1 Reserved on :03.07.2026 Pronounced on :15.07.2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF JULY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.8876 OF 2026 BETWEEN: MR.MUNESH S/O SAMPANGI, AGED ABOUT 20 YEARS, RESIDING AT KAVAL HOSAHALLI, SIDIHOSKOTE PO, ANEKAL, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA – 562 106. (NAME AND ADDRESS AS PER AADHAR CARD) ... PETITIONER (BY SRI GALAVA KUMAR M.V., ADVOCATE) AND: STATE OF KARNATAKA BY ANEKAL POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT OF KARNTAKA BENGALURU – 560 001. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, SPP-I) R Digitally signed by PADMAVATHI B K Location: High Court of Karnataka 2 THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO a) QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.138/2026, DATED 02.05.2026, REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT ANEKAL P.S., BENGALURU RURAL, FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 109, 103(1) R/W 3(5) OF BNS, 2023, PENDING BEFORE THE HON’BLE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE (JR. DN) AND JMFC COURT, ANEKAL, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT, PENDING IN CRIME NO.138/2026, PRODUCED HERETO AS ANNEXURE-A, IN SO FAR AS THESE PETITIONER IS CONCERNED; b) CONSEQUENTLY, DIRECT THE PRISON AUTHORITIES, BENGALURU CENTRAL PRISON TO THE RELEASE OF THE PETITIONER FROM THE JUDICIAL CUSTODY. THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 03.07.2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- 3 CAV ORDER The petitioner is before the Court seeking the following prayer: - (1) “Quash the FIR in Crime No.138 of 2026 dated 02-05- 2026 registered by the Respondent Anekal Police Station, Bengaluru Rural, for the offence punishable under Section 109, 103(1) r/w 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, laid before the Hon’ble Principal Civil judge (Junior Division) & JMFC Court, Anekal, Bengaluru Rural District (pending in Crime No.138/2026 produced hereto as Annexure-A) insofar as the petitioner is concerned (2) Consequently, direct the Prison Authorities, Bengaluru Central Prison to the release of the petitioner from the Judicial Custody. (3) And grant such other and further reliefs in the interest of justice and equity.” 2. Heard Sri Galava Kumar M.V., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned State Public Prosecutor-1 appearing for the respondent. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: - CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA 4 3.1. The petitioner accused No.2, who is a 20 year old man and a labourer, is the brother-in-law of the deceased; Accused No.1 is the father-in-law of the deceased; accused No.3 is the mother in- law of the deceased and accused No.4 is the wife of the deceased. On 14-04-2026 the incident of burning the deceased by accused No.1 and the petitioner/accused No.2 surfaces. The wife of the deceased, accused No.4 leaves the matrimonial house with her two children. At about 12 p.m. at noon, on 14-04-2026 the deceased/husband goes to the house of his father-in-law/accused No.1 which is the maternal home/parental house of his wife. From there he travels to a place called Janatha Colony where his father- in-law/accused No.1, mother-in-law/accused No.3, wife’s brother the petitioner/accused no.2 and wife/accused No.4 were present. Then the deceased/husband asked his wife to go with him, but she refused and tells the deceased to go somewhere and die. When the deceased/husband insists that his wife/accused No.4 and his children should return back to the marital home, the wife’s father/accused No.1 and the petitioner/accused No.2 beat the deceased/husband and do not stop at that. Accused No.1 takes a bottle in which there was half a liter of petrol and pours it on the 5 deceased/son-in-law. That is the role of accused No.1. Accused No.2, the present petitioner, takes a matchstick from the matchbox and lights the body of the husband of accused No.4. A person from the nearby shop watching the said incident rushes and pours water on the deceased. The fire though extinguished, the burns remain. The deceased was taken to the Anekal Government Hospital and the wounds were dressed. Later he was taken for further treatment in a car to a Hospital in Hosur and from there he was taken to the Krishnagiri Government Hospital. 