M/L.17. July 13, 2026. MNS. SA No. 44 of 2026 + CAN 1 of 2026 Sri Kishore Kumar Khaitan and another Vs. Sri Praveen Kumar Singh Mr. Aniruddha Mitra, Sr. Adv., Mr. Ishaan Saha, Mr. Sayan Banerjee, Advs. … for the appellants. Mr. Kumar Jyoti Tewari, Sr. Adv., Ms. Rajlakshmi Ghatak, Mr. Amrit Sinha, Mr. Aniruddha Tewari, Advs. …for the respondent. 1. The present challenge has been preferred against a judgment of affirmance, whereby both the courts below decreed the suit for declaration of tenancy rights as well as delivery possession in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. 2. Learned senior counsel appearing for the defendants/appellants argues that simultaneously with the said declaratory suit, another suit was filed by the appellants seeking cancellation of a purported tenancy document dated April 17, 1998, which was the plinth of the plaint case in the present litigation. However, the said suit is still pending. 3. Learned senior counsel argues that ample evidence was produced by the defendants/appellants in the courts below, including air tickets, boarding passes and evidence 2 of a hotel personnel of Delhi, to show that the defendant/appellant no. 1 was in Delhi at the relevant point of time, when the tenancy agreement was allegedly executed by him. 4. From the document-in-question, being Exhibit- 1 in the suit, it transpires that the same was allegedly executed on April 17, 1998. However, from the boarding pass in the name of the defendant/appellant no. 1 on the relevant date, it appears that the defendant could not have been in Kolkata at least before 9.30 am on the said date; whereas the plaint case is that the document was executed sometime between 9 to 9.30 am in Howrah. 5. It is submitted that it would be impossible for the plaintiff/respondent to be present in Howrah at the relevant point of time, which belies the very existence of the document. 6. Secondly, learned counsel places reliance on Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 to argue that no consideration passed between the parties, since there is no independent receipt of payment of such consideration and/or any rent receipt produced on behalf of the plaintiff/respondent to substantiate the claim of tenancy, which vitiates the purported tenancy agreement. 7. Even otherwise, it is submitted that the purported rent fixed by the disputed document, being Exhibit-1, is grossly inadequate in view of the locality of the tenanted premises and the measurement of the premises, which is about 7,000 square feet. 3 8. It is next argued on behalf of the appellants that the clear case of the defendants/appellants was that the plaintiff/respondent was given the task of renovation of the premises-in-question, taking undue advantage of which the plaintiff claimed tenancy in respect thereof. 9. However, in the absence of any independent rent receipt and/or single paper to show the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the suit premises, both the courts below committed a patent perversity in declaring the tenancy rights of the plaintiff on the basis of Exhibit-1. 10. Learned senior counsel further argues that the disputed document was purportedly executed in the letterhead of one Khaitan Paper Machine Limited. However, the said concern was never the owner of the suit premises. 11. Learned senior counsel takes the court through the findings arrived at by the courts below and argues that the first appellate court erroneously relied on a photocopy of a purported document of delivery of possession on the letterhead of the said Khaitan Paper Machine Limited, also acknowledging the receipt of Rs.2,00,000/- (Exhibit-39) by one Shivanand Mishra, the admitted previous tenant of the suit property. However, since Shivanand Mishra himself, in his compromise petition, signed along with the plaintiff, admitted to have vacated the premises of his own, there arose no question of payment of Rs.2,00,000/- by him. 12. Furthermore, it is argued that in the event a receipt was given for a payment made by the plaintiff to 4 Shivanand Mishra and possession was delivered by Shivanand Mishra to the plaintiff, the original of such receipt would, under normal circumstances, be in the custody of said Shivanand Mishra. 13. It is surprising, learned senior counsel submits, that such purported receipt, only a photocopy of which was produced in the courts below, was signed in the letterhead of the said Khaitan Paper Machine Limited, the alleged grantor of the receipt. 14. Learned senior counsel for the appellants also places reliance on an order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a Special Leave Petition, bearing SLP (Civil) No. 11469 of 2025, renumbered as Civil Appeal 1101 of 2026, which went up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in connection with an order obtained by the plaintiff/respondent for restoration of his purported possession in respect of the suit premises during pendency of the suit. 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while overturning such order of restoration of possession, made certain categorical observations casting serious doubts on the veracity of the plaint case. 16. Certain issues were flagged by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, including the non-compliance of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as well as the consideration for the alleged tenancy being inadequate, keeping in view the large area of the suit premises. 5 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the question of admissibility in evidence and validity of the lease deed (Exhibit 1) had to be decided in the suit. 18. However, such salient features of the case were given a total go-bye by the learned trial Judge as well as the learned first appellate Judge while deciding the suit against the appellants. 19. Thus, it is argued that several questions of law are involved inasmuch as both the courts below erred in law in decreeing the suit. 20. We find from a perusal of the judgments of the courts below that both the courts appreciated the evidence elaborately and arrived at their own findings on the basis thereof. 