Order : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. This First Appeal is being preferred under Section 96(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assailing the impugned order dated 06.11.2023 passed by the learned III rd Additional District Judge, Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh), whereby the suit instituted by the Plaintiffs/Appellants has been dismissed at the threshold by invoking the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the plaint was insufficiently stamped. 2. Facts of the case, as canvased, are that the appellants, who were the Plaintiffs before the learned Trial Court, instituted a civil suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of different immovable properties described in Schedules appended to the plaint. The plaintiffs prayed for a declaration that they are the owners and in peaceful possession of the suit property situated at Plot No. 33, admeasuring 225 square meters, Nazul Sheet No. 49-C, Ganj Line, Rajnandgaon, as more fully described in Schedule-A of the plaint. They further sought a declaration that defendants No. 1 to 11 are the owners and in possession of the property situated at Plot No. 14/2, admeasuring 176 square meters, Nazul Sheet No. 27-D along with the house constructed thereon, as described in Schedule-B, and that defendants No. 12 to 22 are the owners and in possession of the property situated at Plot No. E-33, admeasuring 25 × 40 feet (1000 sq. ft./92.90 sq. meters), Samta Sahkari Grih Nirman Sanstha Samiti, Chirhuldih, along with the house constructed thereon, as detailed in Schedule-C of the plaint. In addition thereto, a decree of permanent injunction was sought restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs, along with any other relief deemed just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. 3. The aforesaid reliefs were claimed on the foundation that Ratanlal, the father of the Plaintiffs, Gendlal, the father of defendants No. 1 to 4 and 10 and 11 and the grandfather of defendants No. 5 to 9, and Champalal, the father of defendants No. 12 to 22, were real brothers and constituted a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF). It was pleaded that various properties were acquired out of joint family funds and were held for the benefit of the members of the HUF, though some of the properties stood in the names of individual members for convenience. It was pleaded that various properties were acquired out of joint family funds and were held for the benefit of the members of the HUF, though some of the properties stood in the names of individual members for convenience. It was specifically pleaded that on 23.07.1984, the HUF purchased a property in the name of Gambhirmal Parakh (defendant No. 13, son of Champalal) by a registered sale deed, which property has been described in Schedule-C of the plaint. Subsequently, on 09.02.1987, another property was purchased by the HUF in the name of Champabai, wife of Ratanlal, through a registered sale deed, the said property being described in Schedule-B of the plaint. It was further averred that on 01.04.1992, a partnership firm under the name and style of Ratanlal Shantilal Parakh was constituted between Ratanlal, Gendlal, Champalal and Shantilal (defendant No. 12). During the subsistence of the said partnership firm, the property described in Schedule-A of the plaint was acquired. Thereafter, on 01.04.1997, the partnership firm was dissolved, pursuant to which Ratanlal separated from the HUF after taking the property described in Schedule-A towards his share. After the demise of Ratanlal, the plaintiffs, being his legal representatives, continued to remain in possession of the said property. It was also pleaded that thereafter Champalal and Gendlal, by way of a family arrangement and oral partition, partitioned the properties of the HUF. As per the said oral partition, the property described in Schedule-B fell to the share of Gendlal and thereafter to his legal heirs, whereas the property described in Schedule-C, originally standing in the name of Gambhirmal, fell to the share of the legal heirs of Champalal, who are in possession of their respective properties. It was agreed among the family members that necessary assistance would be extended to each other for effecting mutation in the revenue records; however, despite such understanding, the mutation proceedings could not be concluded. 4. It was further pleaded that on 04.07.2018, the plaintiffs and defendants executed a memorandum acknowledging the earlier oral family partition and arrangement. Thereafter, when the plaintiffs requested the defendants to cooperate in mutating their names in respect of the property described in Schedule-A, the defendants adopted dilatory tactics. In August 2019, when the plaintiffs again sought mutation of their names for meeting family necessities, assurances were given by the defendants, but the same were not acted upon. Thereafter, when the plaintiffs requested the defendants to cooperate in mutating their names in respect of the property described in Schedule-A, the defendants adopted dilatory tactics. In August 2019, when the plaintiffs again sought mutation of their names for meeting family necessities, assurances were given by the defendants, but the same were not acted upon. Consequently, the cause of action arose, compelling the Plaintiffs to file the suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. 5. Upon institution of the suit, notices were issued to the defendants; however, written statements were not filed. During the pendency of the suit, the parties amicably settled their disputes and jointly filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, placing on record the terms of compromise. The said application was duly supported by the parties and sought disposal of the suit in terms of the compromise arrived at between them. The learned Trial Court, however, vide order dated 04.07.2023, dismissed the application filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC and simultaneously directed the plaintiffs to deposit the requisite Court fees, failing which the suit was directed to be dismissed by invoking the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Subsequently, by the impugned order dated 06.11.2023, the learned III rd Additional District Judge, Rajnandgaon, dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs/appellants by invoking Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground of insufficiency of Court fees. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the plaint and dismissal of the suit at the threshold, despite the existence of a compromise between the parties and without adjudication on merits, the plaintiffs have preferred the present First Appeal challenging the legality, propriety and correctness of the impugned order dated 06.11.2023. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned order dated 06.11.2023 passed by the learned III rd Additional District Judge, Rajnandgaon, suffers from patent errors of law and jurisdiction, inasmuch as the learned Trial Court has dismissed the entire suit at the threshold by invoking Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure solely on the alleged ground of deficiency of Court fee. It is contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the true nature of the suit and the reliefs claimed therein. It is contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the true nature of the suit and the reliefs claimed therein. The suit, as instituted by the plaintiffs/appellants, was essentially one for declaration of title and affirmation of possession in respect of the house and land situated on the disputed khasra numbers as stated above, coupled with a consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs, along with such other reliefs as the Court deemed fit. It is further submitted that the cause of action for filing the suit clearly arose in the year 2019, when after the death of late Ratanlal Ji Parakh, the plaintiffs sought mutation of their names in the suit property and the defendants categorically denied the same, compelling the plaintiffs to approach the Civil Court. Learned counsel further submits that the learned Trial Court has gravely erred in holding that the suit was insufficiently stamped and in proceeding on the assumption that ad-valorem Court fee was payable. It is argued that a bare perusal of the plaint and the relief clause would reveal that the suit was neither one for partition nor for recovery of possession, but was confined to a declaration of title and a permanent injunction. In such circumstances, the suit was correctly and properly valued under the provisions of the Court Fees Act, and the question of payment of ad-valorem Court fee did not arise at all. On this count alone, it is submitted that the impugned order rejecting the plaint and dismissing the suit is legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside. It is further contended that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the partition of family properties had already taken place by way of an oral family arrangement, which was subsequently reduced into a memorandum/acknowledgement. Such a memorandum merely records a past oral partition and family arrangement and, therefore, is expressly exempted from compulsory registration under Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. The learned Trial Court, while dealing with the said aspect, misdirected itself in law and ignored the settled legal position governing family arrangements and memoranda recording oral partitions. 7. Such a memorandum merely records a past oral partition and family arrangement and, therefore, is expressly exempted from compulsory registration under Section 17(2) of the Registration Act. The learned Trial Court, while dealing with the said aspect, misdirected itself in law and ignored the settled legal position governing family arrangements and memoranda recording oral partitions. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants also submits that while passing the impugned judgment and decree, the learned Trial Court has travelled far beyond the scope and object of Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, despite the fact that the parties had amicably settled the dispute and had jointly filed an application seeking disposal of the suit in terms of the compromise. Instead of adjudicating the compromise application in accordance with law, the learned Trial Court rejected the same and proceeded to examine issues wholly alien to the limited scope of Order XXIII Rule 3, thereby acting with material irregularity. It is further urged that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the plaintiffs were not required to pay Court fee as applicable to a suit for partition, as the suit was not one seeking partition of joint family property but was confined to declaration of title and permanent injunction. The finding of the learned Trial Court regarding insufficiency of Court fee is, therefore, based on a complete misreading of the plaint and the reliefs claimed therein. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that the observation of the learned Trial Court branding the suit as a collusive suit is wholly unfounded, conjectural and based on surmises, inasmuch as there was no pleading, material or evidence on record to warrant such a conclusion, particularly when the Defendants had not even filed their written statements and the compromise application was jointly filed by the parties. Lastly, it is contended that the impugned judgment and order is a non-speaking and unreasoned order, bereft of proper discussion of facts, pleadings and settled principles of law, and therefore fails to satisfy the basic requirements of a judicial order. On this ground as well, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. Lastly, it is contended that the impugned judgment and order is a non-speaking and unreasoned order, bereft of proper discussion of facts, pleadings and settled principles of law, and therefore fails to satisfy the basic requirements of a judicial order. On this ground as well, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. In view of the foregoing submissions, learned counsel for the appellants prays that this Court may be pleased to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment/order and decree dated 06.11.2023 (Annexure A/1) passed in Civil Suit No. 4-A/2022 by the learned III rd Additional District Judge, Rajnandgaon (C.G.), in the interest of justice. 