a legal obligation to perform his part of the contract. Being left with no alternative, the appellant was constrained to file Civil Suit No. 164-A/2016 before the learned VI th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.), seeking specific performance of the agreement dated 26.11.2013. 3. The learned Trial Court issued summons to the respondent, who appeared and filed his written statement denying the averments made in the plaint. Being left with no alternative, the appellant was constrained to file Civil Suit No. 164-A/2016 before the learned VI th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur (C.G.), seeking specific performance of the agreement dated 26.11.2013. 3. The learned Trial Court issued summons to the respondent, who appeared and filed his written statement denying the averments made in the plaint. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed as many as ten issues, including issues relating to payment of consideration through cheques, delivery of possession of the suit property to the appellant, and the readiness and willingness of the appellant to perform his part of the contract. After recording the evidence led by both the parties, the learned Trial Court held that the appellant had failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform the contract and decided Issue No. 6 against him. The learned Trial Court further held that since the agreement dated 26.11.2013 (Ex.P/10) was not duly stamped as required under the Indian Stamp Act, the same was inadmissible in evidence, and consequently, the appellant was not entitled to a decree for specific performance. Although no alternative relief for refund of earnest money had been specifically prayed for, the learned Trial Court, while exercising its discretion, directed refund of Rs. 5,00,000/- as earnest money and denied the claim of Rs. 2,00,000/- paid vide cheque No. 42009773 dated 26.11.2013, and ultimately dismissed the suit. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the appellant has preferred the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment and decree dated 15.01.2020, passed by the learned VI th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 164-A/2016, is ex facie illegal, arbitrary, contrary to law and facts on record, and therefore liable to be set aside. The learned Trial Court has failed to appreciate the settled principles governing suits for specific performance and has dismissed the suit on hyper-technical grounds, resulting in grave miscarriage of justice. The appellant is legally entitled to a decree of specific performance and the learned court below ought to have allowed the suit. The learned Trial Court gravely erred in discarding the agreement dated 26.11.2013 (Ex. P/10) merely on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped. The appellant is legally entitled to a decree of specific performance and the learned court below ought to have allowed the suit. The learned Trial Court gravely erred in discarding the agreement dated 26.11.2013 (Ex. P/10) merely on the ground that it was insufficiently stamped. The Court below ought to have followed the mandate of the Indian Stamp Act by impounding the document and referring it to the Collector of Stamps for proper adjudication and payment of deficit stamp duty along with penalty, instead of rejecting the claim outright. The dismissal of the suit solely on this ground is unsustainable in law. The appellant was always ready and willing to cure the defect of insufficient stamping and is even now willing to make good the deficit stamp duty along with penalty. The appellant acted bona fide under the advice of counsel and was never granted an opportunity by the learned Trial Court to rectify the defect. The conduct of the appellant is further established by the fact that he paid substantial Court fees amounting to Rs. 94,300/-, which clearly demonstrates that there was no intention whatsoever to evade statutory dues. Even at the appellate stage, the appellant has filed an application under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act seeking impounding of Ex. P/10. The learned Trial Court committed a serious error in law by holding that Ex. P/10 was “not duly stamped” instead of treating it as an “insufficiently stamped” document and thereafter following the procedure prescribed under law. Once the document was admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the Court below had no jurisdiction to discard the same and was bound to act in accordance with Sections 33 and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act by referring it to the Collector for due stamping. The learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the legal effect of Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act, which clearly provides that once a document has been admitted in evidence, its admissibility cannot be questioned thereafter on the ground of insufficiency of stamp. In the present case, despite objection by the respondent, the document Ex. P/10 was permitted to be exhibited with a clear observation that its admissibility would be decided at the stage of final judgment. In the present case, despite objection by the respondent, the document Ex. P/10 was permitted to be exhibited with a clear observation that its admissibility would be decided at the stage of final judgment. Having taken such a view, the learned Trial Court ought to have afforded an opportunity to the appellant to get the document impounded when it concluded that the stamp duty was deficient. The deposition of the appellant itself records the conscious decision of the Trial Court to mark the document as an exhibit, clearly observing that marking of an exhibit and its admissibility are distinct concepts. After having taken such a stand, the learned Trial Court acted inconsistently and illegally in completely discarding Ex. P/10 without referring it for impounding. Such an approach reflects non-application of judicial mind and warrants interference by this Court. Denial of opportunity to the appellant to cure the defect of stamp duty has resulted in violation of principles of natural justice. In the absence of any such opportunity, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court on Issues No. 3 and 4 