21. Insofar as the plinth of the defence case is concerned, being that the defendant/appellant no. 1 was in Delhi at the relevant point of time when Exhibit-1 (the lease deed) was allegedly signed, we find several discrepancies in such evidence having been pointed out by the courts below. For example, the air ticket of the defendant/appellant no. 1 was of a different flight than that in respect of which the boarding pass was produced in evidence. Even as per the boarding pass, the defendant/appellant no. 1 was to arrive at Kolkata on April 17, 1998, the day of execution of Exhibit-1, at around 9.30 am. 22. Thus, since the plaintiff’s witnesses had stated that the document was signed at around 9- 9.30 am, the 6 execution of the lease deed cannot be ruled out altogether. Some amount of deviation and discrepancy in oral evidence is permissible and, rather than belying the authenticity of the evidence, minor discrepancies rather prove that the witness was being truthful. 23. There is always a margin of error if the actual facts are stated by a witness, as opposed to a fool-proof deposition based on prior preparation. Thus, going by the approximate time when the appellant no. 1 should have reached Kolkata as per the boarding pass, his signing the deed is not altogether improbable. 24. More importantly, a mutually destructive case in that regard was made out by the defendants themselves insofar as a hotel personnel from Delhi produced documents and adduced evidence to the effect that the defendant/appellant no. 1 had left his hotel in Delhi on the relevant date at around 2 pm; whereas the boarding pass of the defendant no. 1 produced by himself belied such case, as per which he arrived at Calcutta at 9.30 am, which would be impossible. 25. Thus, the defendants demolished their own case with regard to the defendant no. 1 being in Delhi at the relevant point of time, which was the cardinal premise of the defence case vis-a-vis Exhibit-1. 26. The other argument, that Exhibit-1 was not signed by the plaintiff but only by defendant/appellant no. 1 and witnesses, is neither here nor there. 7 27. It is not mandatory in law, in the event a tenancy is granted in writing in the first person by the landlord, for the signature of the tenant to be depicted in the deed. 28. Exhibit-1 indicates that the signature of defendant/appellant no. 1 was there, along with those of other witnesses. The defendant/appellant no. 1 does not dispute the signature but seeks to make out a case that such signature was obtained on the blank letterhead of a company where the defendant/appellant no. 1 is also a functionary, which was later converted to a tenancy agreement. 29. However, since both the courts below elaborately discussed and appreciated the evidence in that regard at length in order to arrive at concurrent findings, the re- appreciation of evidence and the factual aspects involved, at the second appellate stage, is not permissible. 30. Indeed, under Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872, the inadequacy of consideration may be relevant. However, such relevance is in regard to the limited context of the consent of the promisor being freely given. The case of the defendants/appellants is not that the consent of the defendant/appellant no. 1 was obtained by force, but that of misrepresentation and fraud being allegedly practiced by the plaintiff, by obtaining the signature of the defendant/appellant no. 1 on a blank paper and later on converted it to a tenancy agreement. Hence, the provisions of Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872 are not squarely applicable. 8 31. Insofar as Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is concerned, if a lease of immoveable property is executed from year to year or for any term exceeding one year, the same can be made only by a registered instrument. Other leases of immovable property, as per the provision of the said Section, may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement, accompanied by delivery of possession. 32. It is settled law that even if a registered agreement is not produced, in the event the other parameters required in law to create a tenancy are satisfied, the jural relationship would then be treated to a monthly tenancy. 33. In the present case, Exhibit-1 itself evidences not only the payment of consideration but also the handing over of possession. Since the said document itself has been believed by both the courts below upon consideration of the rebuttal evidence of the defendants, there is no scope of invoking non-compliance of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in the circumstances of the present case. 34. The order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which has been relied on by the defendants/appellants was in the context of an interlocutory proceeding, where the respondent got an order of restoration of possession during pendency of the suit. 35. It is trite law that orders passed, even if by the topmost court of the country, in the context of interlocutory proceedings, are tentative in nature and cannot be binding 9 at the stage of final hearing of the suit itself, which is conducted by trial on evidence. 36. That apart, there are comments galore in the said order itself qualifying most of the observations made therein with the expression “prima facie”, which itself indicates that the said observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were arrived at only for the purpose of deciding the interlocutory application for restoration of possession and not meant to be conclusive insofar as the suit was concerned. The only finding in the said order in respect of the suit was that the genuineness of Exhibit-1, which was seriously disputed by the defendants, its admissibility in evidence and validity were to be decided in the suit. 37. Both the courts below extensively decided such issue upon adverting to the materials on record and upon such appreciation of the evidence, came to a particular conclusion which is not altogether improbable. 38. Thus, the test of perversity is not met in the present case. There cannot be a re-appreciation of evidence by the second appellate court if there are concurrent findings of fact, both the trial court as well as the first appellate court, even if in the opinion of the second appellate court, a different view could be possible on the basis of the materials on record. 39. Looking at the matter from such perspective as well, we do not find any arguable substantial question law having been raised at all in the present appeal. 10 40. In view of the above findings, SA No. 44 of 2026 is dismissed under Order XLI Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 41. Consequentially, CAN 1 of 2026 stands disposed of as well. 42. There will be no order as to costs. 43. Urgent certified copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with the requisite formalities. (Supratim Bhattacharya, J.) (Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)