1 CGHC010409292025 2026:CGHC:30778 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 11528 of 2025 1 - Prabhanshu Pandey S/o Biranjan Pandey Aged About 37 Years R/o Village And Post Basna, P.S. Bishrampur, Sub District- Bishrampur, Distt- Palamu (Jharkhand), Pin Code 822124. 2 - Jhanak Lal Sahu S/o Shri Prem Lal Sahu Aged About 33 Years R/o Dev Nagar, Jamul Ward No. 10, Near Prem Kirana Store, Jamul Cement Works, Distt- Durg C.G., Pin Code 490024. 3 - Krishna Nand Dwivedi S/o Gore Lal Dwivedi Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Jhakhrawal, Post Jhakhrawal, Tehsil- Devsar, Distt- Singrauli (Madhya Pradesh), Pin Code 486881. Petitioner(s) Versus 1 - N.M.D.C. Iron And Steel Plant Through The Managing Director N.M.D.C. Iron And Steel Plant, Post Nagarnar (Bastar) Jagdalpur District Bastar C.G. 2 - National Mineral Development Corporation Limited, Through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director, Khanij Bhavan, 10-3-311/a, Masab Tank District Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. 3 - General Manager, (H R) N M D C Limited, Iron And Steel Plant Post Nagarnar (Bastar) Jagdalpur, District Bastar C.G. 4 - D G M (Per), (H R) N M D C Limited, Iron And Steel Plant Post Nagarnar (Bastar) Jagdalpur, District Bastar C.G. 5 - Deputy Collector, District Bastar C.G. 6 - Labour Officer, District Bastar C.G. RAHUL JHA Digitally signed by RAHUL JHA Date: 2026.07.22 10:17:44 +0530 2 Respondent(s) (Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Himanshu Sharma, Advocate For Respondents No.1 to 4 : Ms Naushina Ali, Sr. Advocate (through VC) with Ms Poulami Das & Ms Ankita Gourha, Advocate For State : Mr. S.D. Badgaiyabn, Govt. Advocate (HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU) Order on Board 20/07/2026 1. The present writ petition has been filed calling in question the legality and validity of the orders dated 29.08.2025 (ANNEXURE-P/1) issued by respondent No.3, General Manager (HR), NMDC Limited, Iron and Steel Plant, Nagarnar, District Bastar, whereby the contractual services of the respective petitioners have been terminated. The petitioners have also sought consequential relief of setting aside the impugned order and their reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits. 2. Facts of the case, according to the petitioners, are that they were initially working with MECON Limited, Ranchi. Pursuant to appointment orders dated 23.11.2024, they came to be appointed by NMDC Limited, Iron and Steel Plant, Nagarnar, District Bastar, on contractual basis as Executives (Grade ‘B’). It is the further case of the petitioners that while they were discharging their duties, Respondent No.3 issued the impugned order dated 29.08.2025 terminating their contractual engagement. It is pleaded that the impugned order has been passed without issuing any show cause notice or affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and is also contrary to Clause 17(ii)(a) of the 3 agreement governing their contractual engagement. It is further pleaded that immediately after the issuance of the impugned order, the petitioners submitted representations dated 01.09.2025 before the General Manager (HR), NMDC Limited, and also before the Deputy Collector and the Labour Officer, District Bastar, seeking reconsideration of the termination order. However, no decision having been taken on the said representations, the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present writ petition. 3. (a) Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order, though couched as an order terminating the contractual engagement of the petitioners, is in reality punitive and stigmatic in nature. It is argued that where the foundation of the order is allegations of misconduct or circumstances casting a stigma upon the employee, the employer is under a legal obligation to conduct a proper enquiry and afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing before passing such an order. It is contended that the respondents have failed to adhere not only to the principles of natural justice but also to Clause 17(ii)(a) of the agreement governing the petitioners' engagement pursuant to the order passed by MECON Limited. (b) It is further submitted that the issue is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Swati Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2139, wherein it has been held that even in the case of contractual employment, a stigmatic order of termination cannot be sustained without holding a proper enquiry and affording due 4 opportunity to the employee concerned. Reliance has also been placed upon the decisions in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. & Others, (2000) 5 SCC 152, and Kaushal Chandrakar & Others v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, 2021 SCC OnLine Chh 2251, to contend that the Court is empowered to lift the veil of an innocuously worded termination order to ascertain its true nature and, if found to be punitive or stigmatic, such an order cannot be sustained in the absence of compliance with the principles of natural justice. On the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the impugned orders dated 29.08.2025 deserve to be quashed. 4. (i) Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents No.1 to 4/NMDC opposes the writ petition and submits that the petitioners were never regular employees of NMDC and their engagement was purely contractual in nature. Initially, the petitioners were engaged by MECON Limited, who has been given the contract of Operation & Maintenance (O&M) by the NMDC Steel Plant (NSL) and were subsequently the petitioners were engaged by NMDC Steel Limited under a fresh contractual arrangement. It is submitted that the terms and conditions of the engagement were specifically incorporated in the offer letter dated 23.11.2024 as well as in the earlier agreement executed with MECON Limited, both of which were duly accepted by the petitioners at the time of joining. (ii) It is further submitted that the contractual documents unequivocally provide that the engagement was for a contractual tenure, renewable only depending upon the requirement of the management and 5 the satisfactory performance of the employee. The terms of engagement also specifically stipulate that the petitioners would not acquire any right to claim regular or permanent employment merely by virtue of such contractual engagement. Therefore, the petitioners cannot claim any vested right either to continue for the entire contractual period or till attaining the age of 65 years. (iii) Learned counsel further submits that the impugned order dated 29.08.2025 has been passed strictly in accordance with Clause 17(ii)(a) of the MECON Agreement read with Clauses 3.0 and 4.0 of the NSL Offer Letter. In terms of the contractual stipulations, the respondents were fully competent to terminate the contractual engagement by paying one month's contract fee in lieu of notice, which has admittedly been paid to the petitioners. It is argued that the termination is thus a simpliciter termination in accordance with the contract and cannot be termed arbitrary or illegal. It is also contended that the allegation regarding violation of the principles of natural justice is wholly misconceived, as the petitioners' engagement being purely contractual, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed exclusively by the contractual terms voluntarily accepted by them. The respondents submit that no departmental enquiry or prior opportunity of hearing was required before exercising the contractual right of termination in terms of the agreement. (iv) Lastly, learned counsel submits that the petitioners had also executed willingness forms accepting the contractual employment on the same terms and conditions as contained in the MECON Agreement. 