JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. Regard being had to the similitude of the questions of fact and law involved and being arising out of a common impugned judgment dated 28.11.2015, all these criminal appeals are clubbed together, heard together and being disposed of by this common order. 2. Invoking criminal appellate jurisdiction of this Court, total 04 accused/appellants, namely, Baital Sahu (A-1), Krishna Yadav @ Chhotu (A-2), Vinod Yadav (A-3) and Manish Singh Rajput (A-4), have preferred these 03 appeals being CRA-1598-2015, CRA-1525- 2015 & CRA-1630-2015 respectively, under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C., calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of common impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 28.11.2015, passed in Session Trial No. 24 of 2014 ( State of Chhattisgarh v. Baital Sahu and others ) by the Addl. Sessions Judge, Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon (CG), whereby they have been convicted for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, sentenced to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 01 month. 3. The case of the prosecution, in short, is that on 29.06.2014, in the night at about 12-12:30 PM, at Pendrikala, Near Banjari Mandir, which comes within the ambit of Police Station Khairagarh, District Rajnandgaon (CG), the accused-appellants herein, in furtherance of their common intention, assaulted Prakash Sahu and Kanwar Devar (PW-03) by means of wooden stick and iron rod, due to which, Prakash Sahu (hereinafter referred to as the “deceased”) suffered grievance injuries and died, whereas, Kanwar Devar (PW- 03) also suffered injuries, which were sufficient in ordinary course to cause his death and, thereby, the appellants herein are said to have committed offences under Sections 302/34 & 307/34. 4. It is further case of the prosecution that immediately after the incident, when the aforesaid incident was reported to the police by Kanwar Devar (PW-03), merg intimation (Ex.P/12) and FIR (Ex.P/15) were registered and wheels of investigation started running, in which, spot map was prepared. Summons under Section 175 of CrPC were sent vide Ex.P/17 and inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/16. The dead-body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. Jitendra Kumar (PW-06) and, as per PM report (Ex.P/22), it has been opined that cause of death of the deceased is shock and hemorrhage as a result of antemortem injuries to liver. The dead-body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted by Dr. Jitendra Kumar (PW-06) and, as per PM report (Ex.P/22), it has been opined that cause of death of the deceased is shock and hemorrhage as a result of antemortem injuries to liver. The accused/appellants were arrested and their memorandum statements were recorded vide Ex.P/01 to P/03 & P/19. Thereafter, pursuant to the memorandum statement of the accused-appellants following articles were seized: 5. Thereafter, the seized articles were sent for chemical examination and, as per FSL report (Ex.P/35), it has been opined that stains of human blood were found on all the aforesaid articles seized pursuant of to the memorandums statements of the appellants herein i.e. rod, wooden stick and their clothes. After statements of witnesses were recorded and due investigation, the police filed charge-sheet against the appellants/accused persons in the competent criminal court having jurisdiction and, thereafter, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and trial in accordance with law, in which the appellants/accused abjured their guilt and entered into defence by stating that they are innocent and have been falsely implicated. 6. The prosecution in order to prove its case examined as many as 11 witnesses and exhibited 36 documents, whereas the appellants-accused in support of their defence neither examined any witness nor exhibited any documents. 7. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, though acquitted all the accused/appellants herein for offence under Section 307/34 of IPC, but proceeded to convict them for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC and sentenced them as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment, against which these appeals have been preferred by the appellants-accused questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 8. Mr. H.S. Ahluwalia, Mr. Siddharth Pandey and Mr. Maneesh Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the accused/appellants in CRA-1525-2015, CRA-1598-2015 & CRA-1630-2015 respectively submit that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. They vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in convicting the appellants only on the basis of FIR (Ex.P/15), as there is no other evidence available on record to connect the appellants for the offences in question. They vehemently argued that the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in convicting the appellants only on the basis of FIR (Ex.P/15), as there is no other evidence available on record to connect the appellants for the offences in question. So far as, the recovery of rod, wooden stick and clothes from the appellants were concerned, in which, as per FSL report stains of human blood were found, there is no material available on record to show that the said human blood belongs to the deceased only or was having same blood group to that of the deceased and, therefore, the recovery of said articles are of no help to the prosecution. As such, all the appeals deserves to be allowed and the appellants are liable to be acquitted of the said charge on the basis of benefit of doubt. 