3.2. On 15-04-2026, a day after the incident, the dying declaration was recorded before the Judicial Magistrate, Krishnagiri in the Krishnagiri Government Hospital along with a fitness certificate given by the Doctor that the deceased was then fit to give a dying declaration. The dying declaration was recorded when the deceased was conscious and on the dying declaration all these facts come to light. On 18-04-2026 the dying declaration was forwarded to the Judicial Magistrate, Anekal where the incident had happened. The deceased then succumbs to his injuries and dies on 02-05-2026, which would be after about 20 days of the incident of 6 burning. After the death of the deceased, a crime comes to be registered on the same day, in Crime No.138 of 2026 for the offence of attempt to murder, punishable under Section 109 r/w Sections 3(5) of the BNS, on the basis of dying declaration. Later upon receiving permission from the concerned Judicial Magistrate, the offence of murder punishable under Section 103(1) of the BNS is added. On 02-05-2026, a witness statement was recorded by the Police. It was the statement of the eyewitness, who poured water on the deceased, husband of accused No.4, to douse the fire. The witness spoke about who poured petrol, who lit the matchstick and who beat the husband. On 04-05-2026, the opinion of the Anekal Panchayat members with reference to the cause of death of the deceased as stated in the inquest report is also drawn. The post-mortem report drawn on 04-05-2026, also indicates that the deceased died due to the burn injuries. On the basis of the statements of the eyewitness and other witnesses, the inquest and post-mortem report drawn thereafter, and after conducting further investigation, the father-in-law/accused No.1 and the petitioner/accused No.2 were arrested and taken into custody. The arrest memo and the grounds of arrest were all furnished to the 7 accused, as recorded in the remand order dated 06-05-2026, which was passed by the learned Magistrate remanding accused Nos.1 and 2 to judicial custody. The FSL report of the bottle that was seized from the crime scene, from which petrol was poured, has recorded that the substance tested positive for petrol. The petitioner/accused No.2, now files the subject petition on the score that, the criminal proceedings have been instituted against the petitioner and he has been taken into custody, solely on the basis of the dying declaration without there being any corroboration. The petitioner therefore, seeks quashing of the criminal proceedings in the subject petition. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would reiterate the grounds set out in the petition that the petitioner has been taken into custody solely based upon the dying declaration without any corroboration. On the said issue, he would seek to place reliance upon certain judgments with regard to the evidentiary value of a dying declaration. 8 5. Per contra, the learned State Public Prosecutor Sri B.N. Jagadeesha would refute the submissions in contending that the petitioner was not taken into custody solely on the basis of dying declaration, but there was corroboration by way of statement of the eyewitness. The petitioner was not immediately taken into custody but only after certain amount of investigation. He would seek dismissal of the petition. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 7. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The date and events are more or less admitted. Accused No.1 is the father- in-law of the deceased and petitioner is the brother-in-law of the deceased. Accused No.1 is the one who pours petrol upon the deceased. Accused No.2, the present petitioner lights a matchstick and burns the husband of accused No.4, now deceased. Dying declaration was recorded on 15-04-2026. The dying declaration which was recorded in Tamil and translated into Kannada reads as follows: 9 ORIGINAL DYING DECLARATION IN TAMIL: 10 11 12 13 TRANSLATED COPY IN KANNADA: “ಾಂಕ : 02.05.2026 ರಂದು ೆ ೆ 9-40 ಗಂೆ ೆ ಅಂೆ ಮೂಲಕ ಬಂದ ಟಾ ಅನು ಪೆದು ಪೕಲೆ !ಾಡ#ಾ$ ಕೃಷ'$ (#ೆ)ಯ ಜು,ೕಯ !ಾ-(ೕ.ೆ/ೕ0 ರವ2ಾದ !ಾನ- 3ೕ. ಆ5. 6ೇವ2ಾ7 ರವರು ಕಳ9:;<ೊಟ= ೈ?ಂ@ ,ಕ)2ೇಶB ವರCಾ$ದುD ಸದ ವರಯು ತGಳ9 HಾIೆಯJ)ದುD KಾLೆ ೆ ತGಳ9 HಾIೆಯನು ಓದುವ #ೋ<ೇN ಎಂಬುವರನು ಕ2ೆ?; ಅವಂದ ವರಯನು ಓ; ಕನಡ HಾIೆ ೆ HಾIಾಂತಸ#ಾ$ ವರಯ .ಾ2ಾಂಶPೇೆಂದ2ೆ, ಚೂೇನಹS ಾ3ಮ, ಆೇಕ Tಾಲೂ)Uನ ನVೕB WB PೆಂಕೇN, 25 ವಷX, <ೋರಮ ಜಾಂಗ, ಏZೆ[ೕರು Pಾ-ಾರ ರವರ \ೇ<ೆಯ .ಾ2ಾಂಶPೇೆಂದ2ೆ, ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಸು^ತ3. ನಮ ೆ ಇಬ`ರು ಗಂಡು ಮಕaದುD, ೆ3ೕb ಕು!ಾ5 ಮತುc ನJd ೆ3ೕb ರವ2ಾದುD. ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಯು ಾಯ ಮುಂನ ನ, ಅವಳ9 ನನ ಮಕaಳನು ತನ Tಾ?ಯ ಮೆ ೆ ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದಳ9. ಕZೆದ HಾನುPಾರ, ಾನು ಮeಾ-ಹ 12-00 ಗಂೆ ೆ ಉಪgನೂನJ)ರುವ ನನ !ಾವನ ಮೆ ೆ \ೋ$6ೆD. ಅJ)ಂದ ಾನು ಜನTಾ <ಾ#ೇಜು ಎಂಬ ಸhಳ<ೆa \ೋ$6ೆD. ನನ !ಾವ, ಅTೆc, ಾiೖದ ಮುೇN, ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಮತುc ಮಕaಳ9 ಅJ)ದDರು. ಾನು \ೋ$ ನನ \ೆಂಡ]ಯನು ನೊಂ ೆ ಬರಲು <ೇ6ೆ. ಅವಳ9 ನೊಂ ೆ ಬರುವjಲ) ನನ ಮತುc [ನ ನಡುPೆ Cಾವj6ೇ !ಾತುಕTೆ ಇಲ) ಎಂದು \ೇದಳ9. ನನ \ೆಂಡ] [ೕನು ಎ#ಾ)ದರೂ \ೋ$ ಸತುc Wಡು ಎಂದು \ೇದಳ9. ನಂತರ ನನ !ಾವ ಸಂಪಂ$, ಾiೖದ ಮುೇN, ನನ ೆ <ೈಗಂದ \ೊೆದರು. ನನ !ಾವ ರವರು ತಮk ಾ,ಯJ) ಇಟು=<ೊಂ,ದD ½ Jೕಟ5 Pಾಟ5 ಾಟ ಅನು ಎ]c<ೊಂಡರು. ಅದರJ) ೆೊ3ೕ ಇತುc. ನನ !ಾವ ಸಂಪಂ$ ೆೊ3ೕ ಅನು ನನ iೕ#ೆ ಸುದರು. ಆಗ ಾನು ಏ<ೆ ನನ iೕ#ೆ ೆೊ3ೕ \ಾUD ಅಂತ <ೇ6ೆನು. ನನ ಾiೖದ ಮುೇN ಅ#ೆ) ಪಕaದ ಅಂಗ,ಯJ)ದD ಒಂದು ೆಂU mಟ=ಣ ಎ]c<ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ತoಣ ೆಂU ಕ,p $ ೆಂU ಹ^qದನು. ನನ ೆ ೆಂU ಹ]c<ೊಂ,ತು. ಅಷ=ರJ) ಅ#ೆ) ಅಂಗ, ಬ ಇದDವನು. ಅ#ೆ) ಇದD ಒಂದು Wಂ ೆ [ೕರನು ಎ]c<ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ನನ iೕ#ೆ ಸುದನು. ನನ ೆ ಹ]c<ೊಂ,ದD ೆಂU ಆತು. ನಂತರ ಾನು ಆೇಕ ಸ<ಾX ಆಸgTೆc ೆ \ೋ6ೆನು. ನನ ೆ ^UTೆr <ೊಟ=ರು. ನಂತರ ನನನು ಆೇಕ ಸ<ಾX ಆಸgTೆ3?ಂದ <ಾನJ) \ೊಸೂರು ಸ<ಾXರ ಆಸgTೆ3 ೆ ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದರು. ನಂತರ ಅJ)ಂದ ಆಂಬು#ೆBr ನJ) ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದರು. ಾನು ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಇರುವ ಹZೆ ಮೆCಾ$ದುD ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ನನ ಬ ಇJ)ಂದ ೇ2ೆ ಮೆ ೆ \ೋ ೋLಾ ಅಂತ \ೇದDಳ9. ಾನು ಸಹ \ೋ ೋLಾ ಅಂತ \ೇ6ೆD. ಾನು ಾ, ೆ ಮೆಯನು ೋಡ ೇ<ಾದ2ೆ ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ೆ ನನ !