JUDGMENT : Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, J. 1. Heard Mr. Pushpendra Kumar Patel, learned Advocate and Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Ashutosh Shukla and Dr. Sudeep Agrawal appearing for the respective parties. 2. First Appeal No.31/2024 has been preferred by Defendant No.1 assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 11.01.2024 passed by the 1 st Additional District Judge, Korba in Civil Suit No.02-A/2020, whereby the counter-claim filed by Defendant No.1 has been dismissed. 3. First Appeal No.62/2024 has been preferred by the Plaintiff challenging the impugned judgment and decree dated 11.01.2024 passed by the 1 st Additional District Judge, Korba in Civil Suit No.02-A/2020, whereby the civil suit filed by the Plaintiff has been dismissed. 4. For the sake of convenience, the status of the parties is referred to as arrayed before the Trial Court in the Civil Suit. 5. The Plaintiff instituted a Civil Suit before the Trial Court seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of the suit property, namely Shop No.4 situated at Transport Nagar, Commercial Complex, Korba, admeasuring 296.5 sq. ft., the detailed description whereof is contained in Schedule-A appended to the Plaint. It is the pleading of the Plaintiff that the Defendants are his real brothers, all being sons of Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal, who was originally a resident of Village Raildabri, Tahsil Pali, District Korba, and had acquired approximately 32 acres of land from his own income. Subsequently, in the year 1974, he shifted from Village Raildabri to Korba along with his family. From the income of the joint family, several properties were purchased at Korba and the four sons managed the family business, though residing separately. The suit shop was obtained on lease on 16.12.1991 in the name of Defendant No.1 – Deendayal Agrawal, and a registered lease deed dated 08.04.1992 was executed in his favour. It is averred that the said shop was acquired from the income of the joint family, though taken in the name of Defendant No.1. The suit shop was given by the father to the Plaintiff for carrying on his business and since 1992, the Plaintiff has been running his business from the suit shop continuously. 6. Subsequently, the Plaintiff purchased Shop No.5 at the Commercial Complex and also obtained Shop No.3 in the name of his wife, Smt. Shanti Devi. He further purchased Shop No.B-2 and got it allotted in his own name. 6. Subsequently, the Plaintiff purchased Shop No.5 at the Commercial Complex and also obtained Shop No.3 in the name of his wife, Smt. Shanti Devi. He further purchased Shop No.B-2 and got it allotted in his own name. Thereafter, all the said shops were merged into one composite shop from which the Plaintiff continued his business. Shop Nos.3, 4 and 5 were thereafter let out on rent to Ashok Bajaj, who is the tenant of the Plaintiff. 7. Defendant No.1 is residing at Power House Road and the house in which he is presently residing was also purchased by their father from the income of the joint family, though it stood in the name of Kedarnath (Defendant No.2). In a family arrangement, the said house was allotted to Defendant No.1 for his residence. Earlier, the Plaintiff was residing in the said house in which Defendant No.1 is presently residing. Kedarnath Agrawal is residing in another house, which was purchased in his name by their father Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal. Though Shop No.4 of the Commercial Complex stands recorded in the name of Defendant No.1, the Plaintiff is in possession thereof. At the time of renewal of the lease in the year 2020, when the Plaintiff came to know that Defendant No.1 had filed an application for renewal of the lease in his own name, the Plaintiff raised an objection and claimed that the renewal of lease ought to be made in his name. Thereupon, a dispute arose between the parties, which ultimately resulted in the filing of the present Civil Suit by the Plaintiff. In the suit, the Plaintiff has claimed title over the suit shop and has also sought a decree of permanent injunction against the Defendants. 8. Defendant No.1 contested the suit filed by the Plaintiff and filed his written statement. He denied the averments made in the Plaint and pleaded that their father Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal had purchased various properties at Korba. Though he admitted that Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal had shifted to Korba from Village Raildabri, he denied that the suit shop was acquired by their father. He further pleaded with regard to the acquisition of various properties from the income of the joint family. Though he admitted that Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal had shifted to Korba from Village Raildabri, he denied that the suit shop was acquired by their father. He further pleaded with regard to the acquisition of various properties from the income of the joint family. It was further pleaded that in the year 1992, when the Plaintiff was unemployed, at the request of their father, Defendant No.1 allowed the Plaintiff to use the suit shop at the instance of Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal, subject to the condition that whenever a shop would be purchased in the name of the Plaintiff, he would vacate the suit shop. Defendant No.1 pleaded that he had purchased Plot No.40 from the Municipal Corporation and when he asked the Plaintiff to vacate the suit shop, the Plaintiff refused to do so. He admitted that Shop No.5 was allotted in the name of the Plaintiff and Shop No.3 was allotted in the name of the Plaintiff’s wife Smt. Shanti Devi and that Shop No.B-2 was also purchased by the Plaintiff; however, he alleged that the Plaintiff had fraudulently obtained permission to make alterations in the shop obtained on lease from the Municipal Corporation/SADA, Korba. He substantially claimed that the suit shop is owned by him and not by the Plaintiff and therefore, no decree can be passed in favour of the Plaintiff and the suit is liable to be dismissed. 