Order : Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J. 1. The appellants are gravely aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 28.09.2018 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Dhamtari (Chhattisgarh) in Civil Suit No. 08- A/2014 , titled Mohammad Akmal Rizvi versus Mamta Yadav and Others, whereby the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit against the appellants. The impugned Judgment and Decree are contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case, based on erroneous appreciation of pleadings and evidence on record, and suffer from serious errors of law as well as jurisdiction. The findings recorded by the learned Court below are perverse, unsustainable, and have resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. Being dissatisfied and prejudiced by the aforesaid Judgment and Decree, the appellant is constrained to prefer the present appeal on the grounds set forth hereinbelow, seeking interference by this Hon’ble Court in the interest of justice. 2. Facts of the case :- The Respondent No.1/Plaintiff instituted a civil suit for specific performance of an alleged agreement to sell dated 26.07.2010 against the Appellants/Defendants No.1 and 2 and Respondent No.3/Defendant No.3 before the Court of the learned Additional District Judge, Dhamtari, asserting that the suit property bearing Khasra No. 7/145 , admeasuring 0.045 hectare (4914 sq. ft.) , along with a double-storied house constructed over 1350 sq. ft. , situated at Vivekanand Nagar, Ward No.4, Dhamtari , originally belonged to late Rakesh Kumar Yadav whose legal heirs are the present defendants; it was pleaded that an agreement to sell was executed by the said Rakesh Kumar Yadav on 26.07.2010, pursuant to which a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- was allegedly paid as advance, possession of 3564 sq. ft. ft. , situated at Vivekanand Nagar, Ward No.4, Dhamtari , originally belonged to late Rakesh Kumar Yadav whose legal heirs are the present defendants; it was pleaded that an agreement to sell was executed by the said Rakesh Kumar Yadav on 26.07.2010, pursuant to which a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- was allegedly paid as advance, possession of 3564 sq. ft. of open land was stated to have been delivered to the plaintiff, and the defendants had purportedly consented by signing on the reverse of the agreement deed along with annexing their photographs, followed by a further alleged payment of Rs.5,00,000/- on 21.08.2010 through cheque, which was acknowledged by Defendant No.3, thereby asserting receipt of a total consideration of Rs.15,00,000/- ; it was further pleaded that the plaintiff had obtained a bank loan of Rs.37,00,000/- for registration of the sale deed, but despite readiness and willingness, the defendants failed to execute the same, leading also to initiation of criminal proceedings and issuance of legal notice, and eventually filing of the suit on 20.03.2014 , after the death of Rakesh Kumar Yadav on 20.04.2013 ; the defendants, however, filed a detailed written statement denying all plaint averments, contending inter alia that the suit property was worth more than Rs.1 crore , that late Rakesh Kumar Yadav had been suffering from serious mental illness since 2007 and was not of sound disposing mind, that he never intended to sell the property, and that the alleged agreement and endorsements were forged and fabricated, obtained by the plaintiff and his associate under coercion, threat, and undue influence, including threats of suicide, without any free consent or payment of consideration, and that no possession was ever delivered; the defendants further pleaded cancellation of earlier agreements due to his mental condition with refund of amounts, rebuttal of public notices issued by the plaintiff, misuse of signatures of Defendant No.3 obtained on blank papers, an offer dated 23.05.2011 to refund the alleged amount without admission of liability, non-filing of the suit during the lifetime of Rakesh Kumar Yadav to avoid scrutiny, bar of limitation, dismissal of a pre-litigation case before the Lok Adalat for non-prosecution, improper valuation and deficit court fee, and prayed for dismissal of the suit; however, the learned Trial Court, after framing issues, recording evidence and hearing the parties, decreed the suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 26.07.2010 in favour of the plaintiff, giving rise to the present first appeal, with a copy of the impugned judgment and decree annexed herewith as Annexure A-1 3. Learned counsel for the appellants respectfully submits that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court are vitiated by serious errors of law and fact and are liable to be set aside, inasmuch as the Court below has erroneously relied upon the alleged agreement dated 26.07.2010, purportedly executed by late Rakesh Kumar Yadav, which on its face records delivery of possession of 3564 sq. ft. ft. of the suit land and therefore partakes the character of a “conveyance” within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, requiring proper stamping under Article 23 of Schedule I-A and compulsory registration under Section 17-A of the Registration Act, 1908, and being unstamped and unregistered, is inadmissible in evidence under Sections 35 of the Stamp Act and 49 of the Registration Act, rendering the decree founded thereon wholly unsustainable; further, though a specific objection as to admissibility of the said document was raised at the stage of evidence and kept open, the learned Trial Court failed to decide the same and nonetheless decreed the suit, which amounts to a material illegality; the Court below has also gravely erred in holding the execution of the agreement and payment of Rs.15 lakhs as proved, ignoring the consistent defence that late Rakesh Kumar Yadav was suffering from serious mental illness, including senile dementia, and was not of sound disposing mind, a fact duly established by the testimony of treating doctors examined as defence witnesses and the medical documents exhibited, which clearly demonstrate that he was incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of his acts and therefore incompetent to enter into any valid contract, rendering the alleged agreement void and unenforceable in the eye of law; the learned Trial Court further failed to scrutinize the genuineness of the alleged agreement, which is replete with suspicious circumstances, including absence of dates of alleged cash payment of Rs.10 