1 CGHC010156502026 2026:CGHC:31103-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 612 of 2026 Vinod Sharma S/o Late Shri Banshilal Sharma Aged About 62 Years Retired Revenue Officer, R/o Mahamaya Vihar, Wire House Road, P.S. Civil Line, Bilaspur District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Appellant versus 1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department of Urban Administration And Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Atal Nagar, New Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 2 - Director Directorate of Urban Administration and Development Department Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh 3 - Commissioner Municipal Corporation Bilaspur District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Respondents For Appellants : Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, Advocate For Respondent No.1 & 2/ State : Mr. Shashank Thakur, Additional Advocate General For Respondent No. 3 : Mr. Bharat Sharma, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge JUDGMENT ON BOARD Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 22 .0 7 .202 6 1. Heard Mr. Ajay Shrivastava, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the State/respondent Nos. 1 & 2 and Mr. Bharat Sharma, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No.3. ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA Digitally signed by ROHIT KUMAR CHANDRA 2 2. By way of present writ appeal under Section 2 of Sub-Section (1) of the Chhattisgarh High Court (Appeal to Division Bench Act, 2006, the appellant / writ petitioner has challenged the order dated 28.02.2026 passed by learned Single Judge in WPS No.1141 of 2025 (Vinod Sharma Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), by which the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner/ appellant herein has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 3. Brief facts, necessary for disposal of this appeal, are that the appellant was holding the post of Assistant Revenue Officer and was at Sr. No.1 in the gradation list. The Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) in its meeting dated 07.02.2022 recommended name of appellant for promotion to the post of Revenue Officer from Assistant Revenue Officer. Proposal of the DPC for promotion of appellant was sent to the competent authority for approval. In the meanwhile, appellant stood retired on 30.09.2023. The appellant thereafter preferred WPS No.6344/2024, which came to be disposed of vide order dated 07.10.2024 directing respondent authorities to take decision on the claim of appellant for grant of promotion within 08 weeks. Subsequently, respondent No.3 vide order dated 03.12.2024 granted notional promotion to appellant on the post of Revenue Officer w.e.f. 27.09.2023, but refused to grant benefits of promotion w.e.f. 07.02.2022 on the ground that approval to grant promotion to appellant has been granted by the Competent Authority only on 27.09.2023. Being aggrieved by the same, the 3 appellant has preferred writ petition before this Court being WPS No. 1141 of 2025, which has been dismissed by learned Single Judge vide impugned order dated 28.02.2026. Hence, this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the learned Single Judge has erred both on facts and in law in upholding the action of the Respondent Corporation by accepting the plea that the delay in issuance of the promotion order occurred on account of obtaining approval from the State Government. The said finding is contrary to the statutory framework governing promotions under the applicable Rules. Neither Rule 11 nor Rule 13 of the Rules, 2018 mandates prior approval of the State Government before issuance of a promotion order pursuant to the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee. The Respondents have, therefore, sought to justify their inaction by relying upon a procedure unknown to law. Furthermore, the Appellant had specifically pleaded that in terms of Rule 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (The Conduct of Business of the Mayor-in-Council/President-in-Council and the Powers and Functions of the Authorities) Rules, 1998, where a proposal is not decided by the Mayor-in-Council within ten days of its receipt, the proposal is deemed to have been approved and consequential action is required to be taken. He contended that in the present case, the proposal forwarded on 22.03.2022 remained pending far beyond the prescribed period 4 and was formally approved only on 06.07.2023. By operation of the deeming provision contained in Rule 13, the proposal stood approved upon expiry of ten days, and consequently the Appellant became entitled to promotion from the date on which the proposal ought to have taken effect, and not from the belated date of issuance of the promotion order. The Respondents have neither explained nor justified the extraordinary delay of more than one and a half years, and such unexplained administrative delay cannot be permitted to prejudice the Appellant's vested service rights. It is further submitted that despite the specific direction issued by this Hon'ble Court in W.P.(S) No. 3282 of 2023 to consider the Appellant's claim in accordance with the relevant statutory Rules, the Respondents failed to adhere to the mandate of the Court and instead reiterated an untenable stand regarding State approval. It is also submitted that the appointing authority was bound either to issue the promotion order in accordance with the recommendations of the DPC or, for legally sustainable reasons, decline to promote the Appellant; however, the Rules do not contemplate keeping the recommendation in abeyance awaiting an approval not envisaged by the statute. The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate these statutory provisions and the legal effect of the deeming clause under Rule 13, resulting in grave prejudice to the Appellant. Accordingly, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside, and the Appellant is entitled to promotion with all consequential benefits from the date on which 5 the proposal stood deemed to have been approved in law. 5. Per contra, learned counsel, appearing for respondent No.3 / Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, submitted that the appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. The learned Single Judge has rightly appreciated the facts and the applicable legal