9. Per-contra, Mr. Sharad Mishra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. In view of the statements of prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. The first and foremost question is as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature or not, which the learned trial Court has recorded in affirmative by taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/22), wherein it has been opined that cause of death of the deceased is shock and hemorrhage as a result of antemortem injuries to liver, which is duly proved by the statement of Dr. Jitendra Kumar (PW-06). Accordingly, taking into consideration the postmortem report (Ex.P/22) and the statement of Dr. Jitendra Kumar (PW-06), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. 12. Jitendra Kumar (PW-06), who has conducted the postmortem of the dead-body of the deceased, we are of the considered opinion that the death of the deceased is homicidal in nature, as the same is correct finding of fact based on evidence and same is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We hereby affirm the said finding. 12. Now, the next question would be whether the accused-appellants herein are the author of the crime in question or not? 13. In the case at hand, the case of the prosecution is mainly based on the testimony of Kanwar (PW-03), who is injured eye-witness. However, Kanwar (PW-03) has chosen not to support the case of the prosecution and turned hostile for the reason that in his statement before the Court, examined on 15.01.2015, he clearly admitted that on the date of incident on account of darkness he could not see the incident of accused-appellants assaulting the deceased and since he was hit by a vehicle he became unconscious and, when he gained consciousness after about 1 & 1.5 hours, he somehow reached to the Banjari Temple, where the Priest of the temple called Ambulance by dialing 108 number and, thereafter, he came to know that Prakash died and ultimately gave information to the police, upon which, FIR (Ex.P/15) came to be lodged at his instance. Further, Kanwar (PW- 03), in his cross-examination has stated that he is illiterate and only know how to sign and even he is unable to read Hindi. He also admitted that while lodging report at police station he only informed about the accident, whereby he and deceased- Prakash suffered injuries and he did not state the name of any of the accused persons/appellant. As such, from perusal of the statement of Kanwar (PW-03), it is quite clear that he has not supported the case of the prosecution at all. Though, Kanwar (PW-03) was declared hostile and Court allowed the prosecution to ask leading question from him, but he clearly refuted the fact that the accused-appellants herein assaulted him or the deceased on the date of occurrence. Even otherwise, Kanwar (PW-03) also refuted the fact that he reported the matter to the police by lodging FIR (Ex.P/15), yet the learned trial Court has placed reliance upon the FIR (Ex.P/15), which is not fully supported by the prosecution. 14. Even otherwise, Kanwar (PW-03) also refuted the fact that he reported the matter to the police by lodging FIR (Ex.P/15), yet the learned trial Court has placed reliance upon the FIR (Ex.P/15), which is not fully supported by the prosecution. 14. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh , AIR 1957 SC 366 may be noticed herein, in which, their Lordships of the have held that a first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under Section 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under Section 145 of that Act. 15. Similarly, in Nanhku Singh v. The State of Bihar , AIR 1973 SC 491 their Lordships further held that FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence, however, it is an information of a cognizable offence given under Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if there is any statement made therein it can only be used for the purpose of contradicting and discrediting a witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. 