JUDGMENT : BASANT BALAJI, J. 1. The petitioner, who claims to be an MSME enterprise, engaged in the manufacture of food products has defaulted in repaying the loan facilities availed from the respondents. Respondents, in turn, had initiated recovery proceedings invoking SARFAESI Act . In the meanwhile, the petitioner by Ext P6 representation dated 12.06.2024 sought restructuring of the loan account as pe the RBI Circulars. The 3 rd respondent classified the accounts of the petitioner as NPA on 26.06.2024 and thereafter, issued Ext P7 demand notice dated 2.8.2024 under section 13(2) of the Act, pursuant to which symbolic possession of the mortgaged properties was also taken, issuing possession notices dated 12.9.2025 and 19.9.2025. The 6 th respondent as well as the 9 th respondent had also issued demand notices to the petitioners dated 05.5.2025 and 28.10.2025 respectively. 2. When the Bank issued Ext P8 notice dated 06.12.2024 proposing sale of the secured assets, substantial payments were made by the petitioners along with an OTS proposal. Though Rs.1 Crore was paid, the petitioner failed to pay the balance, and hence, the proposal was rejected by the bank. Thereafter, the Bank issued Ext P9 sale notice dated 17.10.2025, scheduling the auction on 7.11.2025, aggrieved by which, this writ petition stands filed. 3. According to the petitioners, the respondent Bank had acted in violation of the notification dated 29.05.2015, issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Sec.9 of the MSMED Act, 2006, by the Central Government, and had initiated recovery proceedings against the petitioners without even referring them before the Committee constituted under the framework for rehabilitation for availing benefits as contemplated in the said notification, which is a nullity in the eyes of law and hence, the entire proceedings done pursuant thereto is liable to be quashed. 4. Further, they contended that the judgments of the hon’ble Pro Knits Shri Shri Swami Samarth Apex Court in and, having been rendered per incuriam, is not at all binding on other courts and tribunals within the territory of India. They also challenged the legality of simultaneous proceedings initiated under the SARFAESI Act with that of the suit filed under the RDB Act. It is also contended that the secured assets have not been registered by the respondent Bank with CERSAI and the sale proceedings, hence, would be vitiated due to the violation of section 26-D of the SARFAESI Act . 5. It is also contended that the secured assets have not been registered by the respondent Bank with CERSAI and the sale proceedings, hence, would be vitiated due to the violation of section 26-D of the SARFAESI Act . 5. The counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2, through their counter affidavit, contends the very maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India pointing out the statutory efficacious remedy available and absence of extraordinary circumstances warranting the interference of this Court. Taking into note the earlier litigations instituted on identical grounds and contentions as well as the judgments binding the petitioners, the same attracts the bar under the principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata, warranting the dismissal of the present writ petition. 6. As regards the additional plea raised in respect of the non-registration of the secured asset under CERSAI, the same would also fail, as the secured assets have been validly registered before the CERSAI portal, as early as on 26.7.2016. Moreover, it is also pertinent to note that in S.A. No. 577/2025 which is pending before the DRT-II, Ernakulam, filed by the petitioner challenging the e-auction proceedings of the bank, there was no such challenge raised regarding the CERSAI Registration, and hence, the attempt on the part of the petitioner in taking up such a contention in the present writ petition is nothing but sheer abuse of process of law and is liable to be dismissed. 7. A reply has been filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit wherein, it was stated that the respondent bank has failed to discharge its duty right from the identification of incipient stress and the failure in constituting a Committee for resolution of stress; due to which, the petitioners were denied the benefits conferred under the revival framework as per the MSMED Act. Also, the DRT is not vested with the jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes in the realm of the MSMED Act. 8. As far as obtaining the protection conferred under the revival framework of MSMED Act is concerned, the petitioners herein failed to adhere to the guidelines as held by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Pro Knits v. Canara Bank, (2024) 10 SCC 292 . Relevant paragraphs of the above dictum read as follows:- "16. 