are vitiated and the matter deserves to be remanded for fresh adjudication after impounding of the document. The Trial Court failed in its duty to ensure fair adjudication on merits. A civil Court cannot remain a silent spectator and deny substantive justice on technical grounds. It was incumbent upon the learned Trial Court to facilitate complete adjudication by referring the document to the Collector of Stamps instead of non-suiting the appellant. The learned Trial Court further erred in holding that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. A holistic reading of the plaint and evidence clearly establishes that it was the respondent/defendant who deliberately avoided performance of the contract by failing to obtain requisite permission from the Collector. The finding on readiness and willingness is perverse and contrary to the material available on record. The learned Trial Court has also erred in denying the amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-, which was admittedly paid by the appellant to the respondent through cheque No. 42009773 dated 26.11.2013. In absence of any rebuttal by the respondent, the transaction stands proved and is deemed admitted under the provisions of the Banker’s Books Evidence Act. The learned Trial Court was unjustified in granting return of only Rs. 5,00,000/- while illegally denying Rs. 2,00,000/-. 2,00,000/-, which was admittedly paid by the appellant to the respondent through cheque No. 42009773 dated 26.11.2013. In absence of any rebuttal by the respondent, the transaction stands proved and is deemed admitted under the provisions of the Banker’s Books Evidence Act. The learned Trial Court was unjustified in granting return of only Rs. 5,00,000/- while illegally denying Rs. 2,00,000/-. The suit has been decided in a mechanical and cursory manner, without protecting the substantive rights of the appellant. The impugned judgment reflects denial of a fair trial and complete adjudication, rendering it unsustainable in law. The appellant is legally entitled to a decree of specific performance, and in the alternative, the matter deserves to be remanded to the Trial Court for fresh decision after impounding the document Ex. P/10 and deciding the suit on merits in accordance with law. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court is legal, proper and based on correct appreciation of facts and law and does not warrant any interference by this Court. It is contended that the appellant failed to establish his continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract, which is a mandatory requirement for grant of a decree of specific performance. The agreement dated 26.11.2013 (Ex. P/10) being insufficiently stamped was rightly held to be inadmissible in evidence, and no decree could have been granted on the basis of an inadmissible document. The plea that the Trial Court ought to have impounded the document is misconceived, as the appellant never took effective steps at the trial stage to cure the defect despite being aware of the objection. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court on all material issues are reasoned and based on evidence on record, and the discretionary relief of specific performance has rightly been declined. The appellant has already been granted return of earnest money to the extent permissible, and no further relief is warranted. Hence, the appeal is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 6. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and has carefully perused the pleadings, evidence and the impugned judgment. 7. The appellant has already been granted return of earnest money to the extent permissible, and no further relief is warranted. Hence, the appeal is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 6. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and has carefully perused the pleadings, evidence and the impugned judgment. 7. The present First Appeal has been preferred under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the judgment and decree dated 15.01.2020 passed by the learned VI th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 164-A/2016, whereby the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff for specific performance of contract was dismissed, though a decree for refund of earnest money to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000/- was granted. The appellant seeks reversal of the said judgment primarily on the grounds that the learned Trial Court erred in holding the agreement dated 26.11.2013 (Ex.P/10) to be inadmissible for want of proper stamping and further erred in concluding that the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 8. It is not in dispute that the appellant based his claim for specific performance on two agreements, one dated 11.04.2012 and the subsequent agreement dated 26.11.2013. The learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, rightly held that the agreement dated 11.04.2012 could not form the basis for grant of specific performance, as no suit was instituted within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appellant himself relied upon the subsequent agreement dated 26.11.2013, thereby treating the earlier agreement as having lost its enforceability. In absence of a legally subsisting contract within limitation, the findings of the Trial Court on Issues No. 1 and 2 cannot be faulted. 9. So far as the agreement dated 26.11.2013 (Ex.P/10) is concerned, the learned Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding, based on the recitals of the document and admissions of the appellant himself, that possession of the suit property had already been delivered to the appellant. The appellant further admitted that a borewell was dug on the suit land after taking possession. These facts were also corroborated by other evidence on record. The appellant further admitted that a borewell was dug on the suit land after taking possession. These facts were also corroborated by other evidence on record. In view of such recitals and conduct of the parties, the learned Trial Court correctly concluded that Ex.P/10 was not a mere agreement to sell but was a document evidencing transfer of possession in part performance of the contract. Consequently, the document attracted stamp duty as a conveyance under Sections 2(10) and 2(11) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The learned Trial Court further held that Ex.P/10 was insufficiently stamped and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence in view of the bar contained under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. 