16. Further, in the matter of Dharma Ram Bhagare v. State of Maharashtra , AIR 1973 SC 476 the Supreme Court while considering the value of FIR has held that the FIR is never treated as a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be used for corroborating or contradicting its maker when he appears in court as a witness. Its value must always depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 17. In Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh , (1975) 3 SCC 815 it has been held that no doubt, the FIR is a previous statement which can, strictly speaking, be only used to corroborate or contradict the maker of it. The omissions of important fact, affecting the probabilities of the case, are relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act in judging the the veracity of the prosecution case. 18. In the matter of Madhusudan Singh and another v. State of Bihar , (1996) 11 SCC 248 the Supreme Court while dealing with the evidentiary value of FIR has clearly held that FIR by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence. 18. In the matter of Madhusudan Singh and another v. State of Bihar , (1996) 11 SCC 248 the Supreme Court while dealing with the evidentiary value of FIR has clearly held that FIR by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used to either contradict or corroborate the maker thereof in the manner provided under the Evidence Act, 1872. Conviction for misappropriation of property on the basis of allegations contained in the FIR which were not substantiated by oral evidence, is not sustainable and observed in Para-05 as under: “05. The High Court has dealt with the case of Madhusudan Singh in para 23 of the judgment. A perusal of the said paragraph shows that for coming to the conclusion, that he was responsible for misappropriated of 19 qtls. of wheat, reliance has been placed only on the allegations contained in the F.I.R. F.I.R. by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used to either contradict or corroborate the maker thereof in the manner provided under the Evidence Act. Nothing has been brought to our notice from the record from which it may be possible to hold that the allegations made in the F.I.R. regarding Madhusudan Singh, A-7 were at all substantiated at the trial by any oral evidence. The allegations contained in the F.I.R. have, thus, not been proved at the trial. That being the position, we do not find it possible to uphold the conviction and sentence of Madhusudan Singh, A-7 for any of the charges.” 19. In Bable @ Gurdeep Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2012) 11 SCC 181 the Supreme Court has held that FIR by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence but it certainly is a relevant circumstance of evidence produced by the investigating agency and observed in Para-13 as under: “13. Reverting to the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, we may refer to the fact that the FIR had been lodged upon the statement of PW1. PW1 did not completely support the case of the prosecution and with the permission of the Court he was declared hostile. The contention is that the case of the present appellant would also stand equated to the case of the two acquitted accused persons and the High Court has fallen in error of law in not acquitting the accused-appellant as well. The contention is that the case of the present appellant would also stand equated to the case of the two acquitted accused persons and the High Court has fallen in error of law in not acquitting the accused-appellant as well. It cannot be denied that the FIR Ext.P-1 was registered upon the statement of PW1 and he himself has not supported the case of the prosecution, which creates a doubt in the case of the prosecution.” 20. Lastly, in Goverdhan and another v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2025) 3 SCC 378 it has been held that though the FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence, especially, when the complainant did not fully support the contents of the FIR, yet, it cannot be totally ignored and is to be treated as a relevant circumstance if the same is proved by other prosecution witness and observed in Para-31 & 32 as under: “31. Though the FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence, especially, when the complainant i.e. PW 6 did not fully support the contents of the FIR, yet, it cannot be totally ignored and is to be treated as a relevant circumstance if the same is proved by other prosecution witness, in this case by PW 14, the SHO who recorded the report in the form of FIR as stated to him by the complainant. 32. In this regard, we may profitably refer to the decision of this Court in Bable v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 11 SCC 181 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 417 wherein it was observed as follows : (SCC p. 187, para 14) “14. Once registration of the FIR is proved by the police and the same is accepted on record by the court and the prosecution establishes its case beyond reasonable doubt by other admissible, cogent and relevant evidence, it will be impermissible for the Court to ignore the evidentiary value of the FIR. The FIR, Ext. P-1, has duly been proved by the statement of PW 10, Sub-Inspector, Suresh Bhagat. According to him, he had registered the FIR upon the statement of PW 1 and it was duly signed by him. The FIR was registered and duly formed part of the records of the police station which were maintained in the normal course of its business and investigation. According to him, he had registered the FIR upon the statement of PW 1 and it was duly signed by him. The FIR was registered and duly formed part of the records of the police station which were maintained in the normal course of its business and investigation. Thus, in any case, it is a settled proposition of law that the FIR by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence but it certainly is a relevant circumstance of the evidence produced by the investigating agency. Merely because PW 1 had turned hostile, it cannot be said that the FIR would lose all its relevancy and cannot be looked into for any purpose.” 