Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
RSA-2489-2026 (O&M) [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
RSA-2489-2026 (O&M) Date of decision: 10.07.2026 Ravinder Kumar ...Appellant Versus Brij Lal (since deceased) through his LR -Anil Kumar ...Respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present: Mr. Aayush Kaushik, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The present Regular Second Appeal has been filed against the concurrent judgments and decrees whereby the suit ins8tuted by respondent-plain8ff Brij Lal seeking a decree of permanent injunc8on in respect of the property in dispute was decreed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 20.10.2014, which came to be affirmed by the learned First Appellate Court on 31.05.2018.
2. The appeal is accompanied by CM-8790-C-2026 filed under Sec8on 5 of the Limita8on Act, 1963 seeking condona8on of delay of 2868 days, i.e. more than seven years, in preferring the present appeal.
3.
Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant submits that the delay was neither inten8onal nor deliberate. It is contended that the appellant is a simple rus8c villager having no knowledge of legal technicali8es and remained dependent upon the legal advice rendered by the counsel represen8ng him before the Courts below, who allegedly failed to advise him about the remedy of filing a Regular Second Appeal within the prescribed period of limita8on. It is further submi@ed that during execu8on proceedings, an order passed by the Execu8ng Court was YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2489-2026 (O&M) [2] challenged by filing Civil Revision No.162 of 2020 before this Court on the advice of the previous counsel. The said revision came to be dismissed on 18.02.2026 and only thereaDer, on obtaining proper legal advice, the present appeal has been ins8tuted. On these premises, prayer has been made for condona8on of delay. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the applicant and perused the applica8on, this Court finds no merit therein. 5. The delay sought to be condoned is not marginal but 2868 days, which is excep8onally long. In such a case, the applicant is required to furnish a cogent, convincing and sa8sfactory explana8on covering the en8re period of delay. The expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Sec8on 5 of the Limita8on Act cannot be construed so liberally as to condone gross negligence, prolonged inac8on or lack of bona fides. The discre8on vested in the Court is judicial and must be exercised on well- recognised principles and not on sympathe8c considera8ons alone. 6. The explana8on furnished by the appellant is wholly vague and bereD of material par8culars. A bald plea that the previous counsel failed to advise the appellant regarding the remedy of second appeal does not, by itself, cons8tute sufficient cause. No affidavit of the previous counsel has been placed on record, nor has any material been produced to substan8ate such an allega8on. It is well se@led that a li8gant cannot seek condona8on of an inordinate delay merely by making an unsubstan8ated allega8on against his counsel. 7. The appellant's own conduct belies the explana8on furnished in the applica8on.
Admi@edly, aDer dismissal of the first appeal, he ac8vely contested the execu8on proceedings and even invoked the revisional jurisdic8on of this Court by filing Civil Revision No.162 of 2020 challenging YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2489-2026 (O&M) [3] an order passed by the Execu8ng Court. His par8cipa8on in those proceedings unmistakably demonstrates that he was fully aware of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court and was con8nuously pursuing legal remedies. Once such knowledge is established, the plea that he remained unaware of the remedy of filing a second appeal or of the period of limita8on becomes wholly untenable. 8. It is equally well se@led that pendency of execu8on proceedings or challenge to orders passed therein does not suspend or extend the statutory period of limita8on prescribed for filing an appeal against the original decree. If the appellant consciously elected to pursue proceedings arising out of execu8on without challenging the appellate decree within limita8on, he cannot subsequently invoke Sec8on 5 of the Limita8on Act to overcome the consequences of his own inac8on. 9. The Supreme Court in P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 and Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisi-on Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 has consistently held that the law of limita8on has to be applied with its full rigour and that inordinate delay cannot be condoned in the absence of a bona fide and sa8sfactory explana8on cons8tu8ng "sufficient cause". 10. In the present case, the explana8on offered by the appellant neither explains the en8re period of delay nor discloses any circumstance beyond his control preven8ng him from approaching this Court within the prescribed period. Rather, the record reflects prolonged negligence and complete lack of due diligence on his part. This Court, therefore, finds no sufficient cause to exercise its discre8onary jurisdic8on under Sec8on 5 of the Limita8on Act. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document
RSA-2489-2026 (O&M) [4]
11.
Consequently, CM-8790-C-2026 is dismissed. As a necessary corollary, the present Regular Second Appeal, being hopelessly barred by limita8on, also stands dismissed without examining the merits of the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below. 10.07.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document