8. On the other hand, learned State counsel as well as learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 1 to 22, while opposing the submissions advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for appellants, would submit that the learned Trial Court has committed no error of law or jurisdiction in passing the impugned order and decree, and the same has been passed strictly in accordance with the provisions of law. It is contended that the plaintiffs/appellants, despite having been afforded due and sufficient opportunity by the learned Trial Court, failed to deposit the requisite Court fee as directed, and therefore the learned Trial Court was fully justified in invoking the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC and dismissing the suit on the ground of non-payment of proper ad-valorem Court fee. It is submitted that the reliefs claimed in the plaint, when read as a whole and in substance, clearly disclose that the suit was in the nature of a claim affecting proprietary rights, for which payment of ad-valorem Court fee was mandatory, and the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to avoid the statutory requirement by cleverly drafting the plaint. Learned counsel further submit that the learned Trial Court has rightly held that the plaint does not disclose any valid cause of action for filing the suit. According to the respondents, the pleadings in the plaint are vague, illusory and do not give rise to a legally enforceable right, and therefore the institution of the suit itself was misconceived. In such circumstances, the learned Trial Court was well within its jurisdiction to reject the plaint and dismiss the suit at the threshold, and no fault can be found with the approach adopted by the Trial Court. In such circumstances, the learned Trial Court was well within its jurisdiction to reject the plaint and dismiss the suit at the threshold, and no fault can be found with the approach adopted by the Trial Court. It is further submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based on a proper appreciation of the pleadings and the applicable legal provisions, and the Trial Court has neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor misapplied the law. The impugned order does not suffer from any illegality, arbitrariness or perversity warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On the contrary, the order is well-reasoned, well-merited and has been passed after granting adequate opportunity to the plaintiffs/appellants. In view of the foregoing submissions, learned State counsel and learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 22 pray that the present appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed and the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be affirmed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the documents enclosed along with the appeal with utmost circumspection. 10. This First Appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has been preferred by the plaintiffs/appellants assailing the legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 06.11.2023 passed by the learned IIIrd Additional District Judge, Rajnandgaon (Chhattisgarh), whereby the suit instituted by the appellants was dismissed at the threshold by invoking the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC on the ground of alleged insufficiency of Court fee. 11. From a bare perusal of the record, it appears that the plaintiffs instituted a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of immovable properties described in Schedules A, B and C appended to the plaint. It is not in dispute that houses have been constructed upon all the suit properties. From the averments made in the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiffs as well as the defendants are successors of a common ancestor and are members of the same family, having derived their rights through succession. It is not in dispute that houses have been constructed upon all the suit properties. From the averments made in the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiffs as well as the defendants are successors of a common ancestor and are members of the same family, having derived their rights through succession. The plaint discloses that the properties in question were acquired out of joint family funds and were held for the benefit of the members of a Hindu Undivided Family, though some of the properties stood in the names of individual members. 12. It further transpires from the plaint and the documents annexed therewith that there was an oral family settlement and partition arrived at between the parties in respect of the suit properties, which was subsequently acknowledged by a memorandum executed on 04.07.2018. As per the said arrangement, the property described in Schedule-A fell to the share of the plaintiffs, whereas the properties described in Schedules B and C fell to the respective shares of the defendants, who are stated to be in possession thereof. Despite such settlement, mutation proceedings could not be completed, giving rise to the present dispute. The plaint further discloses that upon denial and non- cooperation by the defendants in mutating the names of the plaintiffs in the revenue records in the year 2019, a cause of action arose, compelling the plaintiffs to institute the suit seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction. Notices were issued in the suit; however, written statements were not filed by the defendants. 13. It is also borne out from the record that during the pendency of the suit, the parties amicably resolved their dispute and jointly filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 read with Section 151 of the CPC seeking disposal of the suit in terms of the compromise arrived at between them. The said application was under consideration before the learned Trial Court. However, in the meanwhile, an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC came to be filed by the defendants, questioning the valuation of the suit and alleging deficiency of Court fee, contending that ad- valorem Court fee was payable. It was also contended that the plaint did not disclose a valid cause of action and was liable to be rejected at the threshold. It was also contended that the plaint did not disclose a valid cause of action and was liable to be rejected at the threshold. The learned Trial Court, while deciding the said application, proceeded to undertake a meticulous examination of the plaint at the nascent stage of the trial and came to the conclusion that the suit was insufficiently stamped and that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action. On such findings, the learned Trial Court rejected the plaint and dismissed the suit by invoking the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. 