Charki Bai, D/o. Late Gosla v. Budhram, S/o. Late Nanku
2026-01-13
Parth Prateem Sahu
body2026
DailyLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : PARTH PRATEEM SAHU, J. 1. This second appeal is filed by the appellants/defendants challenging the legality and sustainability of the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.01.2014, passed by the Third Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, Sarguja in Civil Appeal No.82-A/2012, whereby learned Third Additional District Judge has dismissed the appeal filed by appellant/defendants affirming the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2012, passed in Civil Suit No.43-A/2011, whereby learned Civil Judge Class-I, allowed the civil suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents. 2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that plaintiffs, who are legal representatives of late Nanku Ram and Budhi filed a civil suit seeking relief of declaration of title of the property mentioned in Schedule-A of the plaint situated at village – Rakeli based on family partition/family settlement between their ancestors in the year 1950, they be declared owner of entire property as mentioned in Schedule-A, to pass an order of permanent injunction in favour of plaintiffs over the property as mentioned in Schedule-A and to restrain defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over the property as mentioned in Schedule-A either by themselves or by their agents or any other person. Pleadings in the plaint are that plaintiffs and defendants are legal heirs of same ancestor late Kundo Uraon. Kundo Uraon was survived by three sons namely Nanku, Gosla and Budhi, who also died. Plaintiffs are legal heirs of Nanku and Budhi whereas defendants are legal heirs of Gosla. Property situated at village Rakeli forming part of Schedule-A is fallen in share of Nanku and Budhi in oral partition made by late Kundo Uraon during his lifetime near bout in the year 1950. Other property situated at village – Kalyanpur was given in partition to Gosla. It was further pleaded that the property as forming part of Schedule-A, B, C & D are the property purchased by income of joint family property during lifetime of late Kundo Uraon. Property forming part of Schedule-A was given in share of Nanku and Budhi and property forming part of Schedule -B, C & D were given in share to Gosla, ancestor of defendants since 1950 i.e. by way of family partition/family arrangements. Nanku and Budhi possessed the property of Schedule-A and Gosla possessed the property of Schedule B, C D during their lifetime and after death of Nanku, Budhi, Gosla, their legal heirs came in possession.
Nanku and Budhi possessed the property of Schedule-A and Gosla possessed the property of Schedule B, C D during their lifetime and after death of Nanku, Budhi, Gosla, their legal heirs came in possession. The dispute arose in the year 2005 when defendants have whispered about repartition of the properties as mentioned in Schedule-A of the plaint. 3. Defendants have filed their written statement denying pleadings of the partition of property between Nanku, Budhi and Gosla. It was pleaded that it was not a partition but Nanku and Budhi possessed the property of Schedule-A situated at village- Rakeli and Gosla on the property situated at village – Kalyanpur. Property as mentioned in Schedule-C was earlier recorded as Jungle Jhadi , which was given in favour of Gosla under Nistari Patta vide order dated 08.06.1955 and thereby property of Schedule-C was self earned property of Gosla. Kundo has never partitioned the property during his lifetime. Plaintiffs submitted an application for correction of mistake in which order was passed on 30.06.2005. 4. Based on the pleadings made by respective parties, learned trial Court formulated as many as 7 issues for consideration and upon appreciation of pleadings and evidence brought on record by respective parties allowed the suit holding that the property as mentioned in Schedule A & B were joint family property. Property mentioned in Schedule-A was received by plaintiffs in partition and thereby they are sole owner of property of Schedule-A and are in possession also. 5. Judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court was put to challenge by defendants in an appeal filed under Section 96 of C.P.C. on the grounds as mentioned therein. Learned First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal upholding the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court dated 31.08.2012, which is under challenge in this appeal. 6. This appeal was admitted vide order dated 29.06.2015 on following substantial question of law :- “Whether the findings of the Courts below that family arrangement as partition is perverse?” 7. Learned counsel for appellants submits that the finding recorded by both the Courts below that there was a partition of property by late Kundo Uraon during his lifetime is perverse to the evidence available on record.