9. Along with his written statement, Defendant No.1 also filed a counter-claim under Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking possession of the suit shop. In the counter- claim, he pleaded that the suit shop was allotted to him on 16.12.1991 and a registered lease deed dated 08.04.1992 was executed in his favour and that he is the lessee and owner of the suit shop. It was further pleaded that the Plaintiff was merely a licensee under Defendant No.1 and despite being asked to vacate the suit shop, he refused to do so and illegally merged the same with his other shops. Hence, a decree for possession of the suit shop has been sought in favour of Defendant No.1. 10. Defendant No.4 also filed a written statement in the Plaintiff’s suit and denied the claim of the Plaintiff. Hence, a decree for possession of the suit shop has been sought in favour of Defendant No.1. 10. Defendant No.4 also filed a written statement in the Plaintiff’s suit and denied the claim of the Plaintiff. It was stated in the written statement that the suit shop was allotted to Defendant No.1 in the year 1991 on lease for a period of 30 years. The proceedings for renewal of the lease were pending on account of the lockdown. In the year 2009, upon inspection of Shop Nos.3, 4 and 5, it was found that alterations and inter se partition between the said shops had been made without any permission. It was further stated that Defendant No.1 had thereafter filed an application for renewal of lease before Defendant No.4. 11. The Plaintiff filed his written statement to the counter-claim of Defendant No.1 reiterating the pleadings made in the Plaint and denying the averments made in the counter-claim. He stated that the suit shop was acquired from the income of the joint family and that in accordance with a family arrangement, he is in possession thereof. He further pleaded that he had also acquired Shop Nos.3 and 5 and thereafter merged the same. He denied that Defendant No.1 is the leaseholder or titleholder of the suit shop. It was further pleaded that Defendant No.1 has not claimed any declaration of title in respect of the suit shop and in the absence of such a claim, a decree for possession cannot be granted and the counter-claim is barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 12. Based on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court has framed the following issues:- To substantiate his case, the Plaintiff examined himself and adduced oral evidence of Smt. Triveni Bai Agrawal (PW-1), Shiv Shankar Agrawal, the Plaintiff himself (PW-2), Kedarnath Agrawal (PW-3) and Ashok Bajaj (PW-4). 12. Based on the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court has framed the following issues:- To substantiate his case, the Plaintiff examined himself and adduced oral evidence of Smt. Triveni Bai Agrawal (PW-1), Shiv Shankar Agrawal, the Plaintiff himself (PW-2), Kedarnath Agrawal (PW-3) and Ashok Bajaj (PW-4). The Plaintiff also relied upon documentary evidence namely Ex.P-1, a letter dated 26.08.2020 addressed to the Municipal Corporation, Korba; Ex.P-2, another letter dated 27.08.2020 addressed to the Municipal Corporation, Korba; Ex.P-3, the lease deed; Ex.P-4, the counterpart of the receipt; Ex.P-5 and Ex.P-30, receipts evidencing payment of taxes to the Municipal Corporation, Korba; Ex.P-31, the bill; Ex.P-32 to Ex.P-37, other receipts of payment of tax to the Municipal Corporation, Korba; Ex.P-38, the office copy of the order for fixation of tenant issued by SADA, Korba; and Ex.P-39, another receipt. 13. On the other hand, the Defendants examined Deendayal Agrawal (DW-1); however, no documentary evidence was produced or relied upon by him in support of the defence. 14. Upon appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment and decree dated 11.01.2024, whereby it dismissed the suit filed by the Plaintiff as well as the counter-claim of Defendant No.1. The learned Trial Court held that the Plaintiff is not the title-holder of the suit shop and therefore, he is not entitled to a decree of declaration in his favour alone, holding the property to be joint family property. It was further held that Defendant No.1 is not entitled to a decree for possession of the suit shop without seeking a declaration of title and that being only a lease-holder, he cannot claim title over the same. Hence, these appeals. 15. Learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant in F.A. No.31/2024 submits that the learned trial Court has failed to consider that Defendant No.1 is the leaseholder of the suit shop, as the registered lease deed has been executed in his favour in the year 1992. Though the Plaintiff is in possession of the suit shop as per the arrangement of the family, Defendant No.1 gave the suit shop to the Plaintiff on licence with a condition that when he would manage his own shop, the suit shop would be vacated. Though the Plaintiff is in possession of the suit shop as per the arrangement of the family, Defendant No.1 gave the suit shop to the Plaintiff on licence with a condition that when he would manage his own shop, the suit shop would be vacated. Therefore, Defendant No.1 is not required to claim any title over the said shop and he can claim only possession, which he did; however, his claim has been denied by the learned trial Court holding that though Defendant No.1 is the leaseholder of the suit shop, it is in possession of the Plaintiff and looking to the entire family arrangement, Defendant No.1 can claim partition of the joint family property and therefore, being the leaseholder, he cannot claim possession of the suit shop. This finding recorded by the learned trial Court is erroneous and the same may be set aside and the counter-claim of Defendant No.1 may be decreed in his favour. 16. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant in F.A. No.62/2024 submits that the learned trial Court ought to have passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiff holding that in the family arrangement, the suit shop was allotted to the Plaintiff, in which he is in possession since 1992. Though it was allotted in the name of Defendant No.1, it belonged to the joint Hindu family and was acquired from the income of the joint family property. Defendant No.1 cannot claim sole ownership over the suit shop which has been acquired from the income of the joint family and the evidence produced by the Plaintiff clearly demonstrates that in the family arrangement, it was given to the Plaintiff for his business. The expansion of the Plaintiff’s business by acquisition of Shop No.5 in his own name and Shop No.3 in the name of his wife was within the knowledge of Defendant No.1 and he never raised any objection to the merger of these shops into one. He further submits that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the impugned judgment are in favour of the Plaintiff. It is contended that for the purpose of proving a family arrangement or partition, execution of a written document is not sine qua non and oral evidence is sufficient to establish partition among the members of a joint family. It is contended that for the purpose of proving a family arrangement or partition, execution of a written document is not sine qua non and oral evidence is sufficient to establish partition among the members of a joint family. He further submits that mere execution of a lease deed in the name of Defendant No.1 does not entitle him to possession of the suit shop, particularly when the Plaintiff has specifically pleaded and established that the suit shop was acquired from the income of the joint family and that the entire family property remains joint, there having been no partition. It is, therefore, contended that the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court are erroneous and unsustainable in law, liable to be set aside, and that a decree be passed in favour of the Plaintiff. 17. We have heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and perused the entire record with utmost circumspection. 18. The question for consideration in the present Appeals is whether the learned trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit of the Plaintiff as well as the counter-claim of the Defendants. 19. Plaintiff Shiv Shankar has examined himself as PW-2. He has stated in his evidence that their father, Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal, purchased various properties at Korba from his own income and also from the income of his agricultural property. All the sons of Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal are residing separately and carrying on their businesses separately. The suit shop was allotted to his brother Deendayal Agrawal by the Municipal Corporation, Korba on 16.12.1991. The said suit shop was acquired from the income of the joint family property, though it was allotted in the name of Defendant No.1. Under the family settlement, the said suit shop was given to him for running his business and in the year 1992, he started his business in the name and style of “Shiv Agency”. Subsequently, he acquired Shop Nos.3 and 5 and also Shop No. B-2. By lapse of time, he got the shops merged by removing the separating wall. The house in possession of Defendant No.1 was also purchased by their father from the income of the joint family property. The said house was purchased in the name of Defendant No.2, Kedarnath and under the family settlement it was given to Defendant No.1. By lapse of time, he got the shops merged by removing the separating wall. The house in possession of Defendant No.1 was also purchased by their father from the income of the joint family property. The said house was purchased in the name of Defendant No.2, Kedarnath and under the family settlement it was given to Defendant No.1. In cross- examination, he remained firm in his statement that the suit shop and other properties at Korba had been purchased by their father from the income of the joint family