ಾವ ಏೋ \ೇ<ೊt=ದುD ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ನಮk ಮೆ Wಟು= ಅವರ ತಂ6ೆ ಮೆ ೆ ನಮk ಮಕaಳನು ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದಳ9. ಾನು ಕನಡದJ) \ೇದDನು uೊTೆಯJ)ದDರು. ತGಳ9 14 ಾIೆ ೆ \ೇ ಬ2ೆ;ದುD ಪjನಃ ನನ ೆ ಕನಡದJ) ಓ \ೇದುD ಸ?6ೆ ಅಂತ \ೇ6ೆನು. ಾನು \ೇ<ೆ <ೊಟ= ಸಮಯ 2-00 ಗಂೆ ಆ$ತುc ಾನು \ೆಬ`ಟು= \ಾU6ೆನು.” From the investigation papers it is seen that the Doctor at Krishnagiri Hospital after recording the statement of the deceased, also certifies that, the person who was brunt is fit enough to render the dying declaration. About 20 days after the incident, the husband of accused No.4 dies. The death report is rendered before the Anekal Police Station. A crime then comes to be registered on 02-05-2026. The gist of the crime so registered, reads as follows: “10. ಪ3ಥಮ ವತX!ಾನ ವರಯ Vವರಗಳ9 ಾಂಕ : 02.05.2026 ರಂದು ೆ ೆ 10-00 ಗಂೆ ೆ ಅಂೆ ಮೂಲಕ ಬಂದ ಟಾ ಅನು ಪೆದು ಪೕಲೆ !ಾಡ#ಾ$ ಕೃIಾ'$ (#ೆ)ಯ ಜು,ೕಯ !ಾ-(ೕ.ೆ/ೕ0 ರವ2ಾದ !ಾನ- 3ೕ. ಆ5. 6ೇವ2ಾ7 ರವರು ಕಳ9:;<ೊಟ= ೈ?ಂ@ ,ಕ)2ೇಶB ವರCಾ$ದುD ಸದ ವರಯು ತGಳ9 HಾIೆಯJ)ದುD KಾLೆ ೆ ತGಳ9 HಾIೆಯನು ಓದುವ #ೋ<ೇN ಎಂಬುವರನು ಕ2ೆ?; ಅವಂದ ವರಯನು ಓ; ಕನಡ HಾIೆ ೆ HಾIಾಂತಸ#ಾ$ ವರಯ .ಾ2ಾಂಶPೇೆಂದ2ೆ, ಚೂೇನಹS ಾ3ಮ, ಆೇಕ Tಾಲೂ)Uನ ನVೕB WB PೆಂಕೇN, 25 ವಷX, <ೊರಮ ಜಾಂಗ, ಏZೆ[ೕರು Pಾ-ಾರ ರವರ \ೇ<ೆಯ .ಾ2ಾಂಶPೇೆಂದ2ೆ, ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಸು(ತ3. ನಮ ೆ ಇಬ`ರು ಗಂಡು ಮಕaದುD, ೆ3ೕb ಕು!ಾ5 ಮತುc ನJd ೆ3ೕb ರವ2ಾದುD, ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಯು ಾಯ ಮುಂನ ನ, ಅವಳ9 ನನ ಮಕaಳನು ತನ Tಾ?ಯ ಮೆ ೆ ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದಳ9. ಕZೆದ HಾನುPಾರ, ಾನು ಮeಾ-ಹ 12-00 ಗಂೆ ೆ ಉಪgನೂನJ)ರುವ ನನ !ಾವನ ಮೆ ೆ \ೋ$6ೆD. ಅJ)ಂದ ಾನು ಜನTಾ <ಾ#ೇಜು ಎಂಬ ಸhಳ<ೆa \ೋ$6ೆD. ನನ !ಾವ, ಅTೆc, ಾiೖದ ಮುೇN, ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಮತುc ಮಕaಳ9 ಅJ)ದDರು. ಾನು \ೋ$ ನನ \ೆಂಡ]ಯನು ನೊಂ ೆ ಬರಲು <ೇ6ೆ. ಅವಳ9 ನೊಂ ೆ ಬರುವjಲ) ನನ ಮತುc [ನ ನಡುPೆ Cಾವj6ೇ !ಾತುಕTೆ ಇಲ), ಎಂದು \ೇದಳ9. ನನ \ೆಂಡ] [ೕನು ಎ#ಾ)ದರೂ \ೋ$ ಸತುc Wಡು ಎಂದು \ೇದಳ9. 15 ನಂತರ ನನ !ಾವ ಸಂಪಂ$, ಾiೖದ ಮುೇN, ನನ ೆ <ೈಗಂದ \ೊೆದರು. ನನ !ಾವ ರವರು ತಮk ಾ,ಯJ) ಇಟು=<ೊಂ,ದD ½ Jೕಟ5 Pಾಟ5 ಾಟ ಅನು ಎ]c<ೊಂಡರು. ಅದರJ) ೆೊ3ೕ ಇತುc. ನನ !ಾವ ಸಂಪಂ$ ೆೊ3ೕ ಅನು ನನ iೕ#ೆ ಸುದರು. ಆಗ ಾನು ಏ<ೆ ನನ iೕ#ೆ ೆೊ3ೕ \ಾUDೕ ಅಂತ <ೇ6ೆನು. ನನ ಾiೖದ ಮುೇN ಅ#ೆ) ಪಕaದ ಅಂಗ,ಯJ)ದD ಒಂದು ೆಂU mಟ=ಣ ಎ]c<ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ತoಣ ೆಂU ಕ,p $ ೆಂU ಹ^qದನು. ನನ ೆ ೆಂU ಹ]c<ೊಂ,ತು. ಅಷ=ರJ) ಅ#ೆ) ಅಂಗ, ಬ ಇದDವನು. ಅ#ೆ) ಇದD ಒಂದು Wಂ ೆ [ೕರನು ಎ]c<ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ನನ iೕ#ೆ ಸುದನು. ನನ ೆ ಹ]c<ೊಂ,ದD ೆಂU ಆತು. ನಂತರ ಾನು ಆೇಕ ಸ<ಾX ಆಸgTೆ3 ೆ \ೋ6ೆನು. ನನ ೆ ^UTೆr <ೊಟ=ರು. ನಂತರ ನನನು ಆೇಕ ಸ<ಾX ಆಸgTೆ3?ಂದ <ಾನJ) \ೊಸೂರು ಸ<ಾX ಆಸgTೆ3 ೆ ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದರು, ನಂತರ ಅJ)ಂದ ಆಂಬು#ೆBr ನJ) ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದರು. ಾನು ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ಇರುವ ಹZೆ ಮೆCಾ$ದುD ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ನನ ಬ ಇJ)ಂದ ೇ2ೆ ಮೆ ೆ \ೋ ೋLಾ ಅಂತ \ೇದDಳ9. ಾನು ಸಹ \ೋ ೋLಾ ಅಂತ \ೇ6ೆD. ಾನು ಾ, ೆ ಮೆಯನು ೋಡ ೇ<ಾದ2ೆ ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ೆ ನನ !ಾವ ಏೋ \ೇ<ೊt=ದುD ನನ \ೆಂಡ] ನಮk ಮೆ Wಟು= ಅವರ ತಂ6ೆ ಮೆ ೆ ನಮk ಮಕaಳನು ಕ2ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋದಳ9, ಾನು ಕನಡದJ) \ೇದDನು uೊTೆಯJ)ದDರು. ತGಳ9 ಾIೆ ೆ \ೇ ಬ2ೆ;ದುD ಪjನಃ ನನ ೆ ಕನಡದJ) ಓ \ೇದುD ಸ?6ೆ ಅಂತ \ೇ6ೆನು. ಾನು \ೇ<ೆ <ೊಟ= ಸಮಯ 2-00 ಗಂೆ ಆ$ತುc ಾನು \ೆಬ`ಟು= \ಾU6ೆನು, ಎಂದು \ೇ ತGಳ9 HಾIೆಯJ)ದDನು ಮದು ೊಂಡಪJ) ಾ3ಮದ Pಾ; 3ೕ. #ೋ<ೇN ರವರು ಕನಡ<ೆa HಾIಾಂತರ; ೈx !ಾ,;ದ ವರಯ iೕ2ೆ ೆ KಾLಾ y.ಸಂ 138/2026 ಕಲಂ 109 uೊTೆ ೆ 3(5) WಎBಎb-2023 ೕTಾ- <ೇಸು 6ಾಖಲು !ಾ,<ೊಂ,ರುTೆc.” 8. If things would have stopped at that, perhaps the petitioner would have had a case. On 02-05-2026 the statement of eyewitness is recorded. The statement reads as follows: ““““ಆೇಕ ಆೇಕ ಆೇಕ ಆೇಕ mJೕb mJೕb mJೕb mJೕb KಾLೆ KಾLೆ KಾLೆ KಾLೆ y y y y.ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ ನಂ 138/2026 ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ ಕಲಂ 109 uೊTೆ ೆ uೊTೆ ೆ uೊTೆ ೆ uೊTೆ ೆ 3(5) WWWW.ಎB ಎB ಎB ಎB.ಎb ಎb ಎb ಎb 2023 16 ತ[{ಾ|<ಾಗಳ9 ತ[{ಾ|<ಾಗಳ9 ತ[{ಾ|<ಾಗಳ9 ತ[{ಾ|<ಾಗಳ9 :- 3ೕಮ] ಮು[ರತ.ಎಂ }.ಎb.ಐ .ಾ•6ಾರರ .ಾ•6ಾರರ .ಾ•6ಾರರ .ಾ•6ಾರರ \ೇ<ೆ \ೇ<ೆ \ೇ<ೆ \ೇ<ೆ 3ೕ. ಸ6ಾX5 WB #ೇ: ಅಬುD ಸTಾc5 58 ವಷX, ಮು;)ಂ ಜಾಂಗ, tೕ ಅಂಗ, Pಾ-ಾರ, Pಾಸ Vೕರಸಂದ3 ಾ3ಮ, ಎ#ೆ<ಾ/[€ ;t mೕb=,, ಅ]c ೆ#ೆ \ೋಬ, ಆೇಕ Tಾ#ೊ)ೕಕು mೕB ನಂ 8746938442 ----- ಾಂಕ :02-05-2026 ಾನು iೕಲaಂಡ VZಾಸದJ) PಾಸPಾ$ದುD <ಾವಲ\ೊಸಹS ಾ3ಮದ ಹ]cರ ರುವ ಅ|] ಆಸgTೆ3ಯ ಪಕa tೕ \ೋೆ ಅನು ಇಟು= <ೊಂಡು Pಾ-ಾರ !ಾ, <ೊಂ,ರುTೆcೕೆ. ನಮk tೕ \ೋೆ ಮುಂ6ೆ ಆೇಕ ಚಂ6ಾಪjರ ರ.ೆc ಬಯJ) <ಾವಲ \ೊಸಹS ಜನTಾ <ಾ#ೋ[ಯ Pಾ; ಸಂಪಂ$ ಎಂಬುವನು ಎಳ[ೕರು ಅಂಗ,ಯನು ಇಟು= <ೊಂಡು Pಾ-ಾರ !ಾ, <ೊಂ,ರುTಾc2ೆ. ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ ಾಂಕ 14-04-2026 ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ರಂದು ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ ಾ ಾ ಾ ಾ§ÄÛ ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) tೕ tೕ tೕ tೕ Pಾ-ಾರ Pಾ-ಾರ Pಾ-ಾರ Pಾ-ಾರ !ಾ, !ಾ, !ಾ, !ಾ, <ೊಂ,ರುPಾ ೆ <ೊಂ,ರುPಾ ೆ <ೊಂ,ರುPಾ ೆ <ೊಂ,ರುPಾ ೆ, ಎಳ[ೕರು ಎಳ[ೕರು ಎಳ[ೕರು ಎಳ[ೕರು ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ \ೆಂಡ] \ೆಂಡ] \ೆಂಡ] \ೆಂಡ] ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk, ಮಗ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಮಗ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ, ಮಗಳ9 ಮಗಳ9 ಮಗಳ9 ಮಗಳ9 ಸು^ತ3 ಸು^ತ3 ಸು^ತ3 ಸು^ತ3 ರವರುಗಳ9 ರವರುಗಳ9 ರವರುಗಳ9 ರವರುಗಳ9 ಇದDರು ಇದDರು ಇದDರು ಇದDರು. ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಸು!ಾರು ಸು!ಾರು ಸು!ಾರು ಸು!ಾರು 12-00 ಗಂೆಯJ) ಗಂೆಯJ) ಗಂೆಯJ) ಗಂೆಯJ) ಸಂಪಂ ಸಂಪಂ ಸಂಪಂ ಸಂಪಂ$$$$ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಬ ೆ ಬ ೆ ಬ ೆ ಬ ೆ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಅಯ ಅಯ ಅಯ ಅಯ ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ಎಂಬುವನು ಎಂಬುವನು ಎಂಬುವನು ಎಂಬುವನು ಕು,ದು ಕು,ದು ಕು,ದು ಕು,ದು <ೊಂಡು <ೊಂಡು <ೊಂಡು <ೊಂಡು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಬಂದು ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಇದD ಇದD ಇದD ಇದD ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಪ] ಪ] ಪ] ಪ] ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ರವ ೆ ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ \ೆಂಡ]ಯನು \ೆಂಡ]ಯನು \ೆಂಡ]ಯನು \ೆಂಡ]ಯನು ಕಳ9:; ಕಳ9:; ಕಳ9:; ಕಳ9:; <ೊ, <ೊ, <ೊ, <ೊ, ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಕೂ ಾ, ಕೂ ಾ, ಕೂ ಾ, ಕೂ ಾ, ಗ#ಾೆ ಗ#ಾೆ ಗ#ಾೆ ಗ#ಾೆ !ಾಡು]cದುD !ಾಡು]cದುD !ಾಡು]cದುD !ಾಡು]cದುD ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ ಆತನ \ೆಂಡ] \ೆಂಡ] \ೆಂಡ] \ೆಂಡ] ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಅTೆc ಅTೆc ಅTೆc ಅTೆc !ಾವ !ಾವ !ಾವ !ಾವ, ಾiೖದ[ ೆ ಾiೖದ[ ೆ ಾiೖದ[ ೆ ಾiೖದ[ ೆ ಾ? ೆ ಾ? ೆ ಾ? ೆ ಾ? ೆ ಾ? ೆ ಾ? ೆ ಾ? ೆ ಬಂದಂTೆ ಬಂದಂTೆ ಬಂದಂTೆ ಬಂದಂTೆ ೈಯು]cದುD ೈಯು]cದುD ೈಯು]cದುD ೈಯು]cದುD ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ನVೕನ[ ೆ ನVೕನ[ ೆ ನVೕನ[ ೆ ನVೕನ[ ೆ ಗ#ಾೆ ಗ#ಾೆ ಗ#ಾೆ ಗ#ಾೆ !ಾಡ ೇಡ !ಾಡ ೇಡ !ಾಡ ೇಡ !ಾಡ ೇಡ ಅಂಗ, ಅಂಗ, ಅಂಗ, ಅಂಗ, ಬ?ಂದ ಬ?ಂದ ಬ?ಂದ ಬ?ಂದ \ೊರಟು \ೊರಟು \ೊರಟು \ೊರಟು \ೋಗು \ೋಗು \ೋಗು \ೋಗು ಇಲ)ದD2ೆ ಇಲ)ದD2ೆ ಇಲ)ದD2ೆ ಇಲ)ದD2ೆ [ನ ೆ [ನ ೆ [ನ ೆ [ನ ೆ .ಾ?; .ಾ?; .ಾ?; .ಾ?; WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ ೈಯುD ೈಯುD ೈಯುD ೈಯುD, ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$, ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ, ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ಪಚqಮk ಸು^ತ3 ಸು^ತ3 ಸು^ತ3 ಸು^ತ3 ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ರವರು ನVೕನ ನVೕನ ನVೕನ ನVೕನ [ ೆ [ ೆ [ ೆ [ ೆ :,ದು :,ದು :,ದು :,ದು ಎZೆ6ಾ, ಎZೆ6ಾ, ಎZೆ6ಾ, ಎZೆ6ಾ, <ೈಗಂದ <ೈಗಂದ <ೈಗಂದ <ೈಗಂದ \ೊೆಯು]cದುD \ೊೆಯು]cದುD \ೊೆಯು]cದುD \ೊೆಯು]cದುD, ಇವರದು ಇವರದು ಇವರದು ಇವರದು ಇದD6ೆDೕ ಇದD6ೆDೕ ಇದD6ೆDೕ ಇದD6ೆDೕ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) ಅಂಗ,ಯJ) Pಾ-ಾರ Pಾ-ಾರ Pಾ-ಾರ Pಾ-ಾರ !ಾ, !ಾ, !ಾ, !ಾ, <ೊಂ,6ೆDನು <ೊಂ,6ೆDನು <ೊಂ,6ೆDನು <ೊಂ,6ೆDನು. ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಮ6ಾ-ಹ ಸು!ಾರು ಸು!ಾರು ಸು!ಾರು ಸು!ಾರು 12-30 ಗಂೆಯJ) ಗಂೆಯJ) ಗಂೆಯJ) ಗಂೆಯJ) ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ಸಂಪಂ$ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ರವರ ಅಯ ಅಯ ಅಯ ಅಯ uೋ2ಾ$ uೋ2ಾ$ uೋ2ಾ$ uೋ2ಾ$ Uರು^ Uರು^ Uರು^ Uರು^ <ೊಂ,ದುD <ೊಂ,ದುD <ೊಂ,ದುD <ೊಂ,ದುD ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ನನನನ ಷರt ೆ ಷರt ೆ ಷರt ೆ ಷರt ೆ ೆಂU ೆಂU ೆಂU ೆಂU ಹ]c<ೊಂಡು ಹ]c<ೊಂಡು ಹ]c<ೊಂಡು ಹ]c<ೊಂಡು ಉಯು]cದುD ಉಯು]cದುD ಉಯು]cದುD ಉಯು]cದುD ತoಣ ತoಣ ತoಣ ತoಣ ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು ಾನು \ಾಗೂ \ಾಗೂ \ಾಗೂ \ಾಗೂ ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ ಅಂಗ, ಅಂಗ, ಅಂಗ, ಅಂಗ, ಬ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಇದDವರು ಇದDವರು ಇದDವರು ಇದDವರು ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಅಂಗ,ಯ ಬ ಬ ಬ ಬ Wಂ ೆಯJ)t=ದD Wಂ ೆಯJ)t=ದD Wಂ ೆಯJ)t=ದD Wಂ ೆಯJ)t=ದD [ೕರನು [ೕರನು [ೕರನು [ೕರನು Tೆ ೆದು<ೊಂಡು Tೆ ೆದು<ೊಂಡು Tೆ ೆದು<ೊಂಡು Tೆ ೆದು<ೊಂಡು \ೋ$ \ೋ$ \ೋ$ \ೋ$ ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ನನನನ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ ಸುದು ಸುದು ಸುದು ಸುದು ೆಂU ೆಂU ೆಂU ೆಂU ಆ;6ೆವj ಆ;6ೆವj ಆ;6ೆವj ಆ;6ೆವj. ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ನVೕB ೆ ೆ ೆ ೆ ಏಾಯುc ಏಾಯುc ಏಾಯುc ಏಾಯುc ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ <ೇ6ಾಗ <ೇ6ಾಗ <ೇ6ಾಗ <ೇ6ಾಗ ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ !ಾವ !ಾವ !ಾವ !ಾವ ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಮತುc ಾiೖದ ಾiೖದ ಾiೖದ ಾiೖದ ಇಬ`ರು ಇಬ`ರು ಇಬ`ರು ಇಬ`ರು ನನ ೆ ನನ ೆ ನನ ೆ ನನ ೆ .ಾ?; .ಾ?; .ಾ?; .ಾ?; WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ WಡುTೆcೕೆಂತ ೈಯುD ೈಯುD ೈಯುD ೈಯುD ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ !ಾವ !ಾವ !ಾವ !ಾವ ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ ೆೊ3ೕ ೆೊ3ೕ ೆೊ3ೕ ೆೊ3ೕ ಎರ^ದುD ಎರ^ದುD ಎರ^ದುD ಎರ^ದುD ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ ಾiೖದ ಾiೖದ ಾiೖದ ಾiೖದ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ಮುೇಶ ೆಂU ೆಂU ೆಂU ೆಂU ಕ,p ಕ,p ಕ,p ಕ,p $ೕ $ೕ $ೕ $ೕ ನನ ನನ ನನ ನನ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ iೕ#ೆ ಹ^qದನು ಹ^qದನು ಹ^qದನು ಹ^qದನು ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ \ೇದ \ೇದ \ೇದ \ೇದ Vಾರ Vಾರ Vಾರ Vಾರ ೊTಾc?ತು ೊTಾc?ತು ೊTಾc?ತು ೊTಾc?ತು ನVೕನ ನVೕನ ನVೕನ ನVೕನ [ ೆ [ ೆ [ ೆ [ ೆ ಆಸgTೆ3 ೆ ಆಸgTೆ3 ೆ ಆಸgTೆ3 ೆ ಆಸgTೆ3 ೆ \ೋಗು \ೋಗು \ೋಗು \ೋಗು ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ ಅಂತ \ೇ \ೇ \ೇ \ೇ ಅ6ೇ ಅ6ೇ ಅ6ೇ ಅ6ೇ ರ.ೆcಯJ) ರ.ೆcಯJ) ರ.ೆcಯJ) ರ.ೆcಯJ) ಬರು]cದD ಬರು]cದD ಬರು]cದD ಬರು]cದD ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ಒಂದು ಆೋವನು ಆೋವನು ಆೋವನು ಆೋವನು ಹ]c; ಹ]c; ಹ]c; ಹ]c; ಕಳ9:; ಕಳ9:; ಕಳ9:; ಕಳ9:; <ೊೆ=ನು <ೊೆ=ನು <ೊೆ=ನು <ೊೆ=ನು. 17 ಆದDಂದ ತನ \ೆಂಡ] ಮಕaಳನು ಕಳ9:; <ೊಡು ಅಂತ <ೇಳಲು ಬಂದ ನVೕನ[ ೆ :,ದು <ೊಂಡು ಎZೆ6ಾ, <ೈಗಂದ \ೊೆದು ನVೕನ iೕ#ೆ ೆೊ3ೕ ಎರ^ ೆಂU ಹ^q, <ೊ#ೆ !ಾಡಲು ಪ3ಯ];ರುವ ಆತನ !ಾವ ಸಂಪಂ$, ಾiೖದ ಮುೇಶ, ಅTೆc ಪಚqಮk, \ೆಂಡ] ಸು^ತ3 ರವರುಗಳ iೕ#ೆ <ಾನೂನು ೕ] ಕ3ಮ ಜರು$ಸ ೇ<ೆಂದು <ೋರುTೆcೕೆ. " ನನ ಮುಂ6ೆ " ಓದ#ಾಯುc <ೇ6ೆ ಸ?6ೆ” (Emphasis added at each instance) The name of eyewitness was Sardar who runs a tea shop at Janatha Colony in Anekal. Near the tea shop, is the shop of accused Nos.1 and 2, where they sell coconut water. 