14. This Court finds that the approach adopted by the learned Trial Court is legally unsustainable. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the averments made in the plaint are required to be looked into. Neither the defence raised in the written statement nor the objections taken in the application under Order VII Rule 11 can be considered. The Court is not expected to conduct a roving or detailed inquiry into disputed questions of fact at this preliminary stage. So far as the issue relating to Court fee is concerned, it is well settled that in a suit where a party claims a share in joint family property, possession of one co-sharer is deemed to be possession of all, unless ouster is specifically pleaded and proved. Merely because some of the parties are stated to be in possession of specific portions of the property, it cannot automatically be inferred that the plaintiffs are out of possession so as to compel them to pay ad-valorem Court fee. The question as to whether the plaintiffs are in possession or have been excluded from possession, and consequently, the nature of Court fee payable, is a mixed question of law and fact, which can only be adjudicated after framing appropriate issues and recording evidence of the parties. 15. The learned Trial Court, instead of following the settled principles of law that the issue of deficiency of Court fee is ordinarily a matter to be decided during the course of trial, has prematurely adjudicated the same at the threshold, which is impermissible in law. Such an exercise amounts to pre-judging disputed factual aspects without affording the parties an opportunity to lead evidence. Such an exercise amounts to pre-judging disputed factual aspects without affording the parties an opportunity to lead evidence. With regard to the finding on absence of cause of action, this Court is of the considered view that the same is wholly unsustainable. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that cause of action is a bundle of facts, which gives a party the right to approach the Court for redressal of its grievance. Whether such facts are ultimately proved or not is a matter for trial. At the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court cannot dissect the plaint to determine the sufficiency or correctness of the cause of action. In the matter of Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express , reported in (2006) 3 SCC 100 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with a similar issue. To the extent relevant, para 12 reads as follows : (SCC p. 115) “12. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that the plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of the allegations made by the defendant in his written statement or in an application for rejection of the plaint. The court has to read the entire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action and if it does, then the plaint cannot be rejected by the court exercising the powers under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. Essentially, whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, is a question of fact which has to be gathered on the basis of the averments made in the plaint in its entirety taking those averments to be correct. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleadings relied on are in regard to misrepresentation, fraud, wilful default, undue influence or of the same nature. So long as the plaint discloses some cause of action which requires determination by the court, the mere fact that in the opinion of the Judge the plaintiff may not succeed cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint.” 17. So long as the plaint discloses some cause of action which requires determination by the court, the mere fact that in the opinion of the Judge the plaintiff may not succeed cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint.” 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal , reported in (2017) 13 SCC 174 has held as under : “7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate civil action at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to. The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The averments in the written statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. Even when the allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.” 18. A Coordinate Bench of High Court of Delhi in the matter of Pfizer Enterprises v. Dr. H.R. Manchanda , CS (OS) 641/200 7, placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success , reported in (2004) 9 SCC 512 and observed as under: “13. It is well settled that the court has to see only the contents of the plaint to decide whether the suit discloses a triable cause of action, and whether this court has jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Association Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success, (2004) 9 SCC 512 , held that for the purposes of Order 7 Rule 11 the Court should not only look at the averments in the plaint but also examine into documents filed along with, in view of Order 7 Rule 14. In Sopan Sukhdeo v. Assistant Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137 , the Supreme Court emphasized that a meaningful, and not formal reading of the plaint has to be adopted so as to nip in the bud any clever drafting of the plaint. Therefore, in order to decide the issue of jurisdiction and to assess whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, only the contents of the plaint along with the documents filed are relevant.” 