10. This Court finds that the legal position has been correctly applied. An instrument which is chargeable with stamp duty and is not duly stamped cannot be admitted in evidence for any purpose, except as provided under law. The contention of the appellant that the learned Trial Court ought to have impounded the document and referred it to the Collector of Stamps does not merit acceptance. The record reveals that the respondent had raised objection to the admissibility of Ex.P/10 at the earliest stage. Despite being aware of such objection, the appellant did not take effective steps during the trial to seek impounding of the document or to cure the defect of stamp duty. The Trial Court had clearly observed that admissibility would be considered at the stage of final judgment, and upon such consideration, the document was rightly held to be inadmissible. No illegality can be attributed to this approach. 11. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra , reported in (2009) 2 SCC 532 has held as under : “9. The Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to stamps. “Conveyance” has been defined in Section 2(10) to mean: “2. (10) Conveyance. —‘Conveyance’ includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I;” 10. “Receipt” has been defined in Section 2(23) of the Act to mean: “2. “Conveyance” has been defined in Section 2(10) to mean: “2. (10) Conveyance. —‘Conveyance’ includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether movable or immovable, is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by Schedule I;” 10. “Receipt” has been defined in Section 2(23) of the Act to mean: “2. (23) Receipt.—‘Receipt’ includes any note, memorandum or writing— (a) whereby any money, or any bill of exchange, cheque or promissory note is acknowledged to have been received, or (b) whereby any other movable property is acknowledged to have been received in satisfaction of a debt, or (c) whereby any debt or demand, or any part of a debt or demand, is acknowledged to have been satisfied or discharged, or (d) which signifies or imports any such acknowledgement, and whether the same is or is not signed with the name of any person;” 11. “Stamp” has been defined in Section 2(26) to mean: “2. (26) ‘Stamp’ means any mark, seal or endorsement by any agency or person duly authorised by the State Government, and includes an adhesive or impressed stamp, for the purposes of duty chargeable under this Act.” 12. Chapter II of the Act provides for stamp duties. Section 3, which is the charging section reads as under: “3. (26) ‘Stamp’ means any mark, seal or endorsement by any agency or person duly authorised by the State Government, and includes an adhesive or impressed stamp, for the purposes of duty chargeable under this Act.” 12. Chapter II of the Act provides for stamp duties. Section 3, which is the charging section reads as under: “3. Instruments chargeable with duty.—Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in that Schedule as the proper duty therefor, respectively, that is to say— (a) every instrument mentioned in that Schedule which, not having been previously executed by any person, is executed in India on or after the first day of July, 1899; (b) every bill of exchange payable otherwise than on demand, or promissory note drawn or made out of India on or after that day and accepted or paid, or presented for acceptance or payment, or endorsed, transferred or otherwise negotiated, in India; and (c) every instrument (other than a bill of exchange or promissory note) mentioned in that Schedule, which, not having been previously executed by any person, is executed out of India on or after that day, relates to any property situate, or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in India and is received in India: Provided that no duty shall be chargeable in respect of— (1) any instrument executed by, or on behalf of, or in favour of, the Government in cases where, but for this exemption, the Government would be liable to pay the duty chargeable in respect of such instrument; (2) any instrument for the sale, transfer or other disposition, either absolutely or by way of mortgage or otherwise, of any ship or vessel, or any part, interest, share or property of or in any ship or vessel registered under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, or under Act 19 of 1838, or the Indian Registration of Ships Act, 1841 (57 and 58 Vict., Section 60, 10 of 1841), as amended by subsequent Acts. (3) any instrument executed, by, or, on behalf of, or, in favour of, the Developer, or Unit or in connection with the carrying out of purposes of the Special Economic Zone. (3) any instrument executed, by, or, on behalf of, or, in favour of, the Developer, or Unit or in connection with the carrying out of purposes of the Special Economic Zone. Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, the expressions ‘Developer’, ‘Special Economic Zone’ and ‘Unit’ shall have meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (g), (za) and (zc) of Section 2 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005.” The other provisions contained in the said Chapter deal with the mode and manner of payment, etc. 13. Chapter III of the Act provides for adjudication with regard to proper stamps, whereas Chapter IV deals with instruments not duly stamped. Section 33 casts a duty upon every person who has authority to receive evidence and every person in charge of a public office before whom the instrument is produced, if it appears to him that the same is not duly stamped, to impound the same. Sub-section (2) of Section 33 of the Act lays down the procedure for undertaking the process of impounding. 14. Section 35 provides that an instrument shall be inadmissible in evidence if the same is not duly stamped in the following terms: “35. Sub-section (2) of Section 33 of the Act lays down the procedure for undertaking the process of impounding. 