9. The witness narrates the entire incident that the petitioner/accused No.2 scolded the deceased Naveen along with his father/accused No.1 and they were uttering that they would kill the deceased. The petitioner took a stick and beat the deceased, after which, they poured petrol and set him on fire. The statements of other witnesses were recorded, after which, the offence of murder under Section 103(1) is added. 10. Further, the post-mortem report dated 04-05-2026 which opines on the cause of death of the deceased reads as follows: 18 The report indicates that the deceased died due to septicemic complications caused due to the burn injuries. 11. Now, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, with considerable vehemence, contends that the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioner, which lead to his arrest, are founded solely upon the dying declaration of the deceased and, in the absence of independent corroborative material, his continued incarceration is wholly unsustainable. The law in this regard 19 is no longer res integra. The submission, though attractive at its first blush, withers away the moment the factual matrix obtaining in the case at hand is juxtaposed with the settled principles of law governing the evidentiary value of a dying declaration. 12. The Apex Court in STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. CHAMAN LAL1 has undertaken a comprehensive survey of the law governing dying declarations and holds as follows: “…. …. …. 16. Before examining the evidentiary value of the dying declaration, it is apposite to note the settled legal principles governing dying declarations. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act renders admissible statements made by a deceased person as to the cause of death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in death. It is well settled that a dying declaration need not be made in expectation of immediate death; that a conviction under Section 302 IPC can rest solely on a dying declaration if it is found to be voluntary, truthful and reliable; and that corroboration is not a rule of law but one of prudence. 16.1. In Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, this Court laid down the foundational principles governing appreciation of dying declarations. In that case, the deceased had made three successive dying declarations within a span of two hours, which were to some extent contradictory. However, one aspect remained consistent in all three declarations namely that he had 1 2026 SCC OnLine SC 85 20 been attacked by two persons, Kushal Rao and Tukaram with swords and spears. Relying upon this common thread running through the declarations, which was further corroborated by medical evidence disclosing punctured and incised wounds on various parts of the body, this Court held that the declarations could be safely relied upon to convict the accused who had been named therein. While so holding, this Court expounded the principles governing the circumstances under which a dying declaration may be accepted without corroboration. In this regard, Paragraph 16 of the judgment is apposite: “16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, 1. that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; 2. that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; 3. that it cannot be laid down as a general proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; 4. that a dying declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; 5. that a dying declaration which has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may 21 suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and human character, and 6. that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has to keep in view, the circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it; and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested parties.” 16.2. The above principles were subsequently summarised by this Court in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat, as follows: “(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. [(1976) 3 SCC 104]) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav [(1985) 1 SCC 552]) (iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor [(1976) 3 SCC 618] 22 (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. [(1974) 4 SCC 264]) (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v. State of M.P. [1981 Supp SCC 25]) (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. [(1981) 2 SCC 654]) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu [1980 Supp SCC 455]) (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar [1980 Supp SCC 769]) (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. [1988 Supp SCC 152]) (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan [(1989) 3 SCC 390])” 16.3. In Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, a Constitution Bench held that medical certification of 23 fitness is not an absolute requirement and that the testimony of the Magistrate recording the dying declaration would suffice if the Court is otherwise satisfied about the mental fitness of the declarant. 