8. As far as obtaining the protection conferred under the revival framework of MSMED Act is concerned, the petitioners herein failed to adhere to the guidelines as held by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Pro Knits v. Canara Bank, (2024) 10 SCC 292 . Relevant paragraphs of the above dictum read as follows:- "16. We may hasten to add that under the "Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs", the banks or creditors are required to identify the incipient stress in the account of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, before their accounts turn into non-performing assets, by creating three sub- categories under the "Special Mention Account" Category. However, while creating such sub-categories, the Banks must have some authenticated and verifiable material with them as produced by the concerned MSME to show that loan account is of a Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise, classified and registered as such under the MSMED Act. The said Framework also enables the Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise to voluntarily initiate the proceedings under the said Framework, by filing an application along with the affidavit of an authorized person. Therefore, the stage of identification of incipient stress in the loan account of MSMEs and categorization under the Special Mention Account category, before the loan account of MSME turns into NPA is a very crucial stage, and therefore it would be incumbent on the part of the concerned MSME also to produce authenticated and verifiable documents/material for substantiating its claim of being MSME, before its account is classified as NPA. If that is not done, and once the account is classified as NPA, the banks i.e., secured creditors would be entitled to take the recourse to Chapter III of the SARFAESI Act for enforcement of security interest. 17. It is also pertinent to note that sufficient safeguards have been provided under the said Chapter for safeguarding the interest of the Defaulters-Borrowers for giving them opportunities to discharge their debt. 17. It is also pertinent to note that sufficient safeguards have been provided under the said Chapter for safeguarding the interest of the Defaulters-Borrowers for giving them opportunities to discharge their debt. However, if at the stage of classification of the loan account of the borrower as NPA, the borrower does not bring to the notice of the concerned bank/creditor that it is a Micro, Small or Medium Enterprise under the MSMED Act and if such an Enterprise allows the entire process for enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be over, or it having challenged such action of the concerned bank/creditor in the court of law/tribunal and having failed, such an Enterprise could not be permitted to misuse the process of law for thwarting the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act by raising the plea of being an MSME at a belated stage. Suffice it to say, when it is mandatory or obligatory on the part of the Banks to follow the Instructions/Directions issued by the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India with regard to the Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs, it would be equally incumbent on the part of the concerned MSMEs to be vigilant enough to follow the process laid down under the said Framework, and bring to the notice of the concerned Banks, by producing authenticated and verifiable documents/material to show its eligibility to get the benefit of the said Framework." 9. A division Bench of this Court in P.K. Krishnakumar v. IndusInd Bank , 2024 (6) KLT 606 had also stated that MSMEs cannot later assert benefits, if they did not notify the banks before classification as NPA thereby stressing the obligation incumbent upon the concerned MSMEs for notifying the Banks regarding the MSME status in order to obtain the benefits attached thereto, before the NPA classification is effected. Relevant extract from the above dictum is as follows: - "19. xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx xxx In cases where a borrower who qualifies as MSME does not initially raise its status to challenge a bank's recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act but instead participates fully in the process without objection, cannot later use their MSME status to argue that the proceedings were without jurisdiction. xxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxxx xxx In cases where a borrower who qualifies as MSME does not initially raise its status to challenge a bank's recovery proceedings under the SARFAESI Act but instead participates fully in the process without objection, cannot later use their MSME status to argue that the proceedings were without jurisdiction. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary based on the principles of fairness and justice, which include examining the conduct of the parties involved. When the Appellants, by their actions, accepted the Bank's authority without objection, the High Court will refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction to assist such Appellants, even if there are questions about the jurisdiction of the Bank. This is because the Appellants' own conduct disqualifies them from claiming such relief. When the High Court declines to interfere in such circumstances, it does not mean that the Appellants' waiver vested the Bank with jurisdiction, assuming it is inherently lacking; it means that the borrower is not entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction irrespective of whether the Bank's actions are without jurisdiction or not. These two concepts