property. He also admitted that he had obtained permission from the Municipal Corporation, Korba for merger of Shop Nos.3, 4 and 5 into one shop. He has not filed any application in his own name for extension of lease of the suit shop. 20. Kedarnath Agrawal (PW-3) is the brother of the Plaintiff as well as Defendant No.1. He has also stated that their father, Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal, purchased various properties at Korba including Shop No.4, which is the suit shop and later the Plaintiff purchased Shop Nos.3 and 5 adjacent to Shop No.4. There was a family settlement between the parties and the suit shop was given to the Plaintiff. The house in which Defendant No.1 is residing, situated at Power House Road, is recorded in the revenue records in the name of Kedarnath but is in possession of Defendant No.1. In cross-examination, he admitted that Shiv Shankar Brothers Cloth Shop has been running since 1972; his father ran it up to 2005 and after his death, they are running the shop and there has been no partition between the brothers. 21. Triveni Bai Agrawal (PW-1), the mother of the Plaintiff as well as Defendant No.1, has also deposed in support of the Plaintiff that her husband had purchased various properties at Korba from the income of the joint family property. The suit shop was allotted in the name of Defendant No.1; however, it was given to the Plaintiff for his business under the family settlement. The Plaintiff also acquired Shop Nos.3 and 5 adjacent to Shop No.4 and is in possession thereof. In cross-examination, she remained firm. Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal and his sons Deendayal Agrawal, both have jointly started cloth business and the Suit Shop was acquired by her Late husband. 22. The Plaintiff also acquired Shop Nos.3 and 5 adjacent to Shop No.4 and is in possession thereof. In cross-examination, she remained firm. Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal and his sons Deendayal Agrawal, both have jointly started cloth business and the Suit Shop was acquired by her Late husband. 22. From the evidence produced by the Plaintiff, it is evident that the suit shop was acquired from the income of the joint family property and in the family settlement, it was allotted to him. However, there is no specific evidence with respect to the family settlement or acquisition of separate properties by separate members of the joint family. Even if it was acquired from the income of the joint family, all members of the joint family would have equal right and title over the same as legal heirs of Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal. In the present suit, the Plaintiff alone claims title over the suit shop. In the absence of any partition or cogent evidence of partition, a decree of declaration of title cannot be granted in favour of a particular member claiming allotment under a family settlement. We find no sufficient evidence of any family settlement allotting the suit shop exclusively to the Plaintiff. At best, the father permitted the Plaintiff to start business in the suit shop in the year 1992, which cannot be termed a family settlement but only a family arrangement. 23. Defendant No.1, examined as DW-1, stated that Late Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal had purchased various properties at Korba. In the year 1992, when the Plaintiff was unemployed, he allowed the Plaintiff to use the suit shop at the instance of their father with an assurance that upon acquiring sufficient accommodation, he would vacate it. Admittedly, from the year 1992-93, the Plaintiff has been in possession of the suit shop. Subsequently, he acquired the adjacent Shop Nos.3 & 5 and all the 3 shops have been merged into one shop and there is an allegation that the Plaintiff has filed an application before the SADA, Korba by forging his signature and obtained permission for merger of the Shops for which, he lodged a report before the Police and FIR was registered. He further stated that presently, the lease of the said shop was renewed in his name vide order dated 09.09.2020. He further stated that presently, the lease of the said shop was renewed in his name vide order dated 09.09.2020. In cross-examination, he has stated that on the basis of the said lease deed, he obtained loan of Rs.50 lacs from the Bank. He further stated that Suit Shop is being run by his brother and his possession may also be deemed to his own (Defendant No.1) possession. He further admitted that he filed an application before the SDO for rent of the suit shop and a Civil Suit is also pending before the Civil Court. He further admitted that in the year 1974, he along with his family members, was residing at the house of Shiv brothers and all the family members including their parents were residing jointly. He further stated that the shop which is running by Shiv Brothers, was purchased by his maternal grand father-Late Tulsiram Agrawal. He further admitted that the said shop of Shiv Brothers is in the Municipal records in the name of Kedarnath and he is paying taxes of the Municipal Corporation. He further admitted that he also obtained financial assistance from the income on the basis of shop of Kedarnath. It is further admitted by him that the construction over the land of Kedarnath was being raised by all the brothers jointly. He has been cross-examined in detail by the Plaintiff but the fact remains unshaken that the suit shop was obtained by their Late father Parmeshwari Lal Agrawal and the status of the parties was member of the joint family and under the family arrangement, they are residing separately and running their business separately. 