16.4. In State of U.P. v. Veerpal, it was reiterated that a conviction can be sustained solely on the basis of a dying declaration even in the absence of corroboration, provided it inspires confidence. In the said case, the deceased in her dying declaration named the person who had set her on fire. Even in the statement recorded under section 161 Cr. P.C., the deceased stated that her father-in-law had attacked her with a stick with the intention to kill her and that as a result, she locked herself in the room and set herself ablaze. Considering the dying declaration of the deceased, which was found to be voluntary, truthful and reliable, this Court set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court and restored the conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC recorded by the trial Court. 17. In light of the aforesaid principles, the dying declaration in the present case inspires full confidence. It was recorded on 08.12.2009 by PW-1, the Tehsildar, a neutral and independent public officer. Prior to recording the statement, medical opinion regarding the fitness of the deceased was duly obtained. PW-1 categorically stated that the deceased was conscious, oriented and capable of making a statement. This version stands corroborated by PW-10, the Deputy Superintendent of Police and PW-2, the brother of the deceased, both of whom deposed that the deceased recognised them and responded appropriately to questions. Although PW-11, the Medical Officer vacillated on certain aspects, the dying declaration cannot be discarded on that ground alone. The declaration clearly and unequivocally attributes the act of pouring kerosene oil and igniting the fire to the respondent. It bears the thumb impression of the deceased and was recorded in the presence of senior officers. There is no material on record suggestive of tutoring, coercion or manipulation. 18. The High Court disbelieved the dying declaration primarily on two grounds: (i) an alleged inconsistency with respect to the time at which the statement was recorded; and 24 (ii) a doubt as to whether PW-1 himself recorded the statement or merely dictated it. In our considered opinion, neither ground is sustainable. 18.1. As regards the first aspect, PW-2 initially made a vague reference to the evening; however, upon a clarification sought by the Court, he categorically stated that the statement was recorded at around 11.30 a.m. This clarification aligns with the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-10. Such a minor discrepancy, which stood satisfactorily explained, does not go to the root of the prosecution case, especially when the factum of recording of the dying declaration on 08.12.2009 stands firmly established. 18.2. With regard to the manner of recording, PW-1 clearly deposed that he recorded the statement of the deceased after putting questions to her. PW-10 clarified that the statement was recorded under the supervision and authority of PW-1, who ensured that the answers given by the deceased were correctly reduced into writing. Recording a dying declaration under the supervision of a Magistrate does not render it invalid. No suggestion was put to PW-1 in cross- examination that he did not record the statement or that he abdicated his responsibility. The High Court thus discarded the dying declaration on conjectures not borne out by the evidence. 18.3. In any event, the law does not prescribe any rigid form for recording a dying declaration. So long as the Court is satisfied that the declaration is voluntary, truthful and reliable, hyper-technical objections cannot form the basis for its rejection. 19. In the present case, it is true that the Rukka (FIR) records that the deceased did not initially name the assailant. However, it is settled law that a FIR is not expected to be an encyclopaedia of the entire prosecution case. At that stage, the immediate concern of the family members was the survival of the victim who had sustained nearly 70% burn injuries. Such an omission in the earliest version, in these circumstances, cannot ipso facto discredit the subsequent dying declaration recorded in accordance with law. 25 20. PW-4 and PW-5 were declared hostile and attempted to attribute oral statements to the deceased suggesting self- immolation. The trial Court rightly rejected their testimony. Their version is essentially hearsay and was never disclosed at the earliest available opportunity. In Bhajju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, this Court held that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon only to the extent it is corroborated by other reliable evidence. Recently, in Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, this principle was reiterated. In the present case, no such corroboration exists in respect of the testimony of PW-4 and PW-5, whose statements are unsupported by any independent or reliable evidence on record. 