Learned counsel for appellants submits that the finding recorded by both the Courts below that there was a partition of property by late Kundo Uraon during his lifetime is perverse to the evidence available on record. Both the Courts below erred in holding that there was earlier partition without there being any clinching evidence in this regard and prays for setting aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court and affirmed by learned First Appellate Court and prayed for dismissal of the suit. 8. Learned counsel for respective respondents vehemently opposes the submission of learned counsel for appellants and would submit that the finding arrived at by learned trial Court and upheld by learned First Appellate Court that there was oral partition between the parties during lifetime of late Kundo Uraon is on proper appreciation of documentary and oral evidence of the parties, hence, it does not call for any interference. 9. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the records of trial Court as also the First Appellate Court. 10. In support of the pleadings made in the plaint, plaintiffs have produced Kistbandi Khatauni of the property situated at Village- Rakeli of the year 2003-04 as Ex.P-1, Khasra of the year 2003-04 of village Rakeli as Ex.P-2, Kistbandi Khatauni of the property situated at Village- Kalyanpur as Ex.P-3, Khasra of the property situated at village- Kalyanpur as Ex.P-4, Kistbandi Khatauni of other property situated at village – Kalyanpur is marked as Ex.P-5 and Kistbandi Khatauni of Village – Kalyanpur as Ex.P-6. Documents of Sarguja settlement of the year 1940 of Khatiyan of Village- Kalyanpur (Gadachiranga) is produced as Ex.P-7 and Sarguja State Settlement Khatiyan of the year 1940 of village- Rakeli as Ex.P-8. Plaintiffs have examined Budhram, S/o. Nanku, plaintiff No.1 as (P.W.-1), Haura, S/o. Budhi as (P.W.-2), Ramsagar, S/o. Tirka as (P.W.-3), Bultu, S/o. Choor as (P.W.-4) and Nandkeshwar, S/o. Dilbahal as (P.W.-5). 11. Defendants in support of their pleadings in written statement has produced the copy of the order dated 08.06.2005 of Naib Tahsildar as (Ex.D-1), Adhikar Abhilekh Panji of 1954 as Ex.D-2. Defendants have examined Chamara, defendant No.3 as D.W.-1, Rambhaj, S/o. Muneshwar as D.W.-2. 12. Perusal of the documents (Ex.P-7) i.e. Khatiyan under Srguja State Settlement of the year 1940 would show that name of all three brothers is recorded jointly on the land bearing Kh.
Defendants have examined Chamara, defendant No.3 as D.W.-1, Rambhaj, S/o. Muneshwar as D.W.-2. 12. Perusal of the documents (Ex.P-7) i.e. Khatiyan under Srguja State Settlement of the year 1940 would show that name of all three brothers is recorded jointly on the land bearing Kh. No.51, 54, 204, 207, 177, 178, 179, 181 and part of the land above mentioned in Schedule – B and Schedule-C and D. Aforementioned property under Sarguja State settlement is of village Kalyanpur (Gadhachiranga). The property situated at village – Rakeli of Kh. No.13, 14, 15, 16, 126, 128, 132, 134, 155 is recorded in the name of -Kundo. Some other land is also mentioned in schedule-C of village Kalyanpur. 13. Budhram (P.W.-1) in his evidence has clearly stated that in the year 1950 during lifetime of Kundo Uraon, property as mentioned in Schedule A, B, C & D, was orally partitioned between the parties under family settlement and entire property was divided into three equal share. Property as mentioned in Schedule-A of the suit was given to Nanku and Budhi i.e. elder and youngest son of Kundo Uraon and property as forming part of Schedule B, C & D was given to Gosla, intermediate son of Kundo and since then all three sons of Kundo possessed the property received by them in partition during their lifetime separately. He also stated that due to mentioning of name of late Gosla, their legal representatives made an attempt to deny the earlier partition between their ancestors for which a meeting was also taken place and only because of dispute raised by defendants, plaintiffs also submitted an application for mutation of their names. It is also stated that defendants have sold the big chunk of property of Schedule-B to one Larence Kujur, S/o. Imil Kujur. This witness was cross-examined, however, he stand to the pleadings and evidence made in examination-in-chief with regard to earlier partition of property during lifetime of late Kundo Uraon in the year 1950 and accordingly their ancestors were in possession and earning their livelihood separately from the property received by them in their share. 14. Defendants No.3, Chamara is examined as D.W.-1. Though in examination-in-chief, he denied the partition between the ancestors earlier, however, in cross-examination, he admitted that parties to the suit are following Hindu religion. Plaintiffs are residing at village Rakeli and defendants at village Kalyanpur.