24. In the matter of Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur & Ors. reported in AIR 2020 SC 3799 , it has been held as under:- “16…….The settled legal position is that when by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement, members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once and for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family, such arrangement ought to be governed by a special equity peculiar to them and would be enforced if honestly made. The object of such arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strives which mar the unity and solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family, as observed in Kale (supra). In the said reported decision, a threeJudge Bench of this Court had observed thus: “9. ….. A family arrangement by which the property is equitably divided between the various contenders so as to achieve an equal distribution of wealth instead of concentrating the same in the hands of a few is undoubtedly a milestone in the administration of social justice. That is why the term “family” has to be understood in a wider sense so as to include within its fold not only close relations or legal heirs but even those persons who may have some sort of antecedent title, a semblance of a claim or even if they have a spes successionis so that future disputes are sealed for ever and the family instead of fighting claims inter se and wasting time, money and energy on such fruitless or futile litigation is able to devote its attention to more constructive work in the larger interest of the country. The courts have, therefore, leaned in favour of upholding a family arrangement instead of disturbing the same on technical or trivial grounds. Where the courts find that the family arrangement suffers from a legal lacuna or a formal defect the rule of estoppel is pressed into service and is applied to shut out plea of the person who being a party to family arrangement seeks to unsettle a settled dispute and claims to revoke the family arrangement under which he has himself enjoyed some material benefits. …..” (emphasis supplied) In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: “10. …..” (emphasis supplied) In paragraph 10 of the said decision, the Court has delineated the contours of essentials of a family settlement as follows: “10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions: “(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment of properties between the various members of the family; (2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence; (3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary; (4) It is wellsettled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable; (5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same; (6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.” (emphasis supplied) Again, in paragraph 24, this Court restated that a family arrangement being binding on the parties, clearly operates as an estoppel, so as to preclude any of the parties who have taken advantage under the agreement from revoking or challenging the same. In paragraph 35, the Court noted as follows: “35. … We have already pointed out that this Court has widened the concept of an antecedent title by holding that an antecedent title would be assumed in a person who may not have any title but who has been allotted a particular property by other party to the family arrangement by relinquishing his claim in favour of such a donee. In such a case the party in whose favour the relinquishment is made would be assumed to have an antecedent title. …..” And again, in paragraph 36, the Court noted as follows: “36. … Yet having regard to the near relationship which the brother and the soninlaw bore to the widow the Privy Council held that the family settlement by which the properties were divided between these three parties was a valid one. In the instant case also putting the case of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 at the highest, the position is that Lachman died leaving a grandson and two daughters. Assuming that the grandson had no legal title, so long as the daughters were there, still as the settlement was made to end the disputes and to benefit all the near relations of the family, it would be sustained as a valid and binding family settlement. …” While rejecting the argument regarding inapplicability of principle of estoppel, the Court observed as follows: “38. …” While rejecting the argument regarding inapplicability of principle of estoppel, the Court observed as follows: “38. … Assuming, however, that the said document was compulsorily registrable the courts have generally held that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to it would operate as an estoppel by preventing the parties after having taken advantage under the arrangement to resile from the same or try to revoke it. …..” (emphasis supplied) And in paragraph 42, the Court observed as follows: 42. ..