JUDGMENT : Narendra Kumar Vyas, J. 1. The victim’s father has filed this acquittal appeal under Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment of acquittal dated 10.07.2019 passed by the learned Special Judge, (POCSO) Act, 2012 in Special Criminal Case No. 47/2016 by which the learned Special Judge has acquitted the accused for the offences under Section 354(C), 509 of IPC read with Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and Section 67-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (in short “Act of 2000”). 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 23.06.2016, victim’s father lodged an FIR before the Police Station Kasdol, District - Baloda Bazar (C.G.) bearing Crime No. 242/2016 for commission of offence under Section 354(C), 509 read with Section 34 of IPC against the accused alleging that the complainant’s daughter is student of Class 12 th in Shubh Sai Public School Katgi and the accused is also studying in the same school and during the study, he took photograph of the victim and circulated the video in which some obscene comments were made against the victim. It is also the case of the prosecution that the whats app group members have shown the photographs and also passed the comments to the notice of the complainant in the month of June, 2016 which has necessitated the victim’s father(complainant) to file present FIR. 3. The prosecution after collecting evidence, material on record has submitted charge-sheet and since the offence relates to the POCSO Act, 2012, therefore, the charge-sheet was filed before the Special Judge under the POCSO Act, 2012 on 07.05.2016. The prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused has examined documents as Nazri Naksha (Exhibit P/1), Property Seizure Memo (Exhibit P/2), Custody bond (Exhibit P/3), Report made to the Superintendent of Police, Balodabazar Bhatapara (Exhibit P/4), Property Seizure Memo (Exhibit P/5), Certificate (Exhibit P/6), Property Seizure Memo (Exhibit P/7 & P/8), Arrest Memo (Exhibit P/9), Information of Arrest (Exhibit P/10), First Information Report (Exhibit P/11), Notice under Section 160 of CrPC (Exhibit P/12 to 15) as well as examined 14 witnesses. 4. 4. The complainant (PW-7) who was victim’s father examined before the learned trial Court wherein the complainant in his cross- examination has admitted that the video which has been shown is the school’s video wherein his daughter and other students are sitting in the same bench and also admitted that there is nothing in the video which suggests that the victim and other students were doing any private act. He has also admitted that both the children seemed that they are talking about the study and also admitted that from perusal of the video it looks that there is no obscene scenes in the video which may insult the complainant. In paragraph 6 of his cross- examination, he has admitted that he has not seen what comments have been made and also admitted that there is no comments regarding name of her daughter. He has also admitted that he has seen the video. He has also admitted that Sunil Dewangan has not told him that any obscene comments are being made with regard to the video. He has also admitted that some people are commented as nice video. He has also admitted that the accused has not threatened him and also denied that Hemraj Yadav has made viral the video to disrepute the complainant. 5. Satyanarayan Dewangan (PW/12) who has given the certificate as required under Section 65(B) of the Evidence Act, 1872, has not supported the case of the prosecution and has stated that he has neither given any certificate to anyone nor he has printout the whats app chat from the mobile, but the witness has admitted in the Certificate (Exhibit P/6) he has put his signature on the instruction of police. The said witness was turned hostile and he was allowed to ask leading questions by the prosecution wherein he has again affirmed that he has neither printout any chatting or comments of the whats app group nor he has given the certificate of the printout. In the cross-examination he has admitted that when he was given the Certificate (Exhibit P/6) it was a blank and on the instructions of police he has put his signature in the blank paper. 6. The victim (PW-2) has stated in her evidence that she has told her father that they were discussing on the project file alongwith her friends and other students. 6. The victim (PW-2) has stated in her evidence that she has told her father that they were discussing on the project file alongwith her friends and other students. In the cross-examination she has admitted that the accused and the victim belonged to same community and she treat his father as uncle, therefore, she is his sister. She has also stated that in the school there is prohibition to take the mobile phones and in paragraph 7, she has admitted that no illicit activity was carried out by them and she has also admitted that the same video was shown to her father. 7. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence of the complainant, victim and the person who has given the certificate has recorded its finding that there is no private act shown in the video and in the video it has been shown that all the students are sitting together, therefore, it cannot be termed as obscene photographs to punish the accused for commission of offence under Section 354(C) of IPC and so far as Section 67 of the Act of 2000 is concerned, the learned trial Court has recorded its finding that the video does not fall within the said category as there is no obscene photographs which have been uploaded in the whats app group and Satyanarayan Dewangan (PW- 12) has denied the issuance of certificate, as such, there is no certificate has been placed on record to demonstrate the compliance of Section 65(b) of the Evidence Act, 1872 has been done by the prosecution to prove the charges under Section 67 of Act of 2000. Similarly, for commission of offence under Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012, it has recorded its finding that since the prosecution is unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed sexual harassment to the victim and the victim has not supported the case of the prosecution, accordingly the trial Court has acquitted the accused. 