ORDER : Amitendra Kishore Prasad 1. The present writ petition is being filed seeking following reliefs:- “10.1 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to admit the Writ Petition; issue Rule NISI calling upon the Respondent/ Authorities to show cause as to why the prayers of the Petitioners shall not be allowed and if the Respondents fail to show cause, or show insufficient cause thereof, the said Rule be made absolute in the interest of justice. That, the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to quash the impugned orders of termination /removal from service as vide Annexure-3 (Colly.) by issuing a Writ in the nature of Certiorari. 10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to command the Respondents/Authorities to reinstatement the Petitioners against their posts which are perennial in nature and they may further be directed to allow these Petitioners to continue further as before till the Company survives or in the alternative, without leave of this Hon'ble Court and also be granted with all consequential service benefits. etc., in the interest of justice. 10.3 Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem and proper in the present circumstances of the case” 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioners were duly selected in the year 2008 by a duly constituted Selection Committee of the Management of Utility Powertech Limited (UPL), a Joint Venture Company of NTPC Limited and Reliance Infrastructure Limited having equal shareholding, and were issued letters of appointment against substantive posts, whereafter they have continuously rendered satisfactory services without any adverse remark in their service records; Petitioner No.1 was initially appointed as Supervisor (Civil) on 28.04.2008 and is presently working as Assistant Engineer (Civil), while petitioner No.2 was appointed as Junior Engineer on 02.02.2008 and is presently working as Junior Engineer (Grade-I), and their recent engagements were for the periods 01.04.2023 to 31.03.2024 and 01.07.2023 to 31.12.2023 respectively at the UPL project site, Korba. The petitioners were given to understand that UPL, being a sister concern of NTPC Limited and managed substantially by NTPC personnel, would continue to retain employees recruited on merit and qualifications so long as the Joint Venture and its principal partner subsisted, and accordingly, though termed contractual and tenure-based, their engagements were renewed year after year due to continued requirement of work, availability of substantive workload and satisfactory performance, with parity in duties and responsibilities with regular employees of NTPC projects; however, while their tenure engagements were subsisting and without any closure of projects or reduction of manpower, the Deputy Manager (HR) of respondent No.2- Company issued communications dated around 31.08.2023 abruptly terminating their engagements with effect from 30.09.2023, citing vague reasons stated to be beyond the control of the Company and treating the said communication as one month’s notice, despite the fact that the appointing authority was of a much higher rank, namely the General Manager, rendering the termination orders without jurisdiction. The petitioners contend that such termination is arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory, particularly when similarly placed and even junior employees have been retained, in violation of settled principles of “last come first go” and Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, and that the respondents have indulged in pick-and-choose without disclosing any rational basis; subsequent thereto, the respondents further issued an order dated 13.10.2023 directing the petitioners to vacate the residential quarters by 31.10.2023 and issued service certificates on 02.11.2023, thereby aggravating their hardship, especially in the case of petitioner No.1 who has minor school-going children and no alternative accommodation or source of livelihood; despite repeated representations dated 06.09.2023, 07.09.2023, 12.09.2023 and 15.09.2023 seeking continuation till completion of tenure and reinstatement, no relief was granted, though similarly situated employees have obtained interim protection from the High Court of Orissa in WP(C) No.31625/2023; hence, alleging violation of fundamental rights, arbitrariness in decision-making, lack of competence of the terminating authority and infringement of their right to livelihood, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present writ petition 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners were initially appointed on contractual basis on 28.04.2008 and 02.02.2008 respectively and have been illegally and arbitrarily terminated without assigning any cogent or sufficient reasons, which action is ex facie violative of the settled principles of natural justice. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the petitioners were initially appointed on contractual basis on 28.04.2008 and 02.02.2008 respectively and have been illegally and arbitrarily terminated without assigning any cogent or sufficient reasons, which action is ex facie violative of the settled principles of natural justice. It is further contended that the case of the present petitioners is squarely covered by the judgment passed by this Court in Sushanta Kumar Rath and others v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. and others , WP(C) No.31625/2023 , wherein similarly situated employees have been granted protection, and therefore the petitioners are also entitled to identical relief. Learned counsel submits that the premature termination of the petitioners’ contractual engagement prior to the expiry of the tenure, i.e., till 01.04.2023 and 31.12.2023 respectively, infringes their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India, particularly when no show cause notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded to them, rendering the impugned order dated 31.08.2023 void ab initio for non-compliance of the rule of audi alteram partem. It is argued that the respondents have also failed to adhere to the principle of “first come last go” while issuing the orders of disengagement and have ignored the repeated representations submitted by the petitioners, compelling them to approach the Labour Department, which in turn advised them to seek redressal before this Court. Learned counsel would further submit that the illegal termination has gravely affected the Petitioners’ right to livelihood and shelter, protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, inasmuch as they have been deprived of their sole source of income, and in the case of petitioner No.1, his minor children are pursuing their education at Korba, Chhattisgarh, and the family has no independent house or alternative means of livelihood except the accommodation provided by respondent No.2 – UPL. It is contended that the respondents, while discharging public functions, have acted in an arbitrary and unjust manner, giving a complete go-bye to the principles of social justice, despite the fact that the work being discharged by the petitioners is of a perennial nature and there was no justification to retrench employees who are in the middle of their service career. 4. 4. Learned State counsel would submit that grievance of petitioners pertains to the alleged termination of their contractual engagement by the Deputy Manager (HR) of respondent No.2- Company vide communication dated 31.08.2023; it is contended that the writ petition as framed is wholly misleading, suffers from misrepresentation of facts and is misconceived in law, and therefore deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. Learned State counsel would further submit that the petitioners have never submitted any representation or grievance before the answering respondent at any point of time and no order has been passed by the answering respondent against the petitioners, as such there is no occasion or requirement for the answering respondent to comment upon the merits of the allegations raised in the petition. It is further urged that any issue arising out of the present dispute squarely falls within the jurisdiction of respondent No.3, who alone is the competent authority to deal with the same, and the answering respondent has been impleaded only in a formal capacity, with no substantive relief having been claimed against it. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 would submit that the impugned order dated 31.08.2023 terminating the contractual engagement of the petitioners has been passed by respondent No.2, namely Utility Powertech Limited, which was also the appointing authority, and therefore the writ petition, as framed, is not maintainable against respondent No.1 – NTPC Limited. It is contended that the petitioners were appointed purely on contractual and tenure basis by respondent No.2, which is a joint venture company incorporated as a private entity and not a public sector undertaking, nor an instrumentality of the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, as it is neither a Government company under Section 2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013 nor does it have majority Government shareholding, and merely having NTPC Limited as one of its shareholders does not render it amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Learned counsel submits that respondent No.2 is an independent legal entity having its own Board of Directors, separate establishment, independent contracts, and executes works for NTPC Limited under contractual arrangements, and therefore no public law element is involved in the termination of contractual employees governed purely by the terms of appointment, which clearly stipulate that the engagement is renewable annually based on work requirement and can be terminated by either side by giving one month’s notice or pay in lieu thereof. It is further argued that no relief has been claimed against NTPC Limited, nor could any relief be granted against it, since the petitioners were never its employees and the termination letters under challenge were issued solely by respondent No.2. Learned counsel would also submit that the petitioners have approached this Court with unclean hands by suppressing the material fact that they had earlier filed WPC No.4718/2023 seeking similar relief, which was withdrawn with liberty to approach the appropriate forum, yet in the present writ petition they have falsely stated that no such proceedings were ever initiated, thereby rendering the petition liable to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material facts. It is further contended that the petition has, in any event, become infructuous as the contractual periods of both petitioners have already expired by efflux of time and their appointment letters specifically provided for automatic termination on expiry of the contract period. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of St. Mary Education Society and Others v. Rajendra Prasad , reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and having carefully perused the pleadings and material placed on record, this Court proceeds to decide the writ petition on merits. 7. The undisputed facts reveal that the petitioners were engaged by respondent No.2–Utility Powertech Limited (UPL) on contractual and tenure basis. Their initial engagement dates back to the year 2008 and thereafter their contracts were renewed from time to time depending upon the requirement of work. The latest engagements of petitioner No.1 were for the period from 01.04.2023 to 31.03.2024 and of petitioner No.2 from 01.07.2023 to 31.12.2023. The impugned communication dated 31.08.2023 terminating their contractual engagement was admittedly issued by respondent No.2, which was also the appointing authority. 8. The latest engagements of petitioner No.1 were for the period from 01.04.2023 to 31.03.2024 and of petitioner No.2 from 01.07.2023 to 31.12.2023. The impugned communication dated 31.08.2023 terminating their contractual engagement was admittedly issued by respondent No.2, which was also the appointing authority. 8. Respondent No.2 is a joint venture company incorporated under the Companies Act, having its own independent legal existence, Board of Directors and establishment. Merely because NTPC Limited holds 50% shareholding in the joint venture, respondent No. 2 does not become a “Government company” within the meaning of Section 2(45) of the Companies Act, 2013, nor can it be treated as “State” or “instrumentality of the State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The relationship between the petitioners and respondent No.2 is purely contractual in nature and governed by the terms of engagement. No statutory duty or public law element has been demonstrated so as to attract writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of St. Mary's Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava , reported in (2023) 4 SCC 498 has held as under : “75.1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public. 75.2. Even if it be assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. It is indisputably a public law action which confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element. 75.3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a constitutional court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a “public function” or “public duty” be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognised as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.” 10. It is well settled that contractual employees do not acquire a vested or indefeasible right to continue beyond the terms of contract. The appointment letters specifically provided that the engagement was tenure-based, renewable subject to requirement, and terminable by either party by giving one month’s notice or salary in lieu thereof. Termination in accordance with contractual terms does not, by itself, amount to violation of principles of natural justice. In such cases, issuance of show cause notice or holding of disciplinary enquiry is not mandatory unless the termination is punitive or stigmatic, which is not the case here. Termination in accordance with contractual terms does not, by itself, amount to violation of principles of natural justice. In such cases, issuance of show cause notice or holding of disciplinary enquiry is not mandatory unless the termination is punitive or stigmatic, which is not the case here. The contention that the termination was arbitrary or discriminatory on the ground of non-adherence to the principle of “last come first go” also cannot be accepted. The said principle is applicable in cases of retrenchment governed by statutory service rules or labour laws. The Petitioners were engaged on individual contracts, and disengagement pursuant to contractual terms cannot be tested on the anvil of seniority principles unless specifically provided for in the contract, which is admittedly not so in the present case. 11. So far as the argument that the Deputy Manager (HR) was not competent to issue the termination order is concerned, the record does not disclose any statutory rule or binding regulation prohibiting such delegation of administrative powers within respondent No. 2. In absence of any such prohibition, internal administrative authorization cannot be scrutinized in writ jurisdiction, particularly when the termination itself flows from contractual stipulations. The plea of parity with the interim order passed by the High Court of Orissa in Sushanta Kumar Rath and others is also of no assistance to the petitioners. An interim order passed in another writ petition does not lay down a binding precedent, nor does it confer an enforceable right of automatic parity, especially when maintainability itself is in question before this Court. 12. Additionally, it is not in dispute that the contractual periods for which the petitioners were last engaged have already expired by efflux of time. In terms of the appointment letters, the contract stood automatically terminated on expiry of the tenure. Even otherwise, therefore, no effective relief of reinstatement can be granted at this stage, rendering the writ petition infructuous. 13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition is not maintainable against respondent No.2, no enforceable legal or fundamental right of the petitioners has been violated, the termination is in consonance with the contractual terms. 14. Consequently, the writ petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed No order as to costs.