lakhs, absence of signatures of all defendants acknowledging receipt of Rs.15 lakhs, defective notarization without proper endorsement, seal or verification of the notarial register, and material contradictions in the plaintiff’s own testimony admitting absence of documentary proof of payment, thereby clearly indicating that the document is forged and fabricated; it is also submitted that the plaintiff’s conduct demonstrates lack of readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, as he approached the Court at the fag end of limitation, despite earlier denials and rebuttals by the defendants, and failed to prove payment of huge cash amounts allegedly advanced in violation of statutory prohibitions under income tax law, without receipts, bank entries or corresponding financial disclosures, making the entire story of consideration wholly improbable; the learned Trial Court further erred in overlooking the settled principles under Sections 10 to 19 and 19-A of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, governing free consent and payment of huge cash amounts allegedly advanced in violation of statutory prohibitions under income tax law, without receipts, bank entries or corresponding financial disclosures, making the entire story of consideration wholly improbable; the learned Trial Court further erred in overlooking the settled principles under Sections 10 to 19 and 19-A of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, governing free consent and capacity to contract, and in exercising the discretionary relief of specific performance arbitrarily, without due regard to equity, hardship to the appellants, inadequacy of consideration vis-à-vis the real value of the property exceeding one crore rupees, and the plaintiff’s failure to establish readiness and willingness by cogent evidence; additionally, the dismissal of the appellants’ application under Order XIV Rule 5 CPC for framing additional issues, non- consideration of vital documentary and oral evidence, and erroneous assumptions regarding alleged bank loan, which was never credited to the appellants’ account, cumulatively render the impugned judgment perverse and unsustainable; hence, the appellants respectfully submit that the decree for specific performance is illegal, unjust and contrary to law, and pray that the same be set aside with dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit, reserving liberty to urge additional grounds at the time of final hearing, in the interest of justice. 4. Further, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of R. Nagaraj (Dead) through Lrs. And Another Vs. Rajmani & Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 762 as well as relied upon the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Ramshankar Rao & Anr. Vs. Nandlal Occhwani passed in FA No.88 of 2022 decided on 08.08.2025 5. And Another Vs. Rajmani & Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 762 as well as relied upon the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the matter of Ramshankar Rao & Anr. Vs. Nandlal Occhwani passed in FA No.88 of 2022 decided on 08.08.2025 5. Learned counsel for the respondents respectfully submits that the present appeal is wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed, as it seeks to assail a well-reasoned and legally sustainable judgment and decree dated 28.09.2018 passed by the learned Trial Court, whereby the suit for specific performance instituted by the respondent–plaintiff was rightly decreed after due appreciation of pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and settled principles of law under the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the execution of the agreement to sell dated 26.07.2010 by late Rakesh Kumar Yadav stands duly proved, the defendants being consenting parties thereto, and the agreement bearing their signatures, photographs and notarization, leaving no manner of doubt as to its genuineness, while the plea of alleged mental illness of the executant is a bald, afterthought defence unsupported by convincing evidence and was rightly rejected by the Trial Court; the respondent–plaintiff has conclusively proved payment of a substantial part of the sale consideration amounting to Rs.15,00,000/- and his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract by issuing legal notices, reminders, tendering the balance consideration through demand draft, marking his presence before the Sub-Registrar and even availing a bank loan, thereby fully satisfying the mandate of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act; the conduct of the appellants, including their reply proposing refund of the amount received and their evasive acts during the subsistence of the agreement, clearly establishes deliberate avoidance of performance and disentitles them from any equitable consideration; the suit was filed well within limitation, and mere passage of time cannot defeat a lawful claim for specific performance; objections regarding stamping, registration, framing of issues or alleged inadequacy of consideration are hyper- technical, cause no prejudice, and have been rightly negatived by the Trial Court, which exercised its discretion judiciously under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act based on sound reasons and binding precedents; therefore, the impugned judgment and decree are legal, equitable and based on cogent evidence, call for no interference by this Hon’ble Court, and the appeal deserves to be dismissed with affirmation of the decree for specific performance in the interest of justice. 6. To fortify his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance upon a catena of judicial pronouncements, namely, Lalan Singh v. Balram Kerketta & Others, reported in AIR Online 2022 Chh 560 ; Gulab Devi Singh & Another v. Ritesh Singh & Another, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Chh 2170 ; M. Mohammed Ismail & Others v. K. P. Subbiah & Others, decided in Second Appeal No. 628 of 2008 on 23.02.2015 ; and the authoritative judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi & Others, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 704 further reliance was placed on A. Kanthamani v. Naseer Ahmed , reported in (2017) 4 SCC 654 , P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan , decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 9006 of 2011 on 12.10.2022 , and lastly, Gaddipati Divija & Another v. Pathuri Samrajyam & Others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 442 , to substantiate the legal propositions canvassed on behalf of the respondent. 