RSA-2498-2026 (O&M) [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RSA-2498-2026 (O&M) Date of decision: 10.07.2026 Randhir Singh ...Appellant Versus Shan) and others ...Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Present: Mr. Rose Gupta, Advocate for the appellant. **** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The plain)ff is in Regular Second Appeal against the concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Hisar dated 15.10.2019, and learned Addi)onal District Judge, Hisar dated 24.03.2026, whereby his suit for possession by way of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 09.07.1996 has been dismissed. 2. The plain)ff pleaded that Hari Kishan, owner of the suit land measuring 9 kanals 19 marlas, had executed a registered General Power of A?orney dated 27.05.1996 in favour of Shamsher Singh, who allegedly entered into an agreement to sell dated 09.07.1996 in favour of the plain)ff a@er receiving the en)re sale considera)on of ₹1,25,000/- and delivering possession. According to the plain)ff, the agreement s)pulated that the sale deed could be executed at any )me a@er giving ten days' no)ce. It was further pleaded that a@er the deaths of Hari Kishan and Shamsher Singh, legal no)ce dated 19.08.2015 was served upon the legal representa)ves of Hari Kishan, but they refused to execute the sale deed, compelling ins)tu)on of the present suit. 3. The defendants denied execu)on of the General Power of A?orney as well as the agreement to sell. They asserted that Hari Kishan YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-2498-2026 (O&M) [2] never intended to alienate the property, that Shamsher Singh was merely a distant cul)vator and cousin of the plain)ff, that the alleged agreement was forged and fabricated, and that the suit suffered from unexplained delay and laches. 4. Both the Courts below, upon apprecia)on of oral and documentary evidence, concurrently held that although the registered General Power of A?orney could be accepted to have been executed, the agreement to sell itself had not been proved in accordance with law and, in any event, the plain)ff was guilty of unexplained and extraordinary delay dis-en)tling him to the discre)onary relief of specific performance. Consequently, the suit and the appeal were dismissed. 5. Assailing the concurrent findings, learned counsel for the appellant contends that once execu)on of the registered General Power of A?orney stood proved and there was no prescribed date for execu)on of the sale deed, limita)on commenced only a@er refusal by the defendants in the year 2015. It is argued that both the Courts below erred in trea)ng the suit as suffering from delay and in discarding the agreement merely because it was executed on plain paper. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have perused the record. 7. It is now well se?led that the jurisdic)on of this Court under Sec)on 100 CPC is confined to substan)al ques)ons of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by two Courts cannot be interfered with merely because another view is possible. Interference is warranted only when the findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, founded upon misreading of material evidence or suffering from patent illegality. 8. Even if it is assumed that the General Power of A?orney dated 27.05.1996 stood duly proved, that by itself does not establish the YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-2498-2026 (O&M) [3] execu)on of the subsequent agreement to sell. The plain)ff was independently required to prove that the agreement dated 09.07.1996 was voluntarily executed a@er receipt of considera)on and with inten)on to transfer ownership. 9. The first appellate Court has exhaus)vely examined the evidence and no)ced several circumstances crea)ng serious doubt regarding the genuineness of the agreement. It found that the agreement was executed on plain papers without even minimum stamp duty; no scribe was men)oned or examined; the witnesses failed to prove passing of en)re sale considera)on; no independent evidence established delivery or con)nua)on of possession; the names of witnesses appeared to have been inserted separately; the plain)ff himself was unable to explain where and in whose presence the document was dra@ed; and despite allegedly paying en)re considera)on, no a?empt whatsoever was made for nearly two decades to obtain execu)on of the sale deed. 10. These findings are based upon apprecia)on of evidence and cannot be characterised as either perverse or contrary to record. 11. Equally significant is the conduct of the plain)ff. The agreement is alleged to have been executed on 09.07.1996 a@er payment of the en)re sale considera)on. Hari Kishan died in 1999. Shamsher Singh also died in 2011. Yet, the plain)ff remained completely inac)ve un)l 2015. 12. Although limita)on may technically commence from refusal, where no specific date is fixed, mere ins)tu)on of a suit within limita)on does not automa)cally en)tle a plain)ff to a decree for specific performance. Specific performance has always been an equitable and discre)onary remedy. The Court is required to examine the en)re conduct of the plain)ff. 13. The Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, (1997) 3 YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-2498-2026 (O&M) [4] SCC 1 held that even where limita)on has not expired, extraordinary delay coupled with inac)on may itself cons)tute sufficient ground for refusing specific performance. Likewise, in Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, (2011) 12 SCC 18, it was reiterated that Courts cannot ignore prolonged inac)on merely because the suit falls within limita)on. 14. In the present case, the plain)ff did not issue any no)ce during the life)me of Hari Kishan. Even a@er Hari Kishan's death, he remained silent. Even a@er the death of the alleged a?orney in 2011, he again remained inac)ve for almost four years. Such prolonged silence is wholly inconsistent with the conduct expected from a person, who claims to have already paid the en)re sale considera)on decades earlier. The conduct, therefore, substan)ally weakens the plain)ff's plea of con)nuous readiness and willingness. 15. S)ll further, Sec)on 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act casts a mandatory obliga)on upon the plain)ff to establish con)nuous readiness and willingness throughout. The requirement is not merely financial capacity but con)nuous conduct demonstra)ng genuine inten)on to complete the transac)on. The Supreme Court in Azhar Sultana v. B. Rajamani, (2009) 17 SCC 27; and Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan, (2005) 6 SCC 243 has consistently held that unexplained inac)on over long periods nega)ves readiness and willingness. 16. The plain)ff's solitary act of serving a no)ce a@er almost nineteen years cannot erase his prolonged inac)on preceding it. 17. Not only above, the first appellate Court has further no)ced inconsistencies between the revenue record, the alleged possession, the status of Shamsher Singh as gair Morusi, absence of any revenue entry reflec)ng delivery of possession, and absence of independent witnesses from the village despite their availability. The evidence led by PW2 and YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document RSA-2498-2026 (O&M) [5] PW3 also falls short of proving payment of considera)on and voluntary execu)on of the agreement. 18. All these are pure findings of fact recorded a@er apprecia)on of evidence and do not suffer from perversity. 19. Even assuming some evidence existed in support of execu)on of the agreement, grant of specific performance is not automa)c. The Court exercises equitable discre)on. Where the plain)ff's conduct is inequitable, where unexplained delay exists, where the transac)on itself appears doubOul, or where the evidence does not inspire confidence, refusal of specific performance cannot be faulted. 20. The appellant has been unable to convince this court that any material evidence has been ignored, any statutory provision has been misconstrued or any se?led principle of law has been violated by either of the Courts below. 21. The findings recorded are based upon proper apprecia)on of evidence and represent one possible and plausible view of the ma?er. No substan)al ques)on of law, therefore, arises for considera)on under Sec)on 100 CPC. 22. Consequently, finding no merit in the present Regular Second Appeal and no substan)al ques)on of law arising for considera)on, the appeal is dismissed. 23. Pending applica)on(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. 10.07.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No YOGESH MEHTA 2026.07.10 17:43 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document