21. The defence witnesses, DW-1 and DW-2, stand on no better footing. DW-1 admitted in cross-examination that she had reached the spot only after the deceased had already caught fire and was not present at the time of the incident. Her testimony is thus not based on direct knowledge and lacks corroboration. DW-2, the minor son of the deceased, does not claim to have witnessed the act of pouring kerosene or igniting the fire. At best, his testimony indicates that the respondent attempted to extinguish the fire, a circumstance which does not negate or dilute the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. The High Court without a proper appreciation of the probative value of these testimonies, erred in placing reliance upon them to overturn the conviction recorded by the trial Court. 22. The plea of self-immolation on behalf of the respondent does not inspire the confidence of this Court. The alleged conduct of the respondent in attempting to extinguish the fire and sustaining minor burn injuries does not, by itself, exonerate him from culpability. Such conduct can equally be consistent with an attempt to create an appearance of innocence after the commission of the offence. The defence witnesses are either interested or partisan and fail to rebut the consistent and cogent prosecution evidence. 23. Motive assumes significance, primarily in cases based on circumstantial evidence. Where there is direct evidence in the form of a credible and trustworthy dying declaration, the absence of strong proof of motive is not fatal to the prosecution case. This position has been consistently affirmed by this Court in State of Andhra 26 Pradesh v. Bogam Chandraiah, Dasin Bai @ Shanti Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, and Purshottam Chopra v. State (NCT of Delhi). In the present case, the evidence on record discloses that the respondent subjected the deceased to frequent quarrels, humiliation and verbal abuse, including branding her a “Kanjri” and repeatedly asking her to leave the matrimonial home. The dying declaration itself refers to persistent matrimonial discord and ill-treatment thereby furnishing a plausible background for the commission of the offence. In any event, the prosecution is not required to establish motive with mathematical precision and failure to conclusively prove motive does not weaken an otherwise reliable and cogent case. 24. Upon an overall appraisal of the evidence, we are satisfied that the dying declaration of the deceased, Saro Devi, is voluntary, truthful and reliable. It was recorded by a competent authority at a time when the deceased was conscious, oriented and capable of making a statement. The minor discrepancies highlighted by the High Court do not create any dent in the credibility of the dying declaration. Therefore, the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent committed the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. 25. The trial Court correctly relied upon the dying declaration and the surrounding circumstances to record the conviction of the respondent. The High Court erred in discarding this crucial piece of evidence on speculative and hyper-technical grounds and in placing undue reliance on the testimonies of hostile and defence witnesses. The judgments relied upon by the respondent do not lay down any absolute proposition that a dying declaration must invariably be discarded in the absence of corroboration. Each case must necessarily turn on its own facts.” The Apex Court has reiterated the well-entrenched principle that a dying declaration is a substantive piece of evidence; that it need not be made in the expectation of imminent 27 death; that a conviction for the offence of murder can rest solely upon such declaration, provided it is found to be voluntary, truthful and inspires the confidence of the Court; and that corroboration is not a rule of law but merely a rule of prudence. The judgment traces the jurisprudential evolution of the doctrine beginning from KHUSHAL RAO v. STATE OF BOMBAY, (1957) 2 SCC 787, through the Constitution Bench decision in LAXMAN v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, (2002) 6 SCC 710, till the judgment in STATE OF U.P. v. VEERPAL, (2022) 4 SCC 741, to hold that the evidentiary value of a dying declaration is to be judged on its own intrinsic reliability and not on any inflexible formula demanding corroboration in every case. 13. Long before the said judgment, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of MIRZA JAWED AHMED BAIG v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH2, considers the evidentiary value of a dying declaration and holds such issues are a matter of trial and cannot 2 2014 SCC OnLine AP 426 28 be a subject matter of quashment of proceedings under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The judgment reads as follows: “…… …… …… As seen from the above, the Apex Court in Ashabais case (1 supra) categorically held that where there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be assessed separately and evaluated on its own merit as to its evidentiary value and one cannot be rejected because of certain variation in the other. In view of the judgment of the Apex Court referred to above, and having regard to the material available on record, this court is of the view that the inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot be invoked to stifle a legitimate prosecution. Truthfulness or evidentiary value of each dying declaration has to be assessed during the course of trial. At this stage, it cannot be said that the charge sheet is bereft of basic facts constituting an offence punishable under section 304-B IPC.