are distinct, and the distinction is emphasized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Pro Knit." 10. In a recent judgment of the hon'ble Supreme court in Shri Shri Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution and Ors. v. The Board of Directors of NKGSB Co-op. Bank Ltd. and Ors. 2025 SCC Online SC 1566, the dictum was as follows: - "6. xxxx xxxx xxxx We would read and interpret the seemingly confusing terms of the Framework harmoniously to ensure that a right under the MSME Act is not destroyed by the SARFAESI Act or vice versa. v. The Board of Directors of NKGSB Co-op. Bank Ltd. and Ors. 2025 SCC Online SC 1566, the dictum was as follows: - "6. xxxx xxxx xxxx We would read and interpret the seemingly confusing terms of the Framework harmoniously to ensure that a right under the MSME Act is not destroyed by the SARFAESI Act or vice versa. In our reading, the terms of the Framework do not prohibit the lending bank / secured creditor (assuming that it has no conscious knowledge that the defaulting borrower is an MSME) to classify the account of the defaulting MSME as NPA and to even issue the demand notice under S.13(2) of the SARFAESI Act without such identification of incipient stress in the account of the defaulting borrower (MSME); however, upon receipt of the demand notice, if such borrower in its response under S.13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act asserts that it an MSME and claims the benefit of the Framework citing reasons supported by an affidavit, the lending bank/secured creditor would then be mandatorily bound to look into such claim keeping further action under the SARFAESI Act in abeyance; and, should the claim be found to be worthy of acceptance within the framework of the Framework, to act in terms thereof for securing revival and rehabilitation of the defaulting borrower. 7. As has been noted above, the petitioning enterprise does not seem to have ever claimed the benefit of the terms of the Framework after the demand notice under s.13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued. It is at the stage of compliance with an order passed by the relevant Magistrate under s.14 of the SARFAESI Act that this writ petition has been presented before this Court claiming benefits of the Framework to restrain the respondent no.2 and its officers from proceeding further under the SARFAESI Act and other enactments except in the manner contemplated under the said Notification. We find the bona fides of the petitioning enterprise to be suspect. 8. Pro Knits is a decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court holding. Inter alia, that the Notification is binding on the lending banks / secured creditors. Finding to the contrary by the High Court of Bombay in the judgment and order under challenge in the appeal was, thus, quashed. 8. Pro Knits is a decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court holding. Inter alia, that the Notification is binding on the lending banks / secured creditors. Finding to the contrary by the High Court of Bombay in the judgment and order under challenge in the appeal was, thus, quashed. Though while stressing that the terms of the Framework need to be followed by the lending banks / secured creditors before the account of an MSME is classified as NPA, this decision also lays stress on the obligation of the MSMEs by holding that "it would be equally incumbent on the part of the MSMEs concerned to be vigilant enough to follow the process laid down under the said Framework, and bring to the notice of the Banks concerned, by producing authenticated and verifiable documents/material to show its eligibility to get the benefit of the said Framework". It was cautioned that "if such an Enterprise allows the entire process for enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be over, or it having challenged such action of the bank / creditor concerned in the court of law/tribunal and having failed, such an Enterprise could not be permitted to misuse the process of law for thwarting the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act by raising the plea of being an MSME at a belated stage". This decision, however, left unsaid something which we have explained hereinabove while construing the terms consistently to prevent undermining the rights that one central enactment confers on by another.” 11. In view of the law laid down by the hon’ble Apex Court in Pro Knits (supra) and that laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in P.K. Krishnakumar (supra) , if, at the stage prior to the classification of the loan accounts as NPA, the borrowers do not bring to the notice of the Bank that it is an MSME and allow the proceedings under the SARFAESI Act to go through, then they will be precluded from raising it at a belated stage. A combined reading of these judgments along with that of Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) , made the position more clarified that MSME Framework provisions must be read harmoniously wherein both Banks and MSMEs have complementary obligations regarding obtaining the benefits associated with the said Framework. 