21. As such, in view of the above settled proposition of law, it is quite settled that the FIR cannot be used as substantive piece of evidence and, strictly speaking, it can only be used as a previous statement either to contradict or corroborate its maker in the manner provided under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. FIR by itself cannot be made sole basis for conviction or acquittal of an accused, because the facts alleged therein has to be proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt by adducing oral and documentary evidence. 22. Now, in the instant case, the maker of the FIR (Ex.P/15) i.e. the first-informant, namely, Kanwar (PW-03) has not proved the contents of the FIR, as he clearly turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution at all. Therefore, it has to be treated a relevant circumstance, if the same has been proved by other oral and documentary evidence available on record. So far as Kanwar (PW-03) is concerned, who is injured eye-witness in the present case, has clearly turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. Even when the leading question was being permitted to be asked by the learned trial Court, yet, he remained hostile and not chosen to support the case of the prosecution. Thereafter, the learned trial Court proceeded to rely upon the merg intimation/inquest report recorded under Section 174of CrPC, which is also unsustainable for the reason that the contents of the inquest report cannot be treated as a substantive piece of evidence but it can be looked into for testing the veracity of witnesses of inquest (See: Kuldip Singh v. State of Punjab , 1992 Supp. (3) 1 : AIR 1992 SC 1944 and Yogesh Singh v. Mahabeer Singh , (2017) 11 SCC 195 ). As such, inquest report is also not a substantive piece of evidence to base the conviction. Consequently, for the aforementioned reasoning, the learned trial Court has committed grave legal error in relying upon the FIR and inquest report to base the conviction of the appellants herein. We hereby hold accordingly. 23. So far as the recovery of rods, wooden stick and clothes (i.e. shirt, t-shirt, jeans/full pant, kamiz and bermuda) pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellants herein respectively is concerned, in which, as per FSL report (Ex.P/35), stains of human blood were found. The Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Nayka v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 67 by relying upon its earlier decision rendered in the matter of Mustkeen @ Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan , (2011) 11 SCC 724 has held that sole circumstance of recovery of blood- stained article cannot form the basis of conviction unless the same is corroborated with other piece of incriminating circumstances. Even otherwise, there is no evidence available on record to show that the human blood, which was found on the rods, wooden stick and clothes, seized pursuant to the memorandum statement of the appellants herein, matches with the blood group of the deceased. Furthermore, as per seizure memos (Ex.P/04 to 09, 11 & 20), the aforesaid articles were seized from the appellants on 30.06.2014 and, according to the statement of IO-Vinod Kumar Mandavi (PW-09), the said seized articles were submitted for chemical examination to FSL, Raipur on 20.08.2014 and, there is no evidence available on record to show that whether the said articles were kept in safe custody from 30.06.2014 to 20.08.2014 or not. As such, chances of fabrication and manipulation cannot be ruled out. Consequently, the recovery of aforesaid articles is also of no help to the prosecution. We hereby hold accordingly. 24. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are unable to hold that the prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and, in absence of which, the appellants are entitled to get benefit of doubt. The learned trial Court is unjustified in convicting all the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC in light of the aforesaid evidence available on record. The learned trial Court is unjustified in convicting all the appellants for offence under Section 302/34 of IPC in light of the aforesaid evidence available on record. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of all the appellants for offence punishable under Section 302/34 of IPC, as imposed upon them by the learned trial Court, is hereby set aside. They are acquitted of the said charge on the basis of benefit of doubt. Since the appellants are already on bail, they need not to surrender. However, their bail bonds shall remain in force for a period of six months in view of the provision contained in Section 437A of the CrPC. 25. Consequently, all the criminal appeals are allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 26. Let a certified copy of this order alongwith original record be transmitted to the trial Court for necessary information and action, if any.