14. Section 35 provides that an instrument shall be inadmissible in evidence if the same is not duly stamped in the following terms: “35. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.—No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped: Provided that— (a) any such instrument shall be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion; (b) where any person from whom a stamped receipt could have been demanded, has given an unstamped receipt and such receipt, if stamped, would be admissible in evidence against him, then such receipt shall be admitted in evidence against him on payment of a penalty of one rupee by the person tendering it; (c) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped; (d) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in evidence in any proceeding in a criminal court, other than a proceeding under Chapter XII or Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898); (e) nothing herein contained shall prevent the admission of any instrument in any court when such instrument has been executed by or on behalf of the Government or where it bears the certificate of the Collector as provided by Section 32 or any other provision of this Act.” xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 17. Parliament has, in Section 35 of the Act, advisedly used the words “for any purpose whatsoever”. Parliament has, in Section 35 of the Act, advisedly used the words “for any purpose whatsoever”. Thus, the purpose for which a document is sought to be admitted in evidence or the extent thereof would not be a relevant factor for not invoking the aforementioned provisions. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 22. We have noticed heretobefore that Section 33 of the Act casts a statutory obligation on all the authorities to impound a document. The court being an authority to receive a document in evidence is bound to give effect thereto. The unregistered deed of sale was an instrument which required payment of the stamp duty applicable to a deed of conveyance. Adequate stamp duty admittedly was not paid. The court, therefore, was empowered to pass an order in terms of Section 35 of the Act. 23. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the document was admissible for collateral purpose, in our opinion, is not correct. In Bondar Singh [ (2003) 4 SCC 161 ] this Court was not concerned with the provisions of the Act. Only interpretation of the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 was in question. It was opined: (SCC p. 163, para 5) “5. The main question, as we have already noted, is the question of continuous possession of the plaintiffs over the suit lands. The sale deed dated 9-5-1931 by Fakir Chand, father of the defendants in favour of Tola Singh, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, is an admitted document in the sense its execution is not in dispute. The only defence set up against the said document is that it is unstamped and unregistered and therefore it cannot convey title to the land in favour of the plaintiffs. Under the law a sale deed is required to be properly stamped and registered before it can convey title to the vendee. However, legal position is clear law that a document like the sale deed in the present case, even though not admissible in evidence, can be looked into for collateral purposes. In the present case the collateral purpose to be seen is the nature of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. The sale deed in question at least shows that initial possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land was not illegal or unauthorised.” 24. In the present case the collateral purpose to be seen is the nature of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land. The sale deed in question at least shows that initial possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land was not illegal or unauthorised.” 24. In the present case, by reason of the statutory interdict, no transfer at all is permissible. Even transfer of possession is also not permissible. (See Pandey Oraon v. Ram Chander Sahu [1992 Supp (2) SCC 77] and Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati [ (2004) 10 SCC 65 ] .) The Registration Act, 1908 provides for such a contingency in terms of the proviso appended to Section 49 thereof, which reads as under: “49. Effect of non-registration of documents required to be registered.— No document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered shall— (a) affect any immovable property comprised therein, or (b) confer any power to adopt, or (c) be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered: Provided that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by this Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), to be registered may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance under Chapter II of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (1 of 1877) or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument.”.” 12. The reliance placed by the appellant on Section 36 of the Indian Stamp Act is also misplaced. Mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not amount to its admission in evidence when the objection regarding stamp duty is kept open. Once the Court, at the stage of final adjudication, holds the document to be inadmissible, Section 36 does not come to the aid of the party relying upon such document. The learned Trial Court, therefore, committed no error in discarding Ex.P/10 for the purpose of granting relief of specific performance. In the absence of a legally admissible agreement, the learned Trial Court was fully justified in holding that the appellant failed to establish his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 13. In the absence of a legally admissible agreement, the learned Trial Court was fully justified in holding that the appellant failed to establish his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 13. In a catena of judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is a crucial and indispensable factor to be taken into consideration while deciding a suit for specific performance of a contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pydi Ramana Alias Ramulu Vs. Davarasety Manmadha Rao reported in (2024) 7 SCC 515 relevant paragraphs are as under :- “14. There is a distinction between the terms “readiness” and “willingness”. [Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526 ] “Readiness” is the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the sale consideration. “Willingness” is the conduct of the party. In the instant case, even according to the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, it would emerge that the plaintiff had been able to successfully prove the sale agreement dated 7-6-1993 Ext. A- 1 on which date Rs 2005 was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant. The evidence on record tendered by the plaintiff came to be accepted by all the courts and judgments of courts below would also indicate that further amount towards sales consideration in a sum of Rs 17,000 was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on 23-6-1993 and same was endorsed by him. 15. As per the recital in the agreements, the defendant was required to get the suit land surveyed and as such the total consideration was agreed to be settled after such survey. On the one hand, the plaintiff contends that the defendant never got surveyed the suit land. On the other hand, pleadings and evidence of the plaintiff is silent on steps taken by the plaintiff as expected of a reasonable person which has not been taken in the instant case, namely, the plaintiff has not produced any evidence either oral or documentary to establish that there was any demand made by him for the land being surveyed by the defendant. No witnesses have been examined on behalf of the plaintiff to establish that at any point of time there has been demand made by the plaintiff with the defendant by calling upon him to get the suit land surveyed as agreed under the agreement of sale Ext. A-1. 20. The long unexplained delay and silence on the part of the plaintiff in this regard while in the witness box would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree of specific performance and it is for this precise reason, the trial court as noticed supra has refused to grant the equitable relief which has been reversed by the appellate court without assigning proper and cogent reason and the one assigned are at tangent or in other words contrary to the facts. The resultant effect of filing the suit for specific performance on the verge of limitation coming to an end came to be examined by this Court in Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar [Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 981] and held that the plaintiff would not be entitled to the equitable relief (vide paras 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18). 22. For the reasons aforestated, we are of the considered view that the impugned judgment [Pydi Ramana v. Davarasetty Manmadha Rao, 2011 SCC OnLine AP 280] of the High Court and the first appellate court is liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is set aside. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court dated 19-1-2002 passed in OS No. 226 of 1998 is restored. The appeal stands allowed with no order as to costs.” 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, has categorically held that it is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract till the final disposal of the suit by adducing cogent evidence in this regard reliance be placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P. Ravindranath & Anr. Vs. Sasikala & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1749, as well as on the subsequent decision in the matter of Sangita Sinha Vs. Bhawana Bhardwaj & ors reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 723 . The relevant paragraphs thereof are reproduced hereinbelow: P. Ravindranath (supra) “22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. Bhawana Bhardwaj & ors reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 723 . The relevant paragraphs thereof are reproduced hereinbelow: P. Ravindranath (supra) “22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A few of authorities on the point are referred hereunder: a) In the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, this Court held in paragraph 40 which is reproduced hereunder: “40………A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct………….” b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, following was held in paragraph 46: “46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, it was held under paragraph 2: “2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27- 2-1975. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.” (ii) In the present case, we find from a perusal of the plaint that, at the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to plead specifically with details about the restriction said to have been imposed by the State on registration of sale deeds relating to similar survey numbers and revenue sites. No details of the Government Order are mentioned. Neither the Government Order is placed on record as evidence to connect that such restriction was actually applicable to the land in question. (iii) Defendant nos. 1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the transfer. The plaintiffs do not seem to have ever approached the defendants to get this kind of a status change and, thereafter, get the sale deeds executed. It has not come either in pleadings or in evidence of the plaintiffs that the alleged ban imposed by the State Government had been lifted but still the sale deeds were executed in favour of the appellants and other purchasers in 1983. (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit. (v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed. (vi) The Courts below have proceeded to hold that there was readiness and willingness primarily relying upon the restriction imposed by the State. According to them, as the restriction had not been lifted, there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to have expressed any readiness or willingness. However, the Courts below failed to take into consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju. (vii) The Courts below also fell into error in recording a finding that the defendants 1 to 5 had committed breach of contract and had dishonestly proceeded to get the status of the