12. A combined reading of these judgments along with that of Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) , made the position more clarified that MSME Framework provisions must be read harmoniously wherein both Banks and MSMEs have complementary obligations regarding obtaining the benefits associated with the said Framework. 12. It is already established that while the Bank/creditors are incumbent to identify the incipient stress in an MSME account before its classification as an NPA, it is equally incumbent upon the concerned MSME to initiate the proceedings to avail the stipulated benefits. That is, in clear words, the MSME is duty-bound to provide authenticated documents and materials, along with an affidavit, to substantiate its claim of being an MSME entitled to protection before the NPA classification is effected. If an enterprise fails to notify the concerned Bank/creditor of its status as a Micro, Small, or Medium Enterprise under the MSMED Act, and subsequently allows the entire enforcement of security interest under the SARFAESI Act to be completed, such an enterprise cannot be permitted to misuse the process of law by belatedly raising the plea of being an MSME to frustrate the actions taken under the SARFAESI Act . 13. In the present case, the petitioner firm has neither produced any authenticated/verifiable materials to prove their status of MSME, nor had they even replied to Section 13(2) notice issued by the respondent bank. Hence, this inaction on the part of the petitioners in providing relevant documents to substantiate their MSME status reveals that they failed to discharge their obligation to become eligible for claiming the protection and revival benefits under the MSMED Act. 14. Regarding the reliefs sought touching the question of legality of simultaneous proceedings instituted by the respondent bank, the position is well settled in M/s Transcore v. Union of India, AIR 2007 SC 712 , wherein the hon'ble Supreme Court had upheld the legality of concurrent proceedings initiated under both the SARFAESI and RDB Acts, emphasizing that the principle of doctrine of election of remedies does not apply to the said context as remedies under both the statutes are complementary rather than exclusive and hence, both the remedies can be availed of simultaneously. 15. A learned Single Judge of this Court in M.D. Esthappan (supra) , had also reiterated the permissibility of simultaneous proceedings under both the SARFAESI as well as the RDB Acts in the light of M/s Transcore (supra). 15. A learned Single Judge of this Court in M.D. Esthappan (supra) , had also reiterated the permissibility of simultaneous proceedings under both the SARFAESI as well as the RDB Acts in the light of M/s Transcore (supra). The relevant portion of the above judgment is extracted herein for reference:- "17. The principles laid down in the Transcore judgment dealt with the interplay between the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act (RDB Act) and the SARFAESI Act . The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the first and third provisos to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act are enabling provisions introduced to align the DRT Act, NPA Act, and Order XXIII CPC. Withdrawal of the O.A. is not a precondition for invoking the NPA Act, and the bank/FI may act under the NPA Act with or without DRT's permission, depending on the circumstances. The doctrine of election does not apply to the DRT Act and the NPA Act, as they are not inconsistent or repugnant but together constitute a single, complementary remedy. The NPA Act provides a non-adjudicatory mechanism for enforcing the security interest created by the borrower in favour of the bank/FI, based not only on default in repayment but also on the borrower's failure to maintain margin and asset value, thereby enabling secured creditors to act without court intervention. Issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act constitutes initiation of "action" within the meaning of the first proviso to Section 19(1) of the DRT Act. 18. The Hon'ble Apex Court also held that Section 13(10) of the SARFAESI Act shows that SARFAESI and DRT remedies are complementary and can be pursued simultaneously. Section 13(13) of SARFAESI demonstrates that a Section 13(2) notice has substantive legal consequences and is not merely a show cause notice. Withdrawal under the first proviso to Section 19(1) may be necessary in cases where assets are in possession of a court receiver or under injunction, but not otherwise. The objective behind the proviso is to provide procedural flexibility and not to restrict enforcement under SARFAESI, the High Court's view that the proviso is mandatory was overruled, and it was held that the bank may proceed under SARFAESI without DRT's prior leave.” 16. The objective behind the proviso is to provide procedural flexibility and not to restrict enforcement under SARFAESI, the High Court's view that the proviso is mandatory was overruled, and it was held that the bank may proceed under SARFAESI without DRT's prior leave.” 16. Hence, the contentions mooted by the counsel for the petitioners questioning the legality of parallel proceedings under SARFAESI as well as the RDB Acts cannot be sustained, as the exhaustion of both the remedies are complementary rather exclusive, and therefore can be resorted to simultaneously, in view of the law laid down in M/s Transcore (supra) and in M.D. Esthappan Infrastructure (supra). 