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the afore-quoted judgment, while dealing with the exercise of it’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., had emphatically held that the truthfulness, voluntariness and evidentiary value of a dying declaration are quintessentially matters for appreciation during trial and cannot become the subject of adjudication in proceedings seeking quashment of 29 criminal proceedings. The High Court observed that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court cannot be invoked to throttle a legitimate prosecution. 14. If the law declared by the Apex Court in CHAMAN LAL supra and by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the afore-quoted judgment are applied to the facts obtaining in the present case, the edifice of the petitioner's submission crumbles. The criminal proceedings leading to the arrest of the petitioner, were not initiated against him, merely because the deceased named him in the dying declaration. The dying declaration is, no doubt, the sheet- anchor of the prosecution case; but it does not stand in isolation. It receives substantial and contemporaneous corroboration from the statement of the independent eyewitness - the very person who rushed to the rescue of the deceased and poured water upon his burning body in an attempt to extinguish the flames. 15. The eyewitness has consistently spoken to the entire sequence of events, specifically attributing distinct roles of the 30 accused. According to his statement, accused No.1 poured petrol upon the body of the deceased and the present petitioner, accused No.2, struck the fatal matchstick that engulfed his brother-in-law into flames. The post-mortem report which indicates that the deceased died due to the burn injuries and the FSL report of the bottle recovered from the crime scene which discloses the presence of petrol, lend scientific assurance to the prosecution narrative. Thus, the prosecution case is not woven merely around a solitary dying declaration; it is reinforced by ocular as well as scientific material collected during the course of the investigation. 16. The deceased survived the horrific incident for nearly twenty days before ultimately succumbing to the extensive burn injuries. Immediately, a day after the incident, while fully conscious and certified to be medically fit, he made a dying declaration before a Judicial Magistrate, assigning specific overt acts to each of the accused. That declaration, coupled with the testimony of the independent eyewitness and the forensic material gathered during 31 investigation, furnishes a formidable prima facie foundation for the prosecution. 17. The petitioner, therefore, cannot seek to convert the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS into a forum for conducting a mini-trial. The jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings is intended to prevent manifest abuse of the process of law; it is not designed to weigh the prosecution evidence, as though the Court were rendering a verdict after trial. 18. What further astonishes this Court is that a petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS is preferred seeking quashment of the very FIR, in a prosecution alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of the BNS and also the offence under Section 103(1) of the BNS which was subsequently added. The allegations, if ultimately established, disclose one of the gravest offences known to criminal jurisprudence. The petitioner cannot seek an adjudication on the sufficiency or reliability of the prosecution evidence at the very threshold, when the investigation has yielded a 32 dying declaration, an independent eyewitness account and scientific evidence lending prima facie support to the prosecution story. 19. Thus, the contention that the petitioner has been illegally taken into custody solely on the basis of the dying declaration is equally misconceived. The factual narrative unmistakably demonstrates that the arrest is not predicated upon the dying declaration alone. It rests upon a cumulative body of incriminating material collected during investigation. The submission, therefore, is factually erroneous and legally unsustainable. 20. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at hand, the only course open to the petitioner is to establish his innocence in the crucible of a full-fledged trial. This Court finds neither legal infirmity nor abuse of the process of law warranting interference at this nascent stage. The petition, being devoid of merit, deserves to be rejected. Accordingly, stands dismissed. 33 Pending applications if any, also stand disposed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