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2026 DAILYLAW 28118 (CAL)

DEV KUMAR SIRCAR v. SAHANA SARKAR

FMAT/87/2026 · 2026-07-14

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, Supratim Bhattacharya

body2026

Judgment text

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AD-12&13 Ct No.16 14.07.2026 TN FMAT 87 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 Dev Kumar Sircar Vs. Sahana Sarkar With FMAT 118 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 CAN 2 of 2026 Dev Kumar Sircar and another Vs. Modern Sara Projects and another Mr. Sujit Banerjee, Mr. Nilay Sengupta ....for the appellants Re: CAN 2 of 2026 in FMAT 118 of 2026 1. Since substituted service has already been effected but none appears for the respondents at the time of call, the condonation application is taken up for hearing ex parte. 2. Upon perusal of the averments made in the application, we find sufficient reason for the delay having been made out. 3. Accordingly, CAN 2 of 2026 is allowed, thereby condoning the delay in preferring FMAT 118 of 2026. 4. There will be no order as to costs. 2 Re: FMAT 87 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 With FMAT 118 of 2026 IA No: CAN 1 of 2026 5. The two appeals are connected, in view of certain common issues being involved. 6. FMAT 87 of 2026 arises out of the refusal of an ad interim injunction to the plaintiff/appellant in a suit for cancellation of a purported gift deed executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent, the latter being the appellant’s daughter. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that as per the plaint case, the defendant/respondent “very cunningly and with mala fide intention and with the intention to cheat her father” exercised undue influence on him and coerced the plaintiff/appellant to execute the impugned gift deed dated November 04, 2024. 8. It is submitted that the appellant has also pleaded in the plaint that the defendant/respondent intentionally, deliberately and with mala fide intention told her parents that she will arrange for an accommodation in New Town and arrange for the rent but refused to do so. In view of the respondent/daughter not taking care of her parents, including the appellant/father, the gift deed ought to be cancelled on such ground alone. 9. However, despite such circumstances, the learned Trial Judge refused to grant ad interim injunction. 3 10. Learned counsel also relies on Urmila Dixit vs. Sunil Sharan Dixit and others, reported at (2025) 2 SCC 787, in support of his contentions. 11. Insofar as FMAT 118 of 2026 is concerned, the self- same appellant and his wife challenge an order of injunction granted at the behest of the plaintiff/respondent, being the alleged transferee of the daughter of the appellants, restraining the defendants/appellants from entering into the self- same suit premises and creating any sort of obstructions in respect of the peaceful living, possession and exclusive usage and enjoyment of the suit premises of the respondent and further from ousting the plaintiff/respondent from its lawful possession and occupation in the suit premises. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants argues that in view of the gift deed, on the strength of which the transfer was effected in favour of the respondents in FMAT 118 of 2026, being challenged in the later suit of the appellants, the learned Trial Judge erred in law and in fact in granting such injunction. 13. Learned counsel argues that the appellants, being the parents of the vendor of the respondent in FMAT 118 of 2026 and the respondent in FMAT 87 of 2026, have been thrown out from their own premises on the strength of the gift deed, thereby violating the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (for short “the 2007 Act”). 4 14. We find from the cited judgment that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering a case under the 2007 Act. Within the contemplation of such statute, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe that for attracting the application of Section 23(1) of the 2007 Act, the transfer must have to be made subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and that the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor. 15. The first aspect of the matter which catches the eye is that the present suit has been filed as a regular title suit under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, read with Section 5 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and not under the 2007 Act. The 2007 Act specifically enumerates the authority who will deal with such matters. The power to cancel a gift deed, on the ground that maintenance is not provided to the donor despite such assurance by the donee at the time of execution of the gift deed, is only available under the 2007 Act and not under the general law. Thus, such ground is not available for cancellation of a gift deed in a regular civil suit. Hence, there would be a confusion of jurisdiction in the event a civil court exercises the power conferred specifically by the Legislature on a particular authority under the 2007 Act. 5 16. Also, from the plaint pleadings, we find allegations of undue influence and coercion having been levelled by the plaintiffs/appellants. 17. Thus, the paradigm of the suit is different from that of the 2007 Act. As such, the ratio laid down in Urmila Dixit (supra) is not squarely applicable. 18. At this juncture, learned counsel for the appellant also submits that the appellant has been ousted from the suit premises. As such, in any event, the prayer for injunction sought in the appellant’s suit has been rendered infructuous. 19. Thus, there is no scope of interference with the order impugned in FMAT 87 of 2026. 20. Hence, FMAT 87 of 2026 is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 21. Consequentially, the connected stay application bearing CAN 1 of 2026 is also dismissed. 22. Insofar as the other appeal is concerned, since a valid title deed has been produced by the plaintiffs/respondent, executed by the vendor on the strength of a gift deed which is yet to be declared to be invalid or cancelled by any competent court, a prima facie case for grant of injunction has been made out by the plaintiff/respondent. 23. Hence, the learned Trial Judge was justified in granting the ad interim order of injunction. 24. Accordingly, FMAT 118 of 2026 is also dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6 25. CAN 1 of 2026, filed in connection therewith, also stands consequentially disposed of. 26. Needless to say, none of the above observations shall be binding on the learned Trial Judge in either of the suits at any further stage of the suits or the injunction applications and it will be open to the parties to contest the injunction applications and the suits on their own merits. 27. There will be no order as to costs. 28. Urgent certified copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities. (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.) (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.)