land changed and, thereafter, execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant and other purchasers. (viii) It is clear from the record that the defendant no. 1 had given a written notice in September, 1981, then legal notice in November, 1981 and also another communication in December, 1981 requesting for payment of balance sale consideration and, thereafter communicating that advance amount had been forfeited and the agreement to sell had come to an end as the plaintiffs failed to get the sale deed executed within three months. After December, 1981, the plaintiffs kept silent. They neither responded to the last communication of the defendant no. After December, 1981, the plaintiffs kept silent. They neither responded to the last communication of the defendant no. 1 of December, 1981, nor did they take any steps to file the suit for specific performance of contract for more than one and a half years after the defendant no. 1 had communicated forfeiture of the earnest money and the cancellation of the agreement to sell. There is no communication from the plaintiffs after December, 1981 till July, 1983 when they filed the suit. There is not even a notice by the plaintiffs before filing the suit of showing their readiness and willingness by tendering the amount of balance sale consideration and sending a draft sale deed for approval and fixing a date for execution and registration of the sale deed. (xi) We are thus unable to agree with the findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and registered. As a matter of fact, the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout gives credence and strength to the contention of the defendant nos. 1 to 5 that the plaintiffs never had the funds available with them to clear the balance sale consideration and that they were middlemen only interested in blocking the property and, thereafter, selling it on a higher price to third parties and make profit thereof. The plaintiffs were never the real purchasers interested in buying the land in suit for themselves. (x) Under such facts and circumstances as discussed above, we are of the confirmed view that the decree of specific performance was not warranted in the present case and ought to have been denied and the suit was liable to be dismissed. (xi) In view of the finding on the issue of readiness and willingness being decided against the plaintiffs in the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to enter into other arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties. (xii). However, in order to adjust equities between the parties, as the plaintiffs made a payment of Rs. 12,000/- as advance money on 24.05.1981 or before, that being an admitted position, they need to be suitably compensated for the same. About 43 years have passed since the date of the agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in the written brief, the value of the property is about four crores. 12,000/- as advance money on 24.05.1981 or before, that being an admitted position, they need to be suitably compensated for the same. About 43 years have passed since the date of the agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in the written brief, the value of the property is about four crores. The respondents have not given any such figure of the approximate value of the property in question. Considering the facts and circumstances, we direct that the appellant compensate the plaintiffs by paying an amount of Rs. 24 lakhs in lieu of the advance and further Rs. 6 lakhs as cost of litigation. Total amount of Rs. 30 lakhs to be paid within a period of three months from today and file proof of such payment before this Court within the next four months. In the event, such proof is not filed, the Registry will list the matter before the Court immediately after expiry of the aforesaid period for further orders. Sangita Sinha (supra) “16. It is settled law that under the Act, 1963, prior to the 2018 Amendment, specific performance was a discretionary and equitable relief. In Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi, (2019) 3 SCC 704 , which has been followed in P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, (2022) 14 SCC 793 , this Court framed material questions which require consideration prior to grant of relief of specific performance. The relevant portion of the judgment in Kamal Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: “7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are: 7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property. 7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract. 7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract; 7.4. 7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract; 7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff; 7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money, etc. and, if so, on what grounds. 8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts.” 17. It is trite law that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are not one but two separate elements. ‘Readiness’ means the capacity of the Respondent No. 1- buyer to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the sale consideration. ‘Willingness’ refers to the intention of the Respondent No. 1-buyer as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract, which is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser, including attending circumstances. 18. Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser from the date of execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance. This Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency of the suit up to the decree. This Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency of the suit up to the decree. A few of the said judgments are reproduced hereinbelow:— A. In Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, (1967) 1 SCR 227 , it has been held as under:— “6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43: “In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.” The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit….” B. In Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1913, it has been held as under:— “6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff….” C. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429 , it has been held as under:— “27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.” D. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243 , it has been held as under:— “30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiff-respondents were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in- chief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff- respondents must be judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on records.” E. In Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Ahsanul Ghani (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the plaint, that he has already performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him being on the plaintiff, mere want of objection by the defendant in the written statement is hardly of any effect or consequence. The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the pleading and the evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff has established that he has performed his part of the contract or has always been ready and willing to do so…” F. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (Dead) by Legal Representatives (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract. 17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115 ], it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582 ], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582 ], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of C. S. Venkatesh Vs. A.S.C. Murthy reported in (2023) 3 SCC 280; relevant paragraphs are reproduced for ready reference hereinunder :- “16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract. 17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115 ] , it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582 ] , this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus: (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.” 19. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa, (2003) 10 SCC 390 ] and Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna [Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopalakrishna, (2004) 7 SCC 251 ] . 20. The judgment of this Court in Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan [Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan, (2005) 6 SCC 243 ] is almost similar to the case at hand where the plaintiff had filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to re-convey property. The plea of the plaintiff was that the transaction was one of mortgage and the sale stood redeemed and the plaintiff was discharged from the debt and he was ready to pay the defendant the amount for the property only in the alternative that the plea of mortgage was not accepted by the Court, would show that his readiness was conditional. The plaintiff did not have any income and could not raise the amount required for repurchase of the property. In the totality of the circumstances, it was held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the contract. The conditions laid for the specific performance of the contract are in para 30, which is as under: (SCC p. 256) “30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the respondent-plaintiffs were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in-chief would not suffice. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in-chief would not suffice. The conduct of the respondent-plaintiffs must be judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on record.” 21. In the instant case, the plaintiff has alleged that he was ready to pay Rs 35,000 to the defendants and called upon them to execute the re- conveyance deed. However, in para 11 of the plaint it is pleaded that the plaintiff was running contract business wherein he suffered heavy loss and as such he gave up the business. It is also pleaded that at present the plaintiff has no business or profession and has no source of income. He has no property, either movable or immovable. Mere plea that he is ready to pay the consideration, without any material to substantiate this plea, cannot be accepted. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to produce ready money, but it is mandatory on his part to prove that he has the means to generate the consideration amount. Except the statement of PW 1, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the plaintiff has the means to make arrangements for payment of consideration under the reconveyance agreement.” 16. Readiness and willingness cannot be presumed and must be proved by cogent evidence, which, in the present case, was found lacking. The finding on Issue No. 6 is thus based on proper appreciation of evidence and does not suffer from perversity. As regards the refund of earnest money, the learned Trial Court has exercised its equitable jurisdiction and directed refund of Rs. 5,00,000/-, which stood admitted by the respondent. Although the appellant claimed an additional amount of Rs. 2,00,000/-, the learned Trial Court, upon appreciation of the evidence, declined the said claim. This Court does not find any illegality or arbitrariness in the said finding warranting interference in appeal. 17. It is well settled that the relief of specific performance is though, at present, not discretionary in nature, still an Appellate Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 96 CPC, would interfere with the findings of the Trial Court only if the same are shown to be perverse, contrary to law or based on no evidence. In the present case, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are reasoned, supported by evidence and in consonance with settled legal principles. In the present case, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are reasoned, supported by evidence and in consonance with settled legal principles. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to make out any case for interference with the impugned judgment and decree dated 15.01.2020 passed by the learned VI th Additional District Judge, Bilaspur in Civil Suit No. 164-A/2016. The First Appeal is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 18. Accordingly, the First Appeal stands dismissed . The judgment and decree dated 15.01.2020 passed by the learned Trial Court are hereby affirmed. No order as to costs.