1 CGHC010004122021 2026:CGHC:30697 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 122 of 2021  Dr. Anubha Sharma W/o Ashish Kumar Sharma Aged About 42 Years Working As Ayurveda Medical Officer, Posted At Village Suregaon, Block- Dondilohara, District- Balod (Chhattisgarh) --- Petitioner versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Health And Family Welfare Department, Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 2. The Director Ayurveda, Yoga Evam Prakritik Chikitsa, Unani Sidha Evam Homeopathy (Ayush) Chhattisgarh, Raipur, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh) 3. The Collector Balod, District Balod (Chhattisgarh) 4. The District Ayurveda Officer Balod, District Balod (Chhattisgarh) 5. Dr. Jyoti Gajbhiye District Ayurveda Adhikari, Balod, District Balod (Chhattisgarh) --- Respondent(s) WPS No. 2668 of 2021  Dr. Anubha Sharma W/o Ashish Kumar Sharma Aged About 42 Years Working As Ayurveda Medical Officer Posted At Village Suregaon, Block Dondilohara, District Balod Chhattisgarh., District : Balod, Chhattisgarh ---Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary , Health And Family Welfare Department , Mahanadi Bhawan, Nava Raipur Atal Nagar , District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 2. The Director Ayurveda, Yoga Evam Prakritik Chikitsa , Unani Sidha Evam Homeopathy(Ayush) Chhattisgarh, Raipur , District Raipur Chhattisgarh. 3. The Collector Balod District Balod Chhattisgarh. 4. The District Ayurveda Officer Balod District Balod Chhattisgarh. SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Digitally signed by SIDDHANT TAMRAKAR Date: 2026.07.22 16:44:32 +0530 2 --- Respondent(s) WPS No. 122 of 2021 For Petitioner : Mr. Vikas Dubey, Advocate For State : Mr. Keshav Gupta, Government Advocate For Respondent No. 5 : Mr. Parag Kotecha, Advocate WPS No. 2668 of 2021 For Petitioner : Mr. Vikas Dubey, Advocate For State : Mr. Keshav Gupta, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 20.07 .2026 1. By way of WPS No. 122 of 2021, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 To kindly quash/set aside the order dated 15/12/2020 (Annexure P/1) passed by respondent no. 4 with consequential effects. 10.2 To kindly pass any other order or grant any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. By way of WPS No. 2668 of 2021, the petitioner has sought the following relief(s):- “10.1 To kindly direct the respondent no. 3 & 4 to consider a fresh with respect to extension of contract services of the petitioner with consequential effects and benefits. 10.2 To kindly set aside the notice dated 16/4/2021 (received by petitioner on 19/5/2021) issued by the respondent no. 4. 10.3 To kindly pass any other order or grant any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deems fit under the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Facts in brief are that the petitioner an Ayurveda Medical Officer was appointed on contract basis at Government Ayurved Dispensary, Village 3 Suregaon, Block Dondilohara, District Balod on 16.04.2007 for period of one year. Her contractual period was extended from time to time. During Covid-19 outburst, as alleged, she remained absent from services, and therefore, after service of one month notice, her services were terminated vide order dated 15.12.2020. Interim relief was granted to the petitioner vide order dated 08.01.2021, but prior to said date, services of the petitioner were discontinued and she was not permitted to join services, and therefore, she filed subsequent writ petition bearing WPS No. 2668 of 2021. 4. Mr. Vikas Dubey, Advocate would contend that the order impugned dated 15.12.2020 is punitive and stigmatic, and therefore, respondent authorities were required to conduct an inquiry before termination of her services. It is also argued by Mr. Vikas Dubey that the ACRs for year 2020 and 2021 were taken into consideration while taking decision with regard to non-extension of services of the petitioner, whereas, those ACRs were never communicated. He would contend that though the petitioner was a contractual employee, the employer was under an obligation to communicate ACRs as held by the Hon’bls Supreme Court in the matter of Dev Dutt vs. Union of India and Others reported in (2008) 8 SCC 725. He has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Ram Maurya vs. Union of India and others reported in 2006 (SCC) (L&S) 1677, K. Ragupathi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others reported in 2022 (2) SCC (L&S) 253, Swati Priyadarshini vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in 2024 SSC Online SC 2139 and a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Division Bench in the matter of Humendra Kumar Pawade vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others passed in W.A. No. 813 of 2018. He would pray to allow this petition. 