17. The second relief sought in the Writ Petition that the judgments in Pro Knits (supra) and Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) , are wrongly decided, otherwise, is rendered per incuriam and sub silentio, also cannot be accepted. In Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devu, ( 2025) 3 SCC 95, the hon'ble apex Court had emphasized that the doctrine of per incuriam allows a decision to be disregarded only when it demonstrably fails to consider a binding statutory provision or authoritative precedent that would have necessarily led to a different outcome. This principle is confined to the ratio decidendi and does not apply to obiter dicta. Therefore, departure from an established precedent must be rare and based on sound legal principles. 18. A perusal of Article 141 of the Constitution of India reads as follows:- “Article 141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.” 19. As per the Doctrine of Precedent enshrined under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all courts within the country, including the High Courts and subordinate judiciary. This constitutional mandate ensures that the law of the land remains uniform and certain, requiring lower courts to strictly follow the ratio decidendi established by the Apex Court. While the Supreme Court is not bound by its own previous rulings and may overrule them to correct errors or adapt to societal changes, all other judicial bodies are duty-bound to apply its precedents. Even the obiter dicta, or incidental observations made by the Supreme Court, carry significant persuasive authority. While the Supreme Court is not bound by its own previous rulings and may overrule them to correct errors or adapt to societal changes, all other judicial bodies are duty-bound to apply its precedents. Even the obiter dicta, or incidental observations made by the Supreme Court, carry significant persuasive authority. Given this, the contentions mooted by the petitioners challenging the binding nature of the judgments in Pro Knits (supra) and Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) also goes in vain as it holds strong binding authority on all other Courts and Tribunals within the territory of India. 20. It is seen that the present petition is filed for non-consideration of Ext P6 request for restructuring, which was produced as Ext P3 in W.P.(C) No. 41807/2025 filed earlier by this petitioner before this Court. Apart from the same, in the earlier round of litigation by the very same petitioner as W.P.(C) No. 27271/2025, the only prayer sought was to provide instalments, rather, there was no plea of denial of MSME benefits under the MSMED Act. Although W.P.(C) No. 41807/2025 stands dismissed by this Court by Ext R1(d) dated 11.12.2025 for reasons stated therein as well as for non-compliance of the interim order, a Special Leave to Appeal (C) was preferred against the said judgment as SLP No. 2750/2026, which was also dismissed on 23.01.2026, thereby sustaining the order of this Court. Hence, when a speaking order stands already passed by this Court, another writ petition on identical grounds and contentions is nothing but abuse of process of law. 21. In the light of the previously mentioned judgments, as the challenge raised by the petitioners regarding benefit under the MSMED Act claimed in the above writ petition stands concluded and the pleadings and reliefs sought in the present writ petition are identical to those already adjudicated in W.P.(C) No. 41807/2025, the present writ petition is an abuse of process of law. Moreover, the attempt made by them in simultaneously filing this writ petition contending similar facts and prayers, is impermissible as it expressly attracts the statutory bar under res judicata as well as constructive res judicata. 22. The hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalinga Mining Corp. Moreover, the attempt made by them in simultaneously filing this writ petition contending similar facts and prayers, is impermissible as it expressly attracts the statutory bar under res judicata as well as constructive res judicata. 22. The hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalinga Mining Corp. v. Union of India , (2013) 5 SCC 252 , held that the legal validity or correctness of a judicial decision does not influence its operation as res judicata, rather, a decision rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction remains binding between the parties regardless of whether it is perceived as right or wrong. Under the principles of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is the actual decision declaring the rights of the parties rather than the underlying legal reasoning or principles that constitutes res judicata. Consequently, when a matter of fact or law has been directly and substantially at issue and subsequently adjudicated, that decision definitively concludes those rights, irrespective of whether the dispute involved pure points of law or different causes of action. In fact, the reliefs sought in the current writ petition are identical to those rejected in previous rounds. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna and Ors. 2024 SCC Online SC 3727 went on to hold that where the same set of facts give rise to multiple causes of action, a litigant cannot be permitted to agitate one cause in one proceeding and reserve the other for future litigation. Such fragmentation aggravates the burden of litigation and is impermissible in law. The Court reiterated that all claims and grounds of defence or attack which could and ought to have been raised in earlier proceedings are barred from being re-agitated subsequently. A party must bring forward the entirety of its case in one proceeding and not in a piecemeal or selective manner. Courts must examine whether a matter could and should have been raised earlier, considering the scope of the earlier proceedings and their nexus to the controversy at hand. Once a cause of action has been judicially determined, all fundamental issues related to it are deemed conclusively decided and any attempt to revisit these matters, even if by formal distinctions in pleadings violates the principle of finality. 24. Once a cause of action has been judicially determined, all fundamental issues related to it are deemed conclusively decided and any attempt to revisit these matters, even if by formal distinctions in pleadings violates the principle of finality. 24. As far as the jurisdiction vested with DRT in matters dealing with MSMED Act is concerned, in South Indian Bank v. M/s. PDMC Industries, 2025 KHC 1307, a Division Bench of this Court, relying on the judgment in Kuruvithadam Agencies (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Authorised Officer, Standard Chartered Bank , 2021 KER 20923, held that if the bank has not followed the guidelines/ directives issued by the RBI in the matter of treating of an account as NPA, the same will squarely come under the procedure as contemplated under Section 13 of SARFAESI Act and therefore, there is a clear remedy under the statute. Though the decision in South Indian Bank (supra) was challenged before the Supreme court in S.L.P. © No.36925 of 2025, the same was dismissed by order dated 18.12.2025, thereby the position stands settled. 25. As regards the maintainability of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, owing to the statutory remedy available under section 17 of the Act, the hon’ble apex court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others , (2010) 8 SCC 110 and South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip , 2023 KHC 6435 held that if any aggrieved person has any grievance against the proceedings initiated by the secured creditor under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act , they could avail the statutory remedy by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the DRT, instead of invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the Tribunal which requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. 26. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent that mode shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non-compliance of approaching the Tribunal which requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative. 26. Having regard to the fact that the petitioners neither previously raised their MSME status nor provided authenticated documents to substantiate their claim, as held in Pro Knits (supra) P.K. Krishnakumar (supra) and Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) , it is appropriate to hold that they stand estopped from seeking protection and associated benefits under the relevant notification at this late stage, particularly after allowing the SARFAESI proceedings to commence without objection. Also, in view of the judgment in Transcore (supra) and other relevant decisions regarding the legality of parallel proceedings, it is proper to hold that the invoking remedies under SARFAESI as well as the RDB Acts simultaneously, is permissible. As far as the binding nature of Pro Knits (supra) and Shri Shri Swami Samarth (supra) is concerned, the dictum laid down by the hon’ble supreme court in these decisions must be observed by all the other courts and Tribunals as per Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 27. As regards the challenges made against the SARFAESI proceedings, it is well established that the petitioners have already instituted a writ petition before this Court, which was dismissed, against which an SLP was preferred, which also came to be dismissed, therefore, the contentions and reliefs sought by them in the present writ petition is expressly barred by res judicata and constructive res judicata owing to the similarity in facts and prayers finding place in the earlier litigations. Therefore, it is only to be held that the present petition is devoid of any merits and is nothing but an abuse of process of law as this Court finds no valid grounds to invoke the jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the petitioners are not entitled to any reliefs from this Court. Since the petitioner has already approached the DRT-II, Ernakulam by S.A.No.577 of 2025, which is pending consideration, this W.P. stands dismissed with the above observations granting liberty to the petitioner to raise all contentions in the pending S.A.