7. We have listened to the learned counsel representing the parties and scrutinized the documents placed on record with careful attention. 8. From the pleadings of the parties, it appears that on the basis of an unregistered Agreement to Sell dated 11.08.2010 (Exhibit P-2), late Rakesh Yadav, who expired prior to the institution of the civil suit, had entered into an agreement for the sale of land and a house bearing Khasra No. 145, admeasuring 0.045 hectare (approximately 4,914 square feet), along with a double-storied house situated at Vivekananda Nagar, Ward No. 4, Dhamtari. The said Agreement to Sell also bears the signatures of the legal representatives of late Rakesh Yadav, namely his widow, daughter, and son (the defendants), thereby indicating their consent to the said transaction. 9. From a perusal of Exhibit P-2, it is apparent that possession of a portion of the open land had already been handed over to the plaintiff, whereas the residential house was to be vacated upon execution of the sale deed. From a bare perusal of the plaint, it is evident that the plaintiff has specifically pleaded his readiness and willingness to purchase the suit property. It has been categorically stated that a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- was paid in cash and Rs.5,00,000/- was paid by cheque to late Rakesh Yadav, and the said payments were duly endorsed on the reverse side of the Agreement to Sell. It has been categorically stated that a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- was paid in cash and Rs.5,00,000/- was paid by cheque to late Rakesh Yadav, and the said payments were duly endorsed on the reverse side of the Agreement to Sell. The plaintiff has further averred that, in order to complete the purchase within the stipulated period, he had arranged the requisite funds by availing loans. However, before the sale deed could be executed, late Rakesh Yadav expired, as a result of which the sale deed could not be executed. 10. The legal heirs of late Rakesh Yadav, i.e., the defendants, did not execute the sale deed despite the efforts made by the plaintiff, compelling him to institute the suit for specific performance of contract. From the perusal of the evidence of PW-1, it transpires that on the basis of the Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2), the defendants, including late Rakesh Yadav, had agreed to sell the suit land and house for a total consideration of Rs.15,00,000/-, out of which Rs.10,00,000/- and Rs.5,00,000/- had already been paid. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement to Sell clearly shows that possession of a portion of the suit property had already been handed over to the plaintiff. Since possession was delivered, the document fell within the ambit of a conveyance requiring proper stamping and registration. During the course of evidence, the Trial Court observed that the document appeared to be hit by Sections 33, 35, and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act and recorded that the issue would be decided at the time of final judgment. The document was, however, permitted to be exhibited subject to such decision. 11. Surprisingly, the said issue was not decided by the Trial Court at the time of final judgment and has remained undecided. Moreover, while framing the issues, the Trial Court failed to frame any issue regarding the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract, which is an essential and integral requirement for deciding a suit for specific performance under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. 12. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to advert to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, along with Explanation (ii) thereto, which bars the grant of specific performance of a contract in favour of the plaintiff. 12. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to advert to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, along with Explanation (ii) thereto, which bars the grant of specific performance of a contract in favour of the plaintiff. Section 16(c), read with Explanation (ii), as it stood prior to its amendment with effect from 01.10.2018, reads as under:— “16. Personal bars to relief. - Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person - (a) and (b) (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (c), - (i) XXX XXX XXX (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction." Explanation (ii) suffered with amendment w.e.f. 01.10.2018. After amendment, states as under:- Specific "16. Personal bars to relief. performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of person - (a) and (b) (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (c), - (i) XXX XXX XXX (ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction." 13. The amended Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu Vasudeva Kurup and Others reported in AIR 2023 SC (Civil); AIR Online 2023 SC 64 , wherein it was held that the deletion of the words “who fails to aver” in Section 16 of the Act does not bring about any substantive change in the legal position as it stood prior to the amendment. 14. PW-1 has made several assertions regarding his readiness and willingness; however, in the absence of a specific issue, no focused evidence was led on this vital aspect. 14. PW-1 has made several assertions regarding his readiness and willingness; however, in the absence of a specific issue, no focused evidence was led on this vital aspect. From the examination-in-chief and cross-examination of PW-1, it appears that the defendants took the plea that late Rakesh Yadav was not in a fit mental condition at the time of execution of the Agreement to Sell and that the agreement was obtained fraudulently. PW-1 further stated that the allegations regarding non-service of notice were incorrect and that the notices sent to the defendants were duly served. 15. PW-2, who is an attesting witness to the Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2), stated that he had not received any summons from the Court and further stated that in his presence no amount was paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. He also expressed ignorance regarding the payment of Rs.10,00,000/-. Another attesting witness stated that he was not aware of the exact terms of the agreement between the parties. PW-4, a witness for the plaintiff and a land broker, stated that he came to know about the agreement through late Rakesh Yadav, who informed him that he had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for the sale of the suit land. PW-5 stated that he knew late Rakesh Yadav and defendant No. 1 Mamta Yadav; however, in cross-examination, he denied having such knowledge. PW-6 to PW-14 were found to be not material witnesses. 