4 5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for respondents would oppose. They would submit that during Covid-19 outburst, the petitioner, who was Ayurveda Medical Officer, was directed to perform isolated duties and to look after the patients, but she remained absent from services, therefore, one month notice was issued, and thereafter, her services were terminated in accordance with the provisions of Chhattisgarh Civil Sewa (Samvida Niyukti) Niyam, 2012(for short “Rules, 2012”). It is contended that one month advance notice was served upon the petitioner and decision was taken strictly in accordance with the Rule 11(5) of Rules, 2012. It is also contended that order dated 15.12.2020 is neither punitive nor stigmatic, and therefore, there was no occasion for the respondents to hold an inquiry. They would submit that both the petitions deserve to be dismissed. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents placed on record. 7. Admittedly, the petitioner was a contractual employee. She was appointed to the post of Ayurveda Medical Officer vide order dated 16.04.2007. The order dated 15.12.2020 would reveal that her services were discontinued on account of her absence from duties. Further on a particular date during inspection, she was found absent from Hospital. It is next stated in the order impugned that the conduct of the petitioner was found in contravention to the Rule 3 (ii) Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 (for short “Rules, 1965”). 8. Admittedly, there were allegations against the petitioner and this fact is evident from order impugned. Thus, the order impugned appears to be 5 stigmatic and punitive in nature. The motive of the order impugned was absence of the petitioner from her duties, and therefore, the respondent authorities should have conducted an inquiry. Admittedly, petitioner was not afforded opportunity of hearing by the respondents. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hari Ram Maurya (supra) in para 3 held as under :- “3. From the order of termination Annexure P-7, it appears that the same refers to the show-cause notice dated 20.08.2002 which is to be found at Annexure P-5. It is stated therein that the appellant demanded kickback with a view to help the complainant to get a favourable order in the pension matter. That being so, there was a clear charge of bribery levelled against the appellant. No doubt, the appellant was a temporary employee, but if he is sought to be removed on the ground that he was guilty of the charge of bribery, it becomes necessary for the respondent Union of India to hold an inquiry and thereafter to act in accordance with law. In this case, admittedly, no inquiry was conduced, and that is obvious even from Annexure P-7, the letter described as disengagement of causal labour. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as also the order of termination Annexure P-7 dated 30.09.2002. This, however, will not prevent the respondents from taking action in accordance with law.” 10. In the matter of K. Ragupathi (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 14 held as under:- “14. It could thus be seen that though the communication of the said University dated 12th August 2014 states that the appellant’s contractual period has expired, in the facts of the present case, it would reveal that his services were discontinued on account of the allegation made against him by the Dean of the said University. Since even according to 6 the said University, though the employment was contractual but the employee was entitled to get all the benefits of a regular employee, we find that in the facts of the present case, the appellant’s services could not have been terminated without following the principles of natural justice. We therefore find that the present appeal deserves to be allowed on this short ground.” 11. In the matter of Swati Priyadarshini (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that before passing any stigmatic order for removal of any employee from service, a departmental enquiry is required to be done. Relevant para 34 is reproduced herein-below :- “34. It is profitable to refer to what five learned Judges of this Court laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v Union of India, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 5: “28. The position may, therefore, be summed up as follows: Any and every termination of service is not a dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. A termination of service brought about by the exercise of a contractual right is not per se dismissal or removal, as has been held by this Court in Satish Chander Anand v. Union of India [(1953) 1 SCC 420: (1953) SCR 655]. Likewise the termination of service by compulsory retirement in terms of a specific rule regulating the conditions of service is not tantamount to the infliction of a punishment and does not attract Article 311(2), as has also been held by this Court in Shyam Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1955) 1 SCR 26]. In either of the two abovementioned cases the termination of the service did not carry with it the penal consequences of loss of pay, or allowances 7 under Rule 52 of the Fundamental Rules. It is true that the misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the Government to take action under the terms of the contract