19. Very recently, High Court of Delhi in the matter of Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva vs. Skyways Air Services Pvt. Ltd. , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3017 , has held as under : “10. Very recently, High Court of Delhi in the matter of Gurmeet Singh Sachdeva vs. Skyways Air Services Pvt. Ltd. , reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3017 , has held as under : “10. It is a settled law that while dealing with an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the averments made in the application are germane and the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are irrelevant at that stage. If on an entire reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is vexatious in the sense that it does not disclose any right to sue, the Court should exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 11. What constitutes a cause of action has been succinctly explained by the Apex Court in the case of Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 207 . The relevant paras of the judgment are extracted below:— “9. By “cause of action” it is meant every fact, which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a bundle of facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash Himatlal Desai, [ (1994) 6 SCC 322 ].) 10. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) “cause of action” means every fact, which it is necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment. (See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar, [ (1998) 6 SCC 514 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1471].) 11. It is settled law that “cause of action” consists of a bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. [See South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd., [ (1996) 3 SCC 443 ]] 12. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. [See South East Asia Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd., [ (1996) 3 SCC 443 ]] 12. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense “cause of action” means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in “cause of action”. (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India, [ (2001) 2 SCC 294 ].) 13. The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. (See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh, [ (1977) 1 SCC 791 ].)” 20. From a plain reading of the plaint averments, it is evident that the plaintiffs have pleaded denial of their rights and refusal by the defendants to cooperate in mutation, which clearly discloses a cause of action. This Court further finds that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that the parties had already filed a joint application under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC seeking disposal of the suit in terms of a compromise. Instead of adjudicating the said application in accordance with law, the learned Trial Court rejected the plaint on technical grounds, thereby frustrating the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties. 21. Instead of adjudicating the said application in accordance with law, the learned Trial Court rejected the plaint on technical grounds, thereby frustrating the amicable settlement arrived at between the parties. 21. It is well settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to confine itself to the averments made in the plaint and the documents filed along with it. The plaint cannot be dissected in a hyper-technical manner nor can the Court embark upon a roving inquiry into the correctness or sufficiency of the averments at that stage. The test is whether, on a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint along with the accompanying documents, a cause of action is disclosed. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that though Order VII Rule 11 empowers the Court to reject a plaint where no cause of action is disclosed, such power cannot be exercised merely because the Court is of the opinion that the averments may ultimately fail to prove the claim. The sufficiency of evidence to substantiate the pleaded facts is a matter for trial. If the plaint, read as a whole and in conjunction with the documents relied upon, discloses the foundational facts giving rise to a right to sue, rejection of the plaint would be impermissible. In the present case, the plaintiff has not only set out specific pleadings constituting the cause of action but has also placed on record the relevant documents in support thereof. The disputes raised by the defendants pertain essentially to the adequacy of Court fee and the veracity or sustainability of the cause of action. These are mixed questions of fact and law which necessarily require adjudication after framing of issues and appreciation of evidence. At the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court is not expected to adjudicate upon the merits of the controversy or to weigh the probative value of the documents. The defence taken in the written statement, howsoever strong, cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint. The plaint cannot be rejected on the premise that the plaintiff may not ultimately succeed. Therefore, applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered view that the plaint in the present matter does disclose a cause of action and cannot be rejected at the threshold. The plaint cannot be rejected on the premise that the plaintiff may not ultimately succeed. Therefore, applying the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered view that the plaint in the present matter does disclose a cause of action and cannot be rejected at the threshold. The questions regarding Court fee and the maintainability of the suit are required to be determined during the course of trial upon framing of appropriate issues. 23. Accordingly, the impugned order rejecting the plaint is unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. The suit is restored to its original number. The learned Trial Court shall proceed to adjudicate the matter afresh on merits, after framing proper issues and affording full opportunity of hearing to the parties, and thereafter decide the suit strictly in accordance with law. 24. Consequently, the First Appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed 25. Needless to observe, it shall be open to the parties to explore settlement in accordance with Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, if so advised.