14. Defendants No.3, Chamara is examined as D.W.-1. Though in examination-in-chief, he denied the partition between the ancestors earlier, however, in cross-examination, he admitted that parties to the suit are following Hindu religion. Plaintiffs are residing at village Rakeli and defendants at village Kalyanpur. He also admitted that there was no dispute between three brothers during their lifetime i.e. Nanku, Gosla and Budhi. In para -12 of his evidence, he admitted that he has sold about 10 acres of land of his share of village Kalyanpur to Larence, S/o. Imil Kujur. He also admitted that three brothers were cultivating land separately. Panchayat meeting just before filing of suit is also admitted and further he admits that before Panchayat meeting and during the dispute, defendants have stated that they have sold the land of village Kalyanpur of their share. He also admitted that dispute arose when after death of Gosla, father of defendants, their names were mutated in the property of Schedule-A and thereafter, plaintiffs have submitted an application for mutation of their names in the property of village- Kalyanpur and since then dispute arose. 15. From the aforementioned facts of the case it is reflecting that both the sides in their evidences have admitted that during lifetime of Nanku, Budhi and Gosla, they were doing agricultural work separately, Gosla at Village- Kalyanpur and Nanku and Budhi at village – Rakeli. According to the pleadings, oral partition was affected in the year 1950. From the facts and evidence available on record, it can be culled out that earlier partition between three brothers were accepted by them without any grudge and during their lifetime till before 2005, earlier Nanku, Budhi and Gosla were in separate possession earned their livelihood and thereafter plaintiffs and defendants. It is also the evidence that defendant No.3 son of Gosla had sold the land of his share situated at village Kalyanpur, which is about 10 acres of land. There is also evidence that at the time of selling of land of share of defendant No.3- Chamara, plaintiffs have not raised any objection, which shows that partition which was affected as early in the year 1950 pleaded and stated by plaintiffs and also partly admitted by defendants, was acted upon between the parties. 16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kale & Ors. Vs.
16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kale & Ors. Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation & Ors., reported in (1976) 3 SCC 119 , observed that the object of a family arrangement is to protect the family from long drawn litigation or perpetual strife which mars the unity and the solidarity of the family and create hatred and bad blood between the various members of the family. It promotes social justice through wider distribution of wealth. Courts lean in favour of family arrangements. Technical or trivial grounds are overlooked. Rule of estoppel is pressed into service to prevent unsettling of a settled dispute. 17. It is further observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment held that by virtue of a family settlement or arrangement members of a family descending from a common ancestor or a near relation seek to sink their differences and disputes, settle and resolve their conflicting claims or disputed titles once for all in order to buy peace of mind and bring about complete harmony and goodwill in the family. Family arrangements are governed by a special equity peculiar to themselves and will be enforced if honestly made. The bona-fides and propriety of a family arrangement has to be judged by the circumstances prevailing at the time when such settlement was made. Parties to the family arrangement who have benefited thereunder are precluded from assailing it. 18. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Harishankar Singhania & Ors. Vs. Gaur Hari Singhania & Others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 658 has observed thus :- “42. Another fact that assumes importance at this stage is that, a family settlement is treated differently from any other formal commercial settlement as such settlement in the eye of the law ensures peace and goodwill among the family members. Such family settlements generally meet with approval of the courts. Such settlements are governed by a special equity principle where the terms are fair and bona fide, taking into account the well-being of a family. 43. The concept of “family arrangement or settlement and the present one in hand, in our opinion, should be treated differently. Technicalities of limitation, etc. should not be put at risk of the implementation of a settlement drawn by a family, which is essential for maintaining peace and harmony in a family.