… In these circumstances there can be no doubt that even if the family settlement was not registered it would operate as a complete estoppel against Respondents Nos. 4 and 5. Respondent No. 1 as also the High Court, therefore, committed substantial error of law in not giving effect to the doctrine of estoppel as spelt out by this Court in so many cases. …” (emphasis supplied) The view so taken is backed by the consistent exposition in previous decisions8 referred to and duly analysed in the reported judgment. The question formulated by the High Court, in our opinion, stands answered in favour of the appellants (plaintiff), in 8 Lala Khunni Lal vs. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain, ILR 33 All 356 Mt. Hiran Bibi vs. Mst. Sohan Bibi, AIR 1914 PC 44 Sahu Madho Das vs. Pandit Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481 Ram Charan Das vs. Girjanandini Devi, AIR 1966 SC 323 Tek Bahadur Bhujil vs. Debi Singh Bhujil, AIR 1966 SC 292 Maturi Pullaiah vs. Maturi Narasimham, AIR 1966 SC 1836 Krishna Biharilal vs. Gulabchand, (1971) 1 SCC 837 S. Shanmugam Pillai vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai, (1973) 2 SCC 312 Ramgopal vs. Tulshi Ram, AIR 1928 All 641 Sitala Baksh Singh vs. Jang Bahadur Singh, AIR 1933 Oudh 347 Mst. Kalawati vs. Sri Krishna Prasad, AIR 1944 Oudh 49 Bakhtawar vs. Sunder Lal, AIR 1926 All 173 Awadh Narain Singh vs. Narain Mishra, AIR 1962 Pat 400 Ramgouda Annagouda vs. Bhausaheb, AIR 1927 PC 227 Brahmanath Singh vs. Chandrakali Kuer, AIR 1961 Pat 79 Mst. Bibi Aziman vs. Mst. Saleha, AIR 1963 Pat 62 Kanhai Lal vs. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70 Dhiyan Singh vs. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145 T.V.R. Subbu Chetty’s Family Charities vs. M. Gaghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC Rachbha vs. Mt. Bibi Aziman vs. Mst. Saleha, AIR 1963 Pat 62 Kanhai Lal vs. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70 Dhiyan Singh vs. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145 T.V.R. Subbu Chetty’s Family Charities vs. M. Gaghava Mudaliar, AIR 1961 SC Rachbha vs. Mt. Mendha, AIR 1947 All 177 Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Smt. Satyawati Sood, AIR 1972 Delhi 171 (FB) Shyam Sunder vs. Siya Ram, AIR 1973 All 382 light of exposition of this Court in Kale (supra). A priori, we have no hesitation in affirming the conclusion reached by the first appellate Court that the document Exhibit P6 was nothing but a memorandum of a family settlement. The established facts and circumstances clearly establish that a family settlement was arrived at in 1970 and also acted upon by the concerned parties. That finding of fact recorded by the first appellate Court being unexceptionable, it must follow that the document Exhibit P6 was merely a memorandum of a family settlement so arrived at. Resultantly, it was not required to be registered and in any case, keeping in mind the settled legal position, the contesting defendants were estopped from resiling from the stated arrangement in the subject memorandum, which had recorded the settlement terms arrived at in the past and even acted upon relating to all the existing or future disputes qua the subject property amongst the (signatories) family members despite absence of antecedent title to the concerned property.” 25. From the evidence available on record, it is quite vivid that although the Plaintiff is in possession of the suit shop, mere possession by itself does not entitle him to a decree of declaration of title, particularly when it has been found that the suit property is a joint family property and no partition has taken place. Likewise, Defendant No. 1, though a lease-holder of the suit shop, has not been in possession thereof since 1992 and with his consent the suit shop was given to the Plaintiff under a family arrangement. In such circumstances, in the absence of any claim for partition of the joint family property, neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant No. 1 is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the present suit as well as in the counter-claim. 26. In such circumstances, in the absence of any claim for partition of the joint family property, neither the Plaintiff nor Defendant No. 1 is entitled to the reliefs claimed in the present suit as well as in the counter-claim. 26. While considering the defence of Defendant No.1 and his counter-claim, no relief can be granted in favour of Defendant No.1 in the Suit and since Defendant No.1 is not in possession of the suit shop, he is not entitled for decree for permanent injunction and when it has been observed that it was the property obtained from the income of the joint family and there is no partition between members of the joint family, Defendant No.1 is also not entitled for any claim of possession. 27. After having gone through the entire pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence led by them, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has rightly and elaborately considered the evidence available on record and came to conclusion that the Plaintiff could not prove his exclusive title over the suit shop and the Defendant is also not entitled for any relief in the Suit which does not suffer from any perversity or illegality. 28. Consequently, the First Appeal filed by the Plaintiff as well as Defendant No.1, both are dismissed . Parties shall bear their own costs. An appellate decree be drawn accordingly.