Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.
1
CGHC010280192022
2026:CGHC:30584-DB
NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRMP No. 1479 of 2022 1 - Vijay Dewangan S/o Kheduram Dewangan Aged About 59 Years R/o Mohandipath, P.S. Arjunda, District - Balod (C.G.) 2 - Nandani Dewangan W/o Vijay Dewangan Aged About 54 Years R/o Mohandipath, P.S. Arjunda, District - Balod (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Station Arjunda, District - Balod (C.G.) 2 - Xyz Nill
... Respondent(s) (cause title taken from CIS) For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Anmol Gupta, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Ms. Anusha Naik, Dy. Govt. Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon’ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board Per
Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
20 .07.2026
1. Heard Mr. Anmol Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Ms. Anusha Naik, Dy. Govt. Advocate appearing for the State/ respondent. SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Digitally signed by SAGRIKA AGRAWAL Date: 2026.07.21 10:42:09 +0530
2
2. The petitioner has filed the present CrMP under Section 482 of CrPC, and prayed for the following reliefs:-
“It is therefore prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the charge sheet dated 21.05.2022 for the offence registration under Section 376, 506-B, 323, 34 of IPC, in the interest of justice.”
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the victim, who was married in the year 2000 and had two children, allegedly left her matrimonial home due to harassment by her husband and started residing with her younger brother. Thereafter, in 2014, she along with her children allegedly began living at the house of petitioner No. 1, Vijay Dewangan, where she worked in his factory and household. It is alleged that petitioner No. 1 established physical relations with her against her will by threatening to implicate her in a false case and continued to sexually exploit her. The prosecution further alleges that on 23.10.2021, all the petitioners wrongfully confined the victim, tied her hands and legs, assaulted and threatened her not to disclose the alleged relationship, and on the following day retained her children while she was sent back to her parental home. On the basis of her written complaint dated 05.05.2022, FIR No. 70/2022 was registered at Police Station Arjunda, District Balod, for offences under Sections 376, 506-B, 323 and 34 of the IPC, and after investigation, a charge-sheet was filed culminating in Sessions Trial No. 28/2022 before the Sessions Judge, Balod.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned prosecution is a clear abuse of the process of law and is liable to be
3 quashed as the allegations made in the FIR and the charge-sheet do not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences punishable under Sections 376, 506-B, 323 and 34 of the IPC. It is further submitted that the FIR has been lodged after an unexplained delay of about two years, which seriously affects the credibility of the prosecution case.
Learned counsel further contends that the affidavits executed by the victim's son and daughter clearly reveal that the victim had been caught committing theft at the petitioners' house, following which her father and brother were called and she was taken back to her parental home, thereby indicating that the present criminal case is a counterblast to the said incident and has been maliciously instituted to falsely implicate the petitioners. It is also argued that petitioner No. 2, being a woman, cannot be prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 376 of the IPC in the facts of the present case, and therefore, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioners would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court and deserves to be quashed. 5. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and submits that the impugned FIR and the consequent charge-sheet have been registered and filed strictly in accordance with law after a fair and proper investigation. It is contended that the written complaint of the victim discloses the commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sections 376, 506-B, 323 and 34 of the IPC, whereupon the police, being duty-bound under Section 154 Cr.P.C. During investigation, the statements of the victim under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded, her medical examination was conducted, and sufficient prima facie material was
4 collected establishing the involvement of the petitioners, on the basis of which the charge-sheet came to be filed. It is further submitted that the grounds raised by the petitioners pertain to their defence, which cannot be examined in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and are matters to be adjudicated during trial. Placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, it is argued that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases, and that at the stage of quashment the Court cannot appreciate the evidence or test the truthfulness of the allegations. Since the allegations in the FIR and the material collected during investigation clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offences and make out a prima facie case against the petitioners, no ground for quashing the FIR or charge-sheet is made out, and the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
It is a settled principle of law that where the FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, the investigating agency is duty-bound to conduct a fair and complete investigation and the High Court, in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction, ought not to stifle a legitimate prosecution at its inception. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned FIR and document annexed with the petition. 7. The legal position on the issue of quashing of charge sheet is well- settled that the jurisdiction to quash a complaint, FIR or a charge-sheet should be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases and Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the investigations of cognizable offences. However, where the allegations made in the FIR
5 or the complaint even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, the FIR or the charge-sheet may be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 528 of BNSS/482 of the Cr.P.C.