6 Having accepted the contractual conditions without demur, the petitioners are estopped from questioning the termination effected strictly in accordance with those very terms. It is also submitted that the present petition suffers from non joinder of necessary party, as the initial employer of the petitioners i.e. MECON Limited has not been impleaded as a party respondent. It is, therefore, submitted that the writ petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as well as material available on record. 6. The principal contention urged on behalf of the petitioners is that though the impugned order is couched in innocuous language, it is in reality punitive and stigmatic in nature and, therefore, could not have been passed without conducting an enquiry and affording an opportunity of hearing. The aforesaid submission requires consideration. 7. It is not in dispute that the petitioners were initially engaged by MECON Limited on contractual basis under an agreement dated 23.11.2022. Subsequently, the petitioners were placed under the NSL, as the MECON Limited got the contract of O&M of NSL. Even the petitioners voluntarily submitted willingness forms expressing their consent to continue under NMDC Steel Limited on the same contractual fee and the same terms and conditions as contained in the MECON agreement. Consequent thereto, fresh engagement letters dated 23.11.2024 were issued by NMDC Steel Limited, which were duly accepted by the petitioners. 7 8. The engagement letter specifically stipulates that the petitioners would remain on contract initially for a period of three years; extension of such engagement would depend upon the satisfactory performance of the incumbent and the requirement of the management. It further expressly declares that the contractual engagement would not confer any right to claim regular or permanent employment. The petitioners accepted the aforesaid conditions without any reservation. Even in the willingness form it has categorically been admitted by the petitioner that “I understand that I am liable to be terminated from the service of NSL Limited forthwith without prejudice to any other legal and disciplinary action as deemed fit by the management of NSL.” 9. The impugned order dated 29.08.2025 has, therefore, to be examined in the backdrop of the aforesaid contractual stipulations. 10. A careful reading of the impugned order reveals that it merely states that in exercise of powers under Clause 17(ii)(a) of the MECON Agreement read with Paragraph 1.0 of the Engagement Letter, the contractual engagement of the petitioners stands terminated with immediate effect and that they shall be entitled to one month's contract fee in lieu of notice. Beyond this, the order neither records any allegation nor assigns any reason for bringing the contractual engagement to an end. The order does not attribute any misconduct, negligence, indiscipline, inefficiency or any other conduct which may cast a stigma upon the petitioners. Thus, the submission that the order is stigmatic merely because it brings the contractual engagement to an end cannot be accepted. 8 11. The distinction between a termination simpliciter and a punitive termination is well settled. A termination becomes punitive only where the order itself contains allegations casting a stigma or where the employer, after conducting an enquiry into allegations of misconduct, terminates the employee on the basis of such findings, though the order may appear innocuous on its face. In the present case, neither contingency exists. Firstly, the impugned order is completely bereft of any allegation against the petitioners and secondly, no material whatsoever has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the respondents had conducted any enquiry into any alleged misconduct or that the termination was founded upon any adverse finding recorded against the petitioners. Mere assertion in the writ petition that the order is stigmatic, unsupported by any contemporaneous material, cannot persuade this Court to lift the veil of an otherwise innocuous order. 12. Consequently, the judgments relied upon by the petitioners do not advance their case. The principle laid down in Swati Priyadarshini, Chandra Prakash Shahi and Kaushal Chandrakar (Supra) would apply only where the foundation of the order is misconduct or where the order visits the employee with civil consequences by casting a stigma upon his character or conduct. Since the impugned orders neither contain any such allegation nor has the petitioners established any punitive foundation behind the order, the ratio of the aforesaid decisions is clearly distinguishable on facts. 13. Once the impugned orders are held to be an order of termination simpliciter, the inevitable consequence is that the rights of the parties 9 have to be tested on the touchstone of the contract governing their relationship. 14. The contractual documents accepted by the petitioners expressly authorize the respondents to terminate the contractual engagement by invoking Clause 17(ii)(a), subject to payment of one month's contract fee in lieu of notice. The impugned order itself records compliance with the said contractual requirement. The petitioners, having voluntarily accepted the terms governing their engagement, cannot now seek to avoid one of the essential conditions thereof merely because the contractual power has been exercised against them. 15. It is trite that a contractual employee has no indefeasible or vested right to continue in service beyond the terms of the contract. In the absence of arbitrariness, mala fides or violation of any statutory provision, the writ Court would ordinarily refrain from interfering with an order passed strictly in accordance with the contractual stipulations. In the present case, neither arbitrariness nor mala fides nor violation of any statutory provision has been established. 16. This Court, therefore, finds no infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. Consequently, the Writ Petition deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (BIBHU DATTA GURU) JUDGE Rahul