16. The defendants are the legal heirs of late Rakesh Yadav. Defendant No. 1, Smt. Mamta Yadav, widow of late Rakesh Yadav, was examined and categorically stated that her husband was not in a fit mental condition and was under medical treatment. She further stated that for about five years prior to his death, he was undergoing treatment, including in April 2013. She admitted that earlier agreements to sell were executed by her husband with other persons, though they did not materialise. However, she denied the valid execution of the present Agreement to Sell. 17. The defendants examined Dr. Arunanshu as PW-1 and Dr. Pramod Gupta as PW-3 to establish that late Rakesh Yadav was suffering from dementia and was not in a sound mental condition. According to these witnesses, a person suffering from dementia lacks proper memory, concentration, and control over his faculties. 18. 17. The defendants examined Dr. Arunanshu as PW-1 and Dr. Pramod Gupta as PW-3 to establish that late Rakesh Yadav was suffering from dementia and was not in a sound mental condition. According to these witnesses, a person suffering from dementia lacks proper memory, concentration, and control over his faculties. 18. In order to decide the controversy involved in the present case, the foremost issue is the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract. Surprisingly, no issue on this vital aspect was framed by the Trial Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments, has consistently held that the plaintiff is required to plead and prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, and for that purpose, a specific issue must be framed. In the absence of such an issue, the essential requirement under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act cannot be properly adjudicated. 19. The next question for consideration relates to the admissibility of the Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2). The document clearly shows that possession of a part of the suit property, admeasuring 356 square feet, had already been delivered to the plaintiff. The Trial Court, while exhibiting the document, observed that since it was unregistered and appeared to be a conveyance requiring registration and proper stamping, the issue of admissibility would be decided at the time of final judgment. However, this issue was neither decided nor adjudicated upon at the time of final judgment and was left completely open. 20. In the considered opinion of this Court, the failure of the Trial Court to decide the admissibility of the unregistered Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2), by which possession of a part of the property was delivered, amounts to a serious illegality. This issue goes to the root of the matter, as an unregistered document involving delivery of possession cannot be admitted in evidence for the purpose of proving the contract unless duly registered and stamped. By not deciding this crucial issue, the judgment suffers from material illegality. 21. Since two vital issues:- first, regarding readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, and second, regarding the admissibility of the Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2), were neither properly framed nor decided, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court are not in accordance with law. By not deciding this crucial issue, the judgment suffers from material illegality. 21. Since two vital issues:- first, regarding readiness and willingness of the plaintiff, and second, regarding the admissibility of the Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2), were neither properly framed nor decided, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court are not in accordance with law. The Trial Court ought to have framed specific issues to enable the parties to lead appropriate evidence. Without such adjudication, a decree for specific performance cannot be legally sustained. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, has categorically held that it is the bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his continuous readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract till the final disposal of the suit by adducing cogent evidence in this regard reliance be placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of P. Ravindranath & Anr. Vs. Sasikala & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1749, as well as on the subsequent decision in the matter of Sangita Sinha Vs. Bhawana Bhardwaj & ors reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 723 . The relevant paragraphs thereof are reproduced hereinbelow: - P. Ravindranath (supra) “22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as follows: (i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. A few of authorities on the point are referred hereunder: a) In the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, this Court held in paragraph 40 which is reproduced hereunder: “40………A person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract which are required to be performed by him (other than the terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not correct………….” b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr. Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, following was held in paragraph 46: “46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance, the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence. This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all circumstances including availability of funds and mere statement or averment in plaint of readiness and willingness, would not suffice.” c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, it was held under paragraph 2: “2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration. Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27-2-1975. The draft sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to perform plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with reference to the conduct of the party and the attending circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to perform his part of the contract as he had no financial capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is of the essence of the contract.” (ii) In the present case, we find from a perusal of the plaint that, at the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to plead specifically with details about the restriction said to have been imposed by the State on registration of sale deeds relating to similar survey numbers and revenue sites. No details of the Government Order are mentioned. Neither the Government Order is placed on record as evidence to connect that such restriction was actually applicable to the land in question. (iii) Defendant nos. 1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the transfer. 1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the transfer. The plaintiffs do not seem to have ever approached the defendants to get this kind of a status change and, thereafter, get the sale deeds executed. It has not come either in pleadings or in evidence of the plaintiffs that the alleged ban imposed by the State Government had been lifted but still the sale deeds were executed in favour of the appellants and other purchasers in 1983. (iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard. Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs tendered the balance amount with a request to the defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same status of the land in suit. (v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and registration of the sale deed. (vi) The Courts below have proceeded to hold that there was readiness and willingness primarily relying upon the restriction imposed by the State. According to them, as the restriction had not been lifted, there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiffs to have expressed any readiness or willingness. However, the Courts below failed to take into consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju. However, the Courts below failed to take into consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju. (vii) The Courts below also fell into error in recording a finding that the defendants 1 to 5 had committed breach of contract and had dishonestly proceeded to get the status of the land changed and, thereafter, execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant and other purchasers. (viii) It is clear from the record that the defendant no. 1 had given a written notice in September, 1981, then legal notice in November, 1981 and also another communication in December, 1981 requesting for payment of balance sale consideration and, thereafter communicating that advance amount had been forfeited and the agreement to sell had come to an end as the plaintiffs failed to get the sale deed executed within three months. After December, 1981, the plaintiffs kept silent. They neither responded to the last communication of the defendant no. 1 of December, 1981, nor did they take any steps to file the suit for specific performance of contract for more than one and a half years after the defendant no. 1 had communicated forfeiture of the earnest money and the cancellation of the agreement to sell. There is no communication from the plaintiffs after December, 1981 till July, 1983 when they filed the suit. There is not even a notice by the plaintiffs before filing the suit of showing their readiness and willingness by tendering the amount of balance sale consideration and sending a draft sale deed for approval and fixing a date for execution and registration of the sale deed. (xi) We are thus unable to agree with the findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and registered. As a matter of fact, the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout gives credence and strength to the contention of the defendant nos. (xi) We are thus unable to agree with the findings of the courts below that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to get the sale deed executed and registered. As a matter of fact, the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout gives credence and strength to the contention of the defendant nos. 1 to 5 that the plaintiffs never had the funds available with them to clear the balance sale consideration and that they were middlemen only interested in blocking the property and, thereafter, selling it on a higher price to third parties and make profit thereof. The plaintiffs were never the real purchasers interested in buying the land in suit for themselves. (x) Under such facts and circumstances as discussed above, we are of the confirmed view that the decree of specific performance was not warranted in the present case and ought to have been denied and the suit was liable to be dismissed. (xi) In view of the finding on the issue of readiness and willingness being decided against the plaintiffs in the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to enter into other arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties. (xii). However, in order to adjust equities between the parties, as the plaintiffs made a payment of Rs. 12,000/- as advance money on 24.05.1981 or before, that being an admitted position, they need to be suitably compensated for the same. About 43 years have passed since the date of the agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in the written brief, the value of the property is about four crores. The respondents have not given any such figure of the approximate value of the property in question. Considering the facts and circumstances, we direct that the appellant compensate the plaintiffs by paying an amount of Rs. 24 lakhs in lieu of the advance and further Rs. 6 lakhs as cost of litigation. Total amount of Rs. 30 lakhs to be paid within a period of three months from today and file proof of such payment before this Court within the next four months. In the event, such proof is not filed, the Registry will list the matter before the Court immediately after expiry of the aforesaid period for further orders. - Sangita Sinha (supra) “16. 30 lakhs to be paid within a period of three months from today and file proof of such payment before this Court within the next four months. In the event, such proof is not filed, the Registry will list the matter before the Court immediately after expiry of the aforesaid period for further orders. - Sangita Sinha (supra) “16. It is settled law that under the Act, 1963, prior to the 2018 Amendment, specific performance was a discretionary and equitable relief. In Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi, (2019) 3 SCC 704 , which has been followed in P. Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan , (2022) 14 SCC 793 , this Court framed material questions which require consideration prior to grant of relief of specific performance. The relevant portion of the judgment in Kamal Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: “7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief. The material questions, which are required to be gone into for grant of the relief of specific performance, are: 7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property. 7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract. 7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in what manner he has performed and whether such performance was in conformity with the terms of the contract; 7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff; 7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money, etc. and, if so, on what grounds. 8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. and, if so, on what grounds. 8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of the statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22, 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of Appendices A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the case made out by the parties on facts.” 17. It is trite law that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are not one but two separate elements. ‘Readiness’ means the capacity of the Respondent No. 1-buyer to perform the contract, which would include the financial position to pay the sale consideration. ‘Willingness’ refers to the intention of the Respondent No. 1-buyer as a purchaser to perform his part of the contract, which is inferred by scrutinising the conduct of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser, including attending circumstances. 18. Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser from the date of execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree, is a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific performance. This Court in various judicial pronouncements has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency of the suit up to the decree. A few of the said judgments are reproduced hereinbelow:— A. In Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, (1967) 1 SCR 227 , it has been held as under:— “6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43: “In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. If he fails to do so, his claim for specific performance must fail. As observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v. Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43: “In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part. Failure to make good that averment brought with it the inevitable dismissal of his suit.” The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract continuously between the date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit….” B. In Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1913, it has been held as under:— “6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract and the readiness and willingness has to be shown throughout and has to be established by the plaintiff….” C. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429 , it has been held as under:— “27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific performance and is left with no other alternative but to dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.” D. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243 , it has been held as under:— “30. It is also clear that readiness to perform must be established throughout the relevant points of time. “Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct of the parties.” D. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs., (2005) 6 SCC 243 , it has been held as under:— “30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiff- respondents were all along and still are ready and willing to perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act must be determined having regard to the entire attending circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement made in the examination-in- chief would not suffice. The conduct of the plaintiff- respondents must be judged having regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence brought on records.” E. In Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) through Legal Representatives v. Ahsanul Ghani (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the plaint, that he has already performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him being on the plaintiff, mere want of objection by the defendant in the written statement is hardly of any effect or consequence. The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the pleading and the evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff has established that he has performed his part of the contract or has always been ready and willing to do so…” F. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (Dead) by Legal Representatives (supra), it has been held as under:— “16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their logical end so far as they depend upon his performance. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available. Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was always ready to perform his contract. 17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115 ], it was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material and relevant and is required to be considered by the court while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the court must take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be available. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582 ], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. 18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani James, (2002) 9 SCC 582 ], this Court has held that inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5) “5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved.” 23. In view of the above, as the core issues regarding readiness and willingness and admissibility of the Agreement to Sell have not been adjudicated, the matter requires reconsideration. Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree are set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Trial Court with a direction to frame proper issues regarding readiness and willingness and admissibility of Exhibit P-2 and to decide the suit afresh in accordance with law after affording due opportunity to both parties. 24. With these observations and directions, the impugned judgment and decree are hereby set aside.