8. Being aggrieved with the acquittal of the accused, this appeal has been preferred by the complainant. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterating the submission would submit that the trial Court has not taken into consideration the important evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the victim’s father who has stated that the video consists of obscene material. 8. Being aggrieved with the acquittal of the accused, this appeal has been preferred by the complainant. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterating the submission would submit that the trial Court has not taken into consideration the important evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the victim’s father who has stated that the video consists of obscene material. He would further submit that the judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality which is liable to be quashed by this Court while hearing the acquittal appeal. 10. Per contra, learned State counsel would submit that the victim in clear term has supported the case of the prosecution still the trial Court has committed illegality in acquitting the accused, therefore, he would pray for allowing the acquittal appeal. 11. This Court has issued notice to the respondent No. 2 and the notice has been served upon the respondent No. 2 on 30.08.2025, but he has chosen not to appear, therefore, in absence of the respondent No. 2, the matter is being heard finally by this Court. 12. From perusal of the evidences discussed above and the material placed on record by the prosecution and also the statement of the victim’s father who in clear terms has admitted that there was no such scenes in the video which can be termed as private act done by the victim and the other person as per provisions of Section 354(C) of the IPC to attract the offence under Section 354(C) of IPC. Section 354(C) reads as under: Section 354C. Voyeurism. - Any man who watches, or captures the image of a woman engaging in a private act in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed either by the perpetrator or by any other person at the behest of the perpetrator or disseminates such image shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine, and be punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three years, but which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation 1.- For the purpose of this section, "private act" includes an act of watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy and where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public. Explanation 2.- Where the victim consents to the capture of the images or any act, but not to their dissemination to third persons and where such image or act is disseminated, such dissemination shall be considered an offence under this section. 13. From the explanation given under Section 354(C) of IPC, for attracting the offence as per this section, the image captured in the video should be pertained to private act of the victim. In the present case there is no such clinching evidence brought on record by the prosecution that the act which image has been captured in the video pertains to private act of the victim. The learned trial Court on the basis of evidence and considering the material placed on record has recorded its finding that the image captured in the video is not related to private act of the victim. This finding is on appreciation of evidence which cannot be said to be perverse and contrary to the evidence, therefore, finding of the trial Court that no offence under Section 354(C) of IPC has been made out cannot be said to be illegal and same is not liable to be interfered by this Court. 14. Hon’ble the Supreme Court in case of Tuhin Kumar Biswas @ Bumba vs. The State of West Bengal reported in 2025 INSC 1373 has examined the provisions of Section 354(C) of IPC in following paragraphs as under:- 19. Section 354C of IPC defines voyeurism as an act of a man watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a ‘private act’ in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed. Section 354C of IPC defines voyeurism as an act of a man watching or capturing the image of a woman engaging in a ‘private act’ in circumstances where she would usually have the expectation of not being observed. ‘Private act’ has been defined in Explanation 1 as an act including “an act of watching carried out in a place which, in the circumstances, would reasonably be expected to provide privacy and where the victim's genitals, posterior or breasts are exposed or covered only in underwear; or the victim is using a lavatory; or the victim is doing a sexual act that is not of a kind ordinarily done in public.” 20. Upon a perusal of the FIR and chargesheet on record, this Court is unable to conclude the same disclose an offence under Section 354C of the IPC since there is no allegation in the FIR and chargesheet that the complainant was watched or captured by the Appellant-accused while she was engaging in a ‘private act’. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment, has concluded with respect to the offence under Section 354C as under:- “11. Allegation made in the written complaint, in my opinion, did not disclose any offence under Section 354C… 12. From the bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clearly intelligible that the allegation of clicking pictures and making video made in the written complaint cannot be said to be an offence within the meaning of Section 354C of IPC.” (emphasis supplied) 22. Further, in order to constitute an offence of criminal intimidation punishable under Section 506 of IPC, it must be shown that the person charged, threatened another with injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm. Except for the bald allegation that the Appellant-accused intimidated the complainant by clicking her photographs, the FIR and chargesheet are completely silent about the manner in which the complainant was threatened with any injury to her person or her property. The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR. Additionally, as stated above, the complainant or her associates never made a statement to substantiate her allegations. Consequently, in the present case, even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, the ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted. The words, if any, uttered by the complainant are not mentioned in the FIR. Additionally, as stated above, the complainant or her associates never made a statement to substantiate her allegations. Consequently, in the present case, even if the allegations in the FIR are taken at face value, the ingredients of offence of criminal intimidation are not attracted. 15. So far as Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is concerned, to appreciate whether the finding of the learned trial Court that offence under Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is not made out against the accused, it is necessary for this Court to examine Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012 which reads as under: 12. Punishment for sexual harassment. - Whoever, commits sexual harassment upon a child shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 16. The sexual harassment has been defined in Section 11 of the POCSO Act, 2012 which reads as under: 11. Sexual harassment .- A person is said to commit sexual harassment upon a child when such person with sexual intent,- (i) utters any word or makes any sound, or makes any gesture or exhibits any object or part of body with the intention that such word or sound shall be heard, or such gesture or object or part of body shall be seen by the child; or (ii) makes a child exhibit his body or any part of his body so as it is seen by such person or any other person; or (iii) shows any object to a child in any form or media for pornographic purposes; or (iv) repeatedly or constantly follows or watches or contacts a child either directly or through electronic, digital or any other means; or (v) threatens to use, in any form of media, a real or fabricated depiction through electronic, film or digital or any other mode, of any part of the body of the child or the involvement of the child in a sexual act; or (vi) entices a child for pornographic purposes or gives gratification therefor. Explanation.- Any question which involves “sexual intent” shall be a question of fact. 17. Explanation.- Any question which involves “sexual intent” shall be a question of fact. 17. From perusal of the image captured in the video, it is quite vivid that the prosecution is unable to prove any of the ingredients of Section 11 of the Act of 2012 against the accused as sexual intend is clear question of fact and the learned trial Court after appreciating the fact has recorded its finding that no offence under Section 12 is made out. The learned trial Court has also taken into consideration the statement of the victim (PW-2) who in the evidence has admitted that there is no obscene scene picturized in the video and they were also not doing any illegal act and on this evidence the trial Court has held that no offence of harassment as per Section 12 of the POCSO Act, 2012 is made out. This finding neither suffers from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court, therefore, the finding of the trial Court that no offence under Section 12 is made out is not liable to be interfered. 18. So far as Section 67 and 67A of the Act of 2000, to ascertain whether the finding of acquittal under Section 67 of the Act of 2000 is legal and justified, this Court has to extract Section 67 and 67A of the Act of 2000 which reads as under: Section 67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form. - Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees. 67A. Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit act, etc., in electronic form. 67A. Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit act, etc., in electronic form. - Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form any material which contains sexually explicit act or conduct shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees. 19. From perusal of Section 67 of Act of 2000, it is quite vivid that punishment for offence under Section 67 of the Act of 2000 the prosecution has to prove that there was obscene scene which has been transmitted either through the video or with the chat beyond reasonable doubt. From the evidence brought on record, it is quite vivid that the father of the victim has stated that there is no obscene scene in the video and even somebody has appreciated this video. He has also admitted that there is no comment about his daughter, therefore, in absence of any material placed on record by the prosecution, for punishing the accused under the offence of Section 67 and 67A of Act of 2000 the acquittal of the accused for the said offence cannot be found faulty or suffers from perversity warranting interference by this Court. 20. Even otherwise, it is well settled position of law that if the trial Court has taken a view which neither suffers from perversity or illegality, the appellate Court should be very slow in interfering in the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in recent judgment in case of Constable 904 Surendra Singh & Another vs. State of Uttarakhand in Criminal Appeal No. 355 of 2013 reported in 2025 INSC 114 has in paragraphs 11(41), 12 and 13 held as under: 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record. 21. In light of the above settled legal position of law and considering the evidence, material on record and also considering the fact that the prosecution has not proved the charges for which the accused has been prosecuted beyond reasonable doubt, the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court does not warrant interference by this Court Accordingly, the acquittal appeal is dismissed.