8. In Neharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315, the Apex Court has observed that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the Court cannot inquire about the reliability, genuineness, or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint. The power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of the B.N.S.S.) is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the Court to be cautious. The Apex Court has emphasized that though the Court has the power to quash the FIR in suitable cases, the Court, when it exercises power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.), only has to consider whether or not the allegations of FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and is not required to consider the case on merit.
Further, while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. (now 528 of B.N.S.S.) , final conclusions are as under:-
“i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation
6 into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non- interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;
7 xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.
Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer
may
file
an
appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur
8 (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim
order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim
order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in
9 passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/ disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim
order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by
“no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term
“no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”
9. Very recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (Criminal Appeal
10 No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025), while reiterating the settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction for quashing criminal proceedings, has once again emphasized that the jurisdiction vested in the High Court is extraordinary in nature and is required to be exercised with great caution, circumspection and only in exceptional circumstances. 10. From a perusal of the impugned FIR (Annexure-P/1), it is evident that the victim has made specific, detailed and categorical allegations against petitioner No. 1, Vijay Dewangan, and petitioner No. 2, Nandani Dewangan. The FIR discloses that the victim, after leaving her matrimonial home due to alleged harassment by her husband, started residing with her children at the house of petitioner No. 1 in the year 2014, where she worked in his factory as well as in his household. It is specifically alleged that on 11.01.2020, petitioner No. 1, by threatening to implicate her in a false theft case, forcibly established physical relations with her against her will and thereafter repeatedly subjected her to sexual intercourse by extending threats to her life. The FIR further alleges that on 23.10.2021, petitioner No. 2, on the pretext that her child was unwell, called the victim to the house, where both the petitioners took her to an upstairs room, tied her hands and legs, snatched her mobile phone, assaulted her with hands and a stick, and threatened her with dire consequences if she disclosed the alleged physical relationship.
It is further alleged that the petitioners kept her two children with them, sent the victim back to her parental home after allegedly misleading her father and brother, and retained her personal documents, including her Aadhaar Card, PAN Card and passbook. The FIR also specifically attributes active participation and assistance on
11 the part of petitioner No. 2 in the alleged acts committed by petitioner No. 1. Thus, the allegations contained in the impugned FIR, on their face, prima facie disclose the commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sections 376, 506-B, 323 and 34 of the IPC, warranting registration of the crime and investigation, and at this stage, the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations is a matter to be determined during trial and not in proceedings seeking quashment of the FIR. 11. After having gone through the allegations made in the impugned FIR, it cannot be said that no offence prima facie is disclosed against the petitioners, as the FIR contains specific allegations that petitioner No. 1 repeatedly committed forcible sexual intercourse with the victim by threatening to implicate her in a false theft case, and that both the petitioners wrongfully confined, assaulted and criminally intimidated her in furtherance of their common intention. The allegations, if taken at their face value, clearly disclose the commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sections 376, 506-B, 323 and 34 of the IPC. At this stage, the defence raised by the petitioners, including the plea of false implication, delay in lodging the FIR or reliance upon affidavits allegedly executed by the children of the victim, cannot be examined in proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as the Court is only required to ascertain whether the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclose the commission of an offence.
In the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and Pradeep Kumar Kesharwani (supra) and other settled principles governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
12 Cr.P.C., we do not find any good ground for interference, as it cannot be said that no prima facie offence is made out against the petitioners. 12. Accordingly, the instant petition is dismissed. The learned trial Court is
directed to make all endeavour to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
13. The interim relief granted earlier stands vacated.
Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice sagrika