provisions while declining the relief sought by the Appellant. It is submitted that the mere recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee or the passing of a proposal by the competent authority does not confer upon an employee an indefeasible or vested right to promotion. A promotion becomes effective only upon issuance of a formal order by the competent appointing authority after completion of all requisite administrative formalities. The Appellant has erroneously relied upon Rule 13 of the Rules, 1998. The deeming provision contained therein is only intended to facilitate internal decision-making within the Mayor-in- Council and cannot be construed as creating an automatic right to promotion or dispensing with the statutory and administrative procedures required before issuance of a promotion order. He further submitted that the Respondent Corporation acted bona fide and processed the proposal through the prescribed administrative channel, and the promotion order was issued only after completion of all necessary formalities. The delay, if any, was purely procedural and administrative and was neither deliberate nor actuated by mala fides. In any event, no prejudice has been caused to the Appellant, as he has already been granted 6 promotion in accordance with law. It is further submitted that the Appellant has failed to point out any statutory provision mandating grant of retrospective promotion merely because the proposal remained pending beyond the period contemplated under Rule 13. It is well settled that retrospective promotion is not a matter of course and can be granted only where the governing rules expressly so provide or where the employee has been illegally denied promotion. Since no such illegality has been established in the present case, the Appellant is not entitled to promotion from 07.02.2022 or to any consequential monetary or service benefits. Accordingly, the impugned judgment warrants no interference, and the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. It is not in dispute that the Appellant has already been granted promotion by the competent authority. The only grievance raised is with regard to the date from which such promotion ought to have been made effective. The Appellant contends that in view of Rule 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities (The Conduct of Business of the Mayor-in-Council/President-in-Council and the Powers and Functions of the Authorities) Rules, 1998, the proposal stood deemed to have been approved after expiry of ten days and, therefore, he is entitled to retrospective promotion from 07.02.2022. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned order and the materials available on record. 7 8. It is not in dispute that the Appellant has already been granted promotion by the competent authority. The only grievance raised is with regard to the date from which such promotion ought to have been made effective. The Appellant contends that in view of Rule 13 of the Rules, 1998, the proposal stood deemed to have been approved after expiry of ten days and, therefore, he is entitled to retrospective promotion from 07.02.2022. 9. The said contention cannot be accepted. The deeming fiction contained in Rule 13 is intended to ensure expeditious disposal of administrative proposals within the functioning of the Mayor-in- Council. Such a procedural deeming provision cannot, in the absence of any express statutory mandate, be stretched to confer an automatic or vested right to promotion from a retrospective date. Promotion in public service is not effectuated merely upon a recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee or by processing of a proposal. It becomes operative only upon issuance of a formal order by the competent appointing authority in accordance with the applicable statutory rules. 10. It is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that inclusion of a candidate in a select list or recommendation by the DPC does not create an indefeasible right to appointment or promotion. The employer retains the authority to complete the statutory and administrative process before issuing the order of promotion. In Shankarshan Das v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 47, the 8 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a candidate whose name appears in a select list acquires no indefeasible right to appointment unless the relevant rules so provide. The same principle has consistently been applied in matters relating to promotion. 11. Likewise, in Union of India Vs. K.V. Jankiraman, (1991) 4 SCC 109, the Supreme Court observed that promotion is governed by the applicable service rules and that retrospective promotion with consequential benefits cannot be claimed as a matter of right unless the employee was wrongfully denied promotion for reasons attributable to the employer in violation of law. 12. Further, in State of Uttranchal Vs. Dinesh Kumar Sharma, (2007) 1 SCC 683, the Supreme Court reiterated that an employee has no vested right to claim promotion from the date a vacancy arose or from the date of recommendation unless the statutory rules specifically so provide. 13. In the present case, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate any provision in the Rules, 2018 mandating that promotion shall automatically relate back to the date of the proposal or the recommendation of the DPC. Equally, no material has been placed on record to establish that the delay in issuance of the promotion order was actuated by mala fides or was a deliberate attempt to deprive the Appellant of his legitimate service benefits. The explanation offered by the Respondent Corporation regarding 9 completion of administrative formalities has been accepted by the learned Single Judge, and no perversity or patent illegality has been shown in such finding. 14. It is equally well settled that the scope of interference in an intra- court appeal against a reasoned order of the learned Single Judge is limited, and unless the findings recorded are shown to be manifestly erroneous or contrary to law, the appellate court would not substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 15. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the claim of the Appellant for grant of retrospective promotion and consequential benefits. No case for interference is made out. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Chandra