43. The concept of “family arrangement or settlement and the present one in hand, in our opinion, should be treated differently. Technicalities of limitation, etc. should not be put at risk of the implementation of a settlement drawn by a family, which is essential for maintaining peace and harmony in a family. Also it can be seen from decided cases of this Court that, any such arrangement would be upheld if family settlements were entered into to allay disputes existing or apprehended and even any dispute or difference apart, if it was entered into bona fide to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family. Even a semblance of a claim or some other ground, as say affection, may suffice as observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi [ (1965) 3 SCR 841 : AIR 1966 SC 323 ]. 44. In Lala Khunni Lal v. Kunwar Gobind Krishna Narain [(1911) 38 IA 87 : ILR (1911) 33 All 356 (PC)] the Privy Council examined that it is the duty of the courts to uphold and give full effect to a family arrangement. 45. In Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram [ (1955) 2 SCR 22 : AIR 1955 SC 481 ] (Vivian Bose, Jagannadhadas and B.P. Sinha, JJ.) placing reliance on Clifton v. Cockburn [(1834) 3 My & K 76 : (1824-34) All ER Rep 181 : 40 ER 30] and Williams v. Williams [(1867) LR 2 Ch App 294] this Court held that a family arrangement can, as a matter of law, be implied from a long course of dealings between the parties. It was held that: (SCR p. 43) “[S]o strongly do the courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all, that we have no hesitation in taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement.…” * * * * * 47. In Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi [ (1965) 3 SCR 841 : AIR 1966 SC 323 ] this Court observed as follows: (SCR pp. 850 G-851 B) “Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family.
In Ram Charan Das v. Girjanandini Devi [ (1965) 3 SCR 841 : AIR 1966 SC 323 ] this Court observed as follows: (SCR pp. 850 G-851 B) “Courts give effect to a family settlement upon the broad and general ground that its object is to settle existing or future disputes regarding property amongst members of a family. … The consideration for such a settlement, if one may put it that way, is the expectation that such a settlement will result in establishing or ensuring amity and goodwill amongst persons bearing relationship with one another.” 52. In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi [ (1998) 3 SCC 573 ] (Sujata Manohar and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ.) it was held that the true intent and purport of the arbitration agreement must be examined (para 21). Further, the Court examined that: (SCC pp. 594-95, para 52) “[A] family settlement which settles disputes within the family should not be lightly interfered with especially when the settlement has been already acted upon by some members of the family. In the present case, from 1989 to 1995 the memorandum of understanding has been substantially acted upon and hence the parties must be held to the settlement which is in the interest of the family and which avoids disputes between the members of the family. Such settlements have to be viewed a little differently from ordinary contracts and their internal mechanism for working out the settlement should not be lightly disturbed.” (emphasis supplied) 53. Therefore, in our opinion, technical considerations should give way to peace and harmony in the enforcement of family arrangements or settlements.” 19. Larger Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in case of Chinnappareddigari Peda Mutyala Reddy Vs. Chinnappareddigari Venkata Reddy & Ors., reported in 1967 SCC OnLine AP 4 has observed that process of partition contemplates three phases i.e. severance of status, division of joint property by metes and bounds and nature of possession of various share. 20. In the case at hand, it is an admitted fact that both the parties are having the status of serverancy since the time of their ancestor, they are in separate possession of separate properties, having separate kitchen residing in separate house, and defendants in different village. The partition through family settlement was between fathers of plaintiffs and defendants.