of employment or the specific service rule, nevertheless, if a right exists, under the contract or the rules, to terminate the service the motive operating on the mind of the Government is, as Chagla, C.J., has said in Shrinivas Ganesh v. Union of India [LR 58 Bom 673 : AIR (1956) Bom 455] wholly irrelevant. In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. As already stated if the servant has got a right to continue in the post, then, unless the contract of employment or the rules provide to the contrary, his services cannot be terminated otherwise than for misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other good and sufficient cause. A termination of the service of such a servant on such grounds must be a punishment and, therefore, a dismissal or removal within Article 311, for it operates as a forefeiture of his right and he is visited with the evil consequences of loss 8 of pay and allowances. It puts an indelible stigma on the officer affecting his future career. A reduction in rank likewise may be by way of punishment or it may be an innocuous thing. If the government servant has a right to a particular rank, then the very reduction from that rank will operate as a penalty, for he will then lose the emoluments and privileges of that rank. If, however, he has no right to the particular rank, his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not ordinarily be a punishment. But the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied, or under the rules, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that an order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstances be a punishment. The real test for determining whether the reduction in such cases is or is not by way of punishment is to find out if the order for the reduction also visits the servant with any penal consequences. Thus if the order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of the contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated the employment as and by way of penalty. The use of the expression “terminate” or “discharge” is not conclusive. In spite of the use of such innocuous expressions, the court has to apply the two tests mentioned above, namely, (1) whether the servant had a right to the post or the rank, or (2) 9 whether he has been visited with evil consequences of the kind hereinbefore referred to? If the case satisfies either of the two tests then it must be held that the servant has been punished and the termination of his service must be taken as a dismissal or removal from service or the reversion to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of the rules and Article 311, which give protection to government servant have not been complied with, the termination of the service or the reduction in rank must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the servant.” (emphasis supplied)” 12. The Coordinate Bench in the matter of Humendra Kumar Pawade (supra) in para 4 held as under :- “4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are convinced that the order of discontinuation of contract appointment of the appellant deserves to be quashed for the reason that Rule 15 (3) of the Rules, 2012 itself provides that confidential report of the person, appointed on contract, shall be recorded so that his work may be assessed in case he is to be considered for appointment on contract basis for the next year and for such continuation the ACR/PAR should be 'excellent' or 'very good'. Once the Rule itself provides that the ACR or PAR would form the basis for according benefit of extension of contract employment it goes without saying that a contract employee has a right to represent against the ACR which may work adverse to his interest if the same is not of required standard as laid down under Rule 15 (3) of the Rules, 2012. Even if contract employee is not entitled to hold the post, if the Rules itself provide for consideration of ACR or PAR as a measure to assess the 10 suitability, the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dev Dutt (supra) would apply with full force for the reason that if an employee is entitled to any benefit out of the ACR or PAR the same has to be communicated without which it cannot be considered against the employee.” 13. Having considered the facts discussed-above and law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the order Annexure P/1 dated 15.12.2020 is hereby quashed. The respondent authorities are directed to conduct an inquiry, strictly in accordance with the law against the petitioner, preferably within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 14. The petitioner shall be provided sufficient opportunity of hearing during course of inquiry. The respondent authorities while conducting departmental enquiry shall consider the issue with regard to un-communicated ACRs. If any favourable order is passed, it is expected that the petitioner shall be considered for reinstatement. 15. With the aforesaid observation(s), and direction(s), both the petitions are hereby disposed of. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) JUDGE $iddhant