20. In the case at hand, it is an admitted fact that both the parties are having the status of serverancy since the time of their ancestor, they are in separate possession of separate properties, having separate kitchen residing in separate house, and defendants in different village. The partition through family settlement was between fathers of plaintiffs and defendants. During lifetime of their fathers, according to pleadings made in the plaint since 1950 there was no dispute till 2003- 04 and in between the defendants have also sold the property given to their share (of about 10 acres of land) by registered sale deed in which plaintiffs have not objected, which shows that, oral partition through family settlement has been acted upon by the parties and they were in separate possession since last about more than 40 years. 21. In case of Chanvirappa v. Danava , reported in ILR 1894 Bom 593, it was held that partition made by mother as guardian of his minor son is valid, it will bind minor when he becomes major, he can have it set-aside if it can be shown to be illegal or fraudulent. 22. In case of Narendra Kante Vs Anuradha Kante and Ors , reported in (2010) (2) SCC 77 , the fact of the case was that while reducing in writing the family settlement, one co-sharer not signed, it was held that though the family settlement is not signed by one co-sharer, but when the family settlement is acted upon by the co-sharer, then the ground raised that it was not signed by him was liable to be rejected and held thus :- “27. As was held in M.N. Aryamurthy [ (1972) 4 SCC 1 ] , under the Hindu Law if a family arrangement is not accepted unanimously, it fails to become a binding precedent on the co-sharers. Both Mr Vivek Tankha and Mr Anoop G. Chaudhari, learned Senior Advocates, brought this point to our notice to indicate that all the co-sharers had not consented to the deed of family settlement which could not, therefore, be relied upon. The argument would have had force had it not been for the fact that acting upon the said settlement, the appellant had also executed sale deeds in respect of the suit property.
The argument would have had force had it not been for the fact that acting upon the said settlement, the appellant had also executed sale deeds in respect of the suit property. Having done so, it would not be open to the appellant to now contend that the deed of family settlement was invalid.” . 23. Admission of the parties to the suit in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the opinion of this Court, there was oral partition through family settlements between three sons of late Kundo (ancestors of parties to the suit). During lifetime three son’s of late Kundo were happily residing and were in their separate possession of the properties of their share for more than 40 years without any dispute. 24. In view of the above discussions and the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court as mentioned above, in the opinion of this Court, finding recorded by learned trial Court and affirmed by learned First Appellate Court is upon proper appreciation of facts and evidence available on record. Partition of property through oral partition is factual finding recorded by both the Courts below concurrently. 25. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty reported in AIR 1996 SC 3521 , has held that interference with the concurrent findings of the Courts below by the High Court under Section 100 of CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence just to replace the findings of the Lower Court. Even assuming that another view is possible on re-appreciation of the same evidence that should not have been done by the High Court, as it cannot be said that the view taken by the First Appellate Court was based on no material. 26. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Shiv Dayal and Another , Reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para Nos. 14, 15 & 16 as under:- “14. True it is as has been laid down by this Court in several decisions that “concurrent finding of fact” is usually binding on the High Court while hearing the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). However, this rule of law is subject to certain well-known exceptions mentioned infra. 15.
However, this rule of law is subject to certain well-known exceptions mentioned infra. 15. It is a trite law that in order to record any finding on the facts, the trial court is required to appreciate the entire evidence (oral and documentary) in the light of the pleadings of the parties. Similarly, it is also a trite law that the appellate court also has the jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence de novo while hearing the first appeal and either affirm the finding of the trial court or reverse it. If the appellate court affirms the finding, it is called “concurrent finding of fact” whereas if the finding is reversed, it is called “reversing finding”. These expressions are well known in the legal parlance. 16. When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded dehors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (See observation made by learned Judge, Vivian Bose, J., as his Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar [Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar v. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar, 1942 SCC OnLine MP 26 : AIR 1943 Nag 117] para 43.)” 27. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sukhbiri Devi and Others vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322 while reiterating the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Dayal and Another (supra), has held that interference with the concurrent findings in subsequent appeal can be made if it is pointed out that it has been passed dehors the pleadings or based on no evidence or based on misreading of material evidence or against the provision of law etc. 28. The decision relied upon learned counsel for appellants in case of case Sakhahari Parwatrao Karahale & Anr. v. Bhimashankar Parwatrao Karahale, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 608 and in case of Chinthamani Ammal vs Nandagopal Gounder And Anr , reported in (2007) 4 SCC 163 can be differentiated on facts. 29.
28. The decision relied upon learned counsel for appellants in case of case Sakhahari Parwatrao Karahale & Anr. v. Bhimashankar Parwatrao Karahale, reported in (2002) 9 SCC 608 and in case of Chinthamani Ammal vs Nandagopal Gounder And Anr , reported in (2007) 4 SCC 163 can be differentiated on facts. 29. For the foregoing discussions, I do not find any merit in this appeal and accordingly, substantial question of law as formulated